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The purpose of this research project is to help develop the disclosure literature in 
relation to the banking sector, which is currently sparse due to the limited empirical 
research studies on the extent of banking disclosure and its relationship with 
corporate-specific attributes. Specifically, this study seeks to accomplish four main 
objectives. One of the main objectives is to measure the extent of voluntary 
disclosure provided in the annual reports of Libyan commercial banks, over the 
period 2006 to 2011.  
The second objective is to examine if there has been any significant improvement 
in the levels of voluntary information disclosure provided in the annual reports. 
Thirdly, the study investigates whether there is any significant association between 
seven commercial bank-specific attributes (i.e. age of bank, size of bank, bank 
liquidity position, profitability, government ownership, foreign ownership, and 
listing status) and the extent of voluntary disclosure. Finally, this study explores the 
views and perceptions of Libyan commercial ban s’ annual report preparers related 
to the current mandatory financial reporting and voluntary disclosure practice 
issues.  
This study uses a self-constructed, un-weighted disclosure index, comprising of 63 
information items, to measure the extent of voluntary disclosure in 54 annual 
reports of listed and unlisted commercial banks, over a six-year reporting period. 
The research data were analysed using content, descriptive and multiple regression 
analyses. 
Overall, the results show that the extent of voluntary disclosure in the Libyan 
commercial ban s’ annual reports is low, with an average of 38%, however there 
was an improvement in the general level of voluntary disclosure and its categories 
over a six-year period. The multiple regression results indicate that commercial 
bank size and listing status are significant independent variables in explaining 
variation in annual voluntary disclosure, while other independent variables are 
found to be insignificantly associated with the extent of voluntary disclosure.
Abstract 
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Chapter One 
 
Introduction to the Research 
 
 
1.1 Introduction   
The issue of corporate reporting disclosure behaviour is influenced not only by 
environmental factors, but also by corporate-specific attributes (e.g. firm age, firm size, 
profitability, liquidity, government ownership, foreign ownership, and listing status); 
this has attracted many academic researchers in several countries to investigate the 
impact of corporate attributes on the extent of different disclosure levels (i.e. 
mandatory, voluntary or aggregate disclosure). 
A recent review of the academic disclosure literature has revealed that accounting 
researchers in both developing and developed countries have conducted a large number 
of empirical studies on the subject of voluntary disclosure practices and its association 
with corporate characteristics, but the majority of these studies have focused on non-
financial companies. To date, less attention has been paid by academic researchers to 
voluntary disclosure practices by financial institutions in general, and banking 
disclosure practices in particular, despite the fact that the banking sector plays a major 
role in economic growth in a country.  
Moreover, there is very little empirical evidence about the impact of commercial bank-
specific characteristics such as size, age, listing status, profitability, liquidity position, 
foreign ownership and government ownership, on the extent of annual information 
voluntarily disclosed. 
Providing inadequate information in the annual reports has many consequences, the 
main one of which is to reduce the confidence of public users in the commercial 
banking system, and make them less willing to invest in the development of a country. 
Thus, the purpose of this study is to help develop the disclosure literature in relation to 
the commercial banking sector, which is currently sparse, due to the limited empirical 
research on the extent of banking disclosure. The intention is to examine the extent of 
the current voluntary disclosure practices by listed and unlisted commercial banking 
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organisations and their association with the bank characteristics, and to do this with 
particular reference to Libya, as a developing country. 
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows: Section 1.2 provides the research 
aim and objectives. Section 1.3 presents the research questions. Section 1.4 outlines the 
background and motivation for the research. Section 1.5 explains the scope of the 
research and definition of terms. Section 1.6 discusses the importance and contribution 
of the research. Section 1.7 presents a brief outline of the research methodology and 
methods. Finally, Section 1.8 indicates how the study is to be organised. 
 
1.2 Research Aim and Objectives  
The principal aim of this research is to evaluate to what extent the Libyan listed and 
unlisted commercial banks have provided voluntary information disclosure in their 
annual reports. The research is also intended to determine whether the extent of 
voluntary information disclosure is associated with commercial bank-specific 
characteristics. In order to achieve this principal aim the following objectives have been 
set: 
Objective 1: To measure the extent of voluntary disclosure provided in the annual 
reports of Libyan listed and unlisted commercial banks over the period of time from 
2006 to 2011.   
 Objective 2: To examine whether there has been any significant improvement in the 
levels of voluntary disclosure provided in the annual reports of Libyan listed and 
unlisted commercial banks over the period of the study.  
Objective 3: To investigate whether there is any significant association between seven 
commercial bank-specific attributes (i.e. age of bank, size of bank, bank liquidity 
position, profitability, government ownership, foreign ownership, and listing status) and 
the extent of voluntary disclosure in the annual reports over the period of the study.  
Objective 4: To explore the views and perceptions of Libyan commercial ban s’ annual 
reports preparers related to the current mandatory financial reporting and voluntary 
disclosure issues.  
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1.3 Research Questions  
In particular, this study seeks to provide answers to the following research questions:  
1. To what extent have Libyan listed and unlisted commercial banks voluntarily 
disclosed information in their annual reports during the period between 2006 
and 2011? 
2. Has there been any significant improvement in the extent of overall voluntary 
information disclosures in the published annual reports of Libyan listed and 
unlisted commercial banks over the period of the study?  
3. Is there any association between the extent of voluntary information disclosure 
by Libyan listed and unlisted commercial banks and each of the bank attributes 
(age of bank, size of bank, bank liquidity position, profitability, government 
ownership, foreign ownership, and listing status)?  
4. What are the views and perceptions of Libyan commercial ban s’ annual 
reports preparers related to the current mandatory financial reporting and 
voluntary disclosure issues? 
 
1.4 The Background and Motivation for the Research   
In today’s globalised world, financial and non-financial information disclosure is 
increasing in importance for many businesses, since their international and national 
stakeholders use such information as a basis on which to make economic decisions. 
Financial accounting theory has identified that the main objective of corporate financial 
reports is to provide material and useful information to a wide range of users for use in 
decision-making processes (Harahap, 2003).  
The corporate annual report has been found to be the most important source of financial 
and non-financial information for many interested parties such as shareholders, 
creditors, suppliers, financial analysts, management, employees and government 
agencies (e.g. see Abu-Nasser and Rutherford, 1996; Al-Razeen and Karbhari, 2004). 
Financial reporting in banking, in particular, has been accorded greater importance by 
many international organisations, such as the International Accounting Standards Board 
(IASB), which has established unique accounting standards for banks. For example, 
IAS 30 “Disclosure in the Financial Statements of Banks and Similar Financial 
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Institutions”, IAS 32 “Financial Instruments: Disclosure and Presentation”, and IAS 
39 “Financial Instruments: Recognition and Measurement” (superseded by IFRS 7 
“Financial Instruments: Disclosure” on 18th August 2005, effective 1 January 2007).   
Additionally, the Basel Committee on Bank Supervision (Basel Committee) has issued 
a number of papers and guidance notes concerning disclosures in the banking sector. 
For example, in September 1998, it published a report entitled “Enhancing Bank 
Transparency”, which gives general guidance to banking supervisors and regulators on 
regulatory frameworks for public disclosure and supervisory reporting, and to the 
banking sector on core disclosures that have to be provided to the public.  
The Basel Committee’s paper also recommends that banks provide sufficient 
information in their financial reports to the public in order to facilitate market 
participants’ assessment of them. Further, the paper identifies six broad categories of 
information that are required as means of providing users of the financial statements 
with a basic understanding of a ban ’s activities and the ris s it faces. These categories 
are: 
• Financial performance; 
• Financial position (including capital, solvency and liquidity); 
• Ris  management strategies and practices; 
• Ris  exposures (including credit ris , mar et ris , liquidity ris , and operational, legal 
and other risks); 
•  ccounting policies; and 
• Basic business, management and corporate governance information. 
Also in June 1999, the Committee released a consultative paper entitled “A New Capital 
Adequacy Framework”, which emphasised the need for banks to disclose information 
on their accounting policies, including policies for valuation of assets and liabilities, 
their risk management policies, their risk profiles and their capital components. This 
information is crucial in enabling financial statements users to assess and compare the 
characteristics and adequacy of an institution’s capital (Basel Committee on Ban ing 
Supervision, 2000).  
In the context of the banking disclosures, the Basel Committee issued a further paper in 
July 1999, called “Sound Practices for Loan Accounting and Disclosure”. This paper 
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provides guidance on accounting and disclosure practices for banks. Additionally, in 
July 1999, the Committee published a consultative paper entitled “Best Practices for 
Credit Risk Disclosure”, which offers guidance on best practices for public disclosure 
of credit risk in the banking sector and discusses related supervisory needs. Basically, 
the objective of the paper was to encourage the banking industry to provide market 
participants and the interested public with the information they need to make 
meaningful assessments of a ban ’s credit ris  profile.  
The paper also identified five broad areas in which banks should provide more detailed 
disclosures, these being: accounting policies and practices, credit risk management, 
credit exposures, credit quality, and earnings. Furthermore, the Basel Committee 
released qualitative and quantitative disclosures in the areas of the structure of capital, 
risk exposures, and capital adequacy that should be made by the banking industry in 
order to advance the role of market discipline in promoting bank capital adequacy (see 
the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2000).  
In addition to the above, the amount of information disclosed by banks has become a 
more serious issue in recent times for international financial institutions, such as the 
World Bank (WB) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). These international 
organisations have recommended the banking sector operations in developed and 
developing countries to expand the extent of their information disclosures further than 
required by statute.  
The main reason for requiring banks to provide sufficient information in their published 
annual reports is to enable market participants to evaluate the ban s’ activities and risk 
management practices. “Disclosure is particularly important in the banking industry, 
since banks are generally viewed as being opaque to outsiders” (Hirtle, 2007, p. 24).  
The annual report published by a commercial bank is considered an important means of 
communicating financial and non-financial information between the bank and external 
parties. Therefore, the provision of accurate qualitative and quantitative information in 
the commercial ban s’ annual reports about their financial position and performance to 
financial market participants and other interested users will help such recipients to make 
wise economic decisions. More precisely, Tadesse (2006) emphasises that commercial 
banking systems become less vulnerable to crisis if they are supported by financial 
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reporting regimes characterised by (i) more comprehensive disclosure (ii) more timely 
financial reporting (iii) more informative reporting, and (iv) more credible financial 
information disclosure.  
The disclosure practices in the corporate annual reports, both mandatory and voluntary, 
may appear similar from country to country, but there are in fact differences among 
countries, caused by a variety of political and legal circumstances such as culture, 
accounting systems, economic systems, tax regulations, accounting professionals, and 
the nature of the individual countries’ capital mar ets (I SB, 2004; Alexander et al., 
2005; Nobes and Parker, 2006).  
Different corporate financial reporting and disclosure practices often come from the 
different social, economic and legal systems that prevail within countries (Cairns, 1988; 
Kettunen, 1993). Furthermore, different countries have in mind the information needs of 
external users when setting national disclosure requirements (IASB, 2004).  
The issue of corporate reporting disclosure behaviour is influenced not only by 
environmental factors but also by corporate attributes (e.g. firm age, firm size, 
profitability, liquidity, listing status, auditor-types, government ownership, and foreign 
ownership), and accounting researchers in several countries have been interested in 
investigating the influence of corporate attributes on the disclosure levels. However, to 
date, the number of academic studies exploring financial reporting and disclosure 
practices by banking sector, in both advanced and developing countries, remains low 
compared with other industry sectors. 
A few of the studies that have been undertaken in this area have concentrated on 
commercial ban s’ voluntary disclosure practices and their determinants (Kahl and 
Belkaoui, 1981; Hossain and Taylor, 2007; Hossain and Reaz, 2007; Hooi, 2007). In 
fact, most of these research studies have only considered commercial banking voluntary 
disclosure practices for one year (cross-sectional), and as far as the researcher is aware, 
no longitudinal study has been conducted to examine the development of listed and 
unlisted commercial banking voluntary disclosure practices over a period of time. 
Most prior empirical studies have focused on voluntary disclosure practices by listed 
banking companies. Furthermore, the influential factors that are expected to determine 
the amount of information disclosure in the annual reports of listed and unlisted 
7 
 
commercial banks have not been adequately addressed in the academic disclosure 
literature. Accordingly, it is believed that the outcome of this research will help fill this 
gap in the academic disclosure literature. The study considers the voluntary disclosure 
practices by listed and unlisted commercial banks in Libya and their associations with 
commercial ban s’ characteristics, a dimension that has not been explored in studies to 
date. 
Libya, as a developing country with a socialist-oriented economy, has started to 
privatise a number of state-owned enterprises, commercial banks included, which have 
been under state control since the 1970s.  However, since the suspension of the United 
Nations (UN) and the United States (US) sanctions in 2003 and 2004 respectively, the 
Libyan privatisation programme has gained momentum, and a number of reforms aimed 
at the opening the country’s economy and attracting foreign investors have been 
introduced by the authorities. These reforms include: structural economic reforms, 
regulatory reforms, monetary policy reforms, and financial and banking sector reforms 
(African Development Bank, 2009). 
In recent years, the Central Bank of Libya (CBL) has taken significant measures to 
attract greater foreign direct investment into the banking sector and to open up the 
sector to international banks. The CBL has enacted legislation permitting foreign banks 
to establish branches in Libya and allowing them to hold up to 50% of the shares of 
some domestic banks. Furthermore, the CBL has also authorised the establishment of 
private domestic commercial banks. As a result of the implementation of the 
privatisation policy in the banking sector, banks have tended to provide additional or 
voluntary disclosure.  
In 2006, the establishment of the Libyan Stock Market (LSM) was announced and 
operations on the LSM began in June of that year - an event that had happened for the 
first time in the history of Libya. Clearly, the efficiency of any stock market depends 
upon the availability of appropriate and accurate information to current investors at low 
transaction costs. In this respect, Aljifri (2008) notes that adequate disclosure by 
corporations helps to ensure the efficiency of capital markets.  
The establishment of the LSM and the continual growth in the private sector are 
generating much public interest in financial disclosure and in the need to increase 
market transparency. Furthermore, changes and developments in the Libyan economic 
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system and business environment are affecting the types of information needed for 
economic decision-making. At present, after the public revolution during 2011, the 
business environment and the investment climate are changing, and will become more 
attractive for local and foreign investments in the financial services sector and other 
sectors. 
1.5 Scope of the Research and Definition of Terms  
The scope of this study is confined to an evaluation of the voluntary information 
disclosure in the annual reports published by listed and unlisted Libyan commercial 
banks. The study confines itself to the annual reports published in the period from 2006 
to 2011. It includes the whole annual report, which normally includes financial 
statements, the board of ban  directors’ report, and other financial and non-financial 
information published by listed and unlisted Libyan commercial banks during that 
period. Additionally, the study evaluates the impact of seven commercial bank-specific 
characteristics on the level of voluntary information disclosure. 
According to Article of 65 of the Banking Law No.1, 2005, the notion of the 
“commercial bank” is that “any company that ordinarily accepts deposits in current 
demand accounts or time deposits, grants loans and credit facilities and engages in other 
such banking activities according to the provisions of paragraph (II) of this article shall 
be considered a commercial ban ”.  A paragraph (II) specifies the activities in which a 
commercial bank engages, as follows: 
1. The cashing of cheques made out to and by customers. 
2. Services relating to documentary credits, documents for collection, and letters of 
credit. 
3. Issuance and management of instruments of payment including monetary 
drawings, financial transfers, payment and credit cards, traveler’s cheques, etc. 
4. Sale and purchase transactions involving monetary market instruments and capital 
market instruments to the credit of the bank or its customers. 
5. The purchase and sale of debt, without or without the right of recourse. 
6. Lease financing operations. 
7. Foreign exchange transactions in spot and forward exchange markets. 
8. The management, coverage, distribution, and transaction of banknote issues. 
9. The cashing of cheques made out to and by customers. 
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10. Services relating to documentary credits, documents for collection, and letters of 
credit. 
11. The provision of investment and other services for investment portfolios, and the 
provision of investment trustee services, including the management and 
investment of funds for a third party. 
12. Management and safekeeping of securities and valuables. 
13. Provision of trustee or financial investor services. 
14. Any other banking activities approved by the Central Bank of Libya. 
 rticle 65 in Law No.1 of 2005 states: “a specialised ban  whose main purpose is to 
finance and grant credit for specific activities, and whose basic activities do not include 
the acceptance of demand deposits, shall not be considered a commercial ban ”.  
Therefore, specialised banks are considered to be outside the scope of this study due to 
the unique nature of their operations. 
The term “voluntary disclosure” has been given more than one definition by previous 
researchers. For example, voluntary disclosure was defined by Meek et al., (1995, p. 
555) thus: “disclosures in excess of requirements-represent free choices on the part of 
company managements to provide accounting and other information deemed relevant to 
the decision needs of users of their annual reports.  For the purposes of their study in 
Kenya, Bara o et al, (2006, p. 114) have defined it as “the discretionary release of 
financial and non-financial information through annual reports and above the mandatory 
requirements”. 
In context of banking voluntary disclosure, Hossain and Taylor (2007, p. 111), 
conducting a study in Bangladesh, have defined voluntary disclosure as “the 
information prepared and released to the public, by firms, which is beyond the level of 
disclosure required to comply with the firms’ legal reporting requirement”. In addition, 
Maingot and Zeghal (2008, p. 231) have given a clear and simple definition as to what 
voluntary disclosure by ban s means: “voluntary disclosure is information provided by 
the ban s that they are not obliged to reveal under some type of regulation”. 
From the above discussion, it appears that there is no one definition of the voluntary 
disclosure that can be adopted in the current study; most prior disclosure studies used 
their own definition of the term “voluntary disclosure”, based on the purpose of their 
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studies and the surrounding disclosure environment.  ccordingly, “voluntary 
disclosure” in this study is used to refer to those items of information that are disclosed 
in the annual reports of Libyan commercial banks and are not assigned in the Banking 
Law N. 1, 2005 or the LSM Law and its regulation. 
1.6 Importance of the Study   
The primary importance of this study lies in its ability to help fill a gap in the financial 
reporting and disclosure literature. This is one of the few empirical studies that attempts 
to test the significance of the relationship between commercial bank-specific 
characteristics and the extent of voluntary information disclosure. It adds to the 
international accounting literature by providing further insight into the relationship 
between certain corporate characteristics and the extent of voluntary disclosure in 
annual reports.  
The empirical findings from this study will provide further insight into factors 
influencing banking voluntary disclosure practices. The current study is also expected to 
will shed light on the commercial ban s’ management motivations behind released 
voluntarily information in their annual reports, which still not have been fully exposed. 
Although the existing academic accounting literature confirms that numerous studies 
have been undertaken on the financial reporting and disclosure practices in both 
developed and developing countries, very few empirical studies have concentrated on 
reporting and disclosure practices in the banking sector. 
In addition, the influential factors that are expected to determine the extent of 
information disclosure in the annual reports of listed and unlisted commercial banks 
have not been adequately addressed in the academic disclosure literature.  
The disclosure literature reveals that the vast majority of previous disclosure studies 
have focused on the disclosure practices in annual reports of non-financial companies 
(Abdul Hamid, 2004; Linsley et al., 2006); the banking sector and other financial 
institutions are excluded from their samples because of the different regulations and 
specific disclosure requirements applied to financial companies when compared with 
non-financial companies, which, in all probability, lead to biased results (Choi; 1973, 
Cooke, 1989b; Raffournier, 1995; Wallace and Naser, 1995; Hossain et al., 1995).  
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Furthermore, almost all financial companies such as commercial banks and insurance 
companies have different business activities, financial characteristics and natures, which 
make them, in practice, not fully comparable with other companies (Hossain et al., 
1995; Hossain and Taylor, 2007; Hassan et al., 2009). Consequently, this provides the 
motivation to expand the body of knowledge in this area of research. 
Specifically, to date, there is very little supporting empirical evidence about the impact 
of commercial bank specific-attributes such as size, age, listing status, profitability, 
liquidity position, government ownership, and foreign ownership on the extent of 
annual voluntary disclosure. However, the empirical evidence from previous studies 
was conflicting and not conclusive. Some of the bank-specific attributes examined in 
the prior studies were found to be significantly associated with the extent of voluntary 
disclosure in one study, while in other studies these were found not to have a significant 
impact on the voluntary disclosure level. 
This study will therefore provide up to date empirical evidence and address the dearth 
of academic literature in the area of banking industry disclosure. Furthermore, in order 
to externally validate the findings of previous empirical studies on the relationship 
between corporate specific-characteristics and the extent of voluntary disclosure levels, 
more empirical studies conducted in different industries are needed, particularly in the 
banking industry (Malone et al., 1993). Hence, empirical findings of the current study 
are expected to have comparative benefits for studies conducted in other sectors.  
In addition, the empirical findings of this updated study will provide significant 
information for commercial banking management, banking regulators, the Central 
Banks, international institutions, government agencies, financial analysts, researchers, 
and potential local and foreign investors, to help them to assess the transparency level 
and the amount of information available from Libyan commercial banks for their 
decision-making processes, especially since there are no enforced accounting and 
auditing standards in the country. 
Also importantly, the findings from this study can make a prevailing contribution to 
improve transparency in the banking sector in developing countries in particular, 
especially those with limited information or lack of financial transparency. 
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Finally, to the best of the researcher’s  nowledge, there is no published empirical study 
that attempted to measure the extent of voluntary disclosure by listed and unlisted 
commercial banks longitudinally to determine whether the level of annual voluntary 
disclosure has improved over the period of time. A study of voluntary disclosure 
practices in the Libyan commercial banking sector over a six-year period will, therefore, 
it goes beyond the previous literature pursuing to provide an understanding of the 
development of voluntary disclosure practices in one of the Arabic and North African 
countries.  
1.7 Overview of the Research Methodology and Methods 
A mixed-methods research methodology is adopted in the current study (i.e. quantitative 
and qualitative methods); each research method is considered suitable for application to 
the particular type of research question. By combining both research techniques within 
the current study, it will help the study provide stronger evidence for a conclusion 
through convergence and validation of results. Choosing an appropriate research 
approach is critical to the success of any research project, and should be driven by the 
research question and the status of knowledge in the field being researched (Elliott and 
Elliott, 2007).  
Given the second objective of this particular study, and the intention to gather data 
across a number of years, a longitudinal research strategy is also adopted, since, as 
noted by Collis and Hussey (2003), such a study enables the researcher to examine 
change processes within a social, economic and political background. The main 
research methods selected to be applied in this study are summarised below. 
1.7.1 Data collection methods 
The scope of this study is confined to an evaluation of the voluntary information 
disclosure in the annual reports published by listed and unlisted Libyan commercial 
banks. The study confines itself to the annual reports published in the period from 2006 
to 2011. The sample covers the annual reports of seven listed and two unlisted Libyan 
commercial banks, whose annual reports were available for the six-year period 2006-
2011. A copy of the six annual reports for the years 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010 and 
2011 was collected from each commercial bank. Finally, the total of annual reports 
analysed were 54. 
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The second phase of data collection in the current study (qualitative data) involved 
conducting a semi-structured, face-to-face interview designed to meet the fourth 
research objective. A semi-structured, face-to-face interview was conducted with the 
annual reports preparers from four Libyan listed and two unlisted commercial banks 
(mainly the directors of the accounting departments or representatives) who are 
involved directly in the preparation of annual reports. The principal purpose of the 
interviews was to obtain accurate and more detailed information from the participants 
about the current mandatory financial reporting and disclosure practices.  
1.7.2 Research method to measure the extent of voluntary disclosure 
Measuring the level of voluntary information disclosure in the annual reports of each 
individual commercial bank for each year involves a two-step process. A brief 
explanation of each step is given below.  
1.7.2.1 Construction of the voluntary disclosure index 
The first step is to construct a disclosure index in order to assess the voluntary 
disclosure level. It is demonstrated in the disclosure literature that a self-constructed 
disclosure index is a widely-used method of collecting data to assess the extent of 
information disclosure in corporate annual reports (e.g. Singhvi and Desai, 1971; 
Buzby, 1975; Barrett, 1976; Kahl and Belkaoui, 1981; Chow and Wong-Boren, 1987; 
Cooke, 1989a, 1991; Raffournier, 1995; Inchausti, 1997; Hossain and Taylor, 2007: 
Hossain, 2008).  A major step in the construction of the voluntary disclosure index is 
the selection of information items that could be disclosed by commercial banks in their 
annual reports and which are relevant to the Libyan environment. 
In this study, the selection of items included in the index was based on voluntarily 
disclosed items recommended for banking disclosure by the IASB and Basel 
Committee, and items included in earlier relevant empirical voluntary disclosure studies 
(i.e. Kahl and Belkaoui, 1981; Abdul Hamid, 2004; Hossain and Taylor, 2007; Hossain 
and Reaz, 2007; Hooi, 2007; Hossain, 2008; Barako and Brown, 2008, Maingot and 
Zeghal, 2008).  
A total of 63 items of information was identified as relevant to Libyan commercial 
banking disclosure; those items of information were not assigned in the Banking Law 
N. 1, 2005 or the LSM Law and its regulation. These 63 items were then classified into 
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five categories: (a) Background about the commercial bank/ general information; (b) 
Social responsibility information; (c) Financial ratios and other statistics information; 
(d) Accounting policies and (e) Corporate governance information. 
1.7.2.2 Scoring the voluntary information disclosure items 
Two main approaches were found to be widely used by earlier studies to develop a 
scoring scheme to determine the level of disclosure, these being the weighted scoring 
approach, and the un-weighted scoring approach (dichotomous scoring approach). The 
scoring approach used in this study is un-weighted; it assumes all information items are 
considered equally important to all user groups of commercial ban ’s annual reports. 
An item scores one if it is disclosed and zero if it is not disclosed. The main reason for 
adopting this approach in the current study is to avoid the subjectivity inherent in using 
any weighted scoring approach. In order to measure the extent of overall voluntary 
disclosure for every commercial bank in the sample for each year, a scoring sheet was 
designed including all the voluntary disclosure index items.  
The total voluntary disclosure index score (TVDIS) for each of the 54 annual reports 
from the commercial banks in the sample was then calculated as the ratio of the actual 
voluntary disclosure score (AVDS), which is awarded to a commercial bank, divided by 
the maximum voluntary disclosure score (MVDS), which that particular commercial 
bank is expected to earn.  
1.7.3 Interview structure and process 
A semi-structured, face-to-face interview was conducted with those preparing the 
annual reports from four Libyan listed and two unlisted commercial banks (mainly the 
directors of the accounting departments or representatives) who are involved directly in 
the preparation of annual reports. The interview technique was adopted as the most 
effective technique for obtaining deeper information from professionals and experts.   
Semi-structured questions were used in order to allow interviewees to answer questions 
in their own words and encourage them to elaborate on their responses. Concerning the 
interview questions, the original interview questions were first written in the Arabic 
language, since all interviews were conducted in Arabic and later translated into the 
English language by the researcher.  
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1.7.4 Statistical analysis techniques 
Univariate and multivariate analysis techniques have been widely used by accounting 
researchers in previous disclosure studies to test the relationship between the extent of 
information disclosure in the annual reports and the corporate specific-characteristics 
(see e.g., Cooke, 1989a; Akhtaruddin, 2005; Owusu-Ansah, 1998; Owusu-Ansah, 
2005). Both univariate and multivariate techniques was employed in this study as 
statistical analysis methods. 
The multivariate OLS regression model was applied to examine the association between 
the extent of voluntary disclosure and a number of commercial bank-specific 
characteristics. In addition, univariate statistical analysis such as average, minimum, 
maximum, standard deviation, coefficient of determination, and correlation analysis 
(Spearman correlation coefficient) was conducted to analyse and interpret the 
quantitative data. Qualitative analysis technique (content analysis) also was utilised in 
this study to analyse the interview transcripts (qualitative data). 
1.8 Organisation of the Study  
This study is organised into nine chapters (as represented in Figure 1.1), which are 
outlined below.  
Chapter One: Introduction to the Study 
This chapter provides an introduction to the current study. It presents the aim and 
objectives and the research questions. Additionally, it discusses the background and 
motivation to the study, highlights the scope of the study and provides a definition of 
terms. It also explains the importance of the study, and gives a brief summary of the 
research methodology and methods employed. An indication of how the current study is 
organised is also provided. 
Chapter Two: Review of the Relevant Literature 
This chapter reviews previous empirical voluntary disclosure studies that measured the 
extent of overall voluntary disclosure in the corporate annual reports, and examines its 
association with a number of corporate characteristics. Studies conducted in both 
developed and developing countries are featured in this survey. Prior empirical 
voluntary disclosure studies have been reviewed in two sections. The first section 
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reviews empirical studies that have examined the extent of overall voluntary 
information disclosure of non-banking companies, while the second section reviews the 
empirical studies that have investigated the extent of different voluntary disclosure 
levels of banking companies. 
Chapter Three: Theoretical Framework for Corporate Voluntary Disclosure 
This chapter presents a brief discussion of the most common academic theories used in 
previous research to explain voluntary disclosure practices, these theories being: 
Agency theory, Signalling theory, Capital Need theory, and Legitimacy theory. These 
four prominent theories in the voluntary disclosure literature have been postulated as the 
most dominant explanatory theories attempting to explain companies’ incentives to 
disclose additional information voluntarily. This chapter concludes with an outline of 
the theoretical framework adopted by the current study. 
Chapter Four: Libya Background and Banking Sector 
This chapter aims to provide an overview of the Libyan general background, which 
includes the geographical, historical, political, and economic background. The chapter 
also explores the Libya banking sector, its historical and recent developments, and then 
reviews the Libyan Stock Market (LSM).  
Chapter Five: Regulation of Financial Accounting and Reporting in Libya  
This chapter presents and discusses in detail a number of governmental laws and 
regulations that may have influenced corporate financial reporting and disclosure 
practices in Libya. This chapter also provides an overview of the accounting profession 
in Libya. 
Chapter Six: Research Methodology, Methods and Formulation of Hypotheses   
This chapter discusses the research methodology and methods employed in the current 
study, covering issues concerning the selection of the study sample, the collection of 
data (qualitative and quantitative data), the construction of the voluntary disclosure 
index, and the method of scoring the voluntary disclosure items. It also presents the 
research philosophy, approach and strategy used to address the research aim and 
objectives, including justifying the reasons for the choices for the current study. In 
addition, the chapter also discusses the development and formulation of the research 
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hypotheses. Finally, this chapter presents the data analysis techniques employed in this 
study. 
Chapter Seven: Views and Perceptions of Commercial Banks’ Annual Reports 
Preparers Related to Financial Reporting and Voluntary Disclosure 
Issues 
This chapter explores views and perceptions of Libyan commercial ban s’ annual 
reports preparers related to current mandatory financial reporting and voluntary 
disclosure issues. It focuses on the report and discussion of the results of the semi-
structured, face-to-face interviews with six directors of accounting departments in 
Libyan commercial banks, who are involved directly in the preparation of their ban s’ 
annual reports. 
 
Chapter Eight: The Extent of Voluntary Disclosure and its Relationship with 
Commercial Bank-Specific Attributes: Analysis and Findings 
This chapter measures the extent of total voluntary disclosure in the annual reports of 
Libyan listed and unlisted commercial banks during six-year period from 2006 to 2011. 
In addition, it analyses the level of voluntary disclosure by type of information (i.e. 
background about the bank/general information, social responsibility information, 
financial ratios and other statistical information, accounting policies, and corporate 
governance information). It also discusses and reports on the empirical findings of the 
univariate and the multivariate analyses of the testable hypotheses for research question 
three. 
Chapter Nine: Summary, Conclusions, Implications, Contributions, Limitations and 
Suggestions for Further Research 
The last chapter of the thesis is devoted to giving a brief a summary of the research, 
including, the research methodology and methods, main conclusions of the current 
research, and indicates its contributions, implications, and limitations. Suggestions for 
further research are also provided in this chapter.  
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Chapter Two  
 
Review of the Relevant Literature  
 
 
2.1  Introduction 
This chapter represents a review of previous empirical voluntary disclosure studies that 
have been undertaken in both developed and developing countries to measure the 
general level of voluntary disclosure in corporate annual reports, and examines its 
relationship with corporate specific-characteristics. In line with the focus of the present 
study, the prior voluntary disclosure studies have been divided into two groups. Group 
one includes empirical studies, carried out to measure the general level of voluntary 
disclosure in the annual reports of non-banking sector companies, and group two 
includes previous empirical studies that measured the general level of voluntary 
disclosure in the annual reports of banking sector companies. 
The rest of the chapter is structured as follows: Section 2.2 reviews prior empirical 
studies on measuring the extent of voluntary disclosure in the annual reports of non- 
e extent of voluntary disclosure in the annual reports of banking sector companies. 
Finally, a summary of the literature review and conclusion will be provided in section 
2.4.  
 
2.2 Empirical Studies on Measuring the Extent of Voluntary Disclosure in the 
Annual Reports of Non-Banking Companies 
 
This section is devoted to reviewing previous empirical disclosure studies that 
attempted to measure the level of voluntary disclosure in the annual reports of non-
banking sector companies in both developing and developed countries, focusing on 
research instruments adopted by earlier researchers to measure the extent of corporate 
voluntary disclosure, number of independent variables tested (corporate attributes), the 
statistical techniques used and findings of studies. The review of the relevant earliest 
studies that measured the general level of voluntary disclosure in the annual reports of 
companies in the non-banking industry is essential to get the basis for this present study. 
Besides this, it also provides a theoretical background to the current study. 
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A detailed review of the earlier voluntary disclosure studies that have been conducted in 
non-banking sector companies also helps in supporting the research methods to be used 
in the present study, refining the research methodology, forming a structure for the 
study, in the development of the research hypotheses, and assists in the interpretation of 
the present study findings.  
One of the earliest studies was conducted by Singhvi and Desai (1971) it examined 
empirically the relationship between six selected firm-specific characteristics and the 
extent of information disclosure by United States industrial corporations. Six firm-
specific characteristics were examined: assets size (was measured by total assets), 
number of stockholders, listing status, CPA firm size, rate of return (ratio of net 
profit/net worth), and earnings margin (ratio of net profit/net sales).  
  total of 155 listed and unlisted firms’ annual reports were surveyed. 100 annual 
reports were selected from the listed firms, whereas 55 annual reports were selected 
from the unlisted firms. They constructed a disclosure index containing 34 information 
items to examine the relationship between the firm’s characteristics and the quality of 
corporate disclosure. The significance of the relationship between the quality of 
disclosure in annual reports and six characteristics of the firm was tested by a 
multivariate linear regression model. The results of a multivariate regression show there 
is a positive relationship between six independent variables and the extent of disclosure 
in the annual reports. In this study, no differentiation is made between mandatory and 
voluntary disclosure.  
Another empirical study, Buzby (1975) attempted to measure the extent of information 
disclosed in annual reports of a sample of 44 listed, and a matched number of unlisted, 
American manufacturing companies. Financial companies were eliminated from the 
study sample. He also investigated the association between the extent of disclosure and 
two company characteristics: listing status and company size (measured by total asset). 
A rating worksheet was developed in order to measure the extent of disclosure of the 39 
items of information in the sample of 88 annual reports. 
One worksheet was filled out for each annual report in the sample. The worksheet 
consisted of a listing of the items of information. The items fell into three groups:  
group one represented the items which were self-contained, group two consisted of the 
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items that could be disclosed in varying degrees of specificity, and group three 
represented items of information which could be expressed in terms of sub elements of 
information. In order to measure the extent of disclosure, three scores were calculated 
for each annual report. One score measured the maximum amount of information that 
could be presented by a given company as defined by the items of information 
applicable to the company.  
The second score measured the amount of information present in the annual report. 
These two scores were used to form the third, a relative measure of disclosure, by 
expressing the amount of information present in the annual report as a percentage of the 
maximum amount that could have been presented. The relative measure of disclosure 
served as the dependent variable in this study.  
Buzby (1975) used a Wilcoxon matched pairs, signed ranks test to assess the impact of 
listing status on the extent of disclosure and the Kendall’s tau used to test the effect of 
the size on the extent of disclosure for both two samples (listed and unlisted). The 
findings of this study showed that the extent of information disclosure in companies’ 
annual reports is positively associated with company size. In contrast, the study found 
no significant association between the extent of disclosure and listing status.  
In the United States of America, Stanga (1976) conducted a study to measure the extent 
of information disclosure by 80 large industrial firms in the U.S, and examined the 
influence of firm size (measured by net sales) and industry variables on the extent of 
disclosure. A questionnaire containing 79 items of information was distributed to 
financial analysts, they were asked to weight each information item on a five-point 
scale, 0 if unimportant to 5 if essential. Then, a weighted disclosure-scoring sheet was 
developed to evaluate the extent of information disclosure in companies’ annual reports 
based on replies received from financial analysts.  
To test the influence of company size and industry type on the extent of disclosure, the 
linear regression model was constructed. The results revealed that a firm’s size did not 
appear to play a major role in explaining the differences in annual report  disclosure 
among large industrial firms. In addition, the results show that industry type was 
significant in explaining the variations in the extent of annual disclosure among large 
industrial firms. 
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In the United Kingdom, Firth (1979) undertook an examination of the association 
between the extent of voluntary disclosure and three company attributes, namely, 
company size (was measured by terms of sales turnover and capital employed), listing 
status, and type of auditor. He selected randomly manufacturing companies: 40 unlisted 
companies, 40 matched listed companies on the UK Stock Exchange (in terms of size 
and industry group), and 100 stock exchange listed manufacturing companies. To 
measure the level of voluntary disclosure for each company, a weighted disclosure 
index comprising of 48 voluntary disclosure items was applied. A voluntary disclosure 
index items was selected based on review of relevant literature, recent company annual 
reports and discussions with various users. 
The study used the t-test and Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed rank tests to assess the 
impact of three independent variables on the extent of voluntary disclosure level. The 
statistical results showed a significant positive association between listing status, the 
company size and the extent of voluntary disclosure. In addition the results of the study 
revealed that there was no significant relationship between the extent of disclosure and 
auditor types.  
In New Zealand, McNally et al. (1982) have undertaken empirical research to examine 
the association between the level of voluntary disclosure practices by 103 
manufacturing companies listed on the New Zealand Stock Exchange and a number of 
the firm’s characteristics: company size, rate of return, growth, size of auditing firm and 
industry groups. They constructed a weight disclosure index containing 41 items of 
financial and non-financial information that companies may voluntarily disclose.  
A questionnaire containing index items was sent to a number of financial editors and 
Stock Exchange members as two important groups of professional users in New 
Zealand. Two professional groups were asked to identify the relative importance of 
disclosing each of the 41 items on a scale of 1 to 5, 5 being very important. A 
Spearman’s rho analysis and one-way variance analysis were conducted. The results of 
this study revealed that the two groups attribute different importance to the disclosure of 
specific information items, few of these differences were statistically significant. In 
addition, the study found only company size to be significantly positive associated with 
the level of voluntary disclosure. 
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In Mexico, Chow and Wong-Boren (1987) conducted an empirical study to investigate 
the association between the three company attributes and the extent of voluntary 
disclosure published by 52 listed Mexican manufacturing companies. The three 
company attributes examined were: company size (measured by the market value of 
equity plus the book value of debt), financial leverage (measured by the book value of 
debt divided by size), and proportion of assets in place (computed by dividing net fixed 
assets by total assets). 
Chow and Wong-Boren (1987) constructed a disclosure index consisting of 24 
voluntary items to evaluate the extent of annual voluntary disclosure. These items were 
selected based on the Mexican accounting texts, and previous studies. They employed 
both weighted and un-weighted scoring approaches. Using a multiple regression 
technique, the researchers found a significant positive association between the voluntary 
disclosure level and firm size. On the other hand, they found no significant association 
between financial leverage and assets in place, and the voluntary disclosure level. 
In Sweden, Cooke (1989b) examined empirically the relationship between the extent of 
voluntary disclosure and a number of firm-specific characteristics of Swedish 
companies. The firm characteristics were: quotation status, company size (measured by 
annual sales, total assets, and number of shareholders), parent company relationship, 
and industry type. This study sample consisted of 90 Swedish companies including 38 
unlisted and 52 listed on the Swedish Stock Exchange. Banks and insurance companies 
were excluded from the sample population, due to their specialised nature of financial 
transactions.  
The researcher constructed an index of disclosure content of 146 items of voluntary 
information to measure the extent of voluntary disclosure provided by a company. A 
dichotomous procedure was adopted to score index items, one if an item is disclosed or 
zero if it is not. The voluntary disclosure score for each company was calculated as a 
ratio of the actual scores awarded to a company to the scores which that company is 
expected to earn.  Using multiple regression analysis, Cooke (1989b) found that the 
amount of voluntary disclosure in annual reports associated significantly with quotation 
status, industry type, and three measures of company size. On the other hand, the parent 
company relationship was found as not significant in explaining voluntary corporate 
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disclosure in annual reports. The result of this study also showed that the single most 
important independent variable in explaining the variability in voluntary disclosure in 
corporate annual reports was quotation status. It was also found that trading companies 
disclosed less voluntary information than other industry types.    
Lutfi (1989) conducted an empirical study to investigate the voluntary financial 
disclosure practices in the UK by 122 companies in the Unlisted Securities Market 
(USM).  Further, this study also tested the hypotheses of the possible determinants of 
voluntary disclosure that derived from the agency theory, theories of the firm, and the 
informational risk theory literature. To test the hypotheses, a variety of financial 
measures was used as proxies for the explanatory variables. The measures were chosen 
after consulting the disclosure literature. The explanatory variables selected to be tested 
were: firm size, foreign operations, gearing, profitability, diversification, directors' share 
of equity, existence of executive share option schemes, existence of non-executives on 
the Board of Directors, tax status, industry sector and the auditing firm.  
To measure voluntary financial disclosure, un-weighted disclosure index containing 53 
voluntary information items was developed. The index information items were 
classified into six groups: future plans and prospects, segmental information, research 
and development information, foreign operations, assets descriptions, and other 
information. The study used regression statistical technique, the results of the test 
revealed that the probability of USM companies disclosing information voluntarily 
increased with firm's size, percentage of foreign turnover, gearing, and the existence of 
executive share option schemes. 
In addition, the study shows that the probability of USM companies disclosing 
information voluntarily decreased with the percentage of directors’ equity. The 
industrial sector, however, showed mixed results concerning the possibility of the 
relationship. Besides, according to the cross-industry analysis, the probability of  USM 
companies disclosing information voluntarily decreased with the firm's profitability.  
Overall, the study results lend no support to the proposed relationship between levels of 
voluntary disclosure and the auditing firm, number of the non-executives on the Board 
of Directors, tax status, and the number of substantial shareholders. A further empirical 
study by Cooke (1991) also attempted to investigate the extent of voluntary disclosure 
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in 48 Japanese companies’ annual reports for the year 1988. Further, the study 
examined the relationship between the extent of voluntary disclosure and some 
corporate characteristics, namely firm size (measured by number of shareholders, total 
assets and turnover), stock market listing, and industry type. Cook (1991) constructed a 
voluntary disclosure contained 106 items; the selection of items was based on items 
included in previous disclosure studies.  
An un-weighted disclosure approach was used in which an item was awarded one if 
disclosed and zero if not disclosed. The study used a regression model to test the 
relationship between the extent of voluntary disclosure and independent variables, the 
test showed that the level of voluntary disclosure was positively associated with all size 
measures and the stock market listing. In addition, the type of industry was significantly 
associated with the extent of voluntary disclosure. Manufacturing companies were also 
found to disclose more voluntary information than other industry types. 
Malone et al. (1993) measured the extent of financial disclosure in corporate annual 
reports of 125 oil and gas companies. Using a weighted disclosure index consisting of 
129 information items to measure the extent of financial disclosure. The items of 
information were weighted by oil and gas financial analysts according to the importance 
of each disclosure in an investment decision. The extent of financial disclosure for each 
firm in the sample was calculated as the ratio of a firm’s total disclosure score to the 
firm’s total possible disclosure.  
They also investigated whether there was an association between the extent of financial 
disclosure and selected firm characteristics. The characteristics selected for this study 
were: the ratio of debt to total equity, number of shareholders, firm size (total assets), 
inter-industry diversification, rate of return on net worth, earnings margin, audit firm 
size, listing status, foreign operations, and proportion of outside directors. 
The researchers used stepwise regression analysis, they found only three of the firm 
characteristics (exchange listing status, debt-to-total-equity ratio, and number of 
shareholders) to be statistically significant in explaining the extent of financial 
disclosure. On the other hand, they found the other seven firm characteristics: total 
assets, audit firm size, rate of return on net worth, inter-industry diversification, 
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earnings margin, foreign operations, and proportion of outside directors were not 
statistically significant. 
In Malaysia, Hossain et al. (1994) conducted an empirical study to examine the effect of 
six firm-specific characteristics on the general level of voluntary disclosure in the 
annual reports of 67 firms listed on the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange (KLSE) of 
Malaysia. The study sample was randomly selected from the 279 non-financial 
companies on the KLSE on December 31, 1991. Twelve of the 67 companies were also 
listed on the London Stock Exchange (LSE). The researchers eliminated the banking 
sector and other financial services companies from the sample population because they 
have different financial reporting regulation from other non-financial companies. 
The six characteristics were firm size, ownership structure, leverage, assets-in-place, 
size of audit firm, and foreign listing status. The six firm attributes used in this study 
were measured as follows: 
- Firm size was measured by the natural log of market capitalisation; 
- Ownership structure was measured as the number of shares held by the top 10 
shareholders as a proportion of the total number of shares issued; 
- Leverage was the ratio of the book value of long-term debt to the book value of 
owners’ equity; 
- Proportion of assets-in-place was represented by the ratio of book value of fixed 
assets (net of depreciation) to the book value of total assets;  
- The auditor was represented by a dummy variable of one if the firm was audited 
by one of the Big Six audit firms, and zero otherwise, and  
- Foreign listing status was measured by a dummy variable, given one for firms 
listed on KLSE, plus at least one foreign stock exchange listing, and zero for 
firms listed only on the KLSE. 
To evaluate the extent of voluntary disclosure in companies’ annual reports, they 
created a disclosure index containing 78 voluntary information items based on the 
pervious literature. Using an un-weighted approach to capture a voluntary disclosure 
score for each company, given a score one if the item is disclosed or zero if not 
disclosed. A disclosure index for each company was computed as the ratio of the actual 
score awarded to the maximum possible score appropriate for the company. 
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Both univariate and multivariate statistical tests were employed, the analysis of results 
showed that that firm size, ownership structure and foreign investment were 
significantly related to the level of information voluntarily disclosed by Malaysian 
companies in their annual reports. On the other hand, leverage, assets-in-place, and size 
of audit firm did not appear to be important factors in explaining voluntary disclosure 
by firms. 
Meek et al. (1995) conducted an empirical study to examine the association between the 
extent of voluntary disclosure in the annual reports of multinational corporations 
(MNCs) from the U.S., U.K. and Continental Europe and some firm characteristics 
namely, company size, country/region of origin , industry, leverage, multinationality, 
profitability, and international listing status. The study sample consist of 116 U.S, 64 
U.K., and 46 continental European MNCs (France 16, Germany 12, and Netherlands 
18). A disclosure checklist, containing 85 voluntary disclosure items was developed. 
The items included in the checklist were divided into three major groups of information 
types: (a) strategic information, (b) nonfinancial information, and (c) financial 
information. In order to measure the extent of voluntary disclosure, the 1989 annual 
reports were obtained for the samples of companies. Then the contents of each annual 
report were compared to the items on the checklist and coded one if the annual report 
contained the disclosure item or zero if it was not contained. 
An un-weighted voluntary disclosure index for each company was calculated as the 
ratio of the actual score awarded to the company divided by the maximum potential 
score applicable to that company. Using multiple linear regression, they found that 
company size, country/region, and international listing status were the three most 
important variables explaining the voluntary disclosures of the sample of companies.  
On the other hand, they found the other independent variables did not appear to be 
significant in explaining voluntary annual reports disclosure for the samples of firms. 
Overall, the results were statistically significant on the overall basis and by information 
type. However, the amount of explained variation in disclosure ranges from 14% for 
financial information to 46% for nonfinancial information, with strategic information in 
between at 33%. The adjusted R² for voluntary disclosures overall was 35%. 
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In Switzerland, Raffournier (1995) attempted to evaluate the level of voluntary 
disclosure in annual reports of 161 Swiss listed companies. The researcher excluded 
banks and insurance companies from the sample population because they are subject to 
specific disclosure requirements and their financial characteristics. This study also 
examined the relationship between the extent of voluntary disclosure and a number of 
firms’ characteristics, namely firm size, profitability (measured by net income/net worth 
ratio), ownership structure (represented by the percentage of share not held by known 
shareholders), leverage, the percentage of fixed assets, size of auditing firm, 
internationality (represented by the ratio of exports to total sales), and industry type.      
Raffournier (1995) used a disclosure index containing 30 voluntary information items. 
These information items were derived from the Fourth and Seventh European Union 
Directives, despite Switzerland not being a member of the European Union. The 
researcher adopted a similar methodology used by Cooke (1989, 1992) in scoring the 
disclosure items. An information item scores one if it is disclosed in the annual reports 
and zero if it is not disclosed. 
The relationship between the extent of voluntary disclosure and selected firms’ 
characteristics was tested by both univariate analysis and multiple regression. The 
researcher found that firm size (measured by the logarithm of sales) and internationality 
level were associated significantly with the level of voluntary disclosure. Inversely, no 
significant relationship was found for percentage of fixed assets, size of auditing firms, 
industry type, profitability, leverage and ownership diffusion. Hossain et al. (1995) 
examined empirically the relationship between five firm-specific characteristics and 
extent of voluntary disclosure in annual reports of 55 New Zealand owned quoted 
companies.  
This sample included 15 companies listed in both in New Zealand and Overseas Stock 
Exchange and 40 companies randomly selected from the other companies listed only on 
New Zealand Stock Exchange (NZSE). All banks and insurance companies were 
excluded from the study sample because their business activities are not quite 
comparable with other companies. The five firm-specific characteristics were derived 
from agency theory: firm size, leverage, assets-in-place, type of auditor, and foreign 
listing status. To assess the extent of voluntary disclosure by companies, they used an 
un-weighted disclosure index comprising of 95 voluntary information items. Hossain et 
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al. (1995) tested the impact of five firm-specific characteristics on the level of voluntary 
disclosures. Using regression analysis, their empirical study results showed that firm 
size, leverage and foreign listing status were statistically related to the level of 
information voluntarily disclosed by companies, while the type of auditor and assets-in-
place have no significant impact on the level of voluntary disclosure.     
Gray et al. (1995) investigated the impact of international capital market pressures on 
the extent of voluntary disclosure by 116 U.S. and 64 U.K. multinational companies 
(MNCs).   total of 180 companies’ annual reports were obtained for the year 1989.  In 
order to measure the voluntary disclosure level, a checklist comprising of 128 voluntary 
items, categorized into 12 categories: general corporate characteristics, corporate 
strategy, acquisitions and disposals, research and development, future prospects 
information, information about directors, employee information, social responsibility 
and value added disclosures, segment information, financial review information, foreign 
currency information, and stock price information was constructed.  
The information items on the checklist were then compared to the contents of the 
companies’ annual reports and awarded a code one if the annual report contained the 
information items item, and code zero if not present, depending on the applicability of 
the item concerned. The voluntary disclosure index for each company was calculated as 
a proportion of the actual score awarded to a company compared to the maximum 
potential score applicable to that company. 
Using analysis of variance (ANOVA), they concluded that US internationally listed 
MNCs voluntarily disclosed significantly more strategic and non-financial (but not 
financial) information than U.S. domestic listed MNCs. They also revealed that there 
was no difference in the overall level of voluntary disclosures between international 
listed status and domestic listed U.K companies.  
In Spain, Inchausti (1997) studied the influence of seven variables on the level of 
information disclosure by Spanish listed companies. The extent of information 
disclosure was measured by using a disclosure index containing 50 information items 
(including both voluntary and compulsory items). Inchausti (1997) selected 138 listed 
companies: 49 companies in 1998, 47 companies in 1990, and 42 in 1991. The 
researcher excluded financial institutions, insurance companies and investment funds 
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from the sample. Seven independent variables were used to examine their influence on 
the level of information disclosure. The seven independent variables were: firm size, 
stock exchange cross listing, profitability, leverage, auditing, industry type and dividend 
pay-out. The association between the level of disclosure and the seven independent 
variables was examined by using stepwise regression analysis and panel data analysis.  
In this study, only three independent variables, namely firm size, auditing, and stock 
exchange were found to influence the level of annual disclosure. Finally, it was 
concluded that although positive theory can be used to provide an explanation of the 
attitudes of Spanish companies towards information disclosure, it is necessary to 
recognise the effects of legislation.  
In France, Depoers’ (2000) study attempted to assess empirically the extent of voluntary 
information disclosure in the annual reports of 102 French listed non-financial 
companies and its association with company-specific characteristics. A sample of 
companies was randomly selected from the entire population of companies listed on the 
Paris Stock Exchange in 1995. Banks and insurance companies were excluded because 
of their specific disclosure requirements and financial characteristics. The company-
specific characteristics were: firm size (was measured by log of sales), foreign activity 
(was measured as exports on sales ratio), proprietary costs (was measured as gross fixed 
assets), labour pressure, leverage, auditor size, and ownership structure.  
The researcher developed a disclosure index comprising 65 voluntary information items 
to measure the extent of disclosure, using an un-weighted approach to capture a 
voluntary disclosure score for each company, given a score one if the item is disclosed 
or zero otherwise. The level of disclosure for each company was calculated as the ratio 
of the score obtained to the maximum possible score relevant for that company. The 
findings of this study revealed that the level of voluntary disclosure was statistically 
associated with firm size, foreign activity, proprietary costs, and labour pressure. 
Results from this study also showed that leverage, auditor size, and ownership structure 
were insignificant.  
In Jordan, Naser et al. (2002) studied empirically the association between a company’s 
characteristics and the level of information disclosure in the annual reports of 84 non-
financial companies listed on the Amman Financial Market (AFM) for the year 1998, 
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and operating in both the manufacturing and services sector. The banking, finance and 
insurance sector were excluded from the study due to them having to follow specific 
disclosure requirements and therefore not having the same comparable characteristics. 
They divided the company’s characteristics into four main categories as follows: 
Market related variables: 
(1) Company Size: 
     -Assets Size 
     -Number of Employees 
     -Net Sales 
    -Market Capitalisation 
(2) Audit Firm Status 
(3) Industry Type 
Performance variables: 
(1) Profitability:  
    -Profit Margin 
    -Return on Equity 
(2)  Liquidity Ratio  
Ownership structure variables: 
(1) Number of Shareholders 
(2) Government Ownership (ratio) 
(3) Individual Ownership (ratio) 
(4) Foreign Ownership (ratio) 
(5) Arab Ownership (ratio) 
Capital structure variables: 
(1) Gearing Ratio   
A disclosure index consisting 104 items of information was constructed to measure the 
extent of information disclosure in the companies’ annual reports for the year 1998.  n 
un-weighted approach was applied for scoring the items, one point was awarded to a 
disclosed item and zero to an undisclosed item. To test the association between the 
depth of information disclosure and selected company characteristics, the multiple 
regression analysis was employed. 
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The findings of the study indicated that six out of the fifteen variables applied in this 
study demonstrate a statistically (negative or positive) significant association with the 
extent of annual disclosure by Jordan’s listed companies. One of these variables, the 
liquidity ratio, reported a negative significant association, leading to the rejection of the 
hypotheses concerned. On the other hand, market capitalisation, audit firm status, 
gearing ratio, sales, and profit margin reported a positive and significant association, 
resulting in the acceptance of the hypotheses concerned. 
Haniffa and Cook (2002) carried out a study to examine the relationship between a 
number of independent variables and the extent of voluntary disclosure in the annual 
reports of Malaysian listed companies. The independents variables were categorised 
into three groups: corporate governance variables, cultural variables, and firm-specific 
characteristics variables (firm size, assets-in-place, industry type, listing age, 
complexity of business, level of diversification, foreign activities, and gearing). 
The sample covered 167 non-financial companies that published their annual reports at 
the end of December 1995. Selection of companies was based on a stratified random 
sample from the Annual Companies Handbook, published by the Kuala Lumpur Stock 
Exchange in 1995. Banks, insurance and unit trust companies were excluded due to 
their different statutory requirements.  The sample of companies were asked to send the 
English version of their 1995 annual reports. The rate of responses was 83 per cent. 
They used a disclosure index consisting of 65 voluntary disclosure items, the selection 
of the items in the construction of the disclosure index were based on the relevant 
literature and applicability to the Malaysian environment. Haniffa and Cook (2002) 
employed an un-weighted approach for scoring disclosure index items, an items scores 
one if it disclosed and zero if it was not. The results, based on the full regression model, 
indicated that two corporate governance variables (family members sitting on board and 
non-executive chairman), and group firm-specific characteristics were significantly 
associated with the extent of voluntary disclosure. On the other hand, cultural variables 
were found not significant associated with the extent of voluntary disclosure. 
Chau and Gray (2002) examined the association of ownership structure with the extent 
of voluntary disclosures in annual reports of listed companies in Hong Kong and 
Singapore. To ensure that samples selected from Hong Kong and Singapore were 
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homogeneous, they selected only industrial companies for their study. These companies 
fall into industrial sectors: food and beverages; shipping and transportation; publishing 
and printing; electronics and technology; building materials and construction. A sample 
of 60 listed industrial companies was selected randomly from Hong Kong for this study, 
representing about 32% of the total population. 
A similar procedure was carried out for Singapore companies, 62 listed industrial 
companies out of the total population of 133 were selected (representing 47% of the 
total population). Annual Reports for 1997 were obtained for each of the companies in 
the sample. These annual reports represented the most recent source of data available at 
the time of the study. A disclosure checklist was developed to measure the extent of 
voluntary disclosure of 113 index items. Items of information included in the index 
were selected based on the relevant research studies and comprehensive international 
surveys of accounting and reporting. 
The items of information on the checklist were checked against the mandatory 
disclosure requirements of Hong Kong and Singapore in order to arrive at the voluntary 
disclosure checklist applicable to the sample companies. The items on the checklist 
were categorized into three information types. Category (1) Strategic Information 
(including General Corporate Information, Corporate Strategy, Acquisitions and 
Disposals, Research and Development, Future Prospects). Category (2) Nonfinancial 
Information, (including Information about Directors, Employee Information, Social 
Policy and Value Added Information). Category (3) Financial Information (including 
Segmental information, Financial Review, Foreign Currency Information, and Stock 
Price Information). 
The voluntary disclosure index for each company was calculated as a proportion of the 
maximum voluntary disclosure possible. The voluntary disclosure index was compiled 
based on the addition, and un-weighted scoring approach, of the disclosure items. This 
approach was based on the assumption that each item of information disclosure is of 
equal importance in the corporate information users’ decision-making process. A linear 
multiple regression analysis was used to test the association between the extent of 
voluntary disclosure (dependent variable) and the independent variable of ownership 
structure.  
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The results of the test indicated that there is a positive association between wider 
ownership and the extent of voluntary disclosure by Hong Kong and Singapore listed 
companies. Moreover, the empirical findings also highlighted the importance of the 
contextual characteristics of Hong Kong and Singapore. Chau and Gray (2002) 
concluded that insider and family-controlled companies have little motivation to 
disclose information in excess of mandatory requirements because the demand for 
public information disclosure was relatively weak in comparison with that of companies 
with wider share ownership.  
Leventis and Weetman (2004) attempted to investigate the association between seven 
company-specific variables and the extent of voluntary disclosure of 87 non-financial 
publicly traded companies listed on the Athens Stock Exchange (ASE) for the year 
1997. Financial and banking companies were excluded from the sample due to different 
regulations affecting their financial reporting practices. Seven company-specific 
variables were classified into following groups:  
(a) Structure-related variables: firm size (market capitalization) and gearing (long term 
debt to equity); 
(b) Performance-related variables: profitability (return on equity) and liquidity (current 
ratio); and 
(c) Market-related variables: share return, industry (consumer products, industrial 
products and services), and listing status (parallel market, main market).  
A voluntary disclosure index was developed, containing 72 voluntary disclosure items 
relevant to the Greek market. The voluntary items included in the index, divided into 
three categories (namely, corporate environment, social responsibility and finance-
related disclosures). To measure the extent of disclosure, an un-weighted approach was 
applied, scoring awards one if a company disclosed a certain item and zero if it is not 
disclosed. The disclosure score for each company was measured by the ratio of actual 
items disclosed, divided by the maximum possible items that could have been disclosed. 
Using linear regression analysis, the findings indicated that the level of overall 
disclosure in the sample of companies was relatively low at 37.57%.  
Moreover, the level of voluntary disclosure varies materially across the three categories 
ranging from 58.7% for corporate environment to 14.8% for social responsibility 
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information. It was also evident that sample companies vary considerably in both the 
dependent and the independent variables. The adjusted R squared (Adj R2) suggests that 
35.6% of the overall disclosure variation was explained by the independent variables.  
The results also indicated that most significant variable overall was firm size measured 
by market capitalization. Other significant variables were listing status and share return. 
The remaining independent variables were found not statistically significant. The results 
also showed that the amount of explained variation in  information categories ranges 
from 29.3% for financial information to 22.3% for corporate environment information 
and 15.4% for social responsibility information. Further, the independent variables had 
different levels of association with the three separate categories of voluntary 
information. Leventis and Weetman (2004) suggested that the explanatory power of 
each factor depends on the particular nature of each disclosure area. 
Gul and Leung (2004) conducted a study to examine the relationship between board 
leadership structure namely CEO duality (CEOs who jointly serve as board chairs), the 
proportion of expert outside directors on the board (PENEDs) and the extent of 
voluntary disclosure by 385 Hong Kong non-financial listed companies for 1996. Firms 
in the financial sector (banks, insurance and other financial firms) were excluded from 
the sample subject to different disclosure requirements.  
A disclosure index containing 44 discretionary items was developed in order to measure 
the extent of voluntary disclosure. The information items included in the disclosure 
index, was classified into three groups: background information, financial performance 
information and non- financial performance information. The background information 
group includes matters that cover corporate goals, competition, products and markets. 
The performance information group includes items such as changes in sales, gross 
profits and R&D expenditures. The non-financial information group includes number of 
employees, staff training, product segment analysis and Y2K issues.  
They used the un-weighted approach to compute the voluntary disclosure score; a 
company received a score of one if it voluntarily disclosed information on the item and 
zero if the item was not disclosed. A total voluntary disclosure score for each company 
was calculated as the sum of the scores awarded for each item in the disclosure index.  
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Using multiple regression analysis, the results of the analysis showed that CEO duality 
was associated with lower voluntary disclosures. Results of the study also showed that 
firms with a higher proportion of ENEDs were associated with lower voluntary 
disclosures. More interestingly, they found that the negative association between CEO 
duality and corporate disclosures was weaker when the firm has a higher proportion of 
ENEDs. Finally, their study suggested that CEOs with valuable secrets who are also 
chairmen might limit disclosures and keep real outsiders off the board.  
In a Saudi Arabian study, Alsaeed (2006) examined the hypothesised impact of several 
characteristics of the firm on the level of voluntary disclosure in the annual reports, 
using a sample of 40 non-financial companies that were listed on the Saudi Stock 
Market, for the year 2003. Alsaeed (2005) classified the firms’ characteristics 
(independent variables) into three sets: (1) structure-related variables (firm size, debt, 
ownership dispersion, and firm age), (2) market-related variables (industry type and 
audit firm size) and (3) performance-related variables (profit margin, return on equity, 
and liquidity).  A disclosure index consisting of 20 information items was used as a 
yardstick to measure the level of voluntary disclosure in the annual reports of 40 listed 
firms. The construction of the disclosure index was based on the items of information 
that companies supply in their annual financial reports to shareholders. 
The un-weighted approach was employed to calculate the voluntary disclosure score for 
each company, coded one if the information item was disclosed or zero if not. A 
disclosure index for each company was computed as the ratio of the actual score given 
to the company divided by the maximum score. The association between the level of 
voluntary disclosure and firm characteristics was examined using multiple linear 
regression analysis. The results that are found by Alsaeed (2006) revealed that there is a 
significantly positively association between firm size and the level of voluntary 
disclosure. On the other hand, he found that the remaining characteristics do not have a 
significant relationship.  
In China, Huafang and Jianguo’s (2007) study attempted to examine the impact of 
ownership structure (blockholder ownership, managerial ownership, state ownership, 
legal-person ownership, and foreign listing/shares ownership) and board composition 
(was measured by the proportion of independent directors (IND) and CEO duality) on 
voluntary disclosure of 559 listed companies in China. The banking sector, insurance, 
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and other financial companies were excluded from the sample population due to their 
different disclosure requirements from other non-financial companies. 
The researchers adopted the level of voluntary disclosure of the sample firms as a 
measure of their voluntary disclosures in annual reports for three reasons. First, annual 
report disclosure levels were positively correlated with the amount of disclosure 
provided via other media. Second, financial analysts and investors regarded disclosures 
in corporate annual reports as the most important source of information for firms. 
Finally, corporate disclosure of management forecasts (earnings forecasts) was rare in 
China.  
They developed a disclosure index in order to measure the extent of voluntary 
disclosure by companies in the 2002 annual reports. The final-disclosure index 
containing 30 items was developed to measure the extent of voluntary disclosure by 
companies in the 2002 annual reports. The items in the disclosure index were classified 
into four main types of voluntary information. These were background information, 
business information, financial information and non-financial information. The 
background information includes corporate goals, strategy and competition. Business 
information includes items such as changes in sales, changes in costs of goods, and 
profit forecast. Financial information includes gearing ratio, liquidity ratio, inventory 
turnover, and turnover of receivables.  
Non-financial information includes staff training, ISO issues, and corporate culture.  
The un-weighted scoring approach was used to score each item in the voluntary 
disclosure index; a company receives a score of one if it voluntarily discloses 
information on the item and a zero otherwise. The voluntary disclosure score for each 
company was the sum of scores awarded for each item in the disclosure index. A linear-
multiple regression analysis was used to test the association between the dependent 
variable of voluntary disclosure and the independent variables of ownership structure 
and board composition. 
The results of statistics analysis showed that two aspects of ownership namely, 
blockholder ownership and foreign listing/shares ownership were significant, associated 
with increased voluntary disclosure (at the 0.05 level). However, the other three aspects 
of ownership: managerial ownership, state ownership, and legal-person ownership were 
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not significant related to voluntary disclosure. The results also showed that the board 
composition (the percentage of Independent director (IND) on board and CEO duality) 
was significant at the 0.05 level related to voluntary disclosure. 
Agca and Önder (2007) investigated the relationship between certain independent 
variables and the voluntary disclosure levels for Turkish firms listed on the Istanbul 
Stock Exchange in 2003. The study sample contains 51 firms from various sectors, 
banking and insurance were excluded from the sample. The independent variables 
investigated were: firm size, leverage, auditing firm, ownership structure, profitability 
and multi-national firm.  
A voluntary disclosure checklist contained 87 items was utilized to assess the voluntary 
disclosure levels. The voluntary disclosure checklist was divided into three main 
categories: strategic information, non-financial information and financial information. A 
dichotomous procedure (un-weighted) was applied for scoring the index items, if the 
information item in the annual reports matched the information item in the voluntary 
disclosure checklist, the allocated code is one if the information item did not match, 
then the allocated code is zero. The researchers applied a multi-regression model to 
investigate the degree of the effect of independent variables on the extent of voluntary 
disclosure, their results revealed that auditing firm, profitability, and firm size variables 
were significant for the overall disclosure. 
Yuen et al. (2009) investigated the impact of ownership features, corporate governance 
mechanisms, and firm-specific characteristics on the voluntary disclosure practices by 
200 publicly-listed industrial companies on the Shanghai Stock Exchange in China. The 
financial and insurance sectors were excluded from the study sample because these 
companies have different capital structures. The ownership structure features and 
corporate governance mechanisms include (1) concentration of ownership; (2) 
ownership by state and state-related institutions; (3) individual ownership; (4) the chief 
executive officer is also the chairman of the board of directors; (5) board independence, 
and (6) the existence of an audit committee.  
The firm-specific characteristics are (1) firm size; (2) leverage; (3) profitability, and; (4) 
type of industry. In order to measure the extent of voluntary disclosure, a relative 
disclosure index was developed contained 34 voluntary disclosure items. The relative 
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disclosure index of each sample company was computed as the ratio of the absolute 
disclosure score to the maximum possible disclosure score. A regression model was 
utilised to test the relation between independents variables and the extent of voluntary 
disclosure, the regression results revealed that individual ownership, the existence of an 
audit committee, firm size, and leverage were significantly related to the extent of 
voluntary disclosure. 
Jiang and Habib (2009) attempted to examine the impact of different types of ownership 
concentration on corporate voluntary disclosure practices by 116 listed non-financial 
companies on the New Zealand Stock Exchange from 2001 to 2005. Financial 
institutions and overseas companies listed on New Zealand stock markets were 
excluded from the sample. An un-weighted disclosure index comprising 39 items was 
constructed based on the disclosure index used in earlier studies. The items in disclosure 
index were checked against the mandatory annual report disclosure requirements in 
New Zealand in order to sure that the disclosure index reflected only voluntary 
disclosure items.  
To measure the extent of voluntary disclosure, a checklist of 39 items was used. The 
voluntary disclosure items on the checklist were classified into five information 
categories: 
(1) Background information.  
(2) A summary of historical results. 
(3) Key non-financial statistics. 
(4) Projected information. 
(5) Management discussion and analysis. 
A voluntary disclosure index items were scored according to the checklist, and scaled 
by the maximum disclosure score. Firm-year observation is given one point if the 
company annual report has disclosed the relevant items on the checklist, and an 
additional point is awarded if the disclosed items have been found to be quantified 
either as a point or range estimate. The regression model was designed to estimate the 
impact of ownership concentration on the extent of voluntary disclosures. The results 
revealed that the relationship between ownership concentration and the extent of 
voluntary disclosure practices had a non-linear pattern. 
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Akhtaruddin et al. (2009) investigated empirically the association between five 
governance variables and the extent of voluntary disclosure by 105 non-financial listed 
firms in Malaysia. The governance variables examined were board size, proportion of 
independent non-executive directors (INDs) on board, outside share ownership, family 
control, and percentage of audit committee members to total members on the board. To 
measure the level of voluntary disclosure of the sample firms, a disclosure index 
containing 74 information items was developed in consultation with the disclosure 
checklist used by similar studies.  
An un-weighted disclosure approach was applied, the items of information were 
numerically scored on a dichotomous basis. A firm is scored one for an item disclosed 
in the annual report and zero if it is not disclosed. The total voluntary disclosure index 
was then computed for each sample firm as a ratio of the total disclosure score to the 
maximum possible disclosure by the firm. 
They applied the regression model to examine the relationship between explanatory 
variables and the extent of voluntary disclosure, they found a positive association 
between board size, proportion of INDs, outside share ownership and the extent of 
voluntary information. On the other hand, their findings indicated that the extent of 
voluntary disclosure was negatively related to family control and the ratio of audit 
committee members to total members on the board. 
In a recent study in a developing country, Rouf (2010) empirically examined the 
association between corporate characteristics, governance attributes and the extent of 
voluntary disclosure in the annual reports of 120 Bangladeshi listed non-financial 
companies. The main criteria used for sampling the firms were: (i) annual reports must 
be available at the stock exchange and (ii) the firm must have been listed for the entire 
period of the study 2008. The corporate characteristics were: firm size and profitability, 
corporate governance attributes were, independent non-executive directors, audit 
committee, board leadership structure, board size, and ownership structure.  
A disclosure index containing 68 voluntary items was developed. The index items were 
classified into thirteen categories: general corporate information, corporate strategic 
information, corporate governance information, financial information, financial review 
information, foreign currency information, segmental information, employee 
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information, research and development information, future forecast information, share 
price information, social responsibility information and graphical information. 
An un-weighted relative disclosure index was employed to measure the level of 
voluntary disclosure of each company. The items of information were numerically 
scored on a dichotomous basis; a company was scored one for an item disclosed in the 
annual report and zero if it was not disclosed. The total voluntary disclosure index for 
each company was computed as a ratio of the total disclosure score to the maximum 
possible disclosure by the firm. 
The researcher used the ordinary least squares regression model to examine the 
relationship between independent variables and the level of voluntary disclosure, the 
empirical results indicated that there was a positive association between board size, 
board leadership structure, audit committee and the extent of voluntary disclosure. In 
contrast, the extent of voluntary disclosure was found negatively related to proportion of 
independent nonexecutive directors, ownership structure and net profitability. The 
results also indicated that the level of average voluntary disclosure in the sample 
companies was 47.74%, the highest score achieved by a firm was 72% and the lowest 
score was 18%. 
In Iran, Khodadadi et al. (2010) assess empirically the relationship between a number of 
corporate governance attributes and the extent of voluntary disclosure practices by 106 
listed non-financial companies on Tehran Stock Exchange over the period 2001-2005. 
The banking sector, investment and other financial companies were omitted from the 
sample of this study due to their nature of operation and different financial reporting 
practices. The corporate governance attributes examined were: the percentage of 
independent directors on the board, the existence of dominant personalities 
(CEO/Chairman duality) and the percentage of institutional investors. 
In this study, the firm size and the type of audit institute (audit organization or other 
institutes) were used as control variables. In order to measure the extent of voluntary 
disclosure, an un-weighted disclosure index containing 31 items was developed based 
on voluntary disclosure items used in similar prior studies. Regression analysis was 
applied to test the relation between independent variables and the extent of voluntary 
disclosure, the results indicated that that there was no significant relationship between 
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percentage of independent directors on the board, CEO/Chairman duality and the extent 
of voluntary disclosure. In addition, the research results show a significant relationship 
between the percentage of institutional investors and the extent of voluntary disclosure. 
Finally, the coefficient of the control variable of firm size was significant at 5% level, and 
auditor type was also significant at 10% level.  
 
2.3 Empirical studies on measuring the extent of voluntary disclosure in the annual 
reports of banking companies 
In general, up to date there has been little academic research related specifically to 
banking sector disclosures. Earlier research has focused on non-financial companies’ 
annual disclosures and their association with company attributes. Very few empirical 
disclosure studies have sought to measure the extent of voluntary disclosure and its 
relationship with commercial bank-specific characteristics in particular. For this reason, 
this section, therefore, will review the previous empirical studies that measured the 
extent of voluntary disclosure (including social responsibility disclosure and aggregate 
disclosure), in order to identify a potential gap in the relevant academic literature and 
how this current study can be extended in an attempt to fill this gap. 
The first empirical study that attempted to measure the extent of commercial banking 
disclosure was conducted by Kahl and Belkaoui (1981). They  measured the overall 
extent of disclosure adequacy by 70 commercial banks selected from 18 countries 
located in the non-communist world (US 16, Sweden 3, Holland 1, Finland 1, Norway 
1, UK 11, Germany 3, Singapore 1, Denmark 2, Australia 2, France 2, Switzerland 3, 
Austria 1, Italy 1, Canada 10, Japan 10, Spain 1 and Brazil 1). The main criterion for 
selection of the commercial banks sample was the provision of English language 
version annual reports available for the year 1975. 
The commercial banking disclosure level was measured through a weighted disclosure 
index, consisting of 30 items of information by asking fifteen business administration 
professors of the Faculty of Administration of the University of Ottawa, knowledgeable 
in international financial reporting practices, to score the relative importance of 
disclosing each item in a disclosure index on a scale of zero to four, with higher scores 
indicating greater importance. 
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Disclosure index information items were selected based on investment, financial and 
accounting literature, and the researcher’s perceptions of information items that had 
relevance for the ban  stoc  investors’ decision-making. Kahl and Belkaoui thought 
that their sample of professors might not be an adequate proxy for users of bank annual 
reports internationally, so they sent the same questionnaire to 50 of bank financial 
analysts holding the professional designation Certified Financial Accountants who were 
listed in the 1975 Directory of the Financial Analysts Federation.  
The number of responses to the mail survey was ten and their scoring of items was 
identical to that of the early respondents (professors) with some slight but not 
statistically significant difference in the weights. Then the annual reports of the 70 
banks were evaluated on the basis of the response score assigned to each of the 
information items in the disclosure index. The researchers also measured the degree of 
association between the extent of disclosure and the commercial bank size (measured by 
total assets). 
Using the Spearman’s ran  correlation test, they found a positive correlation between 
the size of commercial bank and the extent of disclosure. Additionally, their results 
revealed that the level of information disclosure in the annual reports of commercial 
banks differs from country to country.  
Abdul Hamid (2004) investigates empirically the association between a number of 
corporate characteristics and the level of social information disclosed by 48 banks and 
finance companies in Malaysia. The corporate characteristics examined were: firm size, 
financial performance (was measured by return on equity (ROE) and return on assets 
(ROA)), age of business, listing status, and company profile. A sample of annual reports 
for the year 1999, were drawn from the three sites in Malaysia, namely Malaysia 
Central Bank, Banking Institute of Malaysia, and Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange.  
The total of disclosure index was measured by pages to the nearest of hundredth of a 
page. To assess the effect of each independent variable on the level of disclosure, he 
used multiple regression models. The results of the study showed that the level of social 
information disclosure was significant and positive association with firm size, listing 
status and age of business. In addition, the study shows that insignificant relationship 
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between profitability variables and the disclosures of social information. Finally, for the 
company profiles the results showed an insignificant and negative association.  
Hooi (2007) empirically investigated the impact of national culture on the extent of 
information disclosure in the 2004 annual reports of 37 listed domestic commercial 
banks. The commercial banks sample was selected from 17 developed and developing 
countries. The selection of countries was determined by the data availability of the five 
culture values, namely individualism, masculinity, power distance, uncertainty 
avoidance, and long-term orientation.  
In order to measure the extent of information disclosure in the annual reports of 
commercial banks, he used the 2001 Basel survey checklist, containing 104 voluntary 
and mandatory items. The 104 information items were categorized into twelve types of 
information namely, capital structure (14), capital adequacy (7), market risk internal 
modeling (16), internal and external ratings (4), credit risk modeling (5), security 
activities (8), asset quality (13), credit derivatives and other credit enhancements (6), 
derivatives (other than credit derivatives) (9), geographic and business line 
diversification (10), accounting and presentation policies (7), and other risks (5).  
Using multiple regression analysis, Hooi (2007) found that the only significant cultural 
dimension for commercial banking disclosure was uncertainty avoidance. He also found 
that the banking disclosure level across all countries was a moderate 48%. In addition, 
this study recommended that long-term orientation value should not be used as part of 
the cultural framework for disclosures due to biased data. Finally, the researcher 
concluded that the used of disclosure rate tends to yield slightly better results in terms of 
explanatory power compared to disclosure band.  
Much more recently, Hossain and Taylor (2007) investigated empirically the 
relationship between a number of commercial bank attributes and the extent of 
voluntary disclosure in the annual reports of 20 domestic private banks in Bangladesh. 
The commercial bank attributes examined were: commercial bank size (log of assets), 
audit firm link, and profitability.  
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To select of the voluntary items of information included in the disclosure index, the 
researchers considered the research that used the disclosure indices as a methodology, 
disclosure for financial institutions as required the IAS-30, and the items of information 
having considered potential interest to the user groups (shareholders, financial analysts, 
government authorities, and professional accountants). A total of 45 voluntary 
disclosure items were identified as relevant and could be expected to disclose 
voluntarily in the annual reports of the banking companies in Bangladesh. 
The un-weighted disclosure method was employed in order to measure the voluntary 
disclosure score for each bank, in which an item scores one if disclosed and zero if not 
disclosed. A multiple regression model was applied to investigate the relationship 
between the extent of voluntary disclosure (dependent variable) and bank attributes 
(independent variable). The multiple regression model was significant (P<0.005). The 
adjusted coefficient of determination (R squared) indicated that 24% of the variation in 
the dependent variable was explained by variations in the independents variables. The 
study findings also revealed that bank size and audit firm link to be significant in 
determining the disclosure levels of the banks (at a 5% level).  
In contrast, no statistically significant relationship was found between the extent of 
voluntary disclosure and the profitability variable. Findings of this study suggested that 
the extent of voluntary disclosure by banking companies in Bangladesh systematically 
differ depending upon the bank size and characteristics of its audit market (whether it is 
audited by Big Five audit firms or not). 
In another contemporary study, Hossain and Reaz (2007) investigated empirically the 
extent of voluntary disclosure by 38 listed banking companies in India, also examining 
the association between six bank-specific characteristics and the extent of voluntary 
disclosure of the sample companies. The bank characteristics investigated were: bank 
size (measured by log of assets), age, multiple listing, complexity of business, board 
composition and assets-in-place. A disclosure index was constructed consisting of 65 
items of voluntary information.  
A disclosure index for each bank was calculated using a dichotomous approach (un-
weighted), in which an item scores one if disclosed and zero if not disclosed. The 
Ordinary Least Square (OLS) regression model was used to assess the effect of each 
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bank characteristics on the extent of voluntary disclosure. Their results indicated that 
Indian banks were disclosing a considerable amount of voluntary information. 
Additionally, it was shown that bank size and assets-in-place are statistically significant 
in explaining the level of disclosure. However, the bank age, diversification, board 
composition, multiple exchange listing and complexity of business were found to be 
insignificant in explaining the extent of voluntary disclosure in annual reports. Hossain 
and Reaz  found that 55% was the highest disclosure score and 20% was the lowest. 
Moreover, the study found that Indian banks published 35% of voluntary items of 
information on average.  
It was found also that public sector banks disclosed more voluntary information 
(38.66%) than private sector banks (31.15%).The researchers concluded that this study 
was quite interesting and different from other studies because it was focused on banking 
institutions, also there has been little research in the banking institutions on voluntary 
disclosure and also the developing country perspective. However, this study was limited 
to single fiscal year and single country. 
In a recent study of banking disclosure, Hossain (2008) conducted an empirical study to 
investigate the extent of mandatory and voluntary information disclosed in the annual 
reports of 38 listed banking companies in India. He also examined the association 
between the extent of disclosure and company-specific attributes; namely, age, bank 
size, profitability, complexity of business, assets-in place, board composition, and 
market discipline with the level of disclosure. 
Disclosure indexes used by Hossain show a total of 184 items of information containing 
101 mandatory items and 83 voluntary items that might be disclosed in an annual report. 
The selection of mandatory items was based on the following criteria: (1) banking 
companies act, 1949 (2) company act, 1956, (3) listing rules-clause 49, (4) company act, 
1956 and (5) RBI guidelines. The selection of voluntary items was based on previous 
disclosure studies and BASEL. 
The un-weighted disclosure index methodology was used in the study, an item of 
information scoring one if disclosed, and zero if not disclosed. The Ordinary Least 
Square (OLS) regression model was employed to assess the effect each banking 
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company attributes on the level of disclosure. Hossain (2008) found a significant 
positive relationship between the aggregate disclosure levels and bank size, 
profitability, board composition, and market discipline. The results also showed that 
bank age, assets-in-place, and complexity of business were negatively associated with 
the extent of total disclosure. Overall, on average, India banks published 60% of the 
total disclosure of which 88% were mandatory and 25% were voluntary items. 
This study can be criticised on several points. First, it was limited to a single year 
period.  Secondly, the researcher did not include the unlisted banking companies in their 
sample population. It would have been more meaningful if the research had included 
unlisted banking companies in order to determine whether there is a significant 
difference between disclosure in the annual reports of listed banks and disclosure in the 
annual reports of unlisted banks.  
In another study, Maingot and Zeghal (2008) investigated the corporate governance 
disclosure practices of 8 Canadian banks. The sample of banks was selected based on 
the following three criteria: (1) the bank is a widely held bank with no single 
shareholders can own more than 10% of the total of the bank, (2) the bank is traded on a 
stock market, and (3) the bank must be chartered in Canada. A coding sheet containing 
54 elements of disclosure, was developed to evaluate the corporate governance 
disclosure of in the 2003 annual reports of Canadian banks. Selecting the elements of 
disclosure were based the previous literature and Toronto Stock Exchange Corporate 
Governance Guidelines. The coding mechanism was used, if the bank discloses the 
element a score one will be given, if the bank not disclose the element a score zero is 
given.  
The researchers also examined the effect of the bank size (measured by total assets) on 
the disclosure of corporate governance information. The results of the study showed that 
the large banks disclose more information on the governance section of their web pages. 
The findings also indicated that the smaller banks disclose a large amount of their 
information in both the annual reports and in the proxy circulars. Matingot and Zeghal 
(2008) found that the size of the bank has a positive impact on the volume of disclosure 
information related to corporate governance.   
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In Kenya, Barako and Brown (2008) examine empirically the influence of three 
corporate governance attributes on the level of social information disclosed in 40 
Kenyan banks annual report. The corporate governance variables examined in this study 
were: board composition (independence of board), gender representation on board, and 
foreign nationals on board. To measure the extent of voluntary disclosure, a disclosure 
index comprising 22 social disclosure items was developed. The list of the disclosure 
items were drawn from prior corporate social disclosure studies. The un-weighted 
disclosure scoring approach was applied, with a score of one if an item is disclosed and 
zero if not. 
Multiple regression analysis was used to examine the relationship between the level of 
disclosure of social information (dependent variable) and the three corporate 
governance variables. The results of the regression analysis indicated that the board 
composition variable was significantly associated with the extent of social information 
disclosed annual reports of banks. In addition, the results also showed that the board 
gender diversity variable was statistically significant. However, the proportion of 
foreign national on the board of banks was found not significantly associated with the 
level of voluntary disclosure. 
Overall, the level of disclosure of social information disclosed by Kenyan banks was 
very low with a mean of 15%. In particular, banks did not disclose important 
information relating to recruitments, employment of special groups, assistance to 
retiring employees, employees productivity and turnover. In addition, very few banks, 
12.50% and 0.03% respectively disclose information relating to environment policy and 
environmental activities they undertake, while only three banks contribute to the 
national AIDS campaign. 
In a Libyan context study, Kribat (2009) conducted an empirical study to measure the 
degree of mandatory and the overall information disclosures made by Libyan banks 
during the period from 2000 to 2006. The analysis proceeds to examine the relationship 
between four bank-specific characteristics (i.e. bank size, age of bank, profitability and 
ownership structure) and the extent of aggregate information disclosure. To measure the 
disclosures levels, this study develop a checklist included 126 information items that 
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measures both mandatory and voluntary disclosures in the annual reports of a sample of 
11 private and government owned banks.  
In this study, banks established after 2000 only were measured, and the annual reports 
for the shorter time periods were collected. Only 8 banks out of 11 banks collected their 
annual reports for seven years, some banks only had one annual financial report 
collected over the period of seven years studied (i.e. Aman Bank for Commerce and 
Investment and Alejmaa Alarabi Bank). Further, the researcher included the 
Commercial Arab Bank, in fact this bank was licensed as a commercial bank in 2007 as 
stated in the CBL, Annual Reports of 2007, on page No. 72.  
Kribat (2009) claimed that the mandatory disclosure checklist was constructed based on 
relevant Libyan laws, namely Commercial Law, Income Tax Law and Banking Law. 
There was no information given about these mentioned laws-either the year or the issue 
number, and the researcher did not specify information items resources such as number 
of Articles and the total of required items stated by each Law. Surprisingly, Kribat, 
(2009, p. 26) has stated that “Libyan companies are not required by the Libyan 
Commercial Law to provide the information included in the annual reports to the 
public”.  
This clearly implies that there is no mandatory disclosure requirement at all. 
Surprisingly, later he concluded that Libyan banks failed to comply fully with 
mandatory disclosure requirements in any of the sample years (2000-2006). In fact, no 
information items were queried by stated laws to be published to external stakeholders 
and the items in the Libyan’s annual reports were disclosed voluntarily. In particular, 
there is no Libyan banking law that specified any list of information items must be 
disclosed in the Libyan ban s’ financial annual reports, the sole Libyan ban ing law 
which imposed on the all banks to publish their financial statements to general public 
was the Banking Law No 1 which was issued in 2005 (Article 84), however no specific 
information items were required by this Law to be disclosed.   
Kribat (2009) used a multivariate panel regression analysis to test the association 
between the overall information disclosure and the ban s’ attributes. The results of the 
study revealed that that both profit and age appear to have a positive influence on the 
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overall financial disclosure level while size of the bank has a negative influence. The 
similar variables were also tested by the researchers to investigate their influence on the 
extent of banking disclosure level, and they found that the size of the bank has a 
positive impact on the extent of disclosure (e.g. Kahl and Belkaoui, 1981; Hossain and 
Reaz, 2007; Hossain and Taylor, 2007; Matingot and Zeghal, 2008; Hossain, 2008). 
While, age of the bank was found by similar studies is insignificant in explaining the 
level of disclosure (e.g. Hossain and Taylor, 2007; Hossain and Reaz, 2007; Hossain, 
2008). Finally, the reliability of the Kribat (2009) empirical results is questionable, 
since there was no disclosure requirement imposed in the Libyan’s commercial ban  at 
that time of the study. Also, the sample is not homogeneous in relation to the number of 
annual reports obtained from each bank. 
Another empirical study by Menassa (2010) attempted to investigate the extent of social 
disclosures by 24 Lebanese commercial banks and examined the relationship between a 
number of bank characteristics, namely, bank size, financial performance, listing status, 
and overseas presence and the extent of social disclosure. This study employed the 
sentence count as the main unit of analysis to locate and analyse the type and quantity 
of social disclosure provided in the annual reports for the year 2006. The findings 
provide evidence of the widespread use of this phenomenon by these banks as a means 
to communicate with their stakeholders. 
Moreover, the study results revealed that banks attribute a greater importance to human 
resource and product and customers disclosures, whereas the availability and extent of 
environmental disclosure was still weak. In addition, a strong association was found 
between the extent of social disclosures and bank size and financial performance 
variables. In contrast, found no significant statistical relation with the bank age. Finally, 
findings of this study suggested no difference in social disclosure behaviour between 
listed banks and banks with an overseas presence, and non-listed banks and those 
operating only in Lebanon. 
More recently, Agyei-Mensah (2012) conducted an empirical study to investigate the 
influence of firm-specific characteristics (i.e. bank size, profitability, debt equity ratio, 
liquidity and audit firm size) on the extent of voluntary disclosure in annual reports for 
the year 2009, of 21 rural banks in the Ashanti region of Ghana. To assess the level of 
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voluntary disclosure the researcher adopted 27 information items from the checklist 
developed by other researchers. A dichotomous scoring method was used whereby an 
item is scored 1 if it is disclosed and 0 if otherwise. Using regression analysis to test the 
association between selected bank attributes and the voluntary disclosure level, the 
study results indicate that profitability represented by Return on Capital Employed 
(ROCE) is positively associated with the disclosure level, while debt equity ratio, 
liquidity (measured by current ratio), bank size (represented by value of net assets) and 
audit firm size were insignificantly associated to the extent of disclosure.  
2.4 Summary and Conclusions  
This chapter has reviewed relevant empirical disclosure studies that have measured the 
extent of voluntary disclosure in the corporate annual reports and investigated its 
association with certain corporate specific-characteristics, classified as those applied to 
non-banking sector companies and those applied to banking sector companies 
specifically. The review shows that there were numerous empirical studies which 
investigated the extent of corporate voluntary disclosure and its relationship with certain 
corporate attributes in a variety of different countries, which include both the developed 
and developing countries. However, the vast majority of these studies have focused 
primary on voluntary information disclosures in non-ban ing company’s annual reports 
in those countries.  
Remarkably, all of the empirical disclosure studies reviewed in the section (2.2) have 
suggested to exclude the banking sector and other financial institutions from the sample 
due to their different reporting requirements and disclosure regulations and their 
business activates being unique from other economic sectors.  
Overall, all the prior empirical disclosure studies reviewed in this chapter employed a 
disclosure index as an appropriate research method to measure the extent of voluntary 
disclosure in corporate annual reports, with the exception of the studies which have 
examined social disclosure practices (i.e. Menassa, 2010; Abdul Hamid, 2004). The 
number of voluntary information items selected to form a disclosure index varies among 
prior disclosure studies. Most previous academic researchers who have measured the 
level of voluntary information disclosed in the annual reports have constructed a list of 
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information items based either on review of the relevant accounting literature or on their 
own perceptions.  
In these empirical disclosure studies, both weighted indices and un-weighted indices 
have been widely used by most previous researchers to determine the level of voluntary 
information disclosure in annual reports. A large number of reviewed studies measured 
the voluntary disclosure practices for a single country and a single year, while a very 
small number of these studies attempted to measure the level of voluntary disclosure 
practices cross nationally. 
Previous researchers who have attempted to measure the extent of voluntary disclosure 
in the annual reports have also sought to investigate its association with certain 
company attributes such as age, company size, listing status, profitability, liquidity, 
author type, industry type, ownership structure, and so on. 
As can be seen from sections 2.2 and 2.3, the number and types of company 
characteristics (independents variables) used to test their possible impact on the extent 
of voluntary disclosure in the annual reports varied from one study to another. The 
review of literature has also shown the majority of prior research found a relationship 
(positive/or negative) between certain corporate specific-characteristics and the extent 
of voluntary disclosure of various types of information. 
The majority of empirical voluntary disclosure studies reviewed in this chapter have 
used multiple linear regression method to test the relationship between the extent of 
voluntary disclosure practices (dependent variable) and corporate attributes. However, 
prior empirical studies have provided mixed findings in different countries in such 
relationships. 
In particular, as seen in section 2.3, there is a very small number of empirical studies 
that investigate the overall extent of voluntary disclosure and its relationship with 
certain commercial bank attributes. In addition, the empirical evidence from those 
studies was conflicting and not conclusive, some of bank-specific attributes examined in 
the reviewed studies were found to be significantly associated with the extent of 
disclosure in one study while in other studies these were found not to have a significant 
impact on the disclosure level. 
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For example, Hossain (2008) found a significant statistical relationship between 
profitability and the extent of voluntary disclosure practices in Indian banks, whilst 
similarly a study by Hossain and Taylor (2007) found no significant association 
between profitability and voluntary disclosure practices in Bangladeshi banks. In 
addition, there are other additional bank attributes that are likely to influence the extent 
of voluntary disclosures which remain unexplored (e.g. bank liquidity position, listing 
status and government ownership structure). 
Further, the present empirical evidence on the determinants of overall of voluntary 
disclosure in the annual reports of banking sector companies is very limited as 
compared to evidence from non-financial companies. Therefore, there is a need for 
more empirical evidence from different countries about the influence of bank attributes 
on the extent of voluntary disclosure to enhance a better understanding of the 
relationship between these attributes and banking disclosure. Also, much empirical 
study is still required in this area to confirm or disprove the prior findings.   
In addition, none of the studies have examined the extent of voluntary disclosure in 
annual reports of listed and unlisted commercial banks longitudinally, and examined the 
trends of voluntary disclosure practices over time from one year to the next.  In 
particular, a review of the literature of previous research shows that no empirical studies 
have documented the extent of voluntary disclosure practices in the annual reports of 
Libyan listed and unlisted commercial banks. 
Consequently, the current research attempts to fill the existing gap in the disclosure 
studies literature and contribute to ongoing research addressing voluntary disclosure 
through a longitudinal examination of the extent of voluntary disclosure in the annual 
reports of Libyan listed and unlisted commercial banks, and also to examine the 
influence of seven commercial bank-specific attributes on the overall level of voluntary 
disclosure. 
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Chapter Three 
 
Theoretical Framework for Corporate Voluntary Disclosure  
 
 
3.1 Introduction   
The main purpose of this chapter is to discuss the theoretical framework of corporate 
voluntary disclosure practice. The corporate voluntary disclosure literature has proposed 
that several academic theories may provide an explanation of voluntary disclosure 
practices by companies. The most common academic theories that have been used by 
accounting researchers to explain corporate voluntary disclosure phenomena are: 
Agency theory, Signalling theory, Capital Need theory and Legitimacy theory.  
These four prominent theories in the voluntary disclosure literature have been 
postulated as the most dominant explanatory theories attempting to explain companies’ 
incentives to disclose additional information voluntarily, and these will be reviewed in 
this chapter. However, some scholars, for example, Khlifi and Bouri (2010, p. 62) have 
concluded that: “ fter discussing different theoretical explanations of corporate 
disclosure, we conclude that there is not a definite theory conceived to explain the 
reasons that stimulate voluntary disclosure”. 
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows: Section 3.2 discusses agency 
theory, while Sections 3.3, 3.4 and 3.5 represent the signalling theory, capital need 
theory and legitimacy theory respectively. Finally, a summary and conclusion are 
presented in section 3.6. 
3.2. Agency Theory 
Agency theory, as an economic theory, was developed by Jensen and Meckling in 1976. 
In particular, this theory has been widely used by accounting researchers to explain and 
understand voluntary disclosure phenomena in many countries with a different social, 
political and economic background (e.g. Chow and Wong-Boren, 1987; Cooke, 1989a, 
1991 and 1993; Hossain et al., 1994: Hossain et al., 1995; Meek et al., 1995; 
Raffournier, 1995; Inchausti, 1997; Depoers, 2000; Haniffa and Cooke, 2002; Ferguson 
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et al., 2002; Hossain and Taylor, 2007; Chen et al., 2008; Akhtaruddin and Hossain, 
2008).  
 s highlighted by Bric er and Chandar (1998, p. 487), “current mainstream accounting 
research is based extensively on economic models of agency that represent the 
operating company (firm) manager as “agent” and the individual investor as “principal”. 
From a theoretical perspective, agency theory is mainly concerned with the principal-
agent relationship between the principals (for example, owners) and agents (for 
example, the corporate managers). 
 n agency relationship is defined as: “a contract under which one or more persons (the 
principal(s)) engage another person (the agent) to perform some service on their behalf 
which involves delegating some decision making authority to the agent” (Jensen and 
Meekling, 1976, p. 308). According to Baiman (1990), an agency relationship will exist 
after one or more principals employ others as their agents in order to delegate 
responsibilities to them. In particular, agency theory is founded on the premise of 
maximisation of individual advantage, it therefore assumes that the principal and agent 
are opportunistic and systematically seek their own self-interest and preferences 
(Lacoste et al., 2010). 
Clearly, this theory would suggest that the interests of principals and agents differ 
mainly due to their different utility functions. In this context, the agency theory 
attempted to explain how shareholders, as principals, and companies’ managers as 
agents, arrange the relationship to protect their own interests. It also tries to predict the 
conflicts of the parties within the companies (i.e. conflicts of interest between 
companies’ managers and shareholders, as can be seen in Figure 3.1), because their 
goals are not in perfect agreement (Depoers, 2000). 
The conflict of interest is described as “a situation where an individual or an 
organisation (an agent) has multiple interests and of those interests one could possibly 
corrupt the motivation for an act in the other” (Ittonen, 2010, p. 15).  
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Figure 3.1: Conflict of interest between shareholders and managers 
 
 
Source: Adapted from Ittonen (2010) which has been adapted from Soltani (2007) 
 
Lambert (2001) pointed out that there are four distinctive reasons for conflicts of 
interest between principals and agents comprising: (i) effort aversion by the agent, (ii) 
the agent can divert resources for his own consumption, (iii) divergence of time 
horizons, and (iv) differential risk aversion on the part of the agent. However, Lacoste et 
al. (2010) suggest that the conflict of interest (agency conflict), can be reduced or 
eliminated by two means: monitoring of the agent by the principal and alignment of the 
agent’s interests with that of the principal’s. 
According to agency theory perspective, the principal can limit or reduce any potential 
conflict with the agent by founding appropriate incentives for the agent and by incurring 
monitoring costs designed to limit opportunistic action by the agent (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976; Hill and Jones, 1992). 
Agency theory is concerned with solving two problems arising in the agency 
relationships: firstly an agency problem arises when the desires of the principal and 
agent conflict and it is difficult or costly for the principal to confirm how the agent is 
actually behaving, the problem here is that the principal cannot prove that the agent has 
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acted improperly, and secondly a problem of risk sharing, which arises when the agent 
and the principal have diverse attitudes toward risk, the problem here is that the 
principal and the agent may tend to select opposing actions when the risk happens 
(Eisenhardt, 1989).  
Three common solutions have been suggested by Healy and Palepu (2001) to principal-
agent problems. The first solution to the agency problem is generating optimal contracts 
between corporate insiders, as agents and outside shareholders, as principals, provide 
for corporate insiders to share in the outcome of their actions, which also encourages 
disclosure and support to align the actions and choice of management with the interests 
of stakeholders (e.g. compensation agreements and debt contracts). In their view, such 
contracts regularly necessitate corporate managers to disclose appropriate information 
to enable company sta eholders to observe the companies’ managers’ compliance with 
contractual agreements, and to assess whether the management have managed the 
company’s resources in the shareholders’ interests. 
Another important mechanism to alleviate the principal-agent problem, is the board of 
directors, who have the ability to control and discipline management on behalf of 
shareholders. Specifically, the board of directors are responsible for monitoring 
managerial performance in general, and financial disclosures in particular. A final, 
effective way of overcoming the agency problem is intermediaries (e.g. financial 
analysts, rating agencies and industry experts), involved in private information searches 
to discover managerial misapplication of company resources. As stated by Hossain et al. 
(1995) where there is a separation of ownership and control of a firm, the ‘agency costs’ 
are inevitable because of the conflicts of self-interest inherent between owners and 
management. 
In line with this view, Raffournier (1995) asserts that the separation of ownership and 
control of a firm generates ‘agency costs’ resulting from conflicting interests between 
owners and management of a firm. As Watts and Zimmerman (1979) pointed out, the 
agency costs arise because the company managers (as the agents) interests do not 
necessarily agree with the interests of shareholders (as the principals). Also, agency 
costs arise in any situation involving a cooperative by two or more persons even though 
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there is no clear cut principal-agent relationship (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Agency 
costs comprise monitoring costs, bonding costs and residual loss. 
Monitoring costs refer to the expenditure that the principals are agreeable to pay to 
facilitate the monitoring of agents’ actions, such as audit costs; bonding costs are the 
costs incurred by the agents to guarantee that they will not take certain actions to harm 
the principal’s interests, or that they will compensate the principal if he does ta e such 
action, for example, the cost of internal audit or appointing outside members to the 
board of directors; residual loss refers to the expenses that principals have to incur due 
to poor managerial decisions (Jensen and Meekling, 1976; Hill and Jones, 1992). 
It has been suggested that one of the possible ways to decrease agency costs is to 
disclose more information concerning the management activities and the economic 
reality of the firm and through such information, stakeholders and other investors can 
monitor management more appropriately (Álvarez et al., 2008). 
In this regard, Akhtaruddin and Hossian (2008) affirm that information disclosure is 
motivated by the wish of the managers to efficiently treat the potential conflicts between 
companies’ managers and sta eholders. Consistent with this view, Gray et al. (1995, pp. 
46-47) claim that “accounting information is a mechanism for conflict resolution 
between various sta eholders for both explicit and implied contracts”.  
From the agency theory point of view, both parties to a contract (the principal and the 
agent) often do not have the same information and this situation is called “asymmetric 
information” (Noreen, 1988). Typically, information asymmetry between the principal 
and the agent occurs when the agent has more information than the principal. 
More importantly, information asymmetry gives rise to moral hazard or adverse 
selection problems. Moral hazard problems arise because of the principal’s inability to 
detect the agent’s action choice and when the preference ran ings of the principal and 
the agent over the set of alternative actions diverge (Walker, 1989). Adverse selection is 
a problem that occurs when the agent has access to information preceding his action 
choice which cannot be noticed by the principal (Walker, 1989). However, moral hazard 
and the adverse selection problems can be overcome by disclosing improved public 
information (Walker, 1989).  
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In the context of the firm, the information asymmetry problem arises because outsiders 
to the economic entity (i.e. stakeholders and other investors) have limited access to 
information about the current and likely future operations of an economic entity. In 
other words, information asymmetry arises where the company managers have the 
competitive benefit of information within the company over that of the shareholders and 
other investors (Arnold and Lange, 2004). In addition, the separation of management 
and ownership awards company managers with superior information regarding 
companies’ current activities, financial position and future prospects ( squith and 
Mullins, 1986).  
Consequently, firms’ managers have superior information compared to external owners 
and other investors about the firms’ current performance and future prospects. As 
  htaruddin and Hossain (2008, p. 30) among others, affirmed: “it is well  nown that 
managers have better access to private information than outside shareholders”. Hill and 
Jones (1992) stated that company managers are in a position to filter or distort the 
information that they disclose to sta eholders and managers’ control over critical 
information complicates the agency problem. It is, therefore, problematic for 
stakeholders to identify if managers are performing in their interests. A company 
manager could mitigate the information asymmetry problem by increasing the amount 
of information they voluntarily provide to the outsiders of a company (Hossain et al.  
2005).  
It can be argued that the degree of information asymmetry between corporate managers 
and external users of financial information is particularly high in a country where 
financial reporting standards and corporate reporting requirements offer less disclosure 
(Young and Guenther, 2003). In other words, in a country with high quality accounting 
and financial reporting standards, the corporate annual reports external users may face 
fewer information asymmetry problems than a country with a low quality of accounting 
and financial reporting standards. 
Generally, due to the potential of the information asymmetry problem, management of 
the firms would simply utilise the annual reports of firms to provide additional 
information and other useful private information to outside stakeholders. As Healy and 
Palepu (2001) assert, increased demand for financial reporting and disclosure arises 
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from an information asymmetry problem and the agency conflicts between company 
insiders and outsiders. 
Moreover, companies’ managers  now that stakeholders seek to control their behaviour 
through bonding and monitoring activities, therefore they will have more incentive to 
increase the level of disclosure to convince stakeholders that they are acting optimally 
(Watson et al., 2002). In this regard, Inchausti (1997) highlights the fact that increased 
financial and non-financial information disclosure in corporate annual reports may be 
used to reduce both agency costs and information asymmetries between managers and 
outsiders. In this respect, Gray et al. (1995, p. 46) explain that clearly “the firm is 
viewed as a ‘nexus of contracts,’ and accounting information is demanded by outside 
owner-shareholders as a means of monitoring contracts with managers”.  
Accordingly, external owners and other investors require timely and reliable financial 
and non-financial information about the company in order be able to monitor the 
activities and effectiveness of management, and to make investment decisions. Hence, 
from the corporate annual reports, external users must be able to obtain information 
they need in a timely manner in the situation where they are in a position to make or 
anticipate a decision (Mustafa et al., 2007). With this regard, Imam (2000, p. 133) 
highlighted the primary focus of corporate financial reporting as follows: 
 
Financial reporting is the communication of information about an entity's 
resources, obligations, earnings, expenditures, and revenues to users. Financial 
reporting is concerned with the communication of information to those users who 
have limited authority, ability or resources to obtain the needed information. It 
communicates information about an economic entity to the users. 
 
It was recognised that the corporate financial reporting and disclosures are potentially 
important means for managers to communicate company performance and governance 
to stakeholders (Healy and Palepu, 2001) and stakeholders such as creditors, employees, 
suppliers, customers, competitors, financial analysts, and regulatory authorities are 
dependent on the information disclosed in the companies’ annual reports in making 
economic decisions and reviewing the companies’ performance. This view was 
supported by ArabSalehi and Velashani (2009) who affirm that the users of companies’ 
annual reports, and predominantly investors, require useful financial and non-financial 
information for their decision making.  
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Additionally, it has been asserted that a company disclosure is needed to evaluate the 
timing and uncertainty of present and upcoming cash flows, which will help outside 
investors to evaluate the company performance or make other economic decisions 
(Meek and Roberts, 1995). Indeed, corporate financial reporting, managerial statements, 
and security analysts’ reports all supply valuable information to sta eholders and other 
investors in the markets (Asquith and Mullins, 1986).  
As a conclusion, according to agency theory, disclosing additional information by 
companies’ managers on a voluntarily basis tends to reduce the agency costs resulting 
from conflicts between companies’ managers and shareholders. It also considers 
corporate annual reports disclosure as a mechanism to decrease information asymmetry 
between the company insiders (as agents) and outsiders’ investors (as principals).  
As underlined by Raffournier (1995) the principal-agent relationship is likely to play a 
major role in the corporate disclosure policy since those corporate annual reports can be 
utilised to reduce monitoring costs. In a similar vein, corporate financial reporting and 
disclosures play the role of a control mechanism for managers’ performance 
recognitions to which managers are likely to disclose more voluntary information 
(Khlifi and Bouri, 2010). An overview of agency theory is presented in Table 3.1.   
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Table 3.1: Agency theory overview 
 Key Idea • Principal-agent relationships should 
reflect efficient organisation of 
information and risk-bearing costs 
 Unit of Analysis • Contract between principal and agent 
 Human Assumptions • Self-interest 
• Bounded rationality 
• Risk aversion 
 Organisational Assumptions • Partial goal conflict among 
participants 
• Efficiency as the effectiveness 
criterion 
• Information asymmetry between 
principal and agent 
 Information Assumption • Information as a purchasable 
commodity 
 Contracting Problems • Agency (moral hazard and adverse         
selection) 
• Risk sharing 
 Problem Domain • Relationships in which the principal 
and agent have partly differing goals 
and risk preferences (e.g., 
compensation, regulation, leadership, 
impression management, whistle-
blowing, vertical integration, transfer 
pricing) 
  Source: Adapted from Eisenhardt, 1989. 
 
 
3.2. Signalling Theory 
Signalling theory was originally developed and used to explain information asymmetry 
in labour markets (see Spence, 1973). This theory has also been widely used by 
accounting researchers as a further theory to explain why companies voluntarily 
disclose additional information in their annual reports (e.g. Raffournier, 1995; Haniffia 
and Cooke, 2002; Walston et al., 2002; Akhtaruddin and Hossain, 2008). According to 
Morris (1987) signalling is a common phenomenon relevant in the market with 
information asymmetry; hence the signalling theory shows how this asymmetry can be 
reduced by the party with additional information signalling it to others. Moreover, 
“signalling theory provides an unique, practical, and empirically testable perspective on 
problems of social selection under conditions of imperfect information” (Connelly et al., 
2011, p. 63). 
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A signal can be a visible action or structure utilised to indicate the sign of quality, 
typically the sending of a signal is grounded on the premise that it should be positive to 
the signaller (An et al., 2011). As explained by Morris (1987), in most signalling 
models, the subsequent steps are likely to occur: essentially, sellers in the market are 
assumed to own more information about their products than buyers. In this situation, the 
buyers have no information about particular products but they have some general 
perceptions. Then the buyers will individually value the sellers’ products at the same 
price which is a weighted average of their overall perceptions. 
Under such a scenario, sellers of high average quality products incur an opportunity loss 
because their products could sell at a higher price if the buyers have been informed 
about the quality of products, whereas sellers of below average products make a chance 
gain. Alternatively, sellers of high quality products may have an incentive to withdraw 
their products from the market.  
On the other hand, sellers of superior products may have an incentive to disclose their 
information (or signal) to the market to distinguish their products from that sold by 
other sellers who have lower value products (Dye, 2001, p. 217).  As illuminated by 
Erdem and Swait (1998), sellers know better than buyers about the quality of products 
they are selling in the market (asymmetric information) and buyers cannot easily assess 
product quality (imperfect information). 
Therefore, if the quality of the product cannot be signalled to the buyers, high and low 
quality products are selling for the same price. As a consequence, high quality products 
are underestimated and low quality products overestimated. As Akerlof (1970) stresses, 
the bad products sell at the same price as good products since it is difficult for the buyer 
to recognise the difference between a good and a bad product; only the seller knows.  
There are ways by which the high quality sellers’ products can distinguish themselves. 
One is to disclose information indicating quality then the buyer can verify certain of this 
information, and such self-verification will give credibility to the rest (Easterbrook and 
Fischel, 1984). Einhorn (2007) predicted that buyers sensibly interpret nondisclosure 
information (non-signalling) regarding the seller's products being sold as “bad news”. 
Therefore, the buyers will discount the price of the product up to a point at which it is in 
the seller’s interest to reveal the information. Kirmani and Rao (2000) argue that 
64 
 
signalling may be mainly operative in the market for comparatively new products or 
products about which buyers are relatively uninformed. According to signalling theory 
the information asymmetry between sellers and the prospective buyers can be overcome 
by the sellers with more detailed information signalling it to buyers (Morris, 1987). As 
stated in Connelly et al. (2011, p. 39):    
       Signalling theory is useful for describing behaviour when two parties                  
(individuals or organizations) have access to different information. 
Typically, one party, the sender, must choose whether and how to 
communicate (or signal) that information, and the other party, the 
receiver, must choose how to interpret the signal. 
 
In the corporate disclosure scenario, signalling theory hypothesises that the managers of 
superior performance companies use corporate disclosure to send signals to 
shareholders and the capital mar et. In accordance with this theory, a firm’s information 
disclosure can be considered a signal to capital markets, directed to reduce information 
asymmetry which often exists between management and stakeholders as well as to 
increase the firm’s value (Álvarez et al., 2008). More precisely, voluntarily disclosing 
information in annual reports can be used by companies’ managers as a signal to send 
specific information to the market participants (Khlifi and Bouri, 2010). 
Based on the signalling theory viewpoint, companies’ managers are interested in 
disclosing ‘good news’ to the mar et participants in order to avoid the undervaluation of 
their shares (Inchausti, 1997). Additionally, managers of companies who are more 
interested to disclose additional information voluntarily bear in mind that this 
guarantees a good signal about their companies’ performance and wea ens information 
asymmetry (Khlifi and Bouri, 2010). Specifically, the signalling theory mainly has 
stressed the deliberate communication of positive information in an effort to express 
positive managerial attributes (Connelly et al., 2011).  
From theoretical predictions in signalling theory, the management of high performance 
companies will choose accounting policies which allow their higher performance to be 
disclosed, whereas management of lower performance companies will choose 
accounting policies which attempt to hide their poor performance (Morris, 1987). For 
example, Cai et al. (2007) state that the management of higher quality companies may 
voluntarily adopt segment reporting to disclose the superior risk-return profile of its 
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activities, whereas management of low quality companies would not (see Morris, 1987). 
Furthermore, management of higher quality companies are capable of closing the 
asymmetric information gap via using costly signals of quality, but management of poor 
quality companies are not capable of mimicking. 
Besides, signalling theory’s prediction is that managers of companies released 
additional financial as well as non-financial information to signal that their performance 
is for the best interest of stakeholders (Akhtaruddin and Hossian, 2008). Therefore, 
companies’ managers will have an incentive to disclose all positive distinguishing 
qualities in order to maximise their own self-interest (Campbell et al., 2001). For 
instance, Easterbrook and Fischel (1984) point out that a company with a good project, 
seeking to discriminate itself from a company with an average project, will disclose 
greater information.  
It has also been argued that management of a firm often attempts to adopt the same 
disclosure level as other firms within the same business. In this case, if a firm does not 
maintain the same disclosure level as others then stakeholders may be interpreted that 
the firm is hiding bad news (Victoria et al., 2009). 
Moreover, managers would voluntarily reveal additional information to stakeholders 
and other investors than required by law or any specific regulations if they perceive 
welfare from doing so (Gray et al., 1995). For example, managers of firms may attempt 
to signal that they are superior to others by revealing certain environmental or social 
disclosure in their firms’ annual reports. However, if companies’ management expect 
that an obligation to disclose more information at present might be used to hold them 
further responsible for any following poor performance and therefore they possibly will 
not desire to increase the level of disclosure in a period of poor performance (Healy and 
Palepu, 2001). 
Signalling is recognised as a feasible strategy when two situations hold: (і) for the 
management of a high-quality company, the benefits from signalling outweigh the 
benefits of any other strategy; (іі) for the management of a low-quality company, a non-
signalling strategy supplies a superior payoff than does signalling (Kirmani and Rao, 
2000).   For management companies to signal their quality successfully, the signal must 
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be credible and the credibility is achieved as eventually the true quality of the company 
will be confirmed. If the companies’ management misleadingly attempt to signal that 
they are of high quality, while they are in fact low quality, once this has been 
discovered the upcoming disclosures will not be considered credible (Watson et al., 
2002). 
Undoubtedly, managers have incentives to make self-serving voluntary disclosures; it is 
therefore unclear whether managers’ voluntary disclosures are credible. It has been 
argued by Easterbrook and Fischel (1984) that truthful information is essential to 
guarantee that money moves to managers who can utilise it most efficiently and that 
shareholders ma e ideal selections about the contents of their portfolios. Thus “a world 
without adequate truthful information, is a world with too little investment, and in the 
wrong things to boot” (Easterbrook and Fischel, 1984, P. 673). 
Healy and Palepu (2001) suggest two feasible mechanisms for enhancing the credibility 
of corporate voluntary disclosures. First, third-party intermediaries (e.g. auditors and 
financial analysts) can provide guarantees about the quality of voluntary disclosures 
made by companies. Second, preceding corporate voluntary disclosures can be validated 
via the required financial reporting itself. However, disclosing certain information 
might harm the company's competitive position and consequences in higher costs of 
disclosure, which mirrors the proprietary nature of some information (Diamond, 1985).  
As Darrough (1993) asserts, public information disclosure in annual reports can 
influence a disclosing company negatively if market participants have a plan to utilise 
the information to their benefit.Further, it is believed that information disclosed by an 
economic entity regularly benefits competitors because competitors will enhance their 
skill to learn from informative disclosure and that would aid to maximise competitive 
disadvantage for the disclosing firm (Elliott and Jacobson, 1994). Inchausti (1997) also 
indicates that managers of firms have a disincentive to disclose certain sorts of 
information for competitive causes. 
For example, Cormier and Magnan (1999) illustrate that there may be a cost from 
information disclosure when the information is utilised by external users against the 
company's benefit.   firm’s management will choose not to provide certain voluntary 
disclosures when it believes that the hazard of competitive hurt outweighs the 
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predictable advantage from revealing the voluntary disclosure of information (FASB, 
2001). In this respect, Craswell and Taylor (1992) point out that regardless of whether 
information disclosure has a positive or negative influence on the company value, costs 
will be enforced on the company if competitors, dissident stockholders or employees 
can utilise the information in a way that damages the company’s prospects.  
For instance, disseminating detailed information regarding oil and gas reserves may 
lessen their proprietary value to the disclosing firms, since competitors employ the 
information to plan their exploration and production strategies (see Craswell and 
Taylor, 1992). Elliott and Jacobson (1994) identified three categories of information 
that might generate a competitive disadvantage for the company, these are: (i) 
information about technological and managerial innovation, (ii) strategies, plans, and 
tactics, and (iii) information about operations.  
In summary, signalling theory suggests that voluntary information disclosure in 
corporate annual reports can be used as a signal in order to improve the corporate 
image/reputation, attract new investors, lower capital costs and also help to improve its 
relationships with the relevant stakeholders. This theory would also suggest that 
superior performance economic entities should signal their benefits to the markets. 
Under this theory, companies’ managers tend to ma e voluntary disclosure decisions 
over nondisclosure decisions. 
In this sense, signalling theory conceives voluntary disclosure as a signalling 
mechanism adopted by companies’ managers to distinguish themselves from others on 
achievements. As has been asserted by Álvarez et al., (2008) voluntary information 
disclosures can be considered a signal to capital markets, directed to reduce the 
asymmetry of information that often exists between insiders and outsiders of a 
company, and to enhance corporate value. 
3.3. Capital Need Theory  
The capital need theory can also help to explain the reasons behind the disclosure of 
voluntary information made by companies. This theory implies that companies’ 
managers have an incentive to disclose additional information that enables them to raise 
capital on the best available terms (Gray et al., 1995). As pointed out by Healy and 
Palepu (2001) firms’ managers who are intending to ma e capital mar et transactions 
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have motivations to disclose information voluntarily to decrease the information 
asymmetry problem and thus decrease the external financing cost. 
The capital need theory predicts that increased voluntary disclosure of information by 
the company’s managers will enable them to lower the company's cost of capital 
through reducing investor uncertainty (Schuster and O’Connell, 2006). In this respect, 
Botosan (1997) added that additional information disclosure enhances stock market 
liquidity thereby decreasing costs of equity capital either through reduced transactions 
cost or increased demand for a company’s shares. Thus, more voluntary information 
disclosure is preferable to less, in order to decrease the uncertainty surrounding a 
company’s future performance and to assist trading in shares (Hassan et al., 2011).  
According to this theory, revealing greater information in annual reports helps to attract 
new investors thereby helping to maintain a healthy demand for the company’s shares 
and a share price in the market will more accurately reflect its intrinsic value (Cooke, 
1989b). At the same time, companies with a higher level of disclosure should 
reasonably tend to gain higher stock prices over the long run (Stanga, 1976). The 
argument is that enhanced corporate disclosure is expected to lead to improvements in 
investors’ capital-allocation decisions as well as investors’ assessment of the return 
from a firm’s share (Schuster and O’Connell, 2006). 
As has been emphasised by Craven and Marston (1999, p. 323-24), there are several 
motivations that can motivate companies’ managers to get involved in voluntary 
disclosure decisions: 
One incentive for voluntary disclosure is the need to raise capital at the 
lowest possible cost. Companies might increase their voluntary disclosure 
in order to raise capital more cheaply on the markets. This will increase 
transparency and reduce information asymmetries between the company 
management and market participants. Additional disclosures may help the 
listed companies to attract new shareholders, thus enabling companies to 
maintain a healthy demand for shares with a liquid market. 
According to Firth (1980), managers of the firms will still be influenced to release more 
information to their annual reports users, particularly at the period of raising new funds 
in the stock market. This hypothesis was based on three basic assumptions: (a) 
managers of firms aspiration to raise the capital as cheaply as possible, (b) greater 
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voluntarily disclosed information may lead to a reduction in agency costs and therefore 
new capital may be raised by a firm more cheaply, and (c) providing additional 
disclosure by managers of firms helps to decrease the perceived level of investors’ 
uncertainty about the firms’ future earnings and hence investors have an incentive to 
reduce the rate of return.  
There are also suggestions that disclosing more information in annual reports by 
company managers could lead to increased stock liquidity through decreased transaction 
costs and raised demand for a firm’s securities, and also lessening the uncertainty 
surrounding the valuation of share returns (Hassan et al., 2009). In this regard, Diamond 
and Verrecchia (1991) assert that disclosing more information will improve upcoming 
liquidity of the company’s shares and this can help to reduce the company’s cost of 
equity. Additionally, disclosing more meaningful financial and non-financial 
information by the company management on a voluntary basis will considerably 
improve its credibility among mar et participants (Schuster and O’Connell, 2006).  
It has also been argued that greater information disclosure in corporate annual reports 
tends to reduce the fluctuation of a company share price. For example, Singhvi and 
Desai (1971) demonstrate empirically that poor disclosure in corporate annual reports 
probably extends fluctuations in share prices in the market, which leads to inefficient 
allocation of capital resources in the economy. As explained in Einhorn (2007, p. 246): 
“Corporate voluntary disclosure is commonly viewed in the literature as being 
motivated by the wish of the firm’s management to inflate the investors’ expectations 
about the value of the firm and thereby maximize the price at which the firm’s stoc s 
are traded in the capital mar et” (Einhorn, 2007, p. 246).  
More specifically, Soltani (2000) claims that a company’s voluntary information 
disclosure can yield three types of capital market effects, which include improved 
liquidity for their shares in the stock market; decreases in their cost of capital; and 
increases in financial analysts following the firm. In particular, companies’ information 
disclosures to capital markets will help stakeholders evaluate the companies more 
correctly and in turn can benefit managers learning of the capital market value, 
thereafter improving the company’s strategic and operational decisions (Dye, 2001, p. 
228).  
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A substantial amount of empirical disclosure research has shown that there is a negative 
relationship between the cost of equity capital and the levels of disclosure in corporate 
annual reports. For instance, Botosan (1997) found a negative relationship between a 
self-constructed measure of voluntary disclosure level and the cost of equity capital for 
firms with low analyst following. Empirical evidence of Sengupta (1998) also provides 
theoretical evidence that shows that companies having higher disclosure ratings from 
financial analysts experienced lower cost of equity capital and lower cost of debt.  
Additionally, Botosan and Plumlee (2000) also found a significant negative association 
between cost of equity capital and analyst ran ings of companies’ disclosure levels. In a 
related empirical study, Botosan and Plumlee (2002) provide further empirical evidence 
for a negative relationship between the highest level of disclosure and the cost of equity 
capital. Similarly, Hail (2002) documents a significant negative relationship between 
the extent of disclosure in the annual reports and the cost of equity capital. 
In a recent study, Gietzmann and Ireland (2005) also document evidence that the level 
of corporate voluntary disclosure was negatively associated with the cost of equity 
capital. In the context of banking voluntary disclosure, Poshakwalea and Courtis (2005) 
also document strong evidence that higher levels of voluntary disclosure are associated 
with a reduction in cost of equity capital. A more recent study by Kristandl and Bontis, 
(2007) found an expected negative association between the level of voluntary disclosure 
(forward-oriented information) and cost of equity capital.  
Consistent with the results of previous empirical disclosure research, Reverte (2012) 
also found a significant negative association between the cost of equity capital and the 
level of voluntary disclosure ratings. Thus, these empirical studies show that greater 
annual report disclosure could result in lower cost of equity capital. As has been 
concluded by Dye (2001, p. 224), “most accounting researchers would agree that, by 
disclosing more information, a firm can lower its cost of capital”. 
Besides, there is other empirical disclosure research evidence, which shows that 
increased public disclosure enhances stock market liquidity (e.g. Glosten and Milgrom, 
1985; Diamond and Verrecchia, 1991; Welker, 1995; Healy et al., 1999; Zhang and 
Ding, 2006; Heflin et al., 2005). Diamond and Verrecchia (1991) document empirical 
evidence that more information disclosed by company managers leads to reduced 
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information asymmetry, which increases the liquidity of the mar et for a company’s 
shares. 
In another study, Welker (1995) finds a negative relationship between higher analysts’ 
ratings of the corporate disclosure policy and a company’s bid-ask spread as a proxy of 
stock market liquidity. Similarly, Heflin et al. (2005) find evidence that higher quality 
disclosures are associated with higher liquidity, utilising two measures of liquidity; bid-
ask spreads and depth. More recently, Zhang and Ding (2006) provide further empirical 
evidence that greater disclosure is negatively associated with bid-ask spreads. These 
empirical disclosure studies provide clear evidence that greater disclosure in corporate 
annual reports enhances stock market liquidity. 
In spite of the apparent benefits from increased disclosed financial and non-financial 
information in corporate annual reports, which includes enhanced liquidity and a lower 
cost of capital, some argue that there is an incentive for company managers to withhold 
information because a shortage of information obstructs the capacity of investors and 
other users to monitor companies effectively (Karamanou and Vafeas, 2005). 
In addition, it assumes that disclosure of information concerning enhanced prospects 
that are ambiguous and unverifiable at the time of disclosure releases a company to 
possible legal action, should the final consequence be inauspicious (Kothari, 2000). 
Furthermore, shareholders and other interested parties might suspect or misinterpret the 
managers’ intentions when they release additional information to the mar et with no 
legal obligation to do so (Hassan, et al., 2009).   
Overall, from theoretical predictions in capital need theory, it can be seen that greater 
annual report disclosure can help to reduce the problem of information asymmetry 
which often exists between the company management and its shareholders, it improves 
stock liquidity, and lowers the cost of raising finance in the markets for disclosing a 
company. 
Indeed, the existing disclosure literature has provided empirical evidence which 
supports these theoretical predictions. As Collett and Hrasky (2005 p. 190) affirmed 
“Consistent with the capital market transactions hypothesis, empirical evidence suggests 
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that, in general, voluntary disclosure is associated with positive capital market 
outcomes”. 
3.4. Legitimacy Theory 
The legitimacy theory is derived from the broader political economy perspective and 
has also been used as a further academic theory in accounting literature to explain 
managements’ motivations for particular voluntarily information disclosure. 
Specifically, this theory has been employed extensively as an explanatory theory by 
earlier accounting scholars to explain the motivations behind voluntary corporate social 
and environmental disclosures (e.g. Guthrie and Parker, 1989; Patten, 1991; Gray et al., 
1995; Deegan and Gordon, 1996; Brown and Deegan, 1998; Wilmhurst and Frost, 2000;  
Milne and Patten, 2002; O'Donovan, 2002; O'Dwyer, 2002; Deegan et al., 2000, 2002; 
Watson et al., 2002; Nik Ahmad and Sulaiman, 2004; Luft Mobus, 2005; Bebbington et 
al., 2008;  Laan, 2009; Cowana and Deegan, 2011).  
As Van der Laan (2009, p. 20) noted “from the early 1980s, legitimacy theory has been 
employed by researchers who sought to examine social and, more particularly, 
environmental accounting practice”. In line with this view, Deegan et al. (2002) 
emphasise that legitimacy theory seems to be the most commonly employed theory in 
social and environmental disclosure research. The term “legitimacy” has been defined 
and interpreted in many various ways by several authors. Legitimacy is defined by 
Lindblom (1994, cited in Gray et al., 1995, p. 54) as: 
…a condition or status which exists when an entity’s value system is congruent 
with the value system of the larger social system of which the entity is a part. 
When a disparity, actual or potential, exists between the two value systems, there 
is a threat to the entity’s legitimacy.  
 
Suchman (1995, p. 574) also defines legitimacy which is drawn from the concept of 
organisational legitimacy as “a generalised perception or assumption that the actions of 
any entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed system 
of norms, values, beliefs and definitions”. Legitimacy as described by Scott (1992, p. 
305) “is the property of a situation or behaviour that is defined by a set of social norms 
as correct and appropriate”. According to Tyler (2006), legitimacy is a perceived 
commitment to social authorities or to present social arrangements.  
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The concept of “legitimacy” is “loosely referring to socially accepted and expected 
structures or behaviours” (Mitchell et al., 1997, p. 866). Mitchell et al. (1997) further 
specified that it is commonly linked implicitly with that of power when individuals try 
to assess the nature of social relationships. In the same vein, Krapeis and Arnoid (1996) 
point out that, the concept of legitimacy is a complex issue since legitimacy is defined 
in different ways by various writers. In terms of organisational legitimacy, O’Donovan 
(2002, p. 347) claimed the following:  
The status of a corporation’s legitimacy may be difficult to establish, 
given that a corporation’s legitimacy is based on social perceptions and 
values which can and do change over time. In order to manage 
legitimacy, corporations need to know how legitimacy can be gained, 
maintained or lost.  
Suchman (1995) distinguishes between three broad types of organisational corporate 
legitimacy; pragmatic legitimacy, moral legitimacy, and cognitive legitimacy. The first 
type, pragmatic legitimacy, is based on the self-interested calculations of a company’s 
most immediate stakeholders. The second type, moral legitimacy, is based on judgments 
about whether the activity is “the right thing to do”, rather than whether the activity 
benefits a company evaluator (stakeholders).  
A third type, cognitive legitimacy, is based on comprehensibility or ‘ta en-for-
grantedness’, rather than on the sta eholders’ self-interest. Each type of legitimacy 
utilised an appropriate strategy for gaining, maintaining, and repairing legitimacy (see 
Table 3.1). In addition, Suchman (1995, p. 577) made the following comment about all 
three types of organisational corporate legitimacy (pragmatic legitimacy, moral 
legitimacy, and cognitive legitimacy):   
All three types involve a generalized perception or assumption that 
organizational activities are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some 
socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions. 
However, each type of legitimacy rests on a somewhat different behavioral 
dynamic.  
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Table 3.2: Legitimation strategies 
                       Gain                                               Repair                                    Maintain                                                                                                                                           
General       Conform to environment      Perceive change                                           Normalize 
                    Select environment             Protect accomplishments                                Restructure 
                                                                 -Police operations 
                                                                  -Communicate subtly 
                                                                  -Stockpile legitimacy 
                   Manipulate environment                                                                              Don't panic 
Pragmatic       Conform to demands                  Monitor tastes                                   Deny                                                                                                                      
-Respond to needs                     -Consult opinion leaders 
                          -Co-opt constituents 
                          -Build reputation 
 
                        Select markets                           Protect exchanges                           Create monitors 
                        -Locate friendly                         -Police reliability 
                           audiences                                 -Communicate honestly 
                         -Recruit friendly co-optees        -Stockpile trust 
 
                         Advertise  
                         -Advertise product 
                       -Advertise image 
Moral       Conform to ideals                     Monitor ethics                            Excuse/justify 
                    -Produce proper outcomes             -Consult professions                           
                    -Embed in institutions                 
                    -Offer symbolic displays                 
                                                                        
                     Select domain                            Protect propriety                                 Disassociate 
                     -Define goals                               -Police responsibility                        -Replace personnel 
                                                                          -Communicate authoritatively           -Revise practises                                                                                                                                                                                  
                                                                          -Stockpile esteem                                -Reconfigure                          
                     Persuade 
                     -Demonstrate success 
                   -Proselytise 
Cognitive      Conform to models                      Monitor outlooks                                       Explain  
                       -Mimic standards                            -Consult doubters                                                       
                       -Formalise operations 
                       -Professionalise operations           
                        Select labels                              Protect assumptions 
                      -Seek certification                         -Police simplicity 
                                                                            -Speak matter-of-factly 
                                                                            -Stockpile interconnections  
                                                                                                        
                     Institutionalise 
                       -Persist 
                       -Popularise new models 
                      -Standardise new models 
Source, Suchman, 1995  
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Legitimacy theory is grounded in the concept that the economic entity operates in 
society through a “social contract” where it agrees to carry out different socially desired 
activities in return for approval of its objectives, other rewards and its continued 
existence (Gurthrie and Parke, 1989; Watson et al., 2002; Deegan, 2002). 
The ‘social contract’ represents the multitude of implicit and explicit expectations that 
society has about how an economic entity should conduct its activities (Newsona and 
Deegan, 2002; Guthrie et al., 2004). Accordingly, society will allow the economic entity 
to continue its operations if it complies with the social contract. Under the social 
contract, managers of firms must carry out their activities within the predictions and 
norms of the society at large, not only shareholders’ predictions and norms (Davey and 
Eggleton, 2011). 
According to legitimacy theory, companies are expected to carry out their operations 
within the boundaries of what is deemed satisfactory by the community (Wilmshurst 
and Frost, 2000). Specifically, the insights provided by legitimacy theory would suggest 
that economic entities exist in society under social contract which can be either explicit 
or implicit. Therefore, an economic entity is expected to comply with the terms of this 
‘contract’, and these expressed or implied terms are not static (Brown and Deegan, 
1998).  
In this context, O’Donovan (2002) indicated, in order for organisations to continue 
operating successfully in the market, they must conduct their operations within the 
bounds and norms (social contract) of their respective societies. Based on this 
perspective, failure of a company management to comply with the terms of the ‘social 
contract’ will bring social sanctions on the company, and may ultimately lead to loss of 
legitimacy.  
In other words, if the company does not seem to operate within the bounds and norms of 
that behaviour which is considered by the relevant society as right, then society may act 
to eliminate the company's rights to continue operations. In this view, Brown and 
Deegan (1998) stressed that companies will be punished if they do not work in a manner 
consistent with the societal expectations. Moreover, Cowan and Deegan (2011) argued 
that the fundamental target of legitimating business operations is to gain, maintain or 
repair legitimacy from the business’s relevant publics.  
76 
 
As stressed by Elsbach and Sutton (1992) the organisational legitimacy is conferred 
when stakeholders who are affected by organisational outcomes, authorise and support 
an organisation's goals and activities. In addition, legitimacy is important for any 
organisation because it eases the access to funds needed for their survival (Ivanova and 
Castellano, 2010). 
It also can improve both the stability and the comprehensibility of the company 
activities, and these two aspects of a legitimised organisation often enhance each other 
(Suchman, 1995). However, as pointed out by Suchman (1995) legitimacy varies from 
industry to industry, from state-owned companies to private companies, from new 
companies to old companies, or from the commencement of the companies’ life cycle to 
the end. As illustrated by Zimmerman and Zeitz (2002), industries have varying degrees 
of legitimacy, grounded in a range of activities and significances stemming from the 
shared action of industry participations. 
For instance, the oil industry's reputation has been tarnished by highly observable oil 
spills, the chemical industry has been criticised in the past by environmental groups, 
which may have lessened legitimacy, and in contrast, several well-established industries 
have high levels of legitimacy such as, banking and medicine (see Zimmerman and 
Zeitz, 2002, p. 421). It could be argued that this is not the case anymore, since the 
financial crisis, banks have lost legitimacy and credibility.  
The legitimacy theory assumes that the growth of public awareness and concern will 
result in managers of the companies taking procedures to make sure their actions and 
performance are acceptable to their communities (Wilmshurst and Frost, 2000). So 
management of companies would voluntarily reveal information on actions when they 
perceived that the specific actions were expected by the societies in which their 
companies function (Guthrie et al., 2004). 
In addition, the legitimacy theory would suggest that a company’s disclosure practices 
are a tool to establishing or protecting the company’s legitimacy in that they may affect 
both stakeholders decisions and policy (Tilt and Symes, 1999). It seems, therefore, that 
corporate disclosures can be used to show that the corporate firm is conforming with 
public expectations, or otherwise, they could be utilised to modify societal expectations 
(Deegan et al., 2002). 
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As Singh and Point (2009) state, the objective of corporate disclosures in annual reports 
such as voluntarily disclosed information would be to communicate the business’s  
values and activities that not only comply with relevant law and regulation but also with 
societal expectations (Singh and Point, 2009). 
Again, this theory advocates that corporate voluntary disclosures are considered as part 
of a process of legitimation (Van der Laan, 2009). Because of their role in society, 
economic entities are required to disclose an adequate amount of financial information 
as well as non-financial information to demonstrate that they are fulfilling their 
obligations to society.  
As Tsang (1998) asserts, a sufficient amount information needs to be disclosed for 
society to measure how far a company is a good corporate citizen. According to Brown 
and Deegan (1998) legitimacy theory posits that managers of companies continually 
attempt to ensure that their activities and performance are within the boundaries and 
norms of their respective society. In this respect, changes in social norms and values are 
considered one motivation for corporate change and also one source of pressure for 
corporate legitimation (O’Donovan, 2002).  s has been affirmed by Deegan et al. 
(2002) expectations of the public will change over time and therefore the management 
of a company need to provide disclosure to illustrate that it is also changing, since 
change actions without telling the relevant publics of such changes might be considered 
to be inadequate. 
It has been emphasised that the legitimacy of the company will be threatened when 
there is a conflict between the relevant community’s expectations of the business 
performance and the business’s actual performance; this is referred to as a ‘legitimacy 
gap’ (Brown and Deegan, 1998). Consistent with this argument, Van der Laan (2009) 
point out that a legitimacy gap arises when the organisational performance does not 
meet the expectations of ‘relevant publics’ or primary sta eholder groups. 
A legitimacy gap is a dynamic concept, since the business performance and social 
expectations change across time and they respond to environmental change and 
corporate behaviour (Sethi, 2003). More precisely, Wartick and Mahon (1994, p. 302) 
indicated that the legitimacy gap occurs as a result of three reasons: (a) corporate 
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performance changes while societal expectations of corporate performance remain the 
same, (b) societal expectations of corporate performance change while corporate 
performance remain the same, and (c) both corporate performance and societal 
expectations of corporate performance change, but they diverge or move in the same 
direction with a lead/lag relationship.  
A continually widening gap would cause an economic entity to lose its legitimacy and 
thereby threaten its survival (Sethi, 1979). Most importantly, failure of the management 
company to close the legitimacy gap outcomes will be withdrawn by certain 
communities (Eccles et al., 2004). Hence, it is particularly important that company 
managers must struggle to confine the legitimacy gap. Because narrowing the 
legitimacy gap will help their companies to appeal to their quota of society’s physical 
and human resources and to uphold the highest discretionary control over its outside 
transactions as well as its  internal decision-making (Sethi, 1979). In accordance with 
this theory, voluntary disclosures provided in annual reports can be utilised to narrow 
the legitimacy gap between how the business desires to be perceived and how it actually 
functions (Campbell, 2000). 
Furthermore, legitimacy theory posits that managers of firms require disclosing 
meaningful information to legitimise their firms’ actions and satisfy the information 
needs of various stakeholders regardless of the economic situations, whether good or 
bad (Mia and Al- Mamun, 2011). It has also been advocated that providing additional 
information (financial and non-financial information) will enhance the corporate image, 
accordingly improving their opportunities to muster community support to overturn 
political actions (Craswell and Taylor, 1992).  
Lindblom (1994, cited in Gray et al., 1995) suggested four broad legitimation strategies 
that managers of companies may adopt to close a perceived legitimacy gap:  
• Managers of companies may seek to educate and inform their “relevant publics” 
about (actual or planned) changes in the companies’ performance and activities.  
• Managers of companies may seek to change the perceptions of the relevant 
publics without changing their actual performance.    
79 
 
• Managers of companies may seek to manipulate perception by deflecting 
attention from the issue of concern to other related issues through an appeal to, 
for example, emotive symbols.  
• Managers of companies may seek to change external expectations about their 
performance. 
In relation to the managers’ legitimising strategies which are suggested by Lindblom 
(1994), Gray et al. (1995) explain the situations under which each of the four strategies 
managers may choose to remain legitimate: the first strategy can be chosen in response 
to a realisation that the “legitimacy gap” arose as a result of failure of performance of 
the company. The second strategy can be adopted when the management company 
perceives that the legitimacy gap has arisen due to misperceptions on the part of the 
relevant publics.  
The third strategy can be selected when managers of companies want to manipulate; for 
example, when a firm with a legitimacy gap concerning its pollution performance 
selects to ignore the pollution and moves the discourse towards its participation with 
environmental charities. The fourth strategy can be used when the corporate managers 
consider that shareholders have unrealistic or incorrect expectations of their 
accountabilities. In addition, O’Donovan (2002) further identified four steps that must 
be implemented by an organisation to manage its legitimacy effectively:  
(i) identify its conferring communities; 
(ii)  find its conferring communities’ social and environmental values and 
perceptions of the organisation; 
(iii) determine the purpose or intention of any probable organisational reaction to 
legitimacy threats; and, 
(iv) determine what policies and disclosure choices are available and suitable for 
managing legitimacy, connected to the purpose of the organisational response. 
To sum up, in light of the theoretical arguments discussed above, the legitimacy theory 
is founded on the notion that there is a social contract between an economic entity and 
the society in which it activates. This theory suggests that voluntary information 
disclosures are part of a process of legitimation and used as a device for economic 
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entities to demonstrate that their activities are in consensus with the bounds and norms 
of their respective society. Besides, according to the legitimacy based arguments, 
voluntarily disclosing additional information in corporate annual reports is an effort to 
alleviate public pressure or legitimate a company’s actions.  
As predicted by legitimacy theory, managers of firms would voluntarily disclose more 
information of actions if they perceived that the specific actions were expected by the 
publics in which their companies operate (Guthrie et al., 2004). Based upon the 
theoretical perspectives provided by legitimacy theory, it seems this theory may not 
provide a comprehensive foundation for an explanation of overall voluntary disclosure 
practices by financial and non-financial companies, however it can partially provide an 
explanation for managerial motivation to voluntarily disclose social and environmental 
information. 
 
3.6 Summary and Conclusions  
This chapter has discussed the most common academic theories that have attempted to 
explain why companies voluntarily disclose information in their annual reports, namely 
agency theory, signalling theory, capital need theory, and legitimacy theory. These 
theories have been developed and used to provide explanatory insights to voluntary 
corporate disclosure phenomena. However, there is no single theory offering a 
satisfactory explanation of the voluntary disclosure behaviour since each of these 
theories has its own particular assumptions and it explains voluntary corporate 
disclosure phenomena through a specific theoretical viewpoint. Such a view was 
supported by Khlifi and Bouri (2010, p. 62) who affirm that “in spite of the need to 
develop a specific theory of disclosure, there is not a definite one that has been 
conceived to satisfy this requirement”.  
It is obvious that up to now there is no agreement within academic theory, which 
attempts to provide a theoretical explanation for voluntary disclosure practices by 
companies. It is supposed that by using theoretical triangulation or more than one theory 
may help accounting researchers and others to better understand the motivations for 
corporate voluntary disclosure practices.  
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It is noteworthy that company disclosure is a complex phenomenon that cannot be 
explained by using one theory (Cormier et al., 2005). Furthermore, Morris (1987, p. 52) 
highlighted that: “given the consistency, signalling and agency theories, it is 
conceivably possible to combine them to yield predictions about accounting choices not 
obtainable from either theory alone”. Morris (1987) elaborates further that the 
prediction of accounting (financial reporting) policy choices can at least be enhanced 
through mixing or adding together the predictions from each theory.   
Accordingly, for the purpose of the current study, agency theory and signalling theory 
will be adopted to form the research expectations and to formulate the testable 
hypotheses in Chapter Six, and will also be used to interpret the results achieved from 
empirical investigation in chapters six and seven. By integrating agency theory with 
aspects of signalling theory in this research study, it will provide a useful theoretical 
framework for understanding and gaining a better insight into the motivations behind 
disclosing more information voluntarily in the annual reports of listed and unlisted 
Libyan commercial banks, rather than using a single theoretical perspective (theory).  
The next chapter will give an overview of the background to Libya and its banking 
sector while the research methodology and the research hypotheses will be discussed in 
Chapter Six.   
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Chapter Four 
  
Libyan Background and Banking Sector 
 
 
 
4.1 Introduction  
Different corporate financial reporting and disclosure practices often come from the 
different social, historical, political, economic and legal systems that prevail within 
countries (Nobes, 1983; Cairns, 1988; Gray, 1988; Kettunen, 1993). A common view 
among accounting researchers is that “Each country’s financial reporting practices 
follow a set of principles, rules, or conventions that have evolved in the political, legal, 
economic, and cultural environments of that country” (Qureshi, 1979, cited in Ding et 
al., 2008, p. 145).  As Chand et al. (2008, p. 120) noted, “countries are inclined to adopt 
a financial reporting system that is aligned with the prevailing financial system in the 
country”. 
Financial reporting and disclosure practices cannot, therefore, be studied in isolation of 
country specific factors. Certainly, the discussion of environmental factors will help in 
interpreting the current research findings in ways that help in gaining a better 
understanding of the Libyan commercial banking voluntary disclosure phenomenon. 
Hence, this chapter aims to provide an overview of the Libyan environment and its 
general background, which includes the geographical and population, historical, 
political, and economic background and current economic development. The chapter 
also intends to explore the Libyan banking sector, its historical and recent 
developments; it will then review the Libyan Stock Market (LSM) and its contribution 
to the national economy. 
Consequently, the remainder of the chapter is organised as follows: Section 4.2 provides 
a comprehensive overview of the general background of Libya, which includes 
geography of Libya (4.2.1) and population of Libya (4.2.2), a brief historical and 
political bac ground (4.2.3), and overview of Libya’s economy (4.2.4). Section 4.3 
presents the Libyan Stock Market (LSM), includes a brief history of the LSM (4.3.1), 
followed by objectives behind the establishment of the LSM (4.3.2), the general listing 
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requirements (4.3.3), and  special listing requirements (4.3.4). Section 4.4 is devoted to 
examining the banking sector in Libya, which includes a brief history of the Libyan 
ban ing sector (4.4.1), Libya’s ban ing sector reforms (4.4.2), and the structure of the 
Libyan banking sector (4.4.3). Finally, a summary and conclusions of this chapter are 
presented in Section 4.6.   
4.2 The Libyan Background 
This section contains a comprehensive overview of the general background of Libya, 
which is organised into three subsections: subsection 4.2.1 gives a brief outline of the 
geographical bac ground, the country’s population is represented in subsection 4.2.2, 
and subsection 4.2.3 deals with the historical and political background of Libya; this is 
followed by a brief review of the Libyan economic background and current 
developments which are discussed in subsection 4.2.4.  
4.2.1 Geography of Libya 
Libya is located in the north-central part of Africa (see Figure 4.1); it is bounded on the 
north by the Mediterranean Sea, on the south by Niger and Chad, on the east by Egypt, 
on the southeast by Sudan, on the west by Algeria, and on the northwest by Tunisia (see 
Figure 4.2). The total area of Libya is about 1,775,500 square kilometres (685,000 
square miles), as large as France, Italy, Spain, and Germany combined.  
Libya is the fourth country in size among the countries of Africa and the fifteenth 
among the countries of the world (Metz, 1987, p.46). Almost 45% of the land of Libya 
is desert, while 19% is arable land, 17% is permanent crops, 20% is pastures, and 4% is 
forest (Plan Bleu, 2002). Libya has regional sea ranges of about 12 nautical miles and to 
the Gulf of Sidra closing line of 32º 30' north; it lies on the southern coast of the 
Mediterranean Sea with a length of about 1,770 kilometres. The Mediterranean coast 
and the Sahara desert are the country’s most noticeable natural geographies. 
 
  
84 
 
   
                 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.1                                     Figure 4.2 
            
  Figure 4.1: Location of Libya in the African continent 
  Source: http://worldatlas.com/webimage/countrys/africa/ly.htm   
 
   Figure 4.2: Libya and its borders 
           Source: http://www.africa.upenn.edu/Country_Specific/Libya.html   
 
Libya’s location is tropical and semi-tropical with large areas of desert, meaning the 
temperature in the country does not differ significantly from one region to another. In 
general, the climate condition in Libya is very hot in the summer except for the coast, 
Green Mountain and the West Mountain, and it is moderate to cold in the winter 
months. There is increased temperature range between day and night, summer and 
winter with the trend towards the south away from the influences of the Mediterranean 
climate. 
The average temperatures in most areas on the country's north sea coast during the 
summer are about 30°C, but temperatures tend to be higher in the south than the 
northern regions in summer months; afternoon temperatures are usually recorded at over 
48°C.  The relative wetness is very high, especially in the summer months, in the 
coastal regions due to wet winds from the sea, and it is very low in the south of Libya 
because the surface is barren and far away from marine influences.  
Libya is of great geo-strategic importance (see Figure 4.3): it is placed within easy reach 
of most European countries and links the Arab nations of North Africa with the Middle 
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Eastern Arab countries. Libya also links the Mediterranean countries and those Sub-
Saharan African countries, which facilitates the movement of goods, services, and 
traveller traffic. 
Libya’s location in the eastern basin of the Mediterranean Sea against the European 
coast has also helped to link directly to European countries, making it easy to transport 
crude oil to European industrial countries at the lowest cost and in the shortest time, 
making it superior to the Arabian Gulf oil countries. It is widely ac nowledged that “the 
country is geographically ideally positioned to supply the lucrative Western markets. 
Europe lies a short distance across the Mediterranean Sea, and journey times for tankers 
to the US are shorter than from the currently volatile Persian Gulf region” (Badcock, 
2005, p. 35). 
 
 
Figure 4.3: Libya’s Location on the globe 
Source: http://www.freeworldmaps.net/africa/libya/location.html 
4.2.2 Population of Libya  
Libya’s population was estimated at approximately 6.423 million in 2011, according to a 
United Nations (UN) report published that year. This was increased from about 1.029 
million inhabitants in 1950. The median age of the country’s population in 1950 was 
19.0, whereas in 2011 it was 26.0. The population of Libya is expected to reach 7.465 
million in 2025 as reported by the UN in 2011. In 2011, about 30.7% of Libyans were 
estimated to be under the age of fifteen, while a mere 6.7% of them were over sixty 
years. Life expectancy is 72.7 years for men and 77.9 years for women (UN, 2011). In 
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spite of significant increases expected in the size of the Libyan population in the near 
future, however, the Libyan population is still very small compared with its land size. 
Libyan citizens are Muslims of Arab and North African origin, and the state religion is 
Islam. The available data indicates that around two-thirds of Libyans live in cities along 
the Mediterranean coast, with one-third living in the east region and a small portion 
living in the south. The national and official language of Libya is Arabic, while English, 
French and Italian are limited to their use in trade and tourism. Most of the Libyan 
population lives in the northern region with 85% of the population on 10% of the land 
area (World Health Organization, 2011). 
4.2.3 Historical and political background 
Before Libya became an independent country in 1951, it has a complex early history 
dating back to 10,000 years BC, when Neolithic cultures broke cattle and cultivated 
crops in the coastal region (Ahlbrandt, 2001). Proceeding to its independence, Libya 
was subject to wave after wave of military invasions and occupation by the Phoenicians, 
the Carthaginians, the Greeks, the Romans, the Vandals, the Byzantines, the Turks of 
the Ottoman Empire, the Spanish and finally Italians (Farley, 1971; Fisher, 1985; 
Ahlbrandt, 2001).The Turks of the Ottoman Empire occupied Libya in the mid-16th 
century; Libya remained part of their empire (1551-1911) until Italy invaded on 3 
October 1911. 
Italy’s Libyan colonisation separated the country into three counties, Tripolitania in the 
west, Cyrenaica in the east, and Fezzan in the south. These regions faced miserable 
conditions throughout the period of Italian colonial rule until 1943. More precisely, the 
policy of Italian Fascism undertaken in Libya was unique, as has been described by 
Anderson (1984, p. 346): 
In fact, the Italian occupation was to present an attempt to dismantle a regular, 
extensive political and economic system and to replace it with a second system 
that had few ties and no precedents in the province and, as it soon became clear, 
no place for local participation. The jihad was a simple and eloquent way to 
describe and to rally support for the defense of the new status quo, of the 
structures by which the province -particularly its notables-had been linked over 
the previous seventy-six years to the political and economic system of the 
Ottoman Empire. 
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However, Libyans did not give in to colonialism and rejected the Italian settlement; 
Libyans fought many battles across the country against the Italian occupation. Omar al-
Mukhtar was the most prominent leader of the jihad against the Italian occupation as the 
leader of the jihadist movement in the Green Mountain area. 
After defeating Italy in World War II, Libya fell under the Allies army occupation from 
1943 to 1949, and it divided again: Tripolitania and Cyrenaica were controlled by 
Britain, while Fezzan was under the administration of the French. On November 21, 
1949, the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) approved a determination which 
said that the three separate counties (Tripolitania, Cyrenaica and the Fezzan) had to be 
established as completely self-governing, becoming an independent sovereign state no 
later than the first of January 1952. On December 24, 1951, Libya gained its 
independence as the United Libyan Kingdom (the official state name). It became the 
first African state to achieve independence from European rule and the first and only 
state created by the General Assembly of the United Nations (Paoletti, 2011). 
After the declaration of its independence in December 1951, Libya announced a 
constitutional and a hereditary monarchy ruled by King Idris Al-Sanussi, with a federal 
constitutional system. The country was divided into the three provinces of Tripolitania, 
Cyrenaica and Fezzan based on the constitution promulgated in October 1951. In April 
1963, the federal system was replaced by a unified system; the United Kingdom of 
Libya became the Libyan kingdom thereafter. 
  few years later, on September 1st, 1969, a military coup d’état occurred in the city of 
Benghazi. It was carried out by a small group of army officers, and abruptly ended the 
hereditary monarchy which had ruled the country for approximately two decades. After 
that, the official name of Libya (the Libyan kingdom) was immediately changed to the 
Libyan Arab Republic, and the country was then ruled by the Revolutionary Command 
Council (RCC).  
The RCC disseminated a decree in November 1976 to create the General National 
Congress of Arab Socialist Union (ASU), which was de facto the only legally permitted 
party in Libya. “Domestically, the RCC. sought to directly involve the Libyan masses in 
the programmes of the revolution by organising them into a Nasser- style Arab Socialist 
Union which was an alliance of wor ing people” (Hajjar, 1980, p. 184). 
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Shortly afterwards the  SU was officially renamed to be became the General People’s 
Congress (GPC) in 1977, intended to replace the RCC, which had been the uppermost 
political authority in Libya since the Constitutional Declaration of 1 December 1969. 
On 2nd March 1977, a new political direction took form in the country, after the GPC 
adopted the “Declaration of the Establishment of the People’s  uthority” and 
proclaimed that Libya was the Socialist People’s Libyan  rab Jamahiriya “state of the 
masses”.   s stated by (Hajjar, 1980, p. 187) 
Political power was transferred to the basic people's congresses, their committees, 
and the General People's Congress. Also, the traditional form of government, 
along with the institutions and offices of the Cabinet, Ministers, Directors, 
etcetera, were abolished in favour of a General Secretariat of the General People's 
Congress, comprised of a Secretary-General and a number of other Secretaries, 
each responsible for one of the activities of the state.  
 
Among the RCC members, Muammar Al-Gaddafi turned out to be the leader of the 
RCC as well as Commander in Chief of the Libyan armed forces and eventually as in 
fact Head of Libya, practicing unlimited authority for more than four decades until 
February 17, 2011 when the Libyan revolution took place. The Libyan revolution 
exploded against the Al-Gaddafi regime’s repressive policies. On February 27, 2011, 
the Libyan rebels proclaimed the creation of an Interim Transitional National Council 
(ITNC) in the city of Benghazi, which was intended as an interim government instead of 
the Gaddafi regime.  
On August 3, 2011, the ITNC issued a Draft Constitutional Charter for the Transitional 
Stage. It was intended to address Libyans’ concerns about the ITNC’s authority as an 
unelected committee. The Constitutional Declaration was composed of 37 Articles 
divided into five chapters: (1) general national principles; (2) rights and public 
freedoms; (3) transition to an interim government; (4) judicial guarantees; and (5) the 
status of existing laws. In addition, the document confirmed the ITNC as the only 
legitimate governing power of Libya up to the declaration of liberation. 
The UN General Assembly in September 2011 recognised the ITNC as the legitimate 
governing authority for the Libyan state. The liberation of Libya was formally 
announced on October 23, 2011, after the overthrow of the Al-Gaddafi regime. The 
announcement of liberation mar ed the end of the Libyan people’s armed struggle and 
the formal start of the country’s transition to a new political order (Blanchard, 2011).  
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In November 2011, the ITNC established a transitional government. Afterward, on the 
7th February 2012, the ITNC approved the election law and created the Supreme 
Election Commission (SEC), whose role was to prepare for elections for the General 
National Conference (GNC), to comprise of 200 elected representatives.  On August 8, 
2012, the authority of the TNC was transferred to the GNC, which was elected on 7 July 
2012 and will continue to manage the general affairs of the country for a year and a 
half.  
4.2.4 Overview of Libya’s economy  
  
4.2.4.1 Libya’s economy before the discovery of crude oil 
Before the discovery of significant crude oil reserves in 1959, Libya was one of the 
poorest countries in the world, with depressing economic prospects (Wright, 1981; 
World Bank, 2006). During that time, Libya was basically dependent on foreign 
financial aid, and the country’s economy was based largely on the agriculture sector, 
which employed more than 70 % of the labour force, contributed about 30 % of the 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP), and was reliant on climatic conditions (World Bank, 
2006). Libyans’ economic conditions before crude oil was discovered in the country 
was described by Higgins (1968, p. 819), an economist who had worked as consultant to 
Libyan government since the country gained independence in 1951 as follows: 
In 1952 Libya seemed to be an almost hopeless case. Its great merit as a case 
study is as a prototype of a poor country. We need not to construct abstract 
models of an economy where the bulk of people live on a subsistence level, 
where per capita income is well below $50 per year, where there are no sources 
of power and no mineral resources, where agricultural expansion is severely 
limited by climatic conditions, where capital formation is zero or less, where 
there is no skilled labour supply and no indigenous entrepreneurship. When 
Libya became an independent nation…it fulfils all these conditions. If Libya 
can be brought to a stage of sustained growth, there is hope for every country in 
the world. 
After Libya gained its independence in 1951, prospects for economic growth were 
extremely “blea ” and the country’s economy was “deficient” to an extraordinary extent 
(Bait-EI-mal et al. 1973; Mahmud and Russell, 2003). Difficult economic conditions 
forced the first Libyan government at the time of its independence to seek foreign 
financial assistance to finance economic and social development from different United 
Nations organisations and countries such as the United States, the United Kingdom, and 
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France. The foreign assistance became the main financier of development plans in 
Libya. In 1959-1960, more than 58% of Libya’s state budget came from foreign aid 
(Hamdan, 1996, p. 86).  
Libya’s agricultural sector was noticeable during that period because it was primitive in 
production methods and tools, in addition to other problems which had a negative 
influence on the agricultural sector, such as tribal ownership for most agricultural land 
and the shortage of capital and water resources. Furthermore, no modern industrial 
sector existed in any shape during this period-the industrial activity was confined to 
some traditional industries such as textiles and handicrafts which are usually carried out 
by families. 
There were other simple industries which relied mostly on local agricultural and 
livestock production, such as flour, clothing, footwear, and olive oil squeezing. Most of 
these industries were mainly characterised by their seasonal nature due to their 
dependence on the agricultural sector, and they participated in the absorption of labour 
as well as a modest share in the GDP. Overall, the Libyan economy continued to be 
deeply dependent on external financial aid until the discovery of crude oil in the country 
in 1959. 
4.2.4.2 Libya’s economy after the discovery of crude oil 
After the discovery of crude oil in commercial quantities in Libya in 1959, and the start 
of export in 1961, the social and economic conditions in the country witnessed rapidly 
changed. More precisely, following the discovery of crude oil the Libyan economy 
dramatically shifted from a deficit economy to a surplus economy; this led to significant 
changes in the Libyan economic structure and the structure of both exports and imports. 
 s John (2008, p. 76) pointed out “Libya moved from a stagnant to an exploding 
economy, from a capital-deficit state to a capital-surplus state, from an aid recipient to 
an aid extender”. In addition, Metz (1987, p. 30) also stated that: 
The discovery and exploitation of petroleum turned the vast, sparsely populated, 
impoverished country into an independently wealthy nation with potential for 
extensive development and thus constituted a major turning point in Libyan 
history. 
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In a similar vein, Mahmud and Russell (2003, p. 199) have described how Libyan’s 
economic situation changed following the discovery of crude oil in commercial 
quantities in 1959. They stated that, “since 1961, when Libyan crude oil was first 
exported in commercial quantities, annual crude oil revenue, gross domestic product 
(GDP), and per capital income have increased at an exceptional rate”. 
By 1969, Libya’s crude oil production rose rapidly to more than 3 million barrels a day, 
making it one of the prevailing members of Organization of Petroleum Exporting 
Countries (OPEC) at the time (World Bank, 2006). In 1962, Libya became a member of 
the OPEC. As a result of the oil boom, Libya's economy is no longer dependent on 
foreign aid or exports for a few simple agricultural goods. By 1965 Libya was the sixth-
largest oil exporting country and its population was only 1.6 million (Hagger, 2009, p. 
4). 
The large petroleum revenues and a small population have given the Libyan state one of 
the highest GDPs in the African continent. Libya has been classified by the World Bank 
(WB) as an ‘Upper Middle Income Economy’, alongside only seven other  frican 
countries. Nevertheless, few of these large petroleum resources and incomes flow down 
to the lower orders of society (World Factbook, 2012). It was reported in 2009 by the 
CIA that Libya’s economy ran ed 74th in the world in 2009, and its per capita income 
ranked 83rd. 
According to the IMF report of 2013, over 90% of Libya revenue came from the 
hydrocarbon sector. Chami et al. (2012) point out that hydrocarbons have long 
dominated the Libyan economy, accounting for more than 70 % of GDP, more than 95 
% of exports, and approximately 90 % of government revenue. Around 2.0% of the 
world’s crude oil was produced by Libya and it was ranked the fourth African country 
in terms of the capacity of crude oil produced, after Nigeria, Algeria, and Angola (Taib, 
2011).  
Before 2011, Libya produced around 1.65 million barrels per day (bbl/d) of mostly 
light, sweet crude oil, as was reported in 2012 by the U.S. Energy Information 
Administration (EIA). However, crude oil production had sharply fallen to 22,000 
barrels per day in July 2011, due to the Libyan revaluation, which started in February 
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2011 (Chami et al., 2012). It had significantly negative effects on GDP due to a 
dramatic decline in the exports. 
 ccording to the EI , Libya’s proven oil reserves are estimated at the beginning of 
2012 to be 48.01 billion barrels, and Libya’s petroleum reserves are the biggest on the 
African continent and amongst the nine largest worldwide. Badcock (2005, p.35) has 
claimed that “Offshore and onshore, Libya has great untapped reserves, the true extent 
of which remains unknown, the country has 36bn barrels of proven oil reserves, the 
world’s eighth largest store.” Near to 80 % of Libya’s proven oil reserves are found in 
the eastern Sirte basin, which also accounts for most of the country’s oil production 
(EIA, 2012).  
Besides this, the Libyan state is considered a main natural gas exporter and has a 
number of gas liquefaction factories. The Oil and Gas Journal has revealed that the 
natural gas reserves in Libya are proved at 52.8 trillion cubic feet at the beginning of 
2012. However, the EI  estimated Libya’s natural gas reserves at about 70 trillion cubic 
feet. In this regard, ongoing geological discoveries (onshore and offshore) in Libya have 
demonstrated that Libya has very significant reserves of natural gas.  
In addition to crude oil and gas production, which represent the underpinning of Libya’s 
national economy, the country has also a large amount of other natural resources which 
include iron, petrochemicals, limestone, salt, gypsum, pharmaceuticals, and huge 
reserves of silica. These resources could help the country to attract both foreign and 
national investments in the non-oil industrial sector in the future. Although the Libyan 
state was involved in the past years in some heavy industries such as cement 
manufacturing, limestone factories, petrochemicals, and steel, nevertheless, the oil and 
gas sector in Libya will continue to be the lifeblood of the country’s economy for at 
least an additional two decades (Porter and Yergin, 2006).  
Overall, Libya’s economy is heavily dependent upon revenues from the hydrocarbon 
sector, which in turn is affected by changes in the worldwide oil market. As noted by 
Blanchard and Zanotti (2011), the Libyan economy remains extremely dependent on oil 
revenue and therefore greatly vulnerable to international oil price fluctuations. In 
addition, Libya seems to be one of the less diversified oil-producing economies in the 
world (World Bank, 2006). 
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4.2.4.3 Libya’s economy after adopting a socialist-oriented market economy  
Since becoming independent in 1951, the economic system in Libya was primarily 
capitalist and the private sector dominated all aspects of economic activity in the 
country. From the mid-1970s to the 1980s, the new revolutionary government applied a 
socialist-oriented economy regime in which public ownership of all of the means of 
production and services came into state ownership. As reported by the WB in 2006, 
Libya witnessed a growing government involvement in the economy after a socialist 
state was established in the early 1970s.  
 fter adopting socialist policies, Libyan’s state initiated a number of measures in order 
to put its socialist rhetoric into practice, the ‘socialist mar et economy’.   number of 
laws and resolutions were enacted to establish the complete control of the Libyan state 
over national economic activity. At that time, the private retail, trade, rent, and private 
business establishments were abolished. In addition to this, a number of general 
consumers’ co-operative societies and public supermarkets were founded to replace the 
private retail and wholesale trading operations.  
In addition, the Libyan state enacted the property bylaw aimed at banning Libyans from 
owning more than one private house or rented property from a private landlord. The 
government also gave the Libyan employees who worked in the government-owned and 
privately-run factories the right to take control of them and to establish self-
management. In this context, Ahmad (2004) has pointed out that the state and public 
ownership structure of businesses taking place in Libya at the beginning of the 1970s 
gained momentum in the mid-1970s and touched its highest in the 1980s, where most of 
the businesses turned into public-owned enterprises. 
Indeed, implementing the socialism system in Libya was the turning point in the 
country’s economy; the Libyan state created a large number of state-owned enterprises 
to run economic activities and consequently the role of the private sector in Libya 
became insignificant and dissolved (Kilani, 1988). Furthermore, John (2008) claims, the 
running of the Libyan economy was progressively socialist in intent and influence with 
wealth in housing, capital, and land significantly redistributed, as well as private sector 
being almost removed and replaced by a centrally planned economy. 
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The effects of adopting the socialism system in Libya were particularly clear, as 
described by Vandewalle and Castel (2011). The Libyan state dominated the entire 
country’s manufacturing, agriculture, external and internal retail trade, ban ing 
industry, insurance and other services, and publicly owned enterprises were wholly 
responsible for wholly consumer goods imports. 
Undeniably, the Libyan method of socialism became more essential than that 
established in neighbouring countries (John, 2008). As a consequence, the socialist 
philosophy has influenced Libya’s economy largely in terms of the ownership of a 
business and monitoring of business goals (Ahmad and Gao, 2004). Certainly, the 
Libyan government’s role in economic activities grew progressively and became 
directly accountable for all economic sectors and the entirety of social life (Alafi and 
Bruijn 2009). 
Blanchard and Zanotti (2011) have indicated that Libya’s government rebuilt the 
country’s economy along socialist lines, placing a heavy stress on state-owned 
businesses and the economic resources allocation. Libya’s economic condition from the 
early 1970s to the 1990s has been described thus:   
In the early 1970s, Libya opted for a command economy with essentially state-
driven investment, a strictly controlled external trade, widespread price 
controls and subsidies, and an almost nonexistent private sector. The 
government’s stifling interference in the economy resulted in a continuous 
deterioration in the business climate, low economic growth, declining living 
standards, fragile macroeconomic conditions, and increased vulnerability to 
external shocks. Other impediments to economic development included weak 
institutions and poor governance. Economic conditions started to deteriorate in 
the mid-1980s with the fall in world oil prices, and worsened in the 1990s as a 
result of international sanctions (IMF, 2006a, p. 3). 
 
4.2.4.4 Libya’s economic reforms  
In the late 1980s until the beginning of the 2000s, Libya was subjected to United 
Nations (UN) and United States (US) economic sanctions. The US sanctions in 1982 
prompted American oil companies to withdraw from Libya and prohibited the sale, 
supply, or export - directly or indirectly - of any sophisticated oil and gas equipment to 
Libya. 
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Later, in 1985, the US banned the import of refined petroleum from Libya. In 1986, the 
US government extended its sanctions against the Libyan regime, applying widespread 
commercial sanctions as well as financial controls, which including banning the sale of 
goods and services, and freezing the accounts of the Libyan state in U.S. banks. 
Additionally, in 1996, the US government proclaimed the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act, 
targeted at individuals making certain investments directly and significantly 
contributing to the enhancement of the ability of Libya to develop its petroleum 
resources or enhance Libya’s ability to develop its petroleum resources, and for other 
purposes.   
The UN sanctions were officially lifted in September 2003 and the sanctions imposed 
by the US were consequently removed in 2004. Ultimately, the US. oil companies were 
allowed to return and to sign new contracts with the Libyan government. It is worth 
mentioning that both the UN and US sanctions have left a negative impact on domestic 
economic and foreign investment in the oil sector in particular. As pointed out by 
Fattouh (2008, p. 4), “the imposition of long-term sanctions on Libya affected foreign 
oil companies’ access with adverse consequences on investment in the upstream 
sector”.  
In the wake of the UN and US sanctions, which were imposed for more than ten years, 
the Libyan authorities have taken substantial measures and reforms to reduce the 
country’s dependence on the oil sector and to diversify its economy and national income 
sources as well as to promote greater domestic private and foreign private investors’ 
participation. In this context, Otman and Karlberg (2007) state that, in a post-sanctions 
era, the Libyan government has emerged with numerous alternatives concerning its 
future national and international economic rearrangement.  
From the point when the UN sanctions were lifting, the government of Libya had 
already underta en a chain of structural reforms and speeded its shift to “people’s 
capitalism” (IMF, 2008).   ccording to John (2008), the Libyan state introduced socio-
economic reforms aimed at liberalising its economy, and the measures for liberalisation 
increased in momentum after the Lockerbie crash was resolved and unconventional 
weapons were discarded.  
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Amongst these reform measures, the top legislative authority in Libya (GPC) adopted a 
number of economic reform programmes in recent years, mainly in the privatisation of 
state-owned economic enterprises, encouraging private ownership, forms of the legal 
framework, encouraging competition in the banking sector, monetary and exchange rate 
policy reforms, and encouraging foreign capital investment in non-oil sectors. In line 
with the GPC’s reform programme, approximately 360 state-owned enterprises were 
identified for privatisation in March 2004 (Vandewalle and Castel, 2011). 
Additionally, the Libyan government has created new laws and regulations aimed at 
promoting foreign capital investment in the country. The first law for encouraging 
foreign capital investment to invest in Libya was issued in 1997 (i.e. Law No. 5 for 
Promotion of Investment of Foreign Capital), which was amended through Law No. 7 
of 2003, then by Law No. 9 of 2010. This new law was issued in order to fill the gaps 
discovered during the application of the previous laws as well to place new incentives to 
encourage and attract foreign investors in all economic fields in the country, such as 
industry, health, tourism, services, agriculture, and other sectors specified by the Libyan 
authorities. It allowed foreign investors to invest within the country and provided them 
with numerous privileges and exemptions. 
This law, amongst others, provides an exemption to the investment project from income 
tax for a period of five years from the date of starting production or work, depending on 
the nature of the project, and may extend this period for further period of three years. In 
addition, foreign investors are entitled to carry the losses of the project during the years 
of the exemption to subsequent years. The law, which also affords exemptions from 
some customs duties and excise taxes on exported goods as well as stamp duty tax. 
Besides these incentives, the profits resulting from the project will enjoy similar 
exemption if reinvested. 
Despite the exceptions and benefits offered by Libyan authorities to foreign investors to 
invest in the country, foreign investors remain largely hesitant and unwilling to invest in 
Libya for a variety of reasons. As has been reported by the WB (2006), Libya still 
suffers from a mixed perception by foreign investors concerning the credibility of its 
reform programme as well as the soundness of the whole business environment as it 
links to the quality of economic governance. However, unlike other developing 
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countries, the Libyan state has the advantage of possessing sufficient financial 
resources, and direct foreign investment may be not essential for its economic growth. 
Historical experience suggests in many countries that the foreign investor usually tends 
towards enterprises that achieve a higher profit as soon as possible, regardless of the 
needs of economic and social development in the host country. 
A significant procedure accompanying this law was created by the Libyan Foreign 
Investment Board (LFIB). The idea was to facilitate foreign investment procedures and 
manage the application process. However, in fact, Libyan authorities continue to impose 
restrictions on foreign direct investment in specific businesses such as media, electricity, 
financial, and telecommunications services as well as the sea and air transport sector, 
which are state-owned dominations. However, once again at the present time there is a 
policy alteration to progressively permit most of these businesses to receive investment 
from overseas investors. Furthermore, the Free Trade Act of 1999 created a new legal 
framework for the establishment of offshore Free Trade Zones (FTZ) in Libya. 
Other important measures on the way to diversifying its economy and revenue streams: 
in 2006, the Libyan government established the Libyan Investment Authority (LIA). In 
order to manage the country’s financial assets assigned to it as well as the oil fund’s 
foreign currency reserves, the organisation, through its firms, invests in various sectors 
including infrastructure, real estate, agriculture, tourism, oil and gas sectors. However, 
“the operation and wor ings of Libya’s investment fund were notoriously opaque and 
the extent to which the LI  was carrying out its mandate largely un nown” (Behrendt 
and Sharp, 2011, p. 2).  
Another considerable measure has already been taken by Libyan authorities to eliminate 
a number of the barriers to opening up its market and to attract foreign investment into 
the country, in particular in the non-oil sector. For instance, the official exchange rate 
had been unified and the Libyan dinar has been pegged to the IMF’s Special Drawing 
Rights (SDRs); Libya has also cut its customs duty rate by 50% on most imports. 
More important procedures have been introduced in recent years as part of ongoing 
processes of liberalisation of the socialist-oriented economy, which include widespread 
reform of the domestic banking system and the introduction of Libyan-foreign joint 
banks, reform of the regulatory framework, income tax reforms, and, in 2006, the 
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establishment of a stock market. Stress-free rules and procedures for foreign businesses, 
reforms of the trade and exchange system, and a strategy to promote the country’s 
tourist sector were also recently introduced (Vandewalle and Castel, 2011). 
Notwithstanding the Libyan state’s efforts to reform the private sector and generate 
opportunities by assisting entrepreneurs and minor businesses, its economic 
disorganisation has stood in the way of achieving tangible improvements in the business 
environment (African Economic Outlook, 2012). According to Vandewalle and Castel 
(2011, p. 9), despite the period from 2003 to 2011 showing certain enhancements in 
Libya’s economic reforms, the period conveyed several conflicting messages that 
evidenced the political pressures to which the reforms were subjected:  
• There is little doubt that compared to its previous attempts at economic reform, 
Libya had made progress, and that slowly pockets of greater efficiency, of more 
consistent regulatory practices, and of adherence to international norms were 
emerging. 
• Diversification and privatisation of the economy lagged far behind. There was 
little evidence that either the Libyan Export Promotion Centre and the Libyan 
Privatisation and Investment Board had produced noticeable results. 
• The country’s institutional and legal framewor s remained highly opaque; the 
business environment remained in most instances unpredictable. 
• Philosophical proclivities continued to play havoc with the implementation of 
the planned reforms, particularly since there were no formal (and only weak 
informal) mechanisms to reduce their impact. The climate of uncertainty and 
ineffectiveness that had somewhat diminished, but never disappeared, kept 
hampering progress. 
• Overall coordination remained weak, decision-making remained fragmented, 
and there were clear signs that the power of intermediaries and brokers had 
increased. 
• The economic reforms remained to some extent non-institutionalised, with no 
official representation, and plans did not carry the imprimatur of the country's 
existing political structure. 
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• In some of the main areas, the National Economic Strategy had identified as 
priority areas-human capital, education, and unemployment-very little progress 
had been made. 
4.2.4.5 Libya’s economic conditions post-revolution 
After the start of the Libyan Popular Revolution (LPR) against the Al-Gaddafi regime in 
February 2011, the international community imposed commercial and financial 
sanctions on the Gaddafi regime. The LI  was Libya’s first sovereign wealth fund 
sanctioned by the UN Security Council. In addition, the sanctions later included the 
CBL, the Libyan Foreign Bank (LFB), the Libyan National Oil Corporation (LNOC), 
the Libyan Africa Investment Portfolio (LAIP), and other Libyan-state-owned assets. 
These sanctions were based on the premise that public funds, such as the assets held by 
LIA, represented a potential tool for the regime to control the revolution and commit 
violence against civilians (Behrendt and Sharp, 2011). 
On December 16, 2011, the international sanctions applying to the CBL and the LFB 
were lifted, which allowed the CBL to improve the official exchange rate. In 2011, the 
official value of the LD had fallen on the parallel market due to the incapability of the 
CBL to sell foreign currency because it had no access to its foreign assets (Chami et al., 
2012). However, the UN Security Council preserved the asset freeze on companies 
falling under the responsibility of Libya’s sovereign wealth fund (the LI ).  
More important, during the LPR, the exports of hydrocarbon dropped from USD 48.9 
billion in 2010 to USD 19.2 billion in 2011, and the imports fell from USD 24.6 billion 
to USD 14.2 billion, thus the current account surplus narrowed from 21 % of GDP in 
2010 to less than 4.5 % of GDP in 2011 (Chami et al., 2012). 
The data in Table 4.1 shows that that the Libyan real GDP has recorded a significant 
decline in 2011 compared to 2010. This decline was due to a significant drop in the 
production of crude oil and natural gas. The GDP at constant prices (prices of 2003)  
accounted for LD 20.1 billion in 2011, compared to LD 52.0 billion in 2010. More  
specifically, the total of contraction in GDP in 2011 reached about 61.3%, compared to 
a growth rate of 3.0% during 2010, due to a decline in the value of oil domestic product 
from LD 23.7 billion in 2010 to roughly LD 6.5 billion in 2011, a drop of approximately 
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72.0%. Also, the non-oil GDP declined from LD 28.6 billion to reach around LD 13.6 
billion in 2011 - a decrease of 52.5 %. 
Understandably, the fall in the real growth rates in the year 2011, compared to what it 
was in the previous years (i.e. 2009, 2010), was driven primarily by the significant 
decline in growth rates in the extraction activities of oil and natural gas by about 72.0% 
. It was as result of the decline in the quantities of crude oil due to the events that 
occurred in the country during the outbreak of the revolution of February 17 in 2011, 
which led to stopping the export of crude oil from most of the Libyan ports. 
As well as in the case of non-oil economic sectors, low growth rates amounting to 
approximately 52.5% have been recorded. This decline was concentrated in low rate of 
growth of the hotels and restaurants sector by 81.0%, the mining and quarrying sector 
and the construction sector by 79.0%, and the manufacturing sector decreased by 
77.0%. 
In addition, the reductions have also reached the education sector, the health sector, 
social security, and the supply of electricity, gas and water, which had fallen by 67.0%,  
64.0%, and 61.0%, respectively, whereas the wholesale and retail trade sector, repair of 
mother vehicles, personal and household goods, and community services and other 
personal activities sector have declined by the same percentage - 59.0%. On the other 
hand, the transport, storage and communications sectors recorded a decline of about 
58%, while real estate, renting and business activities recorded a drop approximately 
52%, but the brokerage sector amounted to 46%. It was the only sector that has 
achieved a positive growth, along with the public administration and defence sector, and 
compulsory social security, which achieved growth of 1.4%. 
Concerning the contribution of economic activities in the Libyan real GDP, the 
activities of extraction of crude oil and natural gas have formed a contribution 
accounting for 32.5% of real GDP, while the other economic sectors, accounted for the 
largest contribution to real GDP: nearby 67.5%. The activities of public administration, 
defence, and compulsory social security accounted for 22.8% of the total GDP, while 
the real estate activities, rental and commercial activities formed 13.7%, but the 
transport, storage, and communications sectors have accounted for 8.1%. 
101 
 
However, the wholesale, retail trade, repair of motor vehicles, and personal and 
household goods had shaped about 7.0 per cent. The contribution of the rest of the 
sectors in the real GDP ranged between 0.1% and 4.0%.  Due to the contraction of the 
growth rates in the national economy in 2011, the average per capita real GDP has 
sharply decreased from LD 8526 in 2010 to LD 3236 in 2011(CBL, Annual Report, 
2011). 
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Table 4.1: Libyan real GDP (at 2003 prices) by the industrial sectors 2009-2011 
(thousands LD) 
Economic sectors 2009 *2010 *2011 Growth 
Rate 
Agriculture, forestry, and  fishing 1,800,950 1,785,185 553,407 -69.0 
Crude oil and natural gas 22,487,696 23,379,613 6,546,292 -79.0 
Mining and quarrying 169,516 178,755 37,539 -79.0 
Manufacturing 2,584,731 2,615,780 601,629 -77.0 
Electricity, gas and water  1,342,545 1,405,975 548,330 -61.0 
Construction 3,638,614 3,850,116 808,524 -59.0 
Wholesale, retail trade, repair of motor 
vehicles, and personal and household 
goods 
3,247,724 3,460,206 1,418,684 -59.0 
Hotels and restaurants 160,795 170,643 32,422 -81.0 
Transport, storage and communications 3,650,630 3,900,047 1,638,020 -58.0 
Financial intermediation 961,165 1,021,258 551,479 -46.0 
Real estate, renting and business activities 5,420,256 5,758,234 2,763,952 -52.0 
Public administration, defence and 
compulsory social security 
4,465,720 4,560,602 4,622,388 1.4 
Education  91,182 96,767.0 31,933.1 -67.0 
Health and social work 147,155 156,915.4 56,489.5 -64.0 
Community service and other personal 
activities 
58,687 62,046.8 25,439.2 -59.0 
Imputed financial services indirectly 373,081 392,200 90,206 -77.0 
Total GDP at basic prices, distributes 
between: 
373,081 52,009,943 20,146,323 -61.3 
Oil, gas and related activities *** 22,487,696 23,379,613 6,546,292 -72.0 
Other economic activities 27,366,590 28,630,330 13,600,031 -5.25 
* Preliminary data. 
** Include domestic sector only; education and health services provided by the public sector within the 
activity of public administration and defence. 
*** Include refined petroleum products and petrochemical and plastics industries classified as 
manufacturing 
Source: CBL, Annual Report, 2011.  
Undoubtedly, the interim Libyan government will face serious challenges in the 
political, economic, and security issues following the fall of the Al-Gaddafi regime. As 
has been claimed by Mi ail (2012) Libya’s state challenges are both economic and 
political; there are also other matters to be taken into consideration by new Libyan 
government, specifically on the subject of security. Additionally, diversification, trade, 
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and entrepreneurship will remain main concerns for the incoming Libyan government 
(Vandewalle and Castel, 2011).   
At the present, ordinary people in Libya are waiting for tangible improvements in daily 
life as well as advantages and schemes from the new Libyan authority to show an 
optimistic pathway on the way to the country’s future. There is no doubt that the 
absence of any manufacturing activity, the imperfection of private businesses, the high 
levels of unemployment and the dearth of employment chances altogether threaten the 
Libyan state’s cohesion and stability (Mikail, 2012). In this sense, Vandewalle and 
Castel (2011) have suggested a number of priority actions need to be taken into account 
by the interim Libyan government: 
The new Libya therefore will need to provide sufficient guarantees on a 
number of issues in order to escape the patterns of the past: beyond the hard 
constraints of macroeconomic stability, a sufficiently clear system of 
property rights and contract enforcement for individuals and companies 
alike, mechanisms to avoid anti-competitive behavior, ways to promote trust 
and cooperation, and social and political institutions that can mitigate social 
conflict.  
 
In short, the rapid changes in the business environment and establishment of the first 
stock market in Libya, and the reform of its public sector as well as the continual growth 
in the private sector are generating much public interest in financial and non-financial 
information disclosure and in the need to increase market transparency. Furthermore, 
later radical changes that had occurred in Libya towards a free market economy and 
substantial recent developments in Libya’s economic system, as well as changes in the 
competitive business environment, are affecting the types of information needed for 
economic decision-making. 
According to Ahmad and Gao (2004), the recent economic development in Libya has 
led to a rising demand for both qualified accountants and reliable accounting 
information. Certainly, the Libyan business environment and the investment climate in 
general are likely to be more positive and will only become more attractive in the near 
future for both local and foreign investments in the financial services sector and other 
different businesses, following the LPR, 2011, ‘ rab Spring’. 
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4.3 Libyan Stock Market (LSM) 
This section of this chapter is divided into six subsections, giving a brief history of the 
LSM (4.3.1), discussing objectives behind the establishment of the LSM (4.3.2), 
presenting the organisational structure of the LSM (4.3.3), then highlighting the listing 
application procedure (4.3.4), followed by discussing the general listing requirements 
(4.3.5) as well as special listing requirements (4.3.6).  
4.3.1 A brief history of the LSM  
The Libyan Stock Market (LSM) is the first and only stock market in the country; it was 
founded by Resolution No. (134) which was made by the General People’s Committee 
on 3rd June 2006, in the form of a joint-stock company, with capital of 20 million LD, 
divided into two million shares with a nominal value of LD ten per share. It was 
founded under the supervision of the Ministry of Economy, (formerly Secretary for the 
People’s Committee for Economy, Trade and Investment). The LSM headquarters is 
placed in the capital of Libya (Tripoli) and the main branch is in Benghazi. 
According to Resolution 134, the LSM is structured as a corporation and performs as an 
exchange, a depository centre and a capital market authority. The company that 
manages the stock exchange is itself one of the traded companies in the market; 
approximately 30% of its shares are owned by the government, whereas are 25% owned 
by Libyan’s commercial ban s and the rest of its shares are owned by individuals. LSM 
was listed on the Commercial Register as a joint-stock company on 7th January 2007 
under No. 541. According to Statute of LSM, Article No. 4, market membership should 
including the following economic entities: 
1. Commercial and specialised banks. 
2. Insurance companies. 
3. Financial funds. 
4. Subscribed companies, with capitals that are no less than the limit stated by the 
mar et’s management committee. 
5. Brokers accepted in the market according to the provisions of this Regulation. 
Thus far, the LSM has witnessed a lot of development since it was established: In April 
2008, the LSM launched an Electronic Trading System and also linked the headquarters 
of the market in Tripoli with the branch of the market in Benghazi electronically using 
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fibre optic cable. They also linked up using satellites to be one of the pioneers in this 
field in Libya. According to LSM, this modern system allowed market deals to be more 
simply treated and facilitated to provide information that is more accurate as well as 
helping to make the market more efficient and transparent Moreover, in 2009, LSM 
launched the new website, which operates according to the latest techniques as well as 
offering a variety of new services such as a short message service and centre voice 
services, which allow investors to follow its operations accurately and promptly.  
In 2010 ,the Libyan government issued new LSM Law No. 11, which regulates and 
governs the work in the market, including administration of the stock market authority, 
issuance securities rules, listing, exemption from taxes and duties, disclosure 
requirements, exchange, investment management, establishment of investment funds, 
electronic signature, authentic electronic documents in proof, and the organisation of an 
adjudication and conciliation board.  
By the end of 2007, seven Libyan companies (mostly commercial banks) were listed 
with a total market capitalisation of approximately LD 1.2 billion (IMF 2008). It is 
necessary to point out that the LSM composition is heavily dependent upon financial 
companies (banks and insurance) attracting the largest share of investment flows 
(Aljbiri, 2012). Published data indicated that the daily trading value average reached LD 
417,696,669 by the end of 2010. 
 mong the sectors’ contribution levels, the ban ing sector occupied first place with LD 
8, 144,422.740, which represents 88.63%, while the insurance sector came second with 
7.76%, followed by the financial services sector with 2.85%. Finally, the industry sector 
with 0.7613% (LSM, the Monthly Annual Reports, December 2010).  
The number of listed companies on LSM has grown from seven listed companies in 
2007 to twelve listed Libyan financial and non-financial companies in 2011(see Table 
4.2). However, most of these companies are public companies and most of them suffer 
from many problems, for instance in terms of disclosure, financial deficit, or accounting 
standards (Aljbiri, 2012). The following table presents the names of these listed 
companies, the number of trading operations, and the number of shares traded at the 
beginning of 2011.  
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Table 4.2:  Companies listed in the LSM at the beginning of 2011 
N. Company Name Trading 
Value  
(Million 
LD) 
Trading Volume  
(Number of Shares 
in Thousands) 
Number of  
Transactions 
1. Al-Jomhuriya Bank 2.3 174,9 73 
2. Al-Sahari Bank 2,4 248,8 245 
3. Al-Wehda Bank 2,4 236,1 255 
4. Bank of Commerce and 
Development 
14,5 515 607 
5. Mediterranean Bank 0.979 44,4 137 
6. National Commercial 
Bank 
0,710 57.8 68 
7. Al-Saraya Trading and 
Development Bank 
0,081 8,1 35 
8. Libya Insurance 
Company 
0.654 67,2 194 
9. Al-Mutahed Insurance 
Company 
0,563 25,2 32 
10. Al-Sahara Insurance 
Company 
0,271 25,8 33 
11. Libyan Stock Market 
Company 
0,550 54,8 117 
12. Al-Ahlia Cement 
Company 
0,237 14,4 47 
Total  25,6 1472,5 1.843 
Source: LSM, Trading Annual Report, 2011 
 
As Table 4.2 shows, the companies listed on the LSM fall under four key sectors as 
follows:  
 The banking sector: 7 listed commercial banks, where the majority by volume 
of shares were traded, numbered 1,285,209 shares, which accounted for 87.3% 
of the total number of shares traded in the market. These were worth a total 
amount of LD 23,307,042, representing 91.1% of the total value traded. 
 The insurance sector: 3 listed companies, which recorded 118.230 trading 
shares, representing 8% of the total traded shares, amounting to LD 1,488,711.0  
 The investment sector: one listed company whose contribution was 3.7% of the 
total trading volume. 
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 The industry sector: one listed company, which contributed 1.0% of the total 
trading volume. 
 
At the beginning of 2011, however, daily market indicators, trading data, and general 
levels of prices showed a remarkable increase. Trading in the LSM stopped on 20
th
 
February 2011, as a result of the Libyan revolution which began on February 17th, 
2011. Data indicates that trading volume reached 1,472.682 shares in this period, 
compared to 670.660 shares during the same period in 2010, an increase of 119.6%, and 
in terms of trading value an increase of 227.1%. Generally, the total circulation during 
2011 was LD 25,583,598.930, compared to LD 7,822,187 during the same period in 
2010 (CBL, 2011). The following section highlights the objectives behind the 
establishment of the LSM    
4.3.2 Objectives behind the establishment of the LSM  
The LSM is one of the most important tributaries of the national economy and is aimed 
at providing an opportunity to invest savings and funds in securities, creating an 
environment from which to achieve greater returns and increase in GDP and economic 
growth, and to attract domestic and foreign investment (LSM, Quarterly Report, 2007). 
According to LSM Law No. 11 for the year 2010, LSM contributes to achieving 
important economic objectives sought by the community, and, in particular, the 
following objectives: 
 to create a suitable investment climate for securities in the interest of the 
national economy 
 to encourage savings and raise investment consciousness in ways capable of 
directing savings towards the economic sectors of potential greater return. 
 to supervise the organisation and operation of the share dealings and ownership 
transfer operations.  
 serve the goals of economic and social development, including achieving the 
employment of individuals’ savings of by allowing buying and selling shares 
operations as well as carrying out investment transactions. 
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 contribute to the implementation of the programme of public ownership of the 
economic entities, enterprises and companies to contribute to expansion of the 
ownership base. 
 to put in place the necessary rules for the protection and ensure the honesty of 
transactions in the market in order to achieve trade based on economic 
efficiency.  
 development of linkages and cooperation relations among the Libyan stock 
market and Arab regional and international markets, in ways that lead to raising 
the level of investors’ trust in the domestic economy. 
 
4.3.3 General listing requirements  
There are several conditions must be met by economic entities seeking listing in the 
schedules of the LSM, which include the following (Article 7, the Regulation of Listing 
and Follow-up Disclosure, (RLFD)): 
 The economic entity must abide by the rules governing the work of the 
market.  
 The economic entity must pay the initial and periodic fees to the market.  
 The economic entity shall be registered in the market, and its securities must 
be deposited within the central depositing and registration system.  
 There shall be no restrictions on the transfer of ownership of the securities 
required to be listed.  
 Registration shall be of all issued securities, provided the following issue of 
securities must be registered within one month from the date of completing 
the necessary procedures.  
 The company must sign the agreement of listing in the market.  
 Any other conditions laid down by the management committee of the 
market, which must not be violating the legislation in force. 
 
4.3.4 Special listing requirements 
4.3.4.1 Listing requirements on the main market schedules 
According to the LSM, the main market schedules are divided into two schedules: the 
main market schedule A and the main market schedule B. The following requirements 
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must be met in order for an economic entity to be eligible to offer securities to the 
public and subsequently listed at the main market schedule A: 
1. All the general listing requirements must be satisfied.  
2. The economic entity must have published its financial statements for three fiscal years 
prior to the application for listing; these financial statements should be approved by the 
certified legal auditor. 
1. The economic entity must have published its financial statements for three fiscal 
years prior to the application for listing; these financial statements should be 
approved by the certified legal auditor. 
2. The economic entity must have published its financial statements for three fiscal 
years prior to the application for listing; these financial statements should be 
approved by the certified legal auditor. 
3. The economic entity’s assets must be evaluated by one of the  nown methods of 
evaluation by an independent expert, and the management of the market may 
repeat this evaluation. 
4. The economic entity’s capital must not be less than LD 1,000,000 (One million 
LD) or the equivalent. 
5. The nominal value of the shares is paid in full. 
6. The company must exercise of its actual activity for three years at least, and 
have achieved a net profit from its main activity in the last two years by not less 
than five per cent of the capital. 
7. The company’s financial situation should be proper in terms of assets, liquidity, 
the balance of its financial structure and efficient performance, and the total of 
its fixed assets and current assets should be not less than fifty per cent of the 
value of its capital. 
8. The economic entity’s board of directors has to provide a report on its 
achievements and its performance, and the important events passed by and 
affected by the date of its establishment and until the date of the application for 
listing, and the company’s future plan for the following three years. 
9. The number of shareholders in the economic entity must not be less than one 
hundred shareholders, and that there are at least one hundred shareholders each 
holding not less than fifty shares. 
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10. The proportion of free float shares must be not less than fifteen per cent of the 
capital. 
Whereas, the main market schedule B includes the securities of issuers (economic 
entities) that meet the same conditions to the main schedule A, excepting the following: 
1. The economic entity’s capital must not be less than LD 250,000 (LD two 
hundred and fifty thousand) or the equivalent. 
2. The proportion of free float shares should be not less than ten per cent of the 
capital.  
3. The exception from the conditions mentioned above, including the securities of 
destinations companies that target programme to broaden the base of ownership 
(privatisation) directly in the main table B after the deposit of its securities in the 
central registration depository system, taking into account the commitment to the 
rules and regulations in force in the market. 
4.3.4.2 Listing requirements on the sub-market schedules   
Sub-market schedules are also divided into two schedules: sub-market schedule A and 
sub-market schedule B. Sub-market schedule A includes the securities of the issuer 
which meet the following conditions: 
  1. All the general listing requirements should be satisfied. 
2. The economic entity’s capital must not be less than, LD 100,000 (LD one hundred 
thousand) or the equivalent. 
3.  The economic entity must contract with a sponsor accredited by the LSM. 
4. The economic entity must exercise of its actually activity for one year at least, and 
have made a profit from its main activity in that year by at least five per cent of 
the capital. 
5.  The number of shareholders must not be less than ten shareholders. 
6.  The proportion of free float shares should not be less than five per cent of the 
capital. 
Sub-market schedule B includes the securities of economic entities that do not meet the 
conditions of the main schedules and sub-market schedule A, taking into account the 
following: 
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1. The economic entity’s capital must not be less than LD 100,000 (LD one hundred 
thousand) or the equivalent. 
2. The number of shareholders must not be less than ten shareholders. 
4.3.4.3 Listing requirements for foreign companies in the LSM  
The foreign companies’ securities may be listed in the LSM according to the same 
requirements for listing of the Libyan companies’ securities, taking into the account of 
the following (Article 19 of the RLFD):  
1. Submit a request application for listing, signed by the person or entity authorised 
to officially sign on behalf of the foreign corporation. 
2. Must be to the satisfaction of all the provisions contained in the law of its 
country. 
3. Should take the form of a joint-stock company. 
4. Securities to be listed on the stock market in the foreign state, to which the 
corporation is subject to its laws. 
5. To abide by the rules and regulations governing the functioning of the LSM. 
6. Securities to be issued in convertible currency of the LD. 
7. That has been established for a period of not less than two years and shall have 
issued two balance sheet statements, checked by a certified auditor. 
8. Capital not less than the equivalent of LD one million and the number of 
shareholders not be less than one hundred shareholders. 
9. To have made a net profit available for distribution to shareholders of at least an 
average of about 5% of the paid-up capital during the two years preceding the 
date of submission of the listing application. 
10. That proves the general assembly of the corporation had met once a year at least. 
11. Did not have authority or the state of the nationality of any restrictions on 
absolute prohibition of the transfer of stock ownership among dealers of non-
nationals and statement of limited restrictions, if any. 
12. To provide the commitment to publish its balance sheets and the results of its 
performance in the daily means of publication in Libya before being traded in 
the market. 
13. To appoint its representative in Libya, who undertakes the functions of 
registering shares and dividends, the profits, and receiving and issuing reports 
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and documents related to the work of the entity. The representative may be the 
LSM or a bank operating in Libya, and is licensed by the Libyan central bank or 
one of the companies working in the field of securities.  
14. Any other conditions approved by the LSM, and the market may-in appropriate 
cases-exclude foreign entities that want to list their shares on the market of any 
of the conditions and requirements specified in these regulations. 
The application for listing of foreign entities must contain the following information 
(Article 20 of RLFD): 
1. Name of the foreign corporation, the main location of centre of administration, 
the statement of legal form, amount of capital, the number of shareholders, the 
date of its incorporation, and the statement of nationality.  
2. Name of the applicant with the destination and date of its authorisation officially 
submitted on the listing application. 
3. The nominal value of the shares of the foreign corporation.  
4. Names and addresses of the auditors who have assumed the task of auditing the 
accounts for the two fiscal years preceding the date of submission of the listing 
application. 
5. Name or names of the markets in which it was listed.  
6. Statement of procedure for the transfer of stock ownership and whether there are 
restrictions on the transition to non-citizens of the state, in which the foreign 
corporation’s nationality is followed. 
7. Name of the representative in Libya whose duty is to register the transfer of 
shares ownership and profit distribution, receiving and issuing reports and the 
documents related to the work of the entity. 
In addition to above, foreign entities according to Article 21 of RLFD must provide the 
administration of the market through the following documents: 
1. Report issued by the foreign corporation’s Board of Directors includes the 
following: 
(a) A brief summary of its establishment, the main objectives and its 
relationship to any other company. 
(b) Determine the securities which have previously been issued by the by the 
hand, and those that wish to be issued in the foreseeable future. 
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(c) Names of those who own more than 5% of the securities issued by the 
foreign corporation as well as the number owned by each of them. 
(d) The important events experienced by the foreign corporation from the date of 
its inception until the date of submission of the listing application. 
2. Evaluation of the Board of Directors supported by figures for the performance 
and achievements compared with the plan set.  
3. Financial data about the foreign corporation containing :   
(a) Annual financial statements for the fiscal years preceding the date of 
submission of the listing application, supported by a certified legal auditor in 
the home country. 
(b) Interim financial statements covering the period from the end of the 
previous financial year to the date of submission of the listing application 
and until the end of the last quarter preceding the date of the application to 
be certified by the auditor. 
4. Public documents about the foreign corporation shall include:   
(a)  Memorandum of association and its statute, certified by the state which 
has its nationality. 
(b) Listing certificate in the financial market at the home country and other 
foreign markets (if any). 
(c)  Records of the meetings of the General Assembly of the foreign 
corporation for two fiscal years preceding the date of submission of the 
listing application. 
(d) A copy of the published financial statements and the results of its 
activities in one of the daily means of publication. 
(e)  Assurance that there are no restrictions by the foreign corporation or by 
the state which follows its nationality that may limit the freedom of 
movement of share ownership among dealers, or a statement of the type 
of restrictions imposed on this deal.  
5. Document the appointment of a representative of the foreign corporation in 
Libya, who serves as a registration of shares, the distribution of profits and 
receiving and issuing reports and documents related to its activities.  
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4.4 The Banking Sector in Libya  
This section of the chapter provides an overview of the banking sector currently existing 
in Libya. The section therefore is organised into five subsections: (4.4.1) briefly 
describes the history of the Libyan banking sector, followed by discussing Libya’s 
banking sector reforms (4.4.2). Lastly, the structure of the Libyan banking sector is 
explored in (4.4.3), including the Central Bank of Libya (4.4.3.1), commercial banks 
(4.4.3.2), the Libyan Foreign Bank (4.4.3.3), and specialised banks (4.4.3.4). 
4.4.1 A brief history of Libyan banking sector 
 The first bank was opened in Libya during the Ottoman period, as an agricultural bank 
in Benghazi in 1868, and in 1901 another bank opened in Tripoli (CBL, 2006). A 
number of branches were later opened in different areas of the country. In 1906 , the 
Imperial Ottoman Bank (Banque Impériale Ottomane; BIO) opened its first branch in 
Tripoli and in 1911, opened its second branch in Benghazi (Tschoegl, 2002).  The Bank 
of Rome (Banca di Roma, BdR) in 1907 also opened two branches, one in Tripoli and 
another in Benghazi, and then expanded its operations in the counties of Tripolitania 
and Cyrenaica (Tschoegl, 2002).  
In 9191, Italy  opened a branch of the Ban  of Napoli and the Ban  of Sicily in Tripoli 
( lnas, 2010). In addition, during the era of the British and French military 
administration (1943-1951), Barclays Bank opened two branches in 1943: one in Tripoli 
and the other in Benghazi (Alnas, 2010). After Libya became an independence country 
on 24 December 1951, a number of foreign banks were encouraged to open their 
branches in Libya, namely the Bank of England to the Middle East, the Arab Bank, 
Bank of Egypt, and Tunisian and Algerian Bank (CBL, 2006).  
It is worth mentioning that the majority of activities of these foreign banks at the time 
were linked to funding business operations, where profits were large and of least risk.   
ris . As foreign commercial banks have acted in accordance with their benefits, their 
banking activities were confined to financing rapid yield and secured business, and 
productive economic activities were not given any importance, such as agriculture and 
industry (CBL, 2006). There was also no participation by Libyans in the ownership 
structure of these foreign banks. 
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In 1951, the Libyan interim government at that time enacted the Currency Law No. 4 , in 
which the Libyan Currency Committee (LCC) was established and commenced work in 
February 1952. Its mission was to manage and issue banknotes and coins in Libya. It is 
important to note that throughout this period there were Libyan banks in existence, 
which pushed through the need to establish a national central bank (CBL, 2006; Alnas, 
2010). 
In 1955, the Libyan state passed the Bank Law No. 30, as the first real effort at a general 
regulation of the banking sector in Libya. The National Bank of Libya (NBL) was 
established under this Law and began operations at the beginning of April 1956 in 
Tripoli, later opening a branch in Benghazi in 1957 (CBL, 2006). Functions of the LCC 
as a single authority responsible for issuing banknotes and coins in Libya were 
transferred to the NBL. 
At the same time, the NBL was unable to achieve the objectives assigned to it as a 
central banking authority, where it found that facing branches of foreign banks is no 
way to control them, which prevented it from applying effective monetary policy to 
serve the national economy (CBL, 2006; Alnas, 2010). Although, the law allowed the 
NBL to engage in normal banking business, but did not allow it to organise the banking 
operations or supervision of commercial banks in the country. Later, the NBL was 
renamed “Central Ban  of Libya” (CBL), and was vested with wide authorities for the 
supervision of banking in Libya. 
According to Otman and Karlberg (2007), the Libyan government gave the CBL its 
regulatory role as the watchdog authorised to control commercial banks, their 
administration and methods of working, and the liquidity reserve ratio, as well as 
issuing banking licences. All commercial banks were required to keep legal reserves 
and liquidity ratios with the CBL against deposits. The CBL was also authorised to 
carry out commercial transactions, up until the National Commercial Ban  (NCB) was 
established in 1970 to ta e over the commercial department of the CBL (CBL, 2006). 
In 1963, the Libyan Banking Law No. 4 was passed. This law made it compulsory for 
any foreign bank which had its headquarters in Libya and carrying out banking business 
in the country to take the form of a joint-stock company, with the Libyan state owning 
not less than 51% of its capital (known as the Libyanization policy). On the other hand, 
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any foreign bank with its headquarters outside the country had to remain permanently in 
Libya with funds equivalent to at least the total value of their outstanding obligations 
performance, as well as an amount equal to the capital of the bank. 
Three commercial banks responded out of eleven foreign banks and turned into joint-
stock companies: with the Bank of (Banco di Sicilia) the Libyan state owns 51% of the 
capital of the bank, and was renamed the Sahari Bank (CBL, 2006). The Tunisian 
Algerian estate was converted to the Libyan joint stock company under the name 
 frican Ban ing Corporation, with Libyan state owning 51% of the ban ’s shares.  
In 1966, the British bank for the Middle East responded to the ‘Libyanization policy’ 
and took the form of the Libyan joint stock company under the name North Africa 
Bank; with the Libyan government owning 51% of its capital (Alnas, 2010). In contrast, 
the Rome Ban , Barclays Ban  and Naples Ban  did not respond to the ‘Libyanization 
policy’ and thus the activity of the National Bank of Libya was limited and did not 
include all banks in the country at the time (Alnas, 2010). 
 On 13th November 1969, the RCC took a resolution to nationalise entire foreign 
commercial banks that operated in the country. According to this resolution, it was 
required that foreign banks in the country should take the form of joint Libyan stock 
companies and be at least 51% owned by Libyans. Also, the majority of members of the 
boards of directors should be Libyans (CBL, 2006).  This was followed by issue of the 
Law No. 153, on 22
nd
 December 1977, to nationalise foreign stakes in commercial 
banks and to restructure them, and also to identify the Libyan contributions in these 
banks. Under this Law, the Libyan government bought the ownership of all banks that 
still had some foreign participation. Then, the capital of all foreign banks operating in 
Libya became Libyan-owned by the government. 
Furthermore, the law prohibited all the companies not wholly owned by Libyans from 
practising banking activity in Libya, and included the integration of former commercial 
banks in five state-owned commercial banks, under the following names: 
1. National Commercial Bank (formerly the commercial banking division of CBL, 
and two foreign commercial banks: Istiklal Bank and Orouba Bank). 
2. Al-Jumhoria Bank (formerly Barclays Bank). 
3.  Al-Sahari Bank, (formerly the Banco di Sicilia). 
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4. Al-Umma Bank (the successor of Banco di Roma). 
5. Al-Wahda Bank was founded in 1970 from the merger of five other banks (the 
Bank of North Africa, the Commercial Bank, Nahda Arabia Bank, Societe 
Africaine De Banque SAL and Kafila Al-Ahly Bank) (CBL, 2006).  
 
Officially, private commercial banks were not allowed to establish themselves in Libya, 
up until the new Banking Law was passed in March 1993. The Libyan authorities 
passed Banking Law No. 1, 1993 (amended by Banking Law No. 1, 2005 and then by 
No. 46, 2012), which permitted the establishment of private commercial banks by 
individuals in Libya. This legislation also allowed the foreign banks to open branches 
and representative offices in Libya. Nevertheless, so far this has been limited to the 
opening of a representative office of the Arab Banking Corporation in 1996 and later 
Bank Valetta of Malta as well as Suez Bank of Egypt.  
The Bank of Commerce and Development was the first private commercial bank 
established in Libya owned by Libyans, and commenced its operations in 1996. 
Additionally, in 1996 the CBL allowed the establishment of regional private banks 
(known as Ahliah Banks); these banks are subject to the control and supervision of the 
CBL. Later, the National Banking Corporation was established to be a coordinator 
between these banks and the CBL, commercial banks, other public administrative units, 
and the correspondent banks abroad.  
According to the CBL, the aims and objectives behind the establishment of these 
regional banks was to spread banking services and grant credit for small projects 
productive in the areas where they are based. As their operations and banking services 
are limited to the geographic scope of where they are, these banks were therefore 
relatively small in size and capital as well as in their contribution to national economic 
development. The number of these banks until the end of 2005 was forty-eight small 
regional private banks. 
At the beginning of 2006, as part of the restructuring of the banking sector in Libya, 
forty-two of these banks were merged into the National Banking Corporation based on 
the CBL’s Decree No. 49 of 2006, which in turn became the integration of these banks, 
a state-owned commercial bank (whose name was changed to the North Africa Bank 
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thereafter). One of the six remaining regional banks has been transformed into private 
commercial bank under the name Mediterranean Bank, (formerly Ahliah Bank of 
Benghazi), and Ahliah Bank of Tripoli was also transformed into a private commercial 
bank under the name Alsaraya Trading and Development Bank. 
Three Ahlia Banks were merged (i.e. Al-jeelat, Zuwarah, and Sahal Aljafarah) into a 
single private commercial bank under the name of Al-Mutahed Bank for Trade and 
Investment; this was based on the decision of the governor of the CBL taken on the July 
1
st
 2007 (Al-Mutahed Bank for Trade and Investment, 2011). In 2007, the last 
remaining regional bank (i.e. Bank Al-Andalus) was transformed to a private 
commercial bank under the name Arab Commercial Bank after its capital had increased 
according to Banking Law No. 1 2005. 
Since the Libyan Banking Law No. 1 was applied in 1993, the number of private 
commercial banks in Libya has grown gradually; the first private commercial bank was 
established in 1997 (i.e. Bank of Commerce and Development) and by the end of 2010 
the number of private commercial banks has reached eleven, which includes Al Waha 
Bank, Arab Commercial Bank, Assaray Trade and Investment Bank, Alejmaa Alarabei 
Bank, Al-Wafa Bank, Al-Mutahed Bank for Trade and Investment, Alaman Bank for 
Commerce and Investment, First Gulf Bank, Mediterranean Bank, and the North Africa 
Bank. It should be noted that some of these banks are not wholly owned by the private 
sector (foreign or local); the Libyan government or their agencies own them partially 
from their capital (for more details see Table 4.2, in section 4.4.3.2.2). 
4.4.2 Libya’s banking sector reforms  
The Libyan state has made unremitting efforts to reform and liberalise of the banking 
sector, in light of the overall economic reforms that began to be implemented in the late 
1990s and have intensified during the 2000s. So far, these reforms have contributed to 
the development of the banking sector in many aspects, while other aspects still require 
more effort to reach a strong and competitive banking system. Indeed, several tangible 
reforms and changes in the Libyan ban ing sector’s structure and activities were 
recently witnessed. As have been noted by Otman and Karlberg (2007), the banking 
sector’s reforms in Libya was closely associated with a general reform programme 
intended both to privatise inefficient state-owned enterprises, and as a sensible effort by 
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the Libyan authorities to attract forging direct investment into the national economic 
sectors. 
The Libyan banking sector was long dominated by five state-owned commercial banks; 
these banks are owned in full or in the majority by the Libyan government or its 
agencies, namely the National Commercial Bank, Al-Umma Bank (which merged with 
Jamahiriya Bank in 2008), Jamahiriya Bank, Wahda Bank, and Sahara Bank. These 
public banks dominate over 90% of all deposits, assets and credit in the commercial 
banking sector in the country. As emphasised by IMF (2006a), the Libyan banking 
sector remains predominantly in the hands of the public sector, which represents 90% of 
Libya’s ban ing business. Privatisation of Libyan’s state-owned banks must be viewed 
as an opportunity to attract a qualified group of strategic investors with a proven track 
record into the financial industry, to improve banking sector efficiency (WB, 2006). 
It is widely recognised that the vast majority of these state-owned banks are 
characterised by structural and functioning weaknesses due to poor corporate 
governance practices, lax credit administration processes and the absence or non-
adherence to credit risk management practices. At the same time, the Libyan banking 
sector is characterised by the magnitude of the excess liquidity owned, and a narrow 
product range with a focus on traditional lending and a high number of non-performing 
loans. 
Furthermore, the banking industry in Libya suffers from the unfavourable business 
environment, which restricts private sector development, as well as the lack of expertise 
and modern banking skills (IMF, 2006a). According to the WB (2006), Libyan state-
owned banks still need a management structure supported by modern skills in certain 
critical areas as credit, investment, risk management, and information and control 
systems. 
The banking sector in Libya thus needs to be reformed in order to enhance its ability to 
perform a more proactive role in the development of the economy and to enable the 
banking sector effectively contribute to the advancement of private sector, increasing its 
contribution to the development process as well as to improve its competitiveness. 
 ccording to the IMF’s report published in 2006a, there are vital reform measures that 
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should be undertaken by Libyan government for the development of the banking sector 
and to promote competition within it and improve accounting and financial reporting 
systems which include reforming the current legislation in the areas of accounting, 
bookkeeping, and bankruptcy. 
As a part of efforts to reform the Libyan banking system, the CBL has recently 
undertaken significant measures to attract greater foreign direct investment into the 
Libyan banking industry and to open up the banking sector to international banks, as 
well as to improve the Libyan banking sector efficiency. Accordingly, the CBL has 
created legislation permitting foreign banks to establish branches in Libya and allowing 
them to hold up to 50% of the shares of some domestic banks. Furthermore, the CBL 
has also authorised the establishment of private domestic commercial banks. According 
to the IMF report of 2006/b, the CBL issued a number of decrees to improve the 
operations of commercial banks, launched the privatisation of state-owned banks, as 
well as recapitalising three of the five commercial banks it owns. 
In July 2007, BNP Paribas of France was invited to purchase 19 % share of Sahara 
Bank. One further foreign bank, the Arab Bank of Jordan was selected to buy a 19% 
share of Wahda Bank in November 2007, among five foreign banks (French, Italian, 
Moroccan institutions, Jordanian, and Bahraini) shortlisted for the privatisation of 
Wahda Bank, with the possibility of raising their ownership to 51% over the succeeding 
three to five years. In addition, in August 2010 the CBL allowed the Italian bank 
Unicredit to operate a subsidiary in Libya. Unicredit will hold 49% of the subsidiary 
with full management control, and 51% will be held by Libyan investors. 
It is also noteworthy that the Libyan state is considered the largest shareholder in Italian 
bank UniCredit (the CBL and the LIA in combination own nearly 7.6% of Unicredit). 
Recently, the Arab Banking Corporation (Bahrain) was allowed to buy a 49 % stake in 
Libya’s Mediterranean Ban . The CBL is a majority shareholder in the Arab Banking 
Corporation with 59.37 % of its stock, after purchasing the Abu Dhabi Investment 
 uthority’s 17.7 % sta e. 
The merging of the commercial banking sector is one of the remarkable signs of the 
recent reforms agenda in Libya. In light of subsequent developments in the banking 
121 
 
environment, there has been a trend towards mergers and the privatisation of state-
owned commercial banks in Libya. In October 2007, the CBL announced that it 
intended to consolidate two large state-owned commercial banks, the Umma Bank and 
the Jumhuriya Bank, to form one commercial bank, Jumhuriya Bank. The merging 
process was completed in 2008 and this bank remains state-owned. 
The government’s view is that this will enable the new ban  to be more effective and 
more capable of facing severe competition in the banking market. Furthermore, new 
commercial banking laws were introduced, and several new banking licences were 
recently issued, as part of the banking sector liberalisation, bringing the total number of 
commercial banks operating in the country to 15; the number of representation agency 
offices of foreign banks has increased to reach 24. 
At the time of writing, it is obvious that the role of the banking sector in Libya remains 
very limited in terms of the quality of services provided, compared with other countries 
with similar economic characteristics, which reflects negatively on its contribution to 
national economic development. In spite of privatisation and reform actions recently 
undertaken by Libyan authorities, the banking sector still does not play a full role in the 
country’s economic life, and is also not strongly effective in the process of economic 
development. 
More important, the Libyan banking industry is still dominated by state-owned 
commercial banks. Notwithstanding, the exchange of state-owned commercial banks to 
private commercial banks has become an unavoidable result of socio-economic 
conditions challenging the emerging economy countries, such as Libya.   
Overall, in the absence of reforms, a country-banking sector may not be able to play a 
complete role in the intermediation of national savings and the financing of economic 
growth in the non-oil sector (World Bank, 2006).  
4.4.3 The structure of the Libyan banking sector  
The current structure of the Libyan banking sector is comprised from different types of 
banks; at present it includes the CBL, which represents the monetary authority, 
responsible for the supervision and control over the banks, and a number of public 
commercial banks, in addition to a number of private commercial banks and mixed 
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ownership commercial banks, which contribute to the capital of a foreign partner (see 
Table 4.3).  
Within the components of the Libyan bank sector there are also four specialised banks 
which have been created for the purpose of financing specific activities, such as housing 
activity, agriculture, industry and finance of small projects. In addition to these, there is 
a Libyan Foreign Bank (LFB), represented in overseas investments and banking 
activities and complementary and related financial activities (offshore). There are also a 
number of representative offices of foreign banks based in Libya (see Appendix No. 6). 
The following subsections review in detail the current structure of the Libyan banking 
sector. 
4.4.3.1 Central bank of Libya  
As discussed previously, the CBL commenced its operations on April 1, 1956, under the 
name the National Bank of Libya, which replaced the Libyan Currency Committee 
which was established in 1951. It was then renamed the CBL to perform its main 
functions as the central bank.  
Prior to the issuance the Libyan Banking Law No. 4 for the year 1963, the functions of 
the CBL were limited to keeping sterling assets against the issue of local currency, 
hence, it had no role in controlling money supply or credit, or in supervising banks 
(CBL, 2006). By issuance of the Libyan Banking Law No. 1, 2005, its role has 
improved more effectively, and this law gave the CBL its independence and the 
authority to manage and implement banking and monetary policy, as well as supervising 
and monitoring the ban ing system’s performance, and enhancing confidence therein. 
At present, the CBL is fully (100%) under state ownership and represents the monetary 
authority in Libya, and it has come under the sponsorship of the Secretariat of the 
General People’s Congress since the issuing of the Libyan Ban ing Law No. 1 of 2005. 
The main objectives of CBL under the Banking Law 2005 are to maintain monetary 
stability in the country, and to promote the sustained growth of the Libyan economy in 
accordance with the government’s general economic policy. 
According to Article 18, Libyan Banking Law No. 1, 2005, the governor of the CBL 
shall be the executive chief of the CBL, and shall be responsible for managing the CBL 
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and discharging its normal affairs under the board of directors’ supervision. The CBL 
has established three branches located in Benghazi, Sebha, and Sirte, as well as 
headquarters in Tripoli, which has made its services more accessible to public 
departments as well as commercial bank branches far from the headquarters (CBL, 
2006). 
4.4.3.1.1 Functions of the central bank of Libya 
The Libyan Banking Law No. 46, 2012, Article 5 specified the core functions and 
responsibilities of the CBL, which include the following: 
1. Issue the Libyan currency and maintain its stability within Libya and abroad. 
2. Manage its reserves and the government’s reserves of gold and foreign exchange.  
3. Regulate monetary policy and supervise currency conversion transactions within 
Libya and abroad. 
4. Regulate credit and banking policy and supervise its implementation within the 
framewor  of the government’s general policy. 
5. Achieve the goals of economic policy in terms of stabilizing the general level of 
prices and maintaining the soundness of the banking system. 
6. Manage the liquidity of the national economy. 
7. Regulate and supervise the foreign exchange market. 
8. Provide advice to the government on matters related to the general economic policy. 
In addition, in carrying out the above-mentioned obligations the CBL may (Article 
5/2): 
1. Exert control on the amount, type, and period of credit available to ensure that the 
actual needs of economic factors involved in production and services will be met. 
2. Take appropriate measures to deal with economic and financial troubles, whether 
domestic or international. 
3. Monitor and supervise banks, companies and exchange offices, and financial leasing 
companies to ensure the soundness of their financial position, monitor their 
performance, and protect the rights of their shareholders, depositors and customers. 
4. Supervise the national system of payments, including clearing operations between 
banks subject to the provisions of this law, and develop regulations to govern the 
system. 
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5. Any other measures required to implement the monetary, credit, and banking policies 
and enhance the supervision of banking credit.  
The following is a review of the most important functions undertaken by CBL since it 
was founded.  
 Issuing and regulating the Libyan currency 
CBL is the sole issuer of the Libyan currency; it supplies market needs for banknotes 
and coins and keeps a sufficient inventory of these banknotes and coins. As was stated 
in the  rticle No. 30, Ban ing Law No 46, 2012, “the CBL alone shall have the 
prerogative to issue currency in Libya. In the application of the provisions of this 
section, currency shall mean ban notes and coins”. It is also responsible for eliminating 
and withdrawing old currency from circulation which is damaged or no longer valid.  
According to Libyan Banking Law, 2012, Article 31, the unit of national currency is 
Libyan Dinar (LD), which is divided into (1000 Dirhams); the CBL’s board of directors 
shall set the par value of the LD in SDRs or any convertible foreign currency or 
according to supply and demand in the foreign exchange. The LD was introduced in 
1971 by the CBL as a replacement of the Jonayh.  
One LD equalled $3.04 (US dollars) and continued to be strong until the 1986 (CBL, 
2006). Later the value of LD started to gradually reduce. Currently it is valued at less 
than a dollar (approximately USD 0.80). Since January 2002, the LD has been pegged to 
Special Drawing Rights (SDRs) by fixed rate. In June 2003, the exchange rate was 
devalued by 15 per cent to one LD equals SDRs 0.5175 (IMF, 2005).  
It is worth mentioning that before CBL commenced its activity in 1956 the currency 
notes traded at the time were those issued by the LCC, which was established in 
February 1952, and began issuing the Libyan currency in 24 March, 1952 (CBL, 2006). 
 Manage and develop the government’s gold and foreign exchange reserves 
According to Article 6 of Libyan Banking Law No. 46, 2012, the CBL is the only body 
responsible for managing and developing the government’s gold and foreign exchange 
reserves. In addition, it is responsible for selecting appropriate investment instruments 
and determining the amounts to be invested in each currency, taking into account the 
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developments in foreign exchange and money and capital markets to certify safety and 
profitability. 
The CBL licenses commercial banks to hold foreign currencies in accordance with 
guidelines of the foreign exchange regulations issued from time to time to take into 
account the country’s general economic interests. 
Foreign exchange transactions shall be executed through banks and 
entities that are licensed for this purpose by the Central Bank of Libya. 
Each such bank and entity must prepare a periodic statement of the 
foreign exchange that it sells or buys, the foreign exchange transfers that 
it executes and receives, foreign exchange that it receives for transactions 
involving the export of goods and services, and foreign exchange 
balances at its disposal. It must transfer all such foreign exchange to the 
Central Bank of Libya at the times stipulated by the Central Bank of 
Libya (Article 47, Banking Law No. 46, 2012). 
 
Furthermore, Article 43 indicated that commercial banks operating in Libya may open 
accounts in foreign exchange for individuals and legal entities that are fed by: 
a. Deposits in foreign exchange.  
b. Sums transferred from abroad. 
c. Sums transferred from another domestic account in foreign exchange. 
d. The foreign currency equivalent that the banks receives for its purchase of 
foreign banknotes, or other means of payment in foreign exchange credited 
to the account. 
e. Banking interest on the aforesaid accounts. 
f. Any other legal channel. 
 
 Acting as a banker and financial agent to the state and public entities 
The CBL acts as a banker and financial agent to the Libyan state and public entities. 
Article 9/1 of the Libyan Banking Law No 46, 2012 emphasises that the CBL have to 
engage in banking activities relating to public administrative units required to deposit 
their balances in it, and it must provide banking services to those units. Further, the 
CBL may accept deposits from, and provide banking services to, public entities (Article 
9/2). The CBL may also provide temporary advances to the government to cover any 
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temporary deficit in general budget revenues based on terms agreed between the CBL 
and the Ministry of Treasury (Article 11/2).  
Accordingly, the CBL, under the Libyan Banking Law, is charged with maintaining the 
government and public institutions’ revenues and expenditures accounts. It also makes 
payments, transfers and collects funds locally and abroad, as well as managing letters of 
credit transactions on behalf of its customers, and provides various banking services to 
public institutions. In addition, it participates in representing the government in 
contracts, negotiations, and operations conducted with foreign governments and 
international organisations regarding monetary, financial, or commercial matters. 
 Acting as economic and financial consultant to the state 
The role of the Central Bank of Libya (CBL) in promoting economic activity in the 
country is not limited to its role in monetary stability and managing the banking 
environment. It also provides advice to the government on various aspects of economic 
life, such as the submission of proposals and recommendations to make decisions and 
measures which relate to economic affairs and finance, through studies and reports to 
the competent authorities about the economic developments in the country. Moreover, it 
offers advice on questions or concerns in various topics and economic issues. 
  Acting as a banker to the commercial banks  
The CBL maintains the legal cash reserves required from commercial banks as a 
percentage of their customers deposits. According to Article 57 of the Banking Law No 
46, 2012, all commercial banks operating in Libya must maintain, with the CBL and 
without interest, the required monetary reserve corresponding to their deposit liabilities. 
These reserves must be paid in the Libyan dinar unless the board of directors of the 
CBL permits the provision of some such reserves in the form of other assets. 
Commercial banks have to maintain mandatory cash reserves of 15 % at the CBL by the 
demand deposits, and 7.5% on savings and time deposits. In addition, it accepts time 
deposits of these banks for the benefits, and the CBL is a last resort for the commercial 
banks and can give them unusual loans in the face of any exceptional circumstances it 
assumes threaten the stability of the monetary system and banking in Libya.  
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 Inspecting, supervision and regulation of banking activities  
In order to ensure that banks comply with the CBL rules, regulations, policies, and 
directions, the CBL checks and analyses the financial positions of all banks and their 
branches operating in Libya, in terms of legal liquidity and the safety of their financial 
position, and confirms that they maintain the legal required ratios such as cash reserves 
and legal liquidity. It also examines the truth of figures and information which they 
supply to the CBL and their commitment to following the directives that issued by CBL, 
such as that concerning the size and direction of credit granted by the banking sector. 
Under Banking Law No 46, 2012, Article 55, the following shall be subject to the 
supervision of the CBL:  
1. Commercial banks and Islamic banks. 
2. Specialised banks.  
3. Banks that operate abroad whose head office is in Libya. 
4. The branches of foreign banks in Libya. 
5. The representation offices of foreign banks in Libya. 
6. Companies and exchange offices, financial leasing companies, and investment funds. 
According to Article 61 of the Banking Law No. 46, 2012, the CBL has a right to inspect 
at any time the ban s’ boo s, records, debit accounts, and their electronic systems as well 
as the files pertaining thereto. This inspection should be done at the head office of the 
bank concerned by CBL inspectors assigned to carry out this task. In addition, the banks 
must provide the inspectors with all of the data and facilities that they require to carry out 
their work. Furthermore, all banks must comply with the rules and regulations established 
by the CBL to regulate clearing operations and issues relating to National Payment 
System (NPS) and they must also implement the decrees, circulars, and instructions 
issued by the CBL (Article 64). 
4.4.3.2 Commercial banks  
This includes all commercial banks operating in Libya licensed to perform banking 
operations under the supervision of the CBL, in accordance with the provisions of Libyan 
Banking Law No. (46) of the year 2012. Commercial banks are the most important 
components of the financial sector in Libya in terms of size and role, geographical 
spread, and various types of services offered to customers.  
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4.4.3.2.1 Definition and functions of commercial bank 
The Libyan Banking Law No, 46 of 2012, Article 65/1 defines a commercial bank as 
“ ny company that ordinarily accepts deposits in current demand accounts or time 
deposits, grants loans and credit facilities, and engages in other such banking activities 
according to the provisions of paragraph (2) of this article shall be considered a 
commercial ban ”. This definition does not include the specialised ban s or other 
financial institutions.  
According to the Banking Law commercial banks must assume the form of a Libyan 
joint-stock company, according to the rules and conditions determined by the board of 
directors of the CBL. Commercial banks may engage in some or all of the following 
business activities (Article 65/2): 
a. The cashing of checks made out to and by customers. 
b. Services relating to documentary credits, documents for collection, and letters of 
credit. 
c. Issuance and management of instruments of payment including monetary drawings, 
financial transfers, payment and credit cards, traveller’s cheques, etc. 
d. Sale and purchase transactions involving monetary market instruments and capital 
market instruments to the credit of the bank or its customers. 
e. The purchase and sale of debt, without or without the right of recourse. 
f. Financial leasing activities. 
g. Foreign exchange transactions in spot and forward exchange markets. 
h. The management, coverage, distribution, and transaction of banknote issues. 
i. The provision of investment and other services for investment portfolios, and the 
provision of investment trustee services, including the management and investment 
of funds for a third party. 
j. Management and safekeeping of securities and valuables. 
k. Provision of trustee or financial investor services. 
l. Any other banking activities approved by the CBL. 
Each commercial bank must obtain a license to engage in banking activities before 
commencing such activities. The board of directors of the CBL is responsible for issuing 
this license. According to the Libyan Banking Law, Article No. 66 this license shall 
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replace the license stipulated in the Commercial Law. However, commercial banks in 
Libya are prohibited from engaging in the following transactions (Article 77): 
a. Wholesale and retail commerce, including importation and exportation and 
brokerage or commercial agency activities, except as required by financial 
leasing activities or Islamic banking services. 
b. The acquisition of a joint stoc  company’s shares in the capital of the ban . 
c. The acquisition of the shares of another joint stock company in excess of 10 per 
cent of the company’s paid capital. The nominal value of the total shares owned 
by the bank in such companies must not exceed one-half of the paid capital and 
capital reserve. 
d. Entry as a general partner into partnerships and the like. 
e.  cceptance of shares that comprise the ban ’s capital in the form of a loan 
guarantee, or the transacting in or acquisition of such shares, unless ownership 
of the shares was transferred to the bank in payment of a debt to the bank by a 
third party; in this case, the bank must sell such shares within one year of the 
transfer of the shares to it. 
f. The purchase of the shares of any bank operating in Libya, even if its head 
office is abroad, only with the permission of the board of directors of CBL. 
g. The issuance of bearer notes payable on demand. 
The following are the most important characteristics of the Libyan commercial banking 
sector.  
4.4.3.2.2 Ownership structure of the Libyan commercial banks  
The commercial banking sector in Libya consists of fifteen banks in operation: six 
public sector-owned commercial banks with foreign participation in two banks (i.e. Al-
Wahda Bank and Al-Sahari Bank), eight private commercial banks owned by Libyans 
individuals and foreign participation (joint ownership), and one commercial bank owned 
jointly by the Libyan state and the United Arab Emirates, 50% for each. As can be seen 
in Table 4.3 the ownership structure of the Libyan commercial banking sector can be 
categorised by the following features: 
a. Four commercial banks are 100% private local owners, 
b. Eight commercial banks are wholly or partially owned by the public sector, 
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c. Two private commercial banks are jointly by private local and foreign strategic 
pattern, and 
d. One is owned jointly by the Libyan state and the United Arab Emirates (50% 
for each).   
 
Table 4.3: List of commercial banks operating in Libya as of 2010 
No. Name of the bank  Capital Ownership 
Public Sector 
% 
Private Sector 
% 
Strategic    
Partner  
% 
1. Al-Jumhoria Bank 83.0 17.0 0.0 
2. National Commercial Bank 85.0 15.0 0.0 
3. Al-Wahda Bank 54.0 27.0 19..0 
4. Al-Sahari Bank 59.0 22.0 19.0 
5. North Africa Bank 82.0 18.0 0.0 
6. Al-Waha Bank 90.0 0.0 0.0 
7. Bank Alaman for Commerce and 
Investment 
0.0 60.0 40.0 
8. Al-Wafa Bank 0.65 99.3 0.0 
9. Assaray Trade and Investment 
Bank 
0.0 100.0 0.0 
10. First Gulf Bank 50.0 0.0 50.0 
11. Al-Mutahed Bank for Trade and 
Investment 
3.0 57.0 40.0 
12. Arab Commercial Bank 0.0 100.0 0.0 
13. Bank of Commerce and 
Development 
17.0 34.0 49.0 
14. Mediterranean Bank 0.0 100.0 0.0 
15. Al-Ejmaa Al-Arabei Bank 0.0 100.0 0.0 
   Source: The third annual report of the Department of Bank Supervision and Monetary 
for the years 2010-2011. 
 
 
4.4.3.2.3 The nature of the Libyan commercial banking sector  
Libyan commercial banks, as a profit-seeking business institution, provide traditional 
banking services in rural areas, smaller and bigger cities in the country via (330) 
branches and (159) agencies. These services include accepting the deposits (demand or 
saving) from the general public, granting various types of loans and advances to 
individuals and companies, issuance and management of instruments of payment 
including monetary drawings, financial transfers, credit cards, traveller’s cheques, and 
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collection pensions and salaries on behalf of their clientele. They also offer services 
relating to processing letters of guarantee and letters of credit.   
Along with these services, they also deal in foreign exchange transactions as well as 
acting as brokers in foreign exchange markets, and service transfer of funds in foreign 
countries. In addition to these traditional services, in recent years, due to community 
pressure, several of these commercial banks have begun to offer some banking products 
compliant with Islamic Sharia tenets. The number of branches that began to provide 
banking products according to Islamic Sharia was thirteen. However, the Libyan 
commercial banking sector, up to the present time, is relatively small and 
underdeveloped as well as offering a very limited range of financial products compared 
to other similar countries; services are often provided on the basis of personal 
relationships. 
4.4.3.2.4 Commercial banks’ performance during Libya’s popular revolution 
The fiscal year 2011 was an exceptional year for commercial banks, when the events of 
Libya’s popular revolution on February 17, 2011 split apart the commercial banks 
through most of the year, and contact was completely lost between some branches and 
their major administrations. In addition to restrictions on withdrawals, and the 
disruption of communication networks and irregular electricity, there was also a sharp 
decline in foreign trade activities (CBL, 2011). 
The commercial banks, however, witnessed during the economic conditions that 
prevailed in the domestic environment in the year 2011, remarkable significant changes 
in most of the financial indicators compared with the corresponding period of 2010, as 
follows: 
 The total assets have increased (excluding contra accounts) by a growth rate of 
8.5%, representing LD 5.6 million. The total assets reached LD 70.9 million in 
2011, compared to LD 65.4 million at the end of 2010, with the liquid assets 
formed of total assets accounting for 73.0%, or about LD 51.7 million, mostly in 
the form of certificates deposited with the CBL, which reached its total of around 
LD 30.0 million.  
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 The contra accounts which consist mostly of local and foreign credit and guarantee 
letters, recorded at the end of 2011 an increase of LD 3.6 million, or an increase of 
5.7% over the end of the year 2010, to reach LD 65.9 million. 
 The conditions experienced by Libya after the revolution of February 17, 2011 led 
to a decrease in the total of loans and credits granted by commercial banks from LD 
13044.6 million at the end of 2010 to LD 12786.5 million at the end of the year 
2011, at nearly LD 258.1, representing an average decline of 2.0%. This decline in 
credit granted by commercial banks comes as aggregate to the  following: 
a) social advances items declined by about LD 433.5 million, or 11%, from around 
LD 3770.6 (5.8% of total assets) in 2010 to roughly LD 3337.1 million (4.7% of 
total assets) in 2011. This decline mainly translates to imposition of limits on 
cash withdrawals and the lack of liquidity in LD for banks. 
b) real estate loans items declined by LD 32.5 million, from about LD 11872 
million (1.8% of total assets) at the end of 2010 to approximately 1154.7 (1.6% 
of total assets) at the end of 2011. 
c) increase of economic activities loans items by LD 208.0 million, an increase of 
2.6%, to reach LD 8.2948 million at the end of 2011, compared to LD 8086.8 
million at the end of 2010. The relative size of this item in the structure of assets 
declined during this period from 12.4% to 11.7%. 
 The percentage to cover the provision for doubtful debts to the total loans and 
facilities accounted for 16.7% at year-end 2011, compared with 14.7% in 2010, 
which requires commercial banks to make greater efforts in order to reduce this 
ratio and access to the international averages of less than 6.0 %. 
 The deposits volume of companies, public institutions, and the private sector 
increased from LD 55.3 million to reach LD 58.5 million by a growth rate of 5.7%. 
The demand deposits formed approximately 79.3% of total deposits, while time 
deposits accounted for about 19.5% of total deposits. However, the savings deposits 
constituted only around 1.2 %, whereas the balance of private sector deposits was 
shaped at the end of 2011, about LD 28.9 million, which represented  nearly 49.4% 
of the total deposits, while the balance of public sector deposits represented the 
remaining 50.6% which was worth LD 29.6 million of total deposits. 
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 The total of shareholders’ equity during the same period declined from LD 4517.6 
million at the end of the year 2010 to reach LD 4365.2 million at the end of the year 
2011; the decrease rate was roughly 3.4%. 
 For the same reasons mentioned above, the amount of revenue earned by 
commercial banks during the year 2011 decreased by 38.2% to reach LD 1010.4 
million compared with the corresponding period of 2010, which amounted to LD 
1634.2 million. The expenses also decreased by 26.5% in 2011, reached LD 608.8 
million, compared to LD 828.7 million in 2010. The ratio of expenses to revenues 
was about 60.3% in 2011, compared to 50.7% in 2010. 
 The balance of the surplus liquidity of commercial banks at the end of 2010 was 
about LD 31.126.7 million, compared LD 32808.7 million at the end of 2011, an 
increase of LD 1682.0, representing 5.4%. This increase represents the difference 
between the actual balance of liquid assets (LD 2525.8 million) and the balance of 
liquid assets reserves (LD 843.8 million). It should be noted that although the rate of 
growth of excess liquidity has declined, compared to 2010, the commercial ban s’ 
liquidity reserves remain high for several reasons; perhaps the most important are 
limited areas of employment and the increase in public spending. In addition, 
Libya’s extraordinary conditions witnessed during 2011 are what led to restrictions 
on banking operations. 
4.4.3.3 Libyan Foreign Bank 
The Libyan Foreign Bank (LFB) was founded in 1972 under Law No. (18) as a Libyan 
joint-stock company with a paid up capital of LD10 million, fully owned by the CBL. 
The capital of the bank rose to LD 20 million (equivalent to USD 67.4 million) 
according to the Law No. 66, for the year 1972.  t the beginning of 2006, the ban ’s 
capital was increased once more to reach USD one billion. On December 12, 2009, at 
an extraordinary general assembly meeting of shareholders, the bank decided to 
increase its capital to USD two billion.  
Subsequently, the extraordinary general assembly meeting of shareholders on February 
21st, 2010 agreed to increase the bank capital by a further USD one billion; the paid up 
capital of the LFB therefore became USD three billion. In addition, the extraordinary 
general assembly meeting of shareholders agreed to increase the authorised capital to be 
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USD 8.7 billion divided into 87 million shares at a value of USD 100 per share (LFB, 
2012).  
The LFB serves as the foreign agent for the government and Libyan commercial banks 
and implements the worldwide functions of the CBL through its head office in Tripoli 
and branches in more than 30 countries. In particular, the LFB performs the activity of 
opening accounts and accepting deposits from abroad and non-residents, in addition to 
banking and financial transactions with commercial local banks and any related banking 
activities licensed by the CBL (LFB website, 2012). 
Article No. 20 of the Statute of the LFB identified the purposes for which, performing 
outside Libya, the bank are engaging in all banking and financial services as well as 
development of finance operations and in particular the following: 
 Acceptance of  demand and time deposits, opening current accounts, loans held 
and granting other credit facilities. 
 Collection and payment orders, promissory notes and other securities with 
financial value. 
 Issuance of bonds, notes and other commercial paper. 
 Discount, re-discount and trading of commercial paper. 
 Issuance of letters of guarantee and credits and the opening credits and 
financing foreign trade operations, providing facilities for importers and 
exporters as well as the issuance of securities, as well as project financing and 
development investment on commercial grounds. 
 Carrying out trustees’ investment. 
 
The banking and financial services that LFB is licensed to carry out inside Libya are: 
 Opening accounts and accepting deposits in convertible foreign currencies from 
abroad and non-residents in Libya. 
 Opening accounts and accepting deposits from public institutions assigned from 
the CBL to deal with it. 
 Carrying out banking and financial transactions with local commercial banks in 
line with the purposes of the bank. 
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4.4.3.4 Specialised banks  
Specialised banks (lending institutions) are the institutions that specialise in financing of 
a particular economic activity or specific sectors. Specialised banks were structured on 
cooperative lines; they do not operate on the principle of profit, and thus their activities 
are different from those of commercial banks. These banks were specially established to 
support and accelerate the socio-economic development in Libya by granting medium-
term and long-term loans to agricultural, industrial and real estate activities. 
In accordance with Article 65/1, Banking Law No. 46 of the year 2012, “a specialised 
bank whose main purpose is to finance and grant credit for specific activities, and 
whose basic activities do not include the acceptance of demand deposits, shall not be 
considered a commercial ban ”. In view of that, four specialised banks were established 
in Libya to serve specific types of economic activity, they wholly owned by Libyan 
government, and these are in accordance with the resolutions of their establishment: (i) 
National Agricultural Bank, (ii) Saving and Real Estate Investment Bank, (vi) 
Development Bank, and (v) Rural Bank. Following is a brief introduction to these four 
specialised banks. 
(i) The National Agricultural Bank: 
The National Agricultural Bank (NAB) is one of the oldest specialised banks in Libya. 
It was founded in 1955 and commenced its operations in 1957 with a paid up capital of 
LD one million. In 1960, the Libyan government increased the N B’s capital another 
LD one million;, in March 1967, the N B’s capital became five million dinars, and this 
capital is stipulated in the bank law.  
The capital was increased again to reach LD six million and two hundred thousand, in 
order to meet the expansion aspects of the N B’s activities relating to agriculture and 
the expansion of the open branches and offices in agricultural areas of the country 
(Alnas, 2010). Furthermore, in 2002, the capital of the NAB was increased to LD 450 
million, based on decision No. 105 ta en by the General People’s Committee (CBL, 
2006). Its main purpose was to promote the agricultural sector in the country by 
providing interest-free loans to Libyan farmers; it purchases agricultural products from 
them at a guaranteed profit and sells materials to them at supported prices.  
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In 1970, the NAB was reorganised under law No. 133, which redefined its functions as 
follows:  
a. Work on the promotion and development of agricultural activity in the country. 
b. Grant agricultural loans to farmers and agricultural cooperatives and public 
sector companies related to agricultural activity and livestock. 
c. Accept deposits from individual farmers and agricultural cooperatives and 
public sector companies. 
d. Market agricultural products and animal within the public policy of the state. 
e. Trade in materials, machinery and equipment which is used for agriculture 
purposes. 
f. Establish, own and contribute to companies whose activities relate to agriculture 
 
In order to achieve its objectives the NAB continued to provide loans and credit 
facilities for farmers, companies and public agricultural enterprises. Table 4.4 shows the 
value of loans granted by the bank during the period 1990-2011. It is clear that the total 
loans granted by the NAB (short, medium, and long term) was increased from LD 73.5 
million at the end of 1990 to LD 1571.2 million in 2011, which showed a rise of LD 
1497.7 million. 
By analysing the relative importance of the loans, it is clear that the short-term loans 
accounted for approximately 7.04 % of the total of loans granted by the NAB to reach 
about LD 110.6 million in the end of 2011. The medium-term loans accounted for 
around 40.16% of the total loans granted by the bank to reach around LD 631.0 million 
at the end of 2011. The long-term loans accounted for about 52.8% of the total loans, 
which reached LD 829.6 in 2011.  
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Table 4.4: The value of loans granted by the NAB during the period  
1990-2011 (million LD) 
Year Short Term  Medium Term Long Term Total 
1990 21.4 18.7 33.4 73.5 
1991 22.5 17.4 34.6 74.5 
1992 20.9 15.4 34.4 70.7 
1993 24.9 11.8 31.8 68.5 
1994 25.9 10.9 30.1 66.9 
1995 28.0 10.5 28.8 67.3 
1996 29.6 16.3 29.1 75.0 
1997 32.4 20.0 28.1 80.5 
1998 35.4 22.8 27.5 85.7 
1999 39.5 28.5 27.5 95.5 
2000 50.0 36.0 27.0 113.0 
2001 55.2 44.5 31.5 131.2 
2002 57.4 92.4 82.9 232.7 
2003 51.9 115.6 130.5 298.0 
2004 67.2 148.0 155.2 370.4 
2005 60.1 296.5 360.4 717.0 
2006 64.5 425.1 685.4 1175.0 
2007 63.7 495.5 840.9 1400.1 
2008 81.8 564.2 829.1 1475.1 
2009 89.2 549.2 829.0 1467.4 
2010 73.3 555.0 829.6 1457.9 
2011 110.6 631.0 829.6 1571.2 
      Source: CBL, Economic Bulletin, for the year 2012 
(ii) Saving and Real Estate Investment Bank  
This bank began the exercise of its transactions in the special section in the Industrial 
and Real Estate Bank (IREB) in 1965 with a paid capital of LD 10 million, and then 
increased the ban ’s capital by the end of 1965 to LD 45 million (LCB, 2006). Under 
Law No. 2 for the year 1981, the real estate section was separated from the IREB and 
then became known as the Saving and Real Estate Investment Bank (SREIB), with 
capital of LD 100 million.  
In 2002, the capital of the SREIB was raised to reach LD 1100 by resolution of the 
General People’s Committee No. 105. Law No 2 for the year 1981 specified that the 
SREIB respects and supports the movement of construction and reconstruction by 
encouraging saving, real estate, and providing credit facilities for the purpose of 
providing adequate housing in the context of transformation and plans in line with the 
general policy of the state. In order to achieve this may require the following means:  
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a. Granting real estate loans. 
b. Issuing bonds and investment certificates. 
c.  ccepting deposits from the ban ’s clients relating to real estate activity. 
d. Implementing and managing real estate projects to their account and others. 
e. Constructing, owning and mortgaging the real estate. 
f. Establishing and owning the real estate enterprises or participating in them. 
 
As Table 4.5 shows, the balance of loans and financing provided by the bank (housing 
Loans and construction projects) until the end of 2011 was about LD 7953.3 million, 
compared with DL 520.9 million at the end of 2000, representing an increase of over 
LD 7432.4 million. 
 
Table 4.5: SREIB loans during the period 2000-2011 (million LD) 
Year Disbursements Loans for Housing and 
Construction Projects 
Total 
Housing Loans * Construction 
Projects 
 
2000 503.9 17.0 520.9 
2001 5090.2 18.7 5108.9 
2002 869.5 12.6 882.1 
2003 876.6 198.6 1075.2 
2004 1066.6 83.8 1150.4 
2005 1881.4 95.1 1976.5 
2006 3381.6 130.9 3512.5 
2007 4590.2 194.6 4784.8 
2008 4403.3 1495.4 5898.7 
2009 4666.6 1930.1 6596.7 
2010 5195.7 2207.6 7403.3 
2011 5745.7 2207.6 7953.3 
           * Includes loans by popularity since 2002 
Source: CBL, Economic Bulletin, for the year 2012. 
 
(iii) Development Bank 
Development Bank is a financial institution that was established under Law No. 8 of the 
year 1981, as a joint-stock state-owned company with a capital LD 100 million. Its 
purpose is to support the process of development in Libya, and to establish the 
foundations of an industrial base, contributing to increased production and diversifying 
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production through the support of public companies, cooperatives, and private 
enterprises by granting them the necessary loans for purchasing machinery, equipment 
and operating requirements. 
In 2005, the ban ’s capital was increased to reach LD 628.8 million. In particular, in 
recent years the Development Bank has played an active role in accelerating economic 
development in Libya, through granting loans to finance large or medium-sized 
productive and service projects, in order to develop the production and service sector 
and in particular to encourage projects that used modern methods in manufacturing, 
especially those using local raw materials available in the country. In addition, the bank 
has expanded its activities to include transportation, health and therapeutic services, 
food and feed.  
In order to achieve the objectives of the plans and programmes of economic 
development in the country, the Development Bank continued to grant different types of 
loans with simple terms and conditions, going on the largest number of beneficiaries. 
Short-term and medium-term loans, are often granted to individuals and do not exceed 
LD ten thousand; the period of loan ranges between sixteen months and five years, 
while long-term loans exceeding LD ten thousand are granted to corporations.  
The number of loans granted by the bank during 1990 reached 162 loans, accounting for 
LD 4005 thousand, mostly focused on the food industry to form respectively 54.9% and 
32.4% of the total number and value of granted loans (CBL, 2006). Remarkably, the 
number of granted loans grew to reach 5053 loans and the value of LD 254408.0 in 
2005, mostly focused on service activities, accounting respectively for 90.6% and 
77.3% of the total number and value of granted loans (CBL, 2006).  
Table 4.6 gives the number of loans granted to each industry by the Development Bank 
during the period 1995-2011. For example, the value of loans granted by the bank 
during the year 2011 reached about LD 121115.2 million, growing by about 35.2% 
from what it was in 2010 and amounting to LD 89.6 million. In particular, the 
development bank, according to Law No. 8 Articles 2 and 3, is functioning to achieve a 
set of objectives, which include:  
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a. Contribute to the activation of the production process and increase production 
rates through the provision of funding for productive projects which are 
economically feasible in the fields of industry, agriculture, tourism and other, 
whether new projects or to develop existing production capacities or for the 
purposes of an expansionary. 
b. Forecast for investment opportunities with economic and social returns that 
contribute to the expansion of the productive base and diversity of income 
streams. 
c. Offer technical assistance and advice to the owners of the projects directly or 
indirectly financed from the bank. 
d. Attracting foreign expertise through financing cooperatives that bring together 
the national and foreign investment. 
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Table 4.6: Development bank loans by industries 1995-2011 (thousand LD)        
 Source:  CBL, Economic Bulletin, for the year 2012 
 
 
 
 
 
Year Food 
Industries 
Building 
Material 
Chemical 
and 
Plastics 
Metal 
Works 
Textile 
Industries 
Furniture 
Industries 
Industrial 
services 
Others Total 
1995 50.0 301.1 - - 350.4 0.0 501.0 288.0 1490.5 
1996 65.9 248.4 82.1 521.7 1314.2 0.0 5780.7 27.9 8040.9 
1997 5066.7 2766.9 4801.7 5607.9 4546.2 762.9 2618.7 910.7 27081.7 
1998 322.4 112.5 - 288.1 854.9 0.0 953.6 0.1 2531.6 
1999 1069.4 304.7 378.4 394.6 461.0 5.0 882.3 88.0 3583.4 
2000 4150.7 2445.5 5008.0 4024.0 344.2 814.4 2526.3 1408.7 20721.8 
2001 4794.8 2053.3 6693.7 1862.2 1271.4 730.5 5456.6 8841.7 31704.2 
2002 7368.6 5113.8 18763.3 10023.7 228.7 270.1 17116.1 10282.3 69166.6 
2003 16729.0 10865.0 13695.8 10053.2 844.7 1130.1 16707.6 7800.3 77825.7 
2004 11154.5 6543.1 4059.0 2185.5 233.9 306.7 7147.3 4392.8 36022.8 
2005 10778.3 18604.1 8569.0 3240.9 173.9 8377.6 196685.7 7978.5 254408.0 
2006 25701.6 59518.9 14823.4 6837.2 2480.0 2493.4 12976.3 52645.5 177476.3 
2007 29178.2 129949.2 7843.4 5969.9 490.0 0.0 6858.3 41650.9 221939.9 
2008 4710.6 40820.3 358.2 290.9 607.1 808.6 1356.4 12016.4 60968.5 
2009 6033.0 65793.0 1218.3 1289.4 0.0 1402.2 5260.7 5788.1 86784.7 
2010 4476.9 58967.6 1421.0 808.7 1230.0 780.6 1770.9 20014.6 89470.3 
2011 289.5 8297.9 150.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 60.0 112317.8 121115.2 
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(iv) Rural Bank 
Rural Bank is considered as one of the pillars of the national economy, and an important 
addition to other funding institutions operating in Libya. This bank was established 
based on the decision of the General People’s Committee No. 12 of 2002, it has a legal 
personality and independent financial position and exercises its activity which is stated 
by law under the auspices of the General People’s Committee. 
The authorised capital of the bank was LD 100 million, wholly owned by the Secretariat 
of the General People’s Committee of Finance, and its capital may be increased by a 
decision of the secretariat of the General People’s Committee (CBL, 2006). The main 
purpose of the establishment of Rural Bank was to drive forward the growth and 
development in the areas of industrial and service sectors, by motivating the low-
income individuals and job seekers to participate in the development process. Thus, the 
bank aimed to improve the standard of living of Libyans, especially those who are low-
income, by granting them with loans for businesses in the areas of agriculture, livestock 
production, marine, industrial, artisanal and service.  
The bank offers loans between LD 500 up to LD 10,000, with an interest rate valued at 
2% of the loan amount. As Table 4.7 shows, a number of loans have been granted by 
the Rural Bank to various economic activities (i.e. agricultural, livestock, marine, 
industrial, craft, and service) since it started its operations until the end 2011. The total 
number of granted loans has reached 158,565, with the total amount of loans LD 623.0 
million. 45,732 loans valued at about LD 254.9 million had been granted to service 
activities which represented roughly 40.9% from the total granted loans. While 57,952 
loans with amount up LD 175.4 million had been given to the livestock sector, 
accounting for around 28.1%, and 27,122 loans amounting to LD 99.9 million had been 
granted to craft, which accounts for approximately 16.0%. The rest of the loans granted 
were distributed on industrial, agricultural, and marine as 8.1%, 5.9%, and 1.0% 
respectively.  
The Rural Bank was specially established to achieve a set of economic and social 
objectives including: 
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 Improve the standard of living for members of the community, especially low-
income families and job seekers, encouraging them to establish projects in 
various fields. 
 Contribute to the success of the projects financed by the bank, through the 
provision of technical assistance and advice to the beneficiaries to ensure the 
feasibility of such projects. 
 Benefit most segments of society with limited income and job seekers by 
encouraging them to borrow from the bank, through the ease of the procedures 
for obtaining the loan and the limited interest obtained by the banks, about 2 % 
of the loan value, and to overcome any difficulties that prevent this. 
 Find available investment opportunities, which guarantee the achievement of 
economic and social objectives. 
 Provide various banking services to the beneficiaries by opening deposit 
accounts to them. 
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Table 4.7:  Rural Bank loans by economic activities (thousand LD) 
 
Year Agricultural livestock Marine Industrial Craft Service Total 
N. Value N. Value N. Value N. Value N. Value N. Value N. Value 
2003 352 1048.5 2391 7154.0 11 33.0 87 259.5 114 336.5 110 327.5 3065 9159.0 
2004 891 2496.8 6417 17765.3 96 381.2 309 913.5 1001 2678.5 649 3002.3 9363 27237.6 
2005 2797 4869.7 14230 17776.7 199 197.8 1698 4353.0 3902 10761.0 5743 66307.1 28569 104265.3 
2006 967 6517.2 10340 55896.3 377 2935.3 2196 10011.5 4635 24857.5 12301 44836.1 30816 145053.9 
2007 1871 5715.0 9569 28737.9 199 885.9 2955 10967.5 4798 19161.0 10408 66520.3 29800 131987.6 
2008 602 1811.0 2881 8646.5 46 144.0 690 2220.0 1690 5499.0 2834 16882.8 8743 35203.3 
2009 885 2775.0 3737 11680.1 175 652.5 2040 6700.0 3953 13880.5 6353 30933.0 17143 66621.1 
2010 1466 4529.0 5451 11680.1 175 337.1 2402 7296.0 3901 12055.0 4286 15524.1 17615 56836.2 
2011 1466 6913.5 2935 10472.0 180 574.0 2208 7484.5 3128 10673.0 3048 10538.6 13451 46655.6 
      Source: CBL, Economic Bulletin, for the year 2012. 
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4.6 Summary and Conclusions 
This chapter has reviewed, in section 4.2, the Libyan background, including its 
geographical, population, historical, political, and economic background. This section 
shared that Libya is the largest fourth country among the countries of Africa and the 
fifteenth among the countries of the world. It is of great geo-strategic importance, 
within easy reach of most European countries, and linking the Arab nations of North 
Africa with the Middle Eastern Arab countries. Before the discovery of significant crude 
oil reserves in 1959, Libya was one of the poorest countries in the world. The social and 
economic conditions in the country witnessed rapid change after the discovery of crude 
oil in commercial quantities in 1959. 
Since becoming independent in 1951, the economic system in Libya was primarily 
capitalist and the private sector dominated all aspects of economic activity in the 
country. From the mid-1970s to 1980s, the new revolutionary government applied a 
socialist-oriented economy regime. Later, radical changes occurred in Libya towards a 
free market economy by opening the stock market for the first time and adopting 
market-oriented economic reforms and liberalisation as well as undertaking a number of 
measures to open the Libyan market to foreign investment. 
Overall, Libya’s economy is heavily dependent upon revenues from the hydrocarbon 
sector, which still plays a significant role in supporting and developing the social and 
economic sectors. In addition, this chapter has discussed in section 4.3 the Libyan stock 
market (LSM) as the first and only stock market in the country, which was established 
after issuing the resolution No. 134 of the year 2006 by the General People’s 
Committee. It has been shown that the LSM has undergone many remarkable 
developments since its founding; the LSM launched an Electronic Trading System and 
also linked the headquarters of the market with its branch electronically using fibre 
optic cable, and also linked up using satellites to be one of the pioneers in this field in 
Libya.  
Further, it has been shown that the LSM, in 2009, has launched a new website, as well 
as offering a variety of new services such as a short message service and centre voice 
services, which allow investors to pursue its operations in the market accurately and 
promptly. This section has also revealed that the number of listed companies on the 
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LSM has grown modestly from seven listed companies to twelve listed financial and 
non-financial companies since its inception in 2006. Although the number of listed 
companies has increased, in fact LSM remains the smallest in terms of number of listed 
corporations and mar et capitalisation compared to other  rab countries’ stoc  mar ets. 
Lastly, Section 4.4 has provided a brief overview of the banking sector in Libya, its 
historical and the recent developments, as well as Libya’s ban ing sector reforms. 
Additionally this section has also presented the structure of the Libyan banking sector. 
It has found that the banking sector has grown and currently consists of the Central 
Bank, four specialised banks, fifteen commercial banks, and the Libyan Foreign Bank. 
Furthermore, this section has highlighted that the banking sector in Libya is still 
dominated by state-owned commercial banks, and these banks control over ninety per 
cent of total ban ing deposits and assets. In this section, it was also shown that Libya’s 
banking system was undertaking reforms focused on privatisation and liberalisation of 
state-owned commercial ban s with the view to improving the ban s’ performance and 
their role in the national economic growth. The next chapter will present financial 
reporting laws and regulations in Libya, and it also explores the background and 
evolution of the accounting profession in Libya.  
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Chapter Five 
 
Regulation of Financial Accounting and Reporting in Libya 
 
 
5.1 Introduction 
  country’s laws or statutory regulations (legal systems) can directly or indirectly 
influence its corporate financial reporting and disclosures. Direct influence sets general 
requirements for measurement and disclosure of accounting information (Jaggi and 
Low, 2000). Otherwise, a country’s laws or statutory regulations can influence 
corporate financial reporting and disclosures indirectly through legal protection rights 
provided to investors and creditors (Jaggi and Low, 2000).  
This chapter therefore reviews and discusses in detail a number of governmental laws 
and regulations that may have influenced the corporate financial reporting and 
disclosure practices in Libya. In this chapter, the accounting profession in Libya also 
will be reviewed.  
The rest of this chapter is structured as follows: section 5.2 deals with financial 
reporting laws and regulations in Libya; these include the Commercial Activity Law 
(5.2.1), the Income Tax Law (5.2.2), the Petroleum Law (5.2.3), the Banking Law 
(5.2.4), and finally, Libyan Stock Market Law (5.2.5). The following section, 5.3, 
examines the accounting profession in Libya. Section 5.4 gives a summary and 
conclusions of the chapter. 
5.2 Financial Reporting Laws and Regulations in Libya 
5.2.1 The Commercial activity law 
The Commercial Activity Law (CAL) No. 23 was issued on 28
th
 January 2010 to 
replace the Libyan Commercial Law (LCL), which was issued on 28th November 1953. 
In fact, the LCL 1953 was the first Libyan legislation to deal with certain financial 
accounting rules and provisions. The LCL was amended a number of times between 
1953 and 2010. The old law involved certain aspects of financial reporting and auditing; 
for instance, Article No. 58 (Compulsory Books) of the LCL 1953 required individuals 
conducting business to keep and maintain at least two books: (i) a journal, and (ii) an 
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inventory and balance book. Besides that, businesses must prepare a balance sheet and a 
profit and loss account at least once a year according to the second paragraph of this 
Article. The old law (Article No. 573) also determines the assets and liabilities items 
that have to be included in any business’s balance sheet. However, the LCL of 1953 has 
been criticised by some scholars for many reasons; for example it was stated that:  
Libyan commercial law was passed for the year (1953) from within a group of 
laws in the areas of public law and private law, as an attempt to develop the 
legislation in force in the Libyan environment. It is well known that most laws 
passed in that period, that were prepared by expert Arab non-residents 
(Egyptian, Lebanese, Iraqi, etc.), lack familiarity with the Libyan 
environmental conditions and were not prepared by a team with sufficient 
experiences of Libya. Therefore, any mutation at the legislative level in the 
field of accounting as a result of the issuance of the Libyan Commercial Law 
(1953) cannot be seen on the grounds that they represent a response to the 
requirements and the Libyan environment interactions. In fact, the true 
meaning of the texts regarding Libyan trade law, with respect to the 
accounting area, is still not understood by a large segment of Libyan society 
(Al-Hasade, 2007, p. 10). 
 
Accordingly, CAL No. 23 of 2010 amended a number of the provisions of the LCL of 
1953. The new law included a range of Articles covering certain aspects of corporate 
financial reporting (Articles from 225 to 237 and Articles from 254 to 255), which in 
their entirety included mandatory books, records, financial statements, a balance sheet 
listing items and an estimate basis of its elements. 
Article No. 225 of this law, permits companies to keep their accounting records in the 
form of printed paper or offline and must be dated and numbered in the manner 
prescribed by the law. Companies may also keep and maintain their accounting records 
in the form of an information system (computerised) and are not permitted to change the 
data listed therein. These two approaches, according to the provision of the Article, 225, 
have the same authority as traditional commercial books. In the light of the provisions 
of the law (Article 226) a joint stoc  company’s board of directors has to prepare 
financial statements (balance sheet and the profit and loss account) and the explanatory 
notes, as well as a report about the company’s progress.  
The annual balance sheet and the profit and loss account are to be reported to the 
general assembly of shareholders for approval (Article 234), and a copy of the balance 
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sheet and the profit and loss account is required to be submitted to the Commercial 
Register within ten days of its approval by the general assembly. This is to be 
accompanied by the directors’ report, the monitoring board report, and the minutes of 
the general assembly approval (Article 237).  
Furthermore, each company is required to establish a monitoring board consisting of 
three full-time members and two reserve members from shareholders or others. The 
members and the chairman of the board are nominated by a general assembly of 
stockholders and each member being elected for a three year term  (Articles 196 and 
198). The monitoring board’s duty is, amongst others, to confirm that the balance sheet 
and the profit and loss account correspond with the accounting records as well as to 
chec  the company’s assets at least once every three months ( rticle 200).  
According to Article 223, joint stock companies are required to keep the following 
records further to maintaining the books required by the Article No 460: (1) a register of 
shareholders, (2) a register of loan bonds, (3) a minute record of the general assembly 
and its decisions, (4) a minute record of the meetings of the board directors and its 
decisions, (5) a minute record of the monitoring committee’s meetings and its decisions, 
(6) a minute record of the meetings of the executive committee and its decisions, and 
(7) a minute record of the meetings of bondholders loan association and its decisions ( if 
the company has issued a bond loan). 
Moreover, this law (Article 227) details the items of assets and liabilities that must be 
reported in any company’s balance sheet.  s this  rticle states “without prejudice to the 
laws of private companies that engage in a particular activity, the following items must 
be recorded by total value in the balance sheets sections”.  These items must be reported 
on the assets side of the balance sheet: 
1. Unpaid amount from the shareholders. 
2. Real estate. 
3. Fixed installations and machinery. 
4. Industrial patent rights and rights to exploit intellectual products. 
5. Privileges, trademarks, and the goodwill value.  
6. Portables. 
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7. Raw materials and goods. 
8. Cash and securities in the fund, or deposited with third parties. 
9. Securities with fixed and variable profit. 
10. Partnerships, with a statement (if the company has bought its shares).  
11. Customers’ debts. 
12. Ban s’ debts. 
13. Debts acquired from associated companies. 
14. Others debts acquired from other parties. 
The following items have to be reported on the liabilities side of the balance sheet: 
1- The company’s capital at its nominal value, with a separate statement of ordinary 
shares from other types of stocks. 
2- The legal reserve balance. 
3- Reserve stipulated in the contract and voluntary reserves. 
4- Amounts of depreciation, renewal, and insurance against the risk of decline in the 
value of assets. 
5- Amounts allocated to compensate for the company's employees. 
6- Restricted debt guarantees in kind. 
7- The required debts to suppliers. 
8- The company's debts to banks or other financiers. 
9- Debts acquired for the associated company. 
10- Bonds and loans issued and that still exist. 
11- Other debts acquired from the company. 
12- Deposits by others, optional or mandatory deposit. 
The CAL also offers (Articles 228 to 235) particular guidelines for the valuation of 
assets and liabilities, the goodwill valuation, the creation of legal reserves, shares and 
securities valuation, participation in profits, and the distribution of profits to the 
shareholders. According to the Article No. 228 of the CAL, the following guidelines 
must be followed in respect of valuation of financial statement items. If there are special 
reasons preventing a company from following these rules, a company’s managers and 
monitoring committee must reveal the reasons in their report before the general 
assembly. 
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a. Fixed assets must not be estimated as being greater than the original cost, and in 
each accounting period the value should be reduced by the annual depreciation rate 
for that period. The accumulated depreciation should be reported in the liabilities 
section.      
b. Raw materials and goods should not be valued as greater than the lowest price of 
purchasing or higher than the market price.  
c. Industrial patents, rights of exploitation, inventions, privileges, and trademarks 
should not be valued higher than the price of purchase or cost. These values must 
be amortised periodically on the basis of useful or legal life. 
d. Shares and securities should be estimated by the board of directors and the 
monitoring committee must be informed of the methods of valuation. The 
monitoring committee has to report these methods in its annual report to the 
general assembly of shareholders.  
e. Participations that do not have the status of shares should be estimated as an 
amount not more than that shown on the last balance sheet. 
f. Debts are to be included at their estimated realisable value.   
g. Bond discounts may be recorded in a special division of asset item, and the amount 
should be amortised over the life of the bond. 
h. Construction and development expenses may be capitalised and amortised over a 
period not exceeding five years, if agreed upon by the motoring committee (Article 
229). 
i. Goodwill is to be recorded in the balance sheet assets, but only if it has been 
purchased. It must be amortised over a period decided upon by the board of 
directors and the motoring committee (Article 230). 
In addition to the above, five per cent of annual net profits must be deducted to form a 
legal reserve, until the balance reaches a quarter of the company's capital at least 
(Article 231). According to Article No. 254 of the law, a holding company is required to 
prepare, at the end of each fiscal year, a consolidated balance sheet and profit and loss 
account (income statement) or its cash flows. They must be disclosed to the general 
assembly with explanatory notes and other related data. These accounts have to be 
prepared in accordance with the applicable accounting standards and principles.  
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Additionally, the CAL (Article 460) requires each enterprise to keep and maintain three 
books at least, instead of the two books of accounts which were required by the old law, 
as discussed above. These books are: 
1. Journal: in which the enterprise must enter all daily acts that generally return to 
his business activity, and enter each month the total amounts spent on himself 
and his family. 
2. General ledger: this shows the different enterprise accounts.  
3. Inventory and balance book: in which the enterprise must enter the list of the 
inventory, the balance sheet, and the profit and loss account, at least once every 
year. 
Under the provisions of the CAL, before those books are used, revenue stamps must be 
placed on each page and must be registered at the court, and any transactions prior to 
registration of the books are banned.  
In short, the CAL was very brief in describing the mandatory disclosure requirements of 
the corporations, and no clear forms and contents of the balance sheet and profit and 
loss account were given. Also, all type of companies are not required by CAL to 
disclose detailed financial and operating information for their shareholders; only the 
annual balance sheet, profit and loss account, and explanatory notes were required to be 
available for a company’s shareholders.  
An important point to note is that the CAL does not require mandatory disclosure of 
corporations’ accounts, balance sheet statement, and profit and loss account to the 
market participants and the general public. Besides, the CAL required holding 
companies only to prepare their accounts in accordance with the applicable accounting 
standards and principles, but it did not define these.  
5.2.2 Income tax law  
The second Libyan governmental Law has a certain influence on financial accounting 
and corporate reporting in the country: Income Tax Law (ITL), which was originally 
passed in 1968. Formerly, Italian income tax law was applied with some amendment to 
suit the Libyan circumstances (Oreibi, 1969, p. 47 cited in Bait-El-Mal et al., 1973).  
Italian income tax law was presented by the Italian settlement government to Libya for 
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the first time in 1923; under this law each business entity was required to provide 
financial statements and other financial records at the end of each year to the tax 
authority, prepared according to the 1923 tax law (Bait-El-Mal et al., 1973). The law 
was changed by ITL No. 64 of the year 1973, and was then amended in 2004 by law 
No. 11. Later, ITL No. 11 of 2004 was eliminated on 28th January 2010, while ITL No. 
(7) was passed.  
The recent Libyan ITL contains 105 Articles allocated into Five Parts:  
 Part One-General Provisions (1-33 Articles). 
  Part Two-Taxes in individuals and partnerships (divided into six chapters: 
Chapter (1) General provisions (34-45); Chapter (2) Tax on income of trade, 
industry and crafts (46-49);  Chapter (3) Tax on the income of partners in the 
entities that apply partners, not wage-workers  (50-52); Chapter (4) Tax on the 
income of free professions (53-54); Chapter (5) Tax on income from work and 
equivalents (55-60); and Chapter (6) Tax on interest from the deposits with 
Banks (61-62).  
 Part Three-Tax on Companies (63-71). 
 Part Four- Penalties (72-79). 
 Part Five-Final Provisions (80-105). 
The income tax is imposed on the incomes resulting in Libya and abroad for the 
national companies (including the joint venture “mushtari a” and state-owned 
corporations) and branches of foreign companies in Libya, whatever their type of 
activity or purpose. In applying this law, the companies concerned are those stipulated 
in the law organising commercial activity in Libya. Foreign companies’ branches means 
activities and capitals of foreign companies in Libya whatever their organisational and 
legal status (Article No. 63). 
Under this law, all companies are required to submit an annual declaration about their 
income to the tax authority, approved by legal accountant or auditor registered in the list 
of Libyan accountants and auditors, on the special form prepared for this purpose, 
within one month from the date of approval of the balance sheet, and in a in period not 
exceeding four months of the year following the financial year (Article No. 71).  
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Article 45 of the executive regulation of this law provides that any enterprise (in the 
case of maintaining regular accounts) must attach, with its declaration of annual income 
tax, the following financial statements and documents, which must be prepared in 
accordance with accounting principles and must be audited by a Libyan registered 
certified auditor and accountant. 
a. Cost of Goods Manufactured Statement (In the case of industrial activity). 
b. Income Statement (profit and loss account). 
c. Balance Sheet.  
d. Depreciation Statement. 
e. Detailed Statement of the expenses which are included in the Income Statement. 
In order for the taxpayer’s boo s and records to be considered as regular accounts 
(Article 46 of the executive regulation), the following conditions must be satisfied: 
a) The accounts must be prepared in accordance with the theory of double   
entry and in accordance with Generally Accepted Accounting Principles 
(GAAP).  
b) Accounting entries recorded on the books must be in favour of the necessary 
documents.  
c) There must be an elaborate system of internal control to check on the 
truthfulness of transactions contained within the books.   
d) There must be a commitment to hold the books in accordance with the 
regulations prescribed by CAL. 
e) Does not violate the conditions referred to regarding what should be held in 
the books and other records under any other law or according to the nature of 
the activity in which the company is engaged. 
According to Articles 39 and 66, income tax is identified annually on the net income, in 
accordance with the principle of cash basis or accrual basis or according to the 
taxpayer’s choices during the taxable year. The taxable income is assessed on the basis 
of different  inds of operations’ results for by the taxpayer during the year, after 
deducting all actual costs and expenses, particularly the following:  
a. Instalments for depreciation of the equipment, machinery, buildings and all assets 
used for producing the income; these must be calculated by using the straight-line 
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method, according to annual rates given in Article No. 35 of the executive 
regulation.  
b. Debt which is proved as bad debt, on condition that this debt is entered in the 
activity’s account or is due to lending operation related to the activity.  ny 
amount collected from this debt must be considered as income. 
c. Amounts paid for the benefit of employees according the retirement system, 
or any other alternative system, or any other alternative special system. 
d. Taxes and fees paid by the taxpayer regarding the activity, except the tax 
which is paid according to the provisions of this law. 
e. Contributions to charitable organisations which are approved by the 
government and must not exceed 2% of the net income. 
f.  llocations formed according measures specified by the state’s relevant 
authorities. The refunded amounts from these allocations are subject to tax.  
g. If the accounts for a year have been closed with a loss, the loss is to be 
included in the following year’s expenses and deducted from its profits. If 
the profits were not enough to cover the loss, the loss balance shall be 
carried forward for a maximum of five years from the year of the loss 
(Article 42). 
Briefly, the ITL had certain influence on accounting practice in that many corporations 
have regularly adopted tax guidelines and requirements for general external reporting 
(Bait-El-Mal, p. 95). In fact, the main purpose of the ITL is aimed at determining the 
taxable income, including the methods of accounting to be used to computing this 
income.   
The law has offered specific tax accounting rules to be followed by those preparing 
companies’ financial statements to calculate the companies’ income for taxation 
purposes. For example, the acceptable depreciation methods to be applied to fixed 
assets: there are a number of methods that can be used by accountants to compute 
depreciation of fixed assets, such as declining balance method, and sum-of-years digits, 
but according to the ITL, only straight-line method must be used. Therefore, change 
from straight-line depreciation to another method is not permitted. It is important to 
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note that the ITL does not require publishing of financial statements or other accounts to 
the general public. Based on the preceding discussion, there is no doubting that the 
provisions of the ITL were basically designed to service the needs of the tax authority. 
5.2.3 The petroleum law 
The third Libyan governmental law is the Petroleum Law No 25; this law was enacted 
in 1955, and has been amended several times (Bait-El-Mal, 1973). This law was enacted 
before commercial oil had been discovered in Libya and it was the first to allow drilling 
operations. The first concessions were given in 1955 and by 1968, 137 concession 
agreements had been given to 42 oil companies (International Business Publications, 
2013). 
The Libyan Petroleum Law provides a legal foundation for Libya’s oil and gas sector. 
According to Article No. 1/2 of this law, no person shall explore or prospect for, mine 
or produce, petroleum in any part of Libya, unless authorised by a permit or concession 
issued under this Law. Bait-El-Mal (1973) pointed out that the Libyan Petroleum Law 
prescribed general financial accounting requirements for the oil industry. 
 ccording to  rticle No. 14 of this law, in determining a concession holder’s profits 
(the company), the following items are entitled to deduct from the income resulting 
from the operations of the concession holder in Libya: 
(a) Operating expenses and overheads, the details of which are defined in the 
regulations, excluding the fees, rents, royalties and income tax, and other direct 
taxes. 
(b)  Depreciation of all physical assets in Libya at the rate of 33⅓ per cent per annum 
and amortisation of all other capital expenditure in Libya at the rate of five per cent 
per annum until such assets and expenditure are wholly written off. The 
unamortised balance of the cost of physical assets permanently put out of use may 
be deducted in the year when such assets are scrapped or sold. 
(c) Sixteen and sixty-seven hundredths per cent of the value of the crude oil exported. 
The 16.67% per cent is calculated on the basis of the applicable posted prices of 
crude oil exported by the concession holder in any such complete year and on 
which royalty is payable by the concession holder in that year. 
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According to the fifth paragraph of the Article No. 14 of the Petroleum Law, the income 
resulting from the operations of the concession holder in Libya means: 
(a) In relation to crude oil exported by the concession holder from Libya. Total gross 
receipts realised by the concession holder from such export. 
(b) In relation to other operations of the concession holder in Libya. The income to be 
ascertained in a manner to be agreed between the concession holder and the Libyan 
Ministry of Petroleum. 
Article 14/8 of the Petroleum Law, which emphases that in computing profits as herein 
defined, sound and consistent accounting practices usual in the petroleum industry must 
be employed. Where more than one such accounting practice prevails, the Libyan 
Ministry of Petroleum shall decide which practice is to be applied by the concession 
holder. Article No. 21 of the Petroleum Regulation No. 9 of the year 1973 of the 
Petroleum Law proclaims that each oil company must submit to the Libyan Ministry of 
Petroleum after the end of every month of the calendar year, within no more than thirty 
days from the end of each month, a declaration presenting its estimate of the tax 
obligations payable thereby on the basis of its anticipated profits for the period covered 
by such a declaration.  
The declaration must be made in compliance with the form established for this purpose 
by the Directorate General of Companies’  ccounting of the Ministry of Petroleum. In 
addition, in accordance with the provisions of Article 21 of the Petroleum Regulation No. 
9, the oil company has to submit to the Libyan Ministry of Petroleum, after the end of 
each fiscal year, and no more than four months from the end of each fiscal year, the 
accounts displaying the profits of the year.  
At the same time, when an oil company submits the accounts it must pay an amount 
that, if added to the fees, rents and royalties, excluding 16.67% of the value of the crude 
oil exported and direct taxes previously paid for such year, shall equal 65% of the 
profits presented by the accounts or any other further supplemental payments by which 
the oil company is obligated as per the agreements signed therewith in this regard. The 
amount paid in this manner must be considered as a part of the income tax, surtax and 
the supplemental payments and a payment on their account. 
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From the above discussion, the Libyan Petroleum Law and Petroleum Regulations No. 
9 provided a legal basis for the oil and gas industry and also specified oil and gas 
accounting rules that must be applied for financial accounting and reporting by oil and 
gas companies operating in Libya for income tax purposes or for profit sharing with the 
Libyan state. However, the Libyan Petroleum Law and its Regulations did not define 
mandatory disclosure requirements for oil and gas exploration, production and 
development activities. 
5.2.4 The banking law  
The banking sector in Libya, which includes CBL, specialised banks, Libyan foreign 
banks, and commercial banks as well as a number of representatives of foreign bank 
offices, was governed until 5th of July 2012 by the Banking Law No. 1 of the year 2005. 
Besides, the banking sector also has to follow the directions and guidelines issued by 
the CBL. 
The Libyan Banking Law was partially amended by the Law No 46 of the year 2012 in 
accordance with the decree of the ITNC. The new law was enacted as a result of the 17
th
 
February Libyan revolution, to follow the recent changes that have occurred in the 
Libyan economic, political and legal environment in general, and the banking activities 
in particular. The issuance of the new banking law was aimed at filling the gaps that 
emerged at the application of the previous law, laying the foundations which suit the 
Islamic financial products, and meet the needs of the Libyan’s society, in consistence 
with the Islamic financial regulations and legislation. 
The new Libyan Banking Law No. 46 of 2012 was divided into three key chapters 
including 121 Articles. The following is a review of the most important features of this 
law: 
The first Chapter of the law deals with ‘the Central Bank’. This chapter includes sixty-
four articles and was divided into six sections. Section one, “Nature and Functions of 
the Central Bank of Libya”, includes thirteen Articles. According to Article No. 1 the 
CBL is an independent institution, enjoying the status of a legal entity with independent 
financial liability, and the CBL’s assets are its own funds and may not be held to meet 
the debts owed to other entities. 
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In that sense, the independence of the CBL means that the administration of monetary 
policy, as well as management of its daily business, will be performed without 
interference or pressure from the executive organ of the Libyan state. This independence 
does not mean leading on the implementation of monetary policy without coordination 
with other relevant authorities related to financial and trade policies, especially in light of 
the interdependence and overlapping of various economic policies.  
The Article No. 4 of the law identified that the authorised capital of the CBL shall be LD 
one billion, approved for increasing the ban ’s capital. The first paragraph of the Article 
11 of this law stipulates that the CBL is not permitted to grant facilities or guarantees to 
anyone, either directly or indirectly. On the other hand, the second paragraph of the 
article allows for the CBL to provide temporary advances to the Ministry Treasury, to 
cover any temporary shortage in general budget revenues, according to the conditions to 
be agreed upon between the bank and the Ministry Treasury, and which should include 
the following: 
a) These advances must not exceed one-fifth of the total estimated revenues for the 
general budget. 
b) Any advance must be repaid at the end of the fiscal year in which it was 
provided, and no advance may be provided to the public treasury in a given 
fiscal year until after the advances provided to the public treasury during the 
previous fiscal year have been repaid.   
Section two “Management of the Central Bank of Libya”: this section includes nine 
Articles on various administrative matters in the CBL, including the powers and 
responsibilities, and the terms of appointment of members of the board of directors. The 
current law requires that the six members of the CBL’s board of directors must be highly 
qualified in the fields of law, financial, banking or economics, as well as the chairman of 
the board of directors as the governor, the deputy chairman of the board of directors as 
the deputy governor, and the undersecretary of the Ministry of Finance as member 
(Article 14). 
The membership of the CBL’s board of directors, in accordance with the law, reflect the 
principle of independence of the bank, which does not include in its membership 
representatives of the executive organ of the state except the undersecretary of the 
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Ministry of Finance.  mong other responsibilities, the CBL’s board of directors must 
be responsible for discharging the authorities directly related to the achievement of the 
CBL’s goals and purposes. It must also be responsible for formulating and 
implementing monetary, credit, and banking policies, within the scope of the 
government’s general policy ( rticle 16). 
In addition, the CBL’s board of directors is also responsible for approving the budget, 
financial statements, and reports prepared by the CBL on its financial position and 
activity results (Article 16/5). The governor of the CBL shall be the chief executive of 
the CBL, and it must be responsible for managing the CBL and discharging its normal 
affairs under the board of directors’ supervision ( rticle 18). 
Section three “The Central Bank of Libya’s Accounts”: this section includes seven 
 rticles related to the accounts of the CBL, which determine the CBL’s fiscal year to 
start and end at the start and end of the state’s fiscal year ( rticle 23).  rticle 24 reveals 
that proximately after the end of the last day of each month, the CBL must prepare and 
publish a statement of its assets and liabilities at the close of its operations on that day 
or at the close of the immediately preceding business day if the last day of the month is 
a holiday.  
A copy of this statement must be sent to the legislative power and the prime minister, 
and must be published in the Official Gazette. Article 25 emphasises that the Audit 
Bureau is responsible for auditing the CBL’s accounts according to the nature of the 
activity of central banks and the international auditing and accounting standards. In 
order to comply with the provisions of this law, the CBL requires the preparation of the 
following within four months of the end of its fiscal year (Article No. 26): 
a) Financial statements for the ending fiscal year, according to the nature of the 
activity of central banks and the international accounting standards. 
b)   report on the CBL’s financial position for the ending fiscal year. This 
report shall in particular present domestic and international economic, fiscal, 
monetary, and banking conditions. 
These financial statements and reports have to be submitted within the previously 
mentioned period to the legislative power, after they are approved by the board of 
directors and the Audit Bureau. In addition, the financial statements must be published 
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in the Official Gazette. Additionally, Article 27 provides the following accounting rules 
that must be followed by the CBL: 
a. Boo  profits and losses resulting from the net revaluation of the CBL’s assets 
and liabilities due to a change in the par value of the Libyan dinar must be 
recorded in an account designated the “Revaluation Reserve  ccount.” 
b. Losses resulting from revaluation must be deducted from the credit balance in 
the account stipulated in the previous paragraph. If the balance does not suffice 
to cover these losses, the Minister of Treasury shall issue, for the CBL, bonds in 
the value of the deficit. These bonds should be valuated in the domestic currency 
and shall not bear interest. 
c. In the event of a credit balance in the “Revaluation Reserve  ccount,” the CBL 
should, at the end of each fiscal year, cover the value of the bonds mentioned in 
paragraph (b), in coordination with the Minister of Treasury. If this value is 
covered, the CBL must retain 25 per cent of the remaining balance. Any 
remaining balance must be used to extinguish the public debt. If the public debt 
is paid, the remaining balance must be allocated to finance the deficit, if any, in 
the State's General Budget. 
In additional to the above, Article 28 states that after subtracting all expenses, the 
CBL’s social security contribution for its employees, bad and doubtful debts provisions, 
asset depreciation, reserves designated to cover any shortfall in the CBL’s assets, any 
other reserves required by international accounting standards, other normal and 
unforeseen expenses, and the public treasury’s share of profits resulting from the 
currency issue operations, the remaining amount (net profit) must be added to the 
CBL’s general reserve balance at the end of the fiscal year as follows: 
1. All net profits must be added until the general reserve totals half of the authorised 
capital. 
2. If the general reserve reaches one-half of the capital, 25 % of net profits must be 
added to the general reserve until it totals the authorised capital. 
3. If the general reserve equals the capital, 10 % of net profits must be added to the 
general reserve until its totals twice the amount of the authorised capital. 
4. If the general reserve reaches twice the amount of capital, 5 % of net profits must be 
added to the general reserve balance until it totals 10 % of the CBL’s total assets. 
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5. Net profits remaining thereafter have to be transferred to the Ministry of Finance   
Section four “Issuance of Money”: this section has eleven Articles on the affairs of 
issuing currency. For example, Article No. 30, which stipulates that the CBL alone must 
have the prerogative to issue currency in Libya, and the CBL’s board of directors may 
set and stipulate rules and principles for the issuance of currency, and it may establish 
currency specifications and denominations, and banknotes must bear the signature of 
the governor. Article 31 identifies the Libyan dinar as a unit of currency in Libya, with 
the board of directors of CBL determining the value by offsetting the Libyan dinar 
against the SDRs or any convertible foreign currency or according to the forces of 
supply and demand in the foreign exchange market.  
According to Article 32, the CBL is responsible for determining the exchange rate of the 
Libyan dinar against foreign currencies according to domestic and international 
financial and economic developments so as to achieve the interests of the national 
economy. Given that the amount of banknotes and coins issued in any time is one of the 
most important variables affecting the national economy, monetary stability and the 
stability of the value of the dinar, under the current Law (Article 36) the CBL requires 
that the total value of banknotes and coins in circulation must always correspond to 
specific assets denominated in gold bars or coins, or convertible foreign currencies, or 
SDRs (the value of all of which must not be less than 30 % of the total assets of the 
issue), and securities issued or guaranteed by international financial institutions or 
foreign governments.  
To give the CBL a degree of flexibility in determining monetary assets corresponding to 
the source, it included domestic assets such as treasury notes and bonds issued by the 
Ministry Treasury in Libya, whose value does not exceed 20% of the total assets of the 
issue.  
The regulation of foreign exchange is covered in detail in Section five of the Law, 
“Regulation of Foreign Exchange Transactions”, which consists of Fourteen Articles; 
the Articles in this section confirm the liberalisation of the current account and the 
lifting of government censorship, which was imposed on foreign exchange dealings. For 
example, Article No. 41 allows any natural person or legal entity to retain any foreign 
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exchange that he/it owns or possesses or that is transferred to him/it, and may execute 
any foreign exchange transaction, including transfers to Libya or abroad.  
However, Article 42 stipulates that Libyan legal entities may not retain foreign exchange 
unless it stems from the return on their activities, and they must keep the foreign 
exchange in an account with the CBL or in an account with a national bank that operates 
in Libya. In addition, according to Article 43, banks operating in Libya are permitted to 
open accounts in foreign exchange for natural persons and legal entities that are fed by: 
1. Deposits in foreign exchange. 
2. Sums transferred from abroad. 
3. Sums transferred from another domestic account in foreign exchange. 
4. The foreign currency equivalent that the bank receives for its purchase of foreign 
banknotes or other means of payment in foreign exchange credited to the account. 
5. Banking interest on the aforementioned accounts. 
6. Any other legal channel.  
The Libyan Banking Law has authorised the CBL with all the necessary powers to 
regulate foreign exchange, which is required by a function of the CBL to maintain the 
stability of the value of the LD and the general level to prices; Article 54 gave the CBL 
necessary flexibility to take action in cases involving foreign exchange, which is not 
covered under this law.  
Section six “Supervision of Banks”: this section contains ten Articles. Article No. 55 in 
this section has identified financial institutions which are subject to the supervision and 
control of the CBL under the provisions of this law; they are commercial and Islamic 
banks, specialised banks, banks operating abroad and headquartered in Libya, the 
branches and representative office of foreign banks in Libya, investment funds, finance 
lease companies as well as money changing and financial services companies.  
The board of directors of the CBL have to establish, according to the requirements of 
the domestic money and credit situation, and international banking standards, the 
general rules for the control and supervision of banks and the other institutions 
stipulated in Article No. 55 in order to regulate the following matters (Article 56/1):   
a. The method for appraising different types of entity assets. 
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b. The determination of the types of liquid assets and the ratio of liquidity to deposit 
liabilities that must be maintained. 
c. Areas in which entities subject to the control of the CBL are prohibited from 
investing funds. 
d. The provisions that must be available to cover assets whose value is subject to 
extreme fluctuation. 
e. The ratios that must be observed between the value of credit and the value of credit 
guarantees; and the specification of credit type. 
f. Identification or liberalisation of the interest rates for all accounts, and all the 
interest of delay. 
g. The permitted difference between interest rates and the rediscount rate set by the 
CBL on the one hand, and the discount rates set by the banks for their customers on 
the other hand, if credit instruments are suited to being rediscounted or if they are 
suited to a loan being obtained against them. 
h. The percentage credit policy, that banks should follow, and directing credit, 
including determining the value and term, both for all banks, or of any bank. 
i. The minimum monetary cover needed to establish documentary credits and issue 
letters of credit in general or with respect to a specific type of credit. 
j. The maximum limits on investments in securities, real-estate financing, and credit 
for consumption purposes. 
k. The terms and conditions under which irregular loans must be repaid, and the 
setting aside of, and exemption from, interest calculated thereon. 
l. The rules and facilities needed to regulate clearing operations between banks 
subject to the provisions of this law. 
In addition to the above, the CBL must establish the following rules (Article 56/2):  
a. Disclosure rules, the statements that must be published, and the method of 
publication.  
b. The rules needed to counter money laundering operations and the financing of 
terrorism. 
c. The rules and requirements with which the members of the board of directors of 
banks, investment funds, finance lease companies, and money changing and 
financial services companies must comply. 
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d. The minimum capital adequacy criterion. 
e. Rules for opening accounts and engaging in banking activities. 
f. The criteria required for the classification and irregular classification of the loans 
and credit facilities provided by banks. Each bank shall establish the measures that 
must be taken to cover irregular loans and credit facilities. In addition, auditors 
must be required to ascertain whether the bank management observes these 
criteria. 
g. The rating and classification of banks according to domestic and international 
banking criteria. 
h. Any monetary, financial, and other credit issues consistent with the CBL’s 
objectives and conducive to achieving the interests of the national economy. 
Furthermore, to enable the CBL to practice concrete supervision of the ban s’ operating 
activities, Article No 60 states that CBL must be responsible for collecting and examining 
the reports sent to it by the banks pursuant to the provisions of this law. At the end of the 
last business day of each month, the CBL must prepare a summary report on the ban s’ 
financial positions. Such a summary report must be published in the Official Gazette.  
 rticle 61 states that the CBL may examine, at any time, entities’ boo s, records, debit 
accounts, and the electronic systems and files pertaining thereto. The examination must 
be conducted at the head office of the concerned entity by CBL’s inspectors assigned for 
this purpose. The entities must provide the inspectors with all of the data and facilities 
that they require to carry out their investigation.  
Article 64 emphasises that banks subject to the provisions of this law must comply with 
the rules and regulations established by the CBL to regulate clearing operations and 
issues relating to the System of National Payments. All entities that engage in their 
activities pursuant to the provisions of this law must implement the decrees, circulars, and 
instructions issued by the CBL. 
Chapter Two, “Commercial Banks”, is divided into four sections comprising fifty-
seven Articles, relating to the organisation and conditions for carrying out banking 
business, such as licensing and establishment affairs, mergers and cancellation, while 
others relate business activity that commercial banks are prohibited from exercising.  
Some Articles of the current banking law in this chapter address the board of directors 
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of commercial banks and their duties, and internal auditing matters, as well as the legal 
terms to be provided by the auditors assigned to checking the bank accounts, and the 
financial statements and other accounts that must be provided by commercial banks. 
The rest of the Articles relate to the general provisions. Nine Duplicated Articles add in 
the new banking law; these Articles deal with special provision for the Islamic banks. 
The four sections contained in this chapter can be summarised as follows:  
Section one “The Establishment and Supervision of Commercial Banks” contains eight 
Articles. Article No. 65, for example, gives clear definition to the term “commercial 
ban ” in the first paragraph, and in the second paragraph determines the ban ing 
activities in which a commercial bank should be engaged. Article No. 66 states that each 
entity subject to supervision of the CBL must obtain a license before commencing their 
activities, and that the board of directors of the CBL shall issue this license. This license 
shall replace the license stipulated in the Commercial Law.  
According to Article 67, a commercial bank must assume the form of a Libyan joint-
stoc  company.   ban ’s shares may be held by natural persons, and public and private 
legal entities, according to the rules and conditions stipulated in a decree issued by of 
the board of directors of the CBL. Moreover, this Article requests all the existing 
commercial banks to correct their capital, which is required by the provisions of this law 
within a period not exceeding three years from the effective date of this law, with the 
possibility of extending this term for a similar period once.  
Furthermore, CBL may authorise the establishment of foreign banks and give 
permission to foreign banks to hold shares in the domestic banks, or open branches or 
offices representing them in Libya (67/3). Article 68 identifies the members of the 
board of directors for any commercial bank with at least nine members, provided further 
that the bank must have a general manager, who shall be appointed by its board of 
directors based on the recommendation of the chairman or two members of the board of 
directors. 
Commercial banks are subject to the supervision and control of the CBL, and the CBL 
is responsible for regulating its relations with the commercial banks, coordinating their 
actions, and monitoring their activities in the framework of the government’s general 
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policy (Article 71). In addition, according to the second paragraph of this Article, the 
decisions of the boards of directors of the commercial banks on long-term investments 
and the opening or closing of branches must be conveyed to the CBL within ten days of 
the date on which the decisions are issued. The implementation of such these decisions 
has to be contingent on the CBL’s approval thereof.   rticle 72 of the law approves 
public people to acquire the shares of capital state-owned banks, and each shareholder 
has a voting right according to the percentage of his share of the ban ’s capital.  
Section two “Duties of the Banks”: this section contains nineteen Articles (73-92). 
Article No. 73, for example, highlights that each bank must hold a capital reserve - 
before distributing profits, it must transfer to this reserve no less than 25% of net profits 
until the reserve totals reached one half of its paid capital, and it must then transfer to 
the reserve 10% of net profits until the reserve equals capital. According to Article 76, 
the bank does not have to distribute dividends until after it deducts all expenses, 
including establishment and administrative expenses, expenses to cover losses, and any 
other expenses for which there are no corresponding assets. 
Every commercial bank must have an internal auditing department that is directly 
subordinate to the ban ’s board of directors. The manager of the department has to be 
appointed by decision of the board of directors. The board of directors must be 
responsible for determining the authorities of this department, which must include 
(Article 81): 
1. Review and audit of the ban ’s daily operations. 
2. Preparation of a quarterly report on its activities for submission to the ban ’s 
board of directors. 
3. Coordination between the ban ’s management and external auditors. 
The CBL must prepare, in coordination with the relevant entities, a register of auditing 
offices capable of auditing and inspecting the ban s’ accounts, and another register of 
consulting offices and firms capable of valuating real and other assets provided to banks 
to guarantee financing, loans, and facilities granted by the banks, CBL is responsible to 
establish rules, conditions, and procedures for registering in these two registers (Article 
82).  
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Article No. 83/1 requires that each entity subject to supervision and control of the CBL 
must assign the auditing of its accounts annually to two chartered accountants selected by 
the ban ’s general assembly from among the auditors in the CBL’s register, for a period 
of two years, renewable only once. The decision of assignment of the auditors has to be 
effective only after approval by the governor of the CBL, and each auditor must: 
1. Not be a member of the ban ’s board of directors, a bank employee or agent, or the 
recipient of a loan or facility from the bank with or without a guarantee. 
2. Not be related to any member of the board of directors or to the ban ’s other 
chartered accountant by a kinship tie up to the fourth degree. 
Furthermore, in order to comply with the provision of the second paragraph in Article 
83 of the law, the CBL requires the external auditors each separately: 
1. Prepare a report on the ban ’s annual financial statements. The report must include 
the methods used to ascertain the existence of and to valuate assets, the method for 
appraising existing commitments, and the extent to which the audited transactions 
comply with the law. 
2. Prepare a semi-annual report monitoring the ban ’s financial and administrative 
performance and compliance with domestic and international banking criteria. 
3. Send a copy of the two reports mentioned in the previous two subparagraphs to the 
Central Bank of Libya within the period set by the governor. 
Under the provision of this Article, each chartered accountant must be liable for any 
shortcomings contained in any of the two reports that he submits. In the event of any 
such shortcoming, the CBL may delete the chartered accountant from the register 
stipulated in the previous article. Additionally, in order to comply with the provisions of 
the current banking law, each bank must establish, within its administrative 
organisation, an administrative unit called the “Compliance Unit.” This is directly 
subordinate to the board of directors and is concerned with the duties set out in detail 
paragraph four of Article 83/4 as follows,  
(a). monitoring of supervisory instructions issued by the CBL to ascertain compliance 
therewith by the bank and its branches. 
(b). monitoring of the ban ’s adherence to criteria governing daily banking activity, the 
most important being: 
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1. Capital adequacy. 
2. Maintenance of the legally stipulated liquidity. 
3. Maintenance of the required reserves. 
4. International banking supervision criteria. 
(c). the preparation of a periodic report on its activities, which shall be submitted to the 
board of directors.  
(d). any other functions assigned to the unit by the ban ’s board of directors.  
 
In relation to commercial banking disclosure, the provision of the Libyan Banking Law 
governing the banking disclosure requirements is limited to a provision in Article 84. 
This Article stipulates that each entity subject to the control and supervision of the CBL 
has to display, throughout the year, in a conspicuous place at its head office and at all of 
its branches, a copy of its most recent, audited financial statements. It must also publish 
these statements in the Official Gazette and in a domestic newspaper as well as on its own 
website. 
However, the Libyan Banking Law No. 1, 2005 or its later amendments, did not specify 
any additional requirements concerning the form and content of the balance sheet and 
profit and loss account. In pursuing its objectives in monitoring and supervision, the CBL 
requires each commercial bank to submit the following (Article 85): 
1. Monthly statements on its financial position within fifteen days of the end of each 
month on the form established by the CBL.  
2. Monthly statements that include details of all advances and financial credits provided 
by the bank, with or without guarantees, to any company in which the bank or any 
member of its board of directors has an interest, such as being a member of the 
company’s board of directors, or a manager, agent, or guarantor of the company. 
3. A copy of its most recent, audited financial statements, within four months of the end 
of its fiscal year. 
4.   copy of each report provided to shareholders on the ban ’s activities within five days 
of the provision of the report to shareholders, and a copy of the minutes of each 
meeting held by the general assembly of shareholders within fifteen days of each 
meeting of the assembly. 
170 
 
5.   statement of any change in the members of the ban ’s board of directors within 
fifteen days of the date on which the change occurs. 
6. Any other statements or clarifications on the transactions executed by the bank, 
according to the format and deadline stipulated by the CBL. 
In additional to the above, the governor of the CBL may issue, within a month of the 
date of his receipt of the financial statements and report stipulated in subparagraph (4) 
of the first paragraph, a decision not to approve the profits whose distribution to 
shareholders is proposed, if a shortage of provisions or any drop in the capital adequacy 
criterion below the established minimum level becomes evident to him, or if a 
reservation bearing on distributable profits is expressed in the report of the two auditors 
(Article 85/2). 
Section three “General Provisions”: this section contains seven Articles (93-100). 
Article No. 93, for example, demonstrates that there is no restriction on the freedom of 
depositors to dispose of their account balances with banks subject to the provisions of 
this law according to the conditions agreed upon the opening of such accounts. 
According to Article 94 of this law, all banks have to maintain the confidentiality of 
their customers’ accounts and balances, and all of their customers’ ban ing transactions. 
They must also not permit the examination, disclosure, or provision of information on 
such accounts, balances, and transactions to a third party without the written permission 
of the account holder or a competent judicial authority. 
  
Article 97/1 indicates that the provisions of the Civil and Commercial Codes must be 
applied to banks to the extent that these provisions do not conflict with the provisions of 
this law. In addition, the same Article (97/2) provides that electronic documents and 
signatures executed in the framework of banking transactions and other transactions 
related thereto must be honoured and must have a determinative effect in substantiating 
the data contained therein. 
 
Moreover, paragraph three of the Article 97 reveals that computer output pertaining to 
banking transactions must be regarded as equivalent to the legal books stipulated in the 
Commercial Code and Laws that complement it. Banks must retain, for the period 
established in the law, miniature copies of books, records, statements, documents, 
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correspondence, cables, notices and other documents relating to their activities on hard, 
floppy, or compact disks or other current data or information storage devices instead of 
the originals. These copies have the determinative effect of the original for evidentiary 
purposes. 
Section four “Special Provisions to Islamic banking”: this separate new section was 
added to the current law. It is interesting to note that this section did not exist in the 
previous Banking Law No 1 of 2005. This section contains nine duplicated Articles (i.e. 
100/1-100/9); these Articles deal with different issues related to Islamic banks, such as 
the definition of Islamic bank and other Islamic financial institutions, the function of 
Islamic banks, and the inspection and supervision of the Islamic ban s’ activities, which 
are expected to be established in the near future in Libya for the first time.  
The CBL is responsible for supervising and controlling the activities of the Islamic 
banks under this law provision, is responsible for the conduct of monetary and banking 
policy, for regulating the amount and the type and cost of credit, and for maintaining 
monetary stability in Libya. It should, however, be noted that Libya was not inactive in 
this movement toward Islamic banking. Although there has been a rapid expansion of 
Islamic banking in both the Muslim and non-Muslim world, the CBL has not pursued 
the initiative to establish Islamic banks in the country, or made any effort to change 
conventional commercial banks into Islamic banks.  
The third and final chapter of the Libyan banking law deals with “Penalties”; the 
chapter was divided into twenty-one Articles (101-121). These Articles provide for 
legal deterrents and penalties which oblige banks that are subject to supervision and 
control by the CBL to abide by the provisions of the law. More precisely, the Libyan 
Banking Law No. 46 for the year 2012 authorises the CBL signing of various sanctions 
on banks that violate the provisions of this  law. 
Article No. 104, for instance, states that any bank that fails to put into effect decrees 
issued by the CBL in application of the banking supervision of the provisions stated in 
Article 56, or who violates the provisions of Articles 58 and 59 of this law, will be 
punished by a fine of not less than LD ten thousand, and not more than LD one hundred 
thousand. The bank in violation has to be required to eliminate the violation. Also in 
Article 107, failure to submit the accounts stated in Articles 47 and 85/1 of this law by 
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the designated deadlines or by the deadlines set by the CBL must be punished by a fine 
of not less than LD one thousand, and not more than LD ten thousand. 
The same penalty will be imposed for refusal to provide books, records, documents, and 
papers to employees of the CBL who are assigned to examine and inspect, without 
prejudice to the requirement to submit them. In addition to above, as Article 109 
indicated: 
1. Any person who fabricates, with the intent of fraud, inaccurate facts or conceals 
some documents or facts in statements, minutes, or other papers submitted to the 
CBL or its representatives according to the provisions of this law, shall be 
punished by a fine of not less than LD one thousand, and not more than LD five 
thousand. 
2. The aforesaid penalty shall be doubled in the event of a repeat violation or if the 
act was committed by the chartered auditor or valuation consultant stipulated in 
Article 83 of this law. 
Furthermore, Article 112 provides that any statutory external auditor who violates the 
duties stipulated in Article 83 /2 or fails to observe the rules and principles of the 
profession in his report must be punished by imprisonment of at least six months and/or 
a fine of LD 50, 000. 
Overall, in fact, the new Libyan Banking Law No. 46, 2012, did not make any substantial 
changes, and maintains all of the provisions of the old Libyan banking Law No. 1 of the 
year 2005, with the exception of some slight changes to meet the demand of the new 
Libyan political and economic regime. Only new nine duplicated Articles (i.e. 100/1-
100/9) were added to the new law; these Articles were specific to Islamic banks products. 
A slight amendment was made relating to commercial banking financial statements 
disclosure; according to the old Banking Law, each bank must display, throughout the 
year and in a conspicuous place at its head office and at all of its branches, a copy of its 
most recent, audited financial statements. It must also publish these statements in the 
Official Gazette and in a domestic newspaper, but the commercial banks were not 
required to publish their financial statements on their own websites under the old law; 
however, the new Libyan Banking Law has forced these banks to disclose their audited 
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financial statements on their own websites and to make them available to general 
public. 
However, the newly amended Banking Law still shows considerable shortcomings; it 
has failed to specify the required financial statements and the form and content of these 
statements has not specified which accounting standards should be applied. Moreover, 
the new law did not provide for nonfulfillment penalties or specify the mechanism to 
enforce the law. So no further mandatory legal requirements were required by the new 
Libyan Banking Law, thereby there is no obligation for commercial banks to publish the 
notes to the financial statements, the board of directors’ report or the auditor’s report to 
general public. 
5.2.5 Libyan stock market law 
The Libyan Stock Market Law (SML) No. 11 was enacted to regulate and govern the 
work in the LSM. This law consists of 101 Articles separated into eight chapters; the 
Articles cover the organisation and structure of LSM, control and supervision of the 
stock market, issuance of securities rules, listing requirements, exemption from taxes 
and duties, disclosure rules, exchange, investment management, establishment of 
investment funds, electronic signature, authentic electronic documents in proof, 
organisation of adjudication and conciliation board.  
Specifically, the SML sets out the disclosure requirements with which listed economic 
entities must comply. For example, the disclosure rules in Article 23/1 require each 
economic entity listed on the market to provide, as part of its own responsibility to the 
management market during the specified time period determined by the Stock Market 
Authority (SMA)
 
quarterly, semi-annual, and annual reports on its overall activities and 
the results of its work. These reports must be comprised of the data revealing its honest 
financial position, and the entities must publish a comprehensive summary of these 
reports in two daily newspapers, at least one in the Arabic language.  
The law also requires, in Article No. 23/1, that all listed economic entities must prepare 
their financial statements and other financial statements according to accounting 
standards and auditing rules to be determined or mentioned in the implementing 
regulations of this law. In addition, the second paragraph of Article No. 23 states that 
the SMA has the right to investigate and inspect these financial statements or assign an 
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expert to carry out this investigation, and to inform the listed economic entity in the 
market by their observations, and may request reconsideration of these documents and 
reports in line with the results inspection. 
If the economic entity fails to respond to these observations, then the economic entity 
must be committed to publishing expenses of the SMA observations and modifications 
that it has requested. Moreover, the third paragraph of this Article emphasises that each 
company must notify the SMA of the budget and financial statements before the 
expiration of thirty days from the general assembly meeting of the company’s 
shareholders. More precisely, Article No. 33 of the Regulation of Listing and Follow-up 
Disclosure (RLFD) requires all listed economic entities in the LSM to supply the 
management of the market with the following: 
1. A copy of the annual financial statements and the supplementary information, 
after their approval by the economic entity’s board of directors. These reports 
must be accompanied by the directors’ report and the report of the external 
auditor, to be done before the start of the trading session in the next day. In 
addition to the above, the economic entity must provide the market management 
with a copy of those financial statements and the minutes of the general 
assembly meeting within ten days from the date of authorisation of the general 
assembly, on a computer disk prepared in accordance with the program 
determined by the market management before the start of the trading session on 
the following day at the latest, with statements supporting the amendments and 
their impact on the financial statements. The annual financial statements must 
also be prepared and approved during the period not exceeding three months 
from the date of the end of the financial year. 
2. The annual financial statements must be accompanied by the annual report of 
the board of directors. 
3. A copy of quarterly financial statements, with a summary report of the external 
auditor attached, within thirty days from the date of the period mentioned must 
also be recorded on a computer disk prepared in accordance with the program 
determined by the management of the market. 
Furthermore, taking into account the RLFD of the LSM, Article No. 34 requires all 
listed economic entities to prepare their financial statements in accordance with 
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International Accounting Standards and to be audited according to the International 
Auditing Standards; it should be refer explicitly to this the auditor's report. In order to 
make the information available to the general public, the RLFD (Article No. 35) 
requires all economic entities with their securities listed in the market to publish their 
annual and semi-annual financial statements, supplementary information, the auditor’s 
report, and the management market notes in two widely-circulated daily newspapers, 
one of which should at least be in the English language, within one week from the date 
of approval of the general assembly. 
The SML (Article No. 78) also requires any listed economic entity facing unforeseen 
substantial circumstances affecting its activities or financial position, to disclose them 
forthwith to the market, and to publish all the relevant information in one of the mass-
distribution daily newspapers. If the economic entity did not agree to publish such 
information then the information will be announced by the market in the media, which it 
deems appropriate at the expense of the entity. However, Article No. 98 (Disclosure 
Provisions) states that unless otherwise specifically provided in this law or its 
implementing regulations, the committee of SMA determines the rules, provisions, and 
procedures relating to disclosure. 
In brief, the RLFD indicates clearly that the financial statements have to be prepared 
according to international accounting standards and to be reviewed in accordance with 
the international auditing standards. However, LSML and its RLFD do not include the 
forms of the financial statements or information items that must be reported in financial 
statements in their notes. Moreover, there is no declaration on the audited financial 
statements published by listed companies in LSM that these financial statements were 
prepared in accordance with the IAS/IFRS. 
5.3 Accounting Profession in Libya  
The accounting profession of (internal or external functions) in general plays a 
fundamentally important role in contributing to the development of the country’s 
economy, as has been indicated by the statement that “as an integral facet of society, the 
accounting profession has a role in the state and the corporate sector, and is also 
expected to serve the public interest” (Kaidonis, 2008, p. 1). The accounting profession 
serves community interest by contributing to investor confidence, improving economic 
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growth and, in the end, will improve the financial wellbeing of society (International 
Federation of Accountants, IFAC, 2010).  
There is no doubt that more sophisticated and effective professional accountants will 
contribute impressively in enhancing the development process through the useful and 
reliable information they provide. Certainly, providing useful and accurate financial and 
non-financial information about the economic entity’s financial position, performance, 
and changes is an absolute necessity and is helpful in making any economic decision, or 
particular investment decision, which means there should be an efficient accountant and 
auditor capable of providing such information. According to the IFAC (2010, p. 6) high 
quality financial information, prepared by professional accountants and certified by 
auditors, will contribute to national economic growth by: 
Encouraging investment. 
Assisting the government in economic planning and taxation decisions. 
Helping to avoid damaging accounting scandals. 
Supporting anti-fraud and anti-corruption efforts. 
Assisting good governance and management control. 
Supporting poverty reduction. 
In the Libyan context, a number of factors have significantly influenced the 
improvement of the accounting profession in Libya, since the state of Libya achieved its 
independence in 1951. These include: the inputs from graduates of the Libyan 
accounting education system; the teaching of accounting academics; the preferences of 
international firms; the expertise of international accounting companies, as well as, to a 
certain extent, the rapid changes in the Libyan social, economic, political and legal 
environment (Mahmed and Russell, 2003). 
Additionally, foreign companies or branches, specifically American and British, which 
were operating in the country in a different field, had a positive influence on the 
development of the accounting and auditing profession in Libya in two ways, as pointed 
out by Bait El-Mal et al. (1973, p. 90): (i) Libyan employees in these companies are 
exposed to contemporary accounting in practice; (ii) there is a “tric ling-down effect” 
in that dealings between these companies and local enterprise lead to significant 
improvements in the generally less-developed accounting systems of the latter.  
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Up to the beginning of the seventies, there was no structured public accounting 
profession in Libya (Bait-El-Mal et al., 1973). The Ministry of Treasury was only the 
accounting authority in Libya who was responsible for offering licenses to individuals 
who wished to practices the profession of accounting and auditing, with the requirement 
to obtain a bachelor’s degree in accounting and two years of post-qualifying practical 
accounting experience (Mahmed and Russell, 2003).  
The result of the rapid increase in the number of accounting graduates from the 
University of Libya and the return of numerous Libyan graduates from abroad, as well 
as Libyan-run accounting companies, is the rising demand for the creation of a 
professional body to take the responsibility for developing a general framework of 
accounting (Ahmad and Gao, 2004). As a result, the Libyan Union of Accountants and 
Auditors (LUAA) was established in June 1975, after the Law No. 116 of 1973 was 
passed as the first law regulating the accounting and auditing profession in the country; 
it was an important event for the accounting profession, and the profession became 
formally organised in Libya. 
The law covered a number of issues including the establishment of the LUAA, 
registration of accountants, exercise of profession, fees, pensions and contribution 
funds, obligations of accountants and auditors, penalties and general and transitional 
provisions. The LUAA pronounced that its mission was to achieve the following 
objectives: 
• To organise and improve the settings for the accounting profession and to 
develop the standards of accountants and auditors professionally, academically, 
culturally and ethically; 
• To organise and participate in the seminars, conferences, and workshops 
relating to national and international accounting, and to keep up to date with 
new education and training programmes in the field; 
• To establish a retirement pension fund for its members;  
• To increase collaboration between its members and to protect their rights; and 
• To take disciplinary action against members who violate the traditions and 
ethics of the profession. 
Remarkably, the founding of the LUAA has had a relatively certain influence on the 
organisation and improvement in the performance of professional accounting practice in 
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Libya.  Consequently, the Certified Public Accountant (CPA) system was presented 
officially for the first time in the country; only CPA is permitted to conduct statutory 
audit services. The members of LUAA are divided into two key groups: (i) working 
accountants, which split into two categories; (a) accountants, and (b) assistant 
accountants. (ii) non-working accountants, also split into two categories; (a) non-
working accountants, and (b) non-working assistant accountants. 
According to the requirements of the law, all members of LUAA must hold Libyan 
nationality, have obtained a university degree in accounting, enjoy civil and political 
rights, and have a decent conduct, reputation and respectability, commensurate with the 
profession. In addition to these, an accountant who wants to register as a working 
accountant must have no less five years’ experience in accounting wor  in an 
accounting office after obtaining a university degree.  
The accountant who has a bachelor’s degree in accounting without experience will be 
only able to register as a working assistant accountant and, after two years of 
experience, will have the right to practise in the accounting profession with some 
restrictions. Accountants who hold a university degree with practice experience and do 
not intend to practise in the profession are entitled to list as non-working accountants; 
accountants without experience also have the right to register as non-working assistant 
accountants.  n accountant who obtains a master’s or doctoral degree in accounting is 
exempt from the five years’ experience requirement. Members of LU  , who are 
registered as accountants in practice, are entitled to audit and certify financial 
statements of all types of companies and taxpayers. 
In summary, although the LUAA has clear objectives and regulations, it has not done 
enough to pass a code of professional ethics or to stipulate particular accounting and 
auditing standards and principles that will be expected to be adopted by Libyan 
professional accountants (Buzied, 1998). The LUAA remains, up to the present, only a 
single professional accounting body, and has a relatively low social status in Libya.  It is 
worth noting that the ITNC has issued decree No. 12, dated 29th of March 2011, after 
the Libyan popular revolution starting on the 17th of February 2011, to freeze the 
activities of all unions and professional associations that affiliate to the General 
People’s Congress, which include the LU  ;  thereby the LU   after this date has no 
legal role in the country. 
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5.4 Summary and Conclusions 
This chapter has reviewed, in Section 5.2, the current Libyan laws and regulations, 
which provide a legal basis for corporate financial accounting and reporting practices. 
Five governmental laws were discussed in this chapter, namely the Commercial 
Activity Law (5.2.1), the Income Tax Law (5.2.2), Petroleum Law (5.2.3), Banking Law 
(5.2.4), and Libyan Stock Market Law (5.2.5).  
The chapter has founded the fundamental legal framework for corporate financial 
reporting and auditing practice in Libya is the Commercial Activity Law and Income 
Tax Law, which in particular covered issues such as accounting records and some 
aspects of financial accounting and corporate reporting practices, as well as auditing 
practice.  
Otherwise, Petroleum Law and Petroleum Regulations provided a legal basis for the oil 
industry, and also specified accounting rules that must be applied for financial 
accounting and reporting by oil and gas companies operating in Libya. In addition, the 
Libyan Banking Law No 46, 2012, provides a framework for regulation and supervision 
of the banking sector. The provision of the Libyan Banking Law governing the banking 
disclosure requirements was limited to a provision in Article 84. 
It failed to specify the required financial statements, and neither the form nor the 
content of these statements specified which accounting standards should be applied. 
Furthermore, Libyan Stock Market Law and its regulations included specific 
requirements concerning financial disclosure by listed financial and non-financial 
companies in the market. However, Libyan Stock Market Law and its regulations do not 
include the form of the financial statements or the information required to be disclosed 
in these statements or in their notes. 
Lastly, Section 5.2 has explored the background and evolution of the accounting 
profession in Libya, and it has been observed that the accounting profession in Libya 
has been established since 1973 as a legal body. However, up to the present day the 
impact of the profession on the development of accounting regulations and standards in 
Libya has been inadequate and very limited. Moreover, the accounting profession has a 
relatively low social status in Libya. The subsequent chapter will discuss in detail the 
research methodology and research methods applied for the empirical analysis.   
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Chapter Six  
Research Methodology, Methods and Formulation of Hypotheses 
 
6.1. Introduction 
This chapter aims to provide a brief introduction to the research methodologies and 
methods available in the literature that will help the researcher to develop the research 
methodology and research methods to undertake the current study. It presents the 
research philosophies, approaches and strategies adopted and used to answer the 
research questions posited in section (1.3) of the thesis, including justification of the 
reasons for the choices for the current study. 
The chapter also discusses in detail the research methods chosen to be applied in this 
study, including the data collection and the sample selection process, the research 
instruments and procedures followed, as well as the research hypotheses to be tested. In 
addition, this chapter outlines statistical data analysis techniques adopted in the present 
study.  
The chapter is organised as follows: Section 6.2 explains in detail the research 
methodologies and methods available in the literature. Section 6.3 discusses the 
philosophy underlying the research. Section 6.4 introduces the research approach. 
Section 6.5 deals with the research strategy. Section 6.6 discusses data collection 
methods, including selection of the sample and the method for collecting the annual 
reports as well as selecting sample interviewees. Section 6.7 describes the research 
instruments and procedures selected to be used to measure the extent of voluntary 
disclosure and to elicit the views of those preparing commercial ban s’ annual reports, 
in relation to the current financial reporting practice and voluntary disclosure issues. 
Section 6.8 presents the development and formulation of the research hypotheses to be 
tested in this study. Section 6.9 provides a discussion of the statistical analysis 
techniques applied to analyse data and to test the research hypotheses. Finally, a 
summary and conclusions of the chapter is reported in Section 6.10. 
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6.2. Research Methodology and Methods 
There is often confusion between the terms ‘‘method’’ and ‘‘methodology” (Mingers, 
2001, p. 242). Methodology has been defined by Collis and Hussey (2003, p. 55) as the 
“overall approach to the research process, from the theoretical underpinning to the 
collection and analysis of the data”, whereas Saunders et al. (2003, p. 2) defined 
methodology as “the theory of how research should be undertaken”. 
According to Silverman (2006) a methodology refers to the selections made by a 
researcher about cases to study, methods of data collection, data analysis procedures etc. 
in planning and performing the research study. A research methodology can be 
described as a study of methods which raises philosophical questions about what the 
researchers want to know and how valid their assertions about knowledge might be 
(Fisher, 2010). In this context, Eriksson and Kovalainen (2008) stressed that the 
principal point of methodology is to describe how a particular issue or problem can be 
studied.  
On the other hand, methods, “refer only to the various means by which data can be 
collected and/ or analysed” (Hussey and Hussey, 1997, p. 54). Methods, as described by 
Silverman (2006, p. 15) “are specific research techniques”, which include quantitative 
methods such as statistical correlation, and qualitative methods like observation, 
interviewing and audio recording. According to Saunders et al. (2003, p. 2) the term 
“methods” refers to “tools and techniques used to obtain and analyse the data”. In 
this respect, the term “method” is clearly defined by Jan owicz (2000, p. 209) as 
“a systematic and orderly approach ta en towards the collection and analysis of 
data that information can be obtained from those data”. 
Methods can be classified into methods of data collection (for example interviews, 
observation), and methods of data analysis (for example thematic analysis, narrative 
analysis) (Eriksson and Kovalainen, 2008). However, the terms “methodology” and 
“method” are sometimes used interchangeably by some scholars, and at times they are 
used to refer to different meanings (Hussey and Hussey, 1997; Collis and Hussey, 
2003). In this sense, Mingers (2001, p. 242) stated that: 
It can be difficult to precisely delineate the boundaries between method and 
methodology at one end (e.g. which is administering and analysing a 
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survey?), or between methodology and a general research approach (e.g. 
‘‘qualitative research methodology’’) at the other. 
In the context of research methodology, there are many different types that can be 
employed to achieve the aims and objectives of the research, some of which lend 
themselves more to one paradigm than another. However, the choice of appropriate 
research methodology depends on the nature of study and the research assumption 
adopted by the researcher. According to Collis and Hussey (2003, p.61) there are two 
main types of methodology that can be used in business research: (i) positivistic 
methodologies, which include cross-sectional studies, experimental studies, longitudinal 
studies, and surveys; (ii) phenomenological methodologies, which include action 
research, case studies, ethnography, feminist perspective, grounded theory, 
hermeneutics, and participative enquiry.  
Collis and Hussey (2003) argue that several methodologies can be employed under 
either a positivistic or a phenomenological paradigm, depending on the assumptions of 
the researcher. Figure 6.1 illustrates the key methodologies that can be utilised in 
business research under the two main paradigms. However, it should be recognised that 
these two paradigms are close to the extremities of the continuum; each methodology 
can be moved some way along the continuum according to the individual researcher’s 
assumptions (Collis and Hussey, 2003, p. 61). 
Figure 6.1:  Methodological assumptions of the main paradigms 
Positivistic                     Approach to social sciences             phenomenological                                   
 
Associated methodologies                                          Associated methodologies                                                                                         
Cross-sectional Studies                                              Action Research 
Experimental Studies                                                  Case Studies       
Longitudinal Studies                                                   Ethnography  
Surveys                                                                       Feminist Perspective  
                                                                                   Grounded Theory 
                                                                                   Hermeneutics 
                                                                                              Participative Enquiry          
        Source:  Collis and Hussey (2003)   
 
183 
 
Overall, methodology in particular is concerned with specific issues, which include 
(Hussey and Hussey, 1997): why the researcher collected certain data; what data was 
collected; where the researcher collected it from; when the researcher collected it; how 
the researcher collected it; and how the researcher will analyse it. Eriksson and 
Kovalainen (2008) assert that methodology is focused on the specific ways (the 
methods) that the researcher can use in research when attempting to understand the 
world better. 
Generally, the nature and purpose of the research decides which methods and 
methodologies are appropriate to answer the research question and to accomplish the 
objectives of the research. The methods and methodologies that the present study has 
followed to investigate the research questions will be explained and justified in the 
following sections. 
 
6.3. Research Philosophy  
According to Easterby-Smith et al. (2002), there are three main reasons for why an 
understanding of philosophical issues is very useful for researchers. These are: (i) to 
enable the researcher to clarify research designs which help to provide acceptable 
answers to the basic questions being investigated in the research; (ii) a knowledge of 
research philosophy can aid the researcher to identify which research designs will work 
within the specific research purpose and which will not; and (iii) knowledge of research 
philosophy can help the researcher identify and create research designs that may be 
outside the prior knowledge and experience of the researcher. It may also guide the 
researcher in adapting research designs according to the constraints of different subjects 
or knowledge structures. 
The term research philosophy (paradigm), according to Hussey and Hussey (1997, p. 
47), refers to the “progress of scientific practice based on people’s philosophies and 
assumptions about the world and the nature of  nowledge”.  ccording to Collis and 
Hussey (2003) there are two main traditional research paradigms or philosophies: the 
positivism paradigm and the phenomenological paradigm (social constructionism or 
interpretivism). Denscombe (2007, p. 332) defines the positivistic paradigm as “an 
approach to social research which seeks to apply the natural science model of research 
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to investigations of the social world”. In contrast, the phenomenological paradigm was 
defined as “a fact or occurrence that appears or is perceived, especially one of which is 
the cause in question” ( llan, 1991, p. 893). 
According to the positivism paradigm, knowledge of the world can be obtained through 
applying scientific methods to experiences. The phenomenological paradigm, in 
contrast, believes that knowledge about the world is socially constructed. As Howe and 
Eisenhart (1990) explained, positivism was primarily considered as partly an 
explanation of, and partly a prescription for, the conduct of natural sciences. Positivists 
have faith in empiricism: the idea that observation is the essence of scientific venture 
(Eriksson and Kovalainen, 2008). 
Essentially, the positivistic approach searches for the facts or causes of social 
phenomena and stresses the objective truth, with little concern for the subjective state of 
the individual (Collis and Hussey, 2003). According to Cavana et al. (2001), positivist 
research utilises precise, objective measures, and it is typically associated with 
quantitative data. The standard process under the positivistic paradigm is to review the 
literature to establish an appropriate theory and formulate hypotheses. 
Collis and Hussey (2009) concluded that positivistic research involves a deductive 
procedure with a view to providing explanatory theories to understand social 
phenomena. The positivistic research approach includes cross-sectional studies, 
experimental studies, longitudinal studies, and surveys, and because of the way in which 
data is collected and analysed, it is also referred to as quantitative research (Collis and 
Hussey, 2003). 
The phenomenological paradigm, in contrast, is concerned with understanding human 
behaviour from the participant’s own frame of reference (Collis and Hussey, 2003), and 
involves research methods such as action research, case studies, ethnography, feminist 
perspectives, grounded theory, hermeneutics, and participative enquiry. The 
phenomenological research starts with the direct, existed experience as a starting point, 
not just the ‘articulation’ of that experience; this is because phenomenological 
perspectives consider much of individuals experience to be ‘intuitive’ (Lee and Lings, 
2008). 
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Additionally, phenomenological research is not intended to test hypotheses, but aims to 
understand a phenomenon by letting the data talk for itself, and by attempting to put 
aside personal biases (Osborne, 1990). More precisely, Denscombe (2007, p. 75) 
indicated that phenomenological research is seen as an approach that emphasises: 
• Subjectivity (rather than objectivity) 
• Description (more than analysis) 
• Interpretation (rather than measurement) 
•  gency (rather than structure) 
 
Overall, the philosophical terms are used interchangeably and consequently there is a 
misperception about their meaning (Easterby-Smith et al., 2002). Table 6.1 shows some 
of the more common terms used by other scholars, as alternative terms for the positivist 
and phenomenological paradigms (philosophies). 
 
Table 6.1: Alternative terms for the main research paradigms 
Positivistic Paradigm Phenomenological Paradigm 
Quantitative 
Objectivist 
Scientific 
Experimentalist 
Traditionalist 
Qualitative 
Subjectivist 
Humanistic 
Interpretivist 
 
              Source: Hussey and Hussey (1997) 
Research philosophy depends on the way that researchers think about the development 
of knowledge. Hence, from the underlying research aims and objectives of this study, 
both positivist and phenomenological paradigms have been adopted. The main reason 
for utilising both paradigms is that the study will rely upon the hypothetic-deductive 
method of conducting the study (i.e. deductive reasoning), identifying causal effects, 
testing pre-existing theory, exploring the views and perceptions of those preparing 
commercial ban s’ annual reports (i.e. inductive reasoning), and using a semi-structured 
interview technique. Deductive reasoning, as Kriksson and Kovalainen (2008) 
explained, is concerned with the formulation of hypotheses and theories from which 
specific phenomena can then be explained. 
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As Hussey and Hussey (1997) pointed out, interviews are linked with both positivist 
and phenomenological methodologies; however, a positivistic approach suggests a 
structured interview technique (closed questions) to be used, unlike in the 
phenomenological approach which suggests using unstructured or semi-structured 
interview methods (unstructured questions). In this context, Collis and Hussey (2003, p. 
55) outline a list of the main features of the two philosophy paradigms, as shown in 
Table 6.2.  
  Table 6.2:  Distinctive features of the two philosophy paradigms 
Positivistic Paradigm Phenomenological Paradigm 
Tends to produce quantitative data Tends to produce qualitative data 
Uses large samples Uses small samples 
Concerned with hypothesis Concerned with generating theories 
Data is highly specific and precise Data is rich and subjective 
The location is artificial The location is natural 
Reliability is high Reliability is low 
Validity is low Validity is high 
Generalises from sample to population Generalises from one setting to another 
        Source: Collis and Hussey (2003) 
 
6.4. Research Approach  
The two main research approach methodologies are the empirical inductive approach 
and the deductive approach. The empirical inductive approach is typically an empirical 
investigation of current practices and attempts to generalise from them. In contrast, the 
deductive approach is not dependent on existing practice; the deductive approach seeks 
an identified problem based on testing a theory (Elliott and Elliott, 2011). According to 
Collis and Hussey (2003, p. 15), deductive research is a “study in which a conceptual 
and theoretical structure is developed and then tested by empirical observation; thus 
particular instances are deducted from general inferences”. 
On the other hand, inductive research is a study in which theory is “developed from the 
observation of empirical reality; thus general inferences are induced from particular 
instances, which is the reverse of the deductive method since it involves moving from 
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individual observation to statements of general patterns or laws” (Collis and Hussey, 
2003, p. 15).   
Both deductive and inductive approaches are used in science to arrive at a conclusion. 
In the deductive method, the researcher forms certain expectations or hypotheses from a 
general assumption or theory and collects evidence to investigate those expectations; 
this approach is called the hypothetico-deductive method of investigation 
(Abdolmohmmadi and McQuade, 2002). Practically, the deductive method is referred to 
as moving from the general to the specific (Collis and Hussey, 2009). 
In contrast, in the inductive method, the researcher starts with the data at hand and 
designs a technique to investigate the generalisability of the evidence; this is called 
generating theories from the ground up, known as the inductive ground-up method of 
investigation (Abdolmohmmadi and McQuade,2002). Precisely, the inductive method 
refers to moving from the specific to the general (Collis and Hussey, 2009). 
Abdolmohmmadi and McQuade (2002) recommended that both the hypothetico-
deductive and the inductive approaches could be used in scientific research to conclude 
results from evidence, and both approaches are useful for accounting research. Saunders 
et al. (2003) identified the major differences between deductive and inductive 
approaches to research, as presented in Table 6.3. 
Table 6.3:  Distinctions between deductive and inductive approaches 
Deductive approach Inductive Approach 
Scientific principles Gaining an understanding of the meanings 
humans attach to events 
Moving from theory to data A close understanding of the research context 
The need to explain causal 
relationship between variables 
The collection of qualitative data 
The collection of quantitative data A more flexible structure to permit changes of 
research emphasis as the research progresses 
The application of controls to ensure 
validity of data 
A realisation that the researcher is part of the 
research process 
The operationalisation of concepts to 
ensure clarity of definition 
A realisation that the researcher is part of the 
research process 
A highly structured approach  
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In testing the validity of hypotheses, the researcher typically employs the hypothetico-
deductive approach starting with a theoretical framework, then formulating hypotheses, 
and subsequently deducing what the outcomes of the test should be if the hypotheses are 
supported. Accordingly, Powell (1997, p.  35) states that this is usually accomplished in 
two steps; in the first step, the researcher deductively develops certain logical 
implications that, when stated in operational terms, can help to reject or support the 
research hypothesis; the second basic step is in testing a research hypothesis and 
involves actually subjecting it to a test by collecting and analysing relevant data.  
The research approach to be used depends on the research questions and the nature of 
the investigation related to the focus of the research. In the context of the research 
approach, a combination of research approaches is more acceptable and may be more 
effective in order to achieve the specific research aims and answer research questions, 
and therefore both inductive and deductive approaches appear particularly appropriate 
to the focus of the current study. 
In the current study, the researcher is aiming to test the significant relationship between 
several commercial bank-specific attributes as independent variables and the extent of 
voluntary disclosure in annual reports as dependent variables. It is therefore the 
hypothetico-deductive method which is considered suitable for testing such causal 
relationships. According to Cavana et al. (2001, p. 35), deduction is “the process by 
which the researcher begins with a theoretical proposition and then moves towards 
concrete empirical evidence” (Figure 6.2a). 
The selection of a deductive method also fits well with Collis and Hussey’s view (2003, 
p. 15), who described deductive research as “a study in which a conceptual and 
theoretical structure is developed and then tested by empirical observation”. The 
inductive approach has also been adopted for its ability to inquire into individual 
perceptions of the meanings individuals attach to events. According to Cavana et al.  
(2001, p. 36), induction is “a process by which we observe certain phenomena and 
arrive at certain conclusions” (Figure 6.2b).  
Therefore, this approach will also be considered suitable for the current study, which 
aims to explore the views and perceptions of those preparing commercial ban s’ annual 
reports in relation to the current commercial banking financial reporting and voluntary 
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disclosure issues. Thus, a combination of both approaches (deductive and inductive) 
may be essential to provide a more comprehensive research result. 
 
      Figure 6.2: Deductive and inductive reasoning in business research 
 
 
 
 
 
(a) Deductive Reasoning 
 
(b) Inductive Reasoning  
 
 
 
 
 Adapted from:  Cavana et al. (2001) 
 
 
 
6.5. Research Strategy 
Research strategy is a general plan of how the researcher will go about answering the 
particular research questions. A variety of research strategies are available to 
researchers to use in their studies; some of these strategies belong to the deductive 
approach, others to the inductive approach, and they include experiment, survey, case 
study, grounded theory, ethnography, action research, cross-sectional and longitudinal 
studies, and exploratory, descriptive and explanatory studies (Saunders et al., 2003). 
The purpose of the research strategy is to specify what type of research is undertaken to 
provide satisfactory answers to the research questions. Selecting which strategy 
researchers should apply is dependent on the purpose of the research and the type of 
information required. According to Naoum (2007), research strategies can be divided 
into two types, depending on the type of data collected: ‘quantitative research’ and 
‘qualitative research’. 
Analyse patterns 
and themes 
Formulate 
relationships 
Develop theory 
Observe 
phenomena 
Develop theory  
Formulate 
hypotheses 
Collect and 
analyse data 
Accept/reject 
hypotheses  
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Quantitative research approaches include questionnaires, field and laboratory 
experiments, and also statistical data gathered by organisations. In contrast to 
quantitative approaches, qualitative research approaches include interviews, focus 
groups and observations, and are aimed at understanding the rich, complex and 
idiosyncratic nature of human phenomena; qualitative approaches rely on the researcher 
being a ‘human-as-an-instrument’ to both collect and analyse the data (Cavana et al., 
2001). The qualitative approach stresses the subjective aspects of human action by 
focusing on the sense, rather than the measurement, of social phenomena (Hussey and 
Hussey, 1997). 
Cavana et al. (2001) distinguish between two qualitative and quantitative strategies: 
quantitative research is based on deductive reasoning, and is used within the positivist 
research paradigm. Qualitative research involves inductive reasoning, and is used within 
the interpretivist (phenomenological) paradigm. Moreover, qualitative research is 
‘subjective’ in nature, and the data gathered in qualitative research can be classified 
under two categories of research; exploratory and attitudinal, but quantitative research is 
‘objective’ in nature (Naoum, 2007).  In this sense, Hair et al. (2007, p. 152) have 
compared between quantitative and qualitative approaches, as shown in Table 6.4.  
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Table 6.4: Comparison of quantitative and qualitative approaches 
Description Quantitative Approach Qualitative Approach 
Purpose: Collection quantitative data Collection qualitative data 
 
 
 
 
 
Properties: 
More useful for testing. More useful for discovering. 
Provides summary information 
on many characteristics. 
Provides in-depth (deeper 
understand) information on a few 
characteristics. 
Useful in tracking trends. Discovers ‛hidden’ motivations and 
values. 
More structured data collection 
techniques and objective 
ratings. 
More unstructured data collection 
techniques requiring subjective 
interpretation. 
Higher concern for 
representativeness. 
Less concern for 
representativeness. 
Emphasis on achieving 
reliability and validity of 
measure used. 
Emphasis on the trustworthiness of 
respondents. 
Relatively short interviews (1 
to 20 minutes). 
Relatively long interviews 
(1/2 to many hours 20). 
Interviewer questions directly, 
but does not probe deeply. 
Interviewer actively probes and 
must be highly skilled. 
Large samples (over 50). Small samples (1-50). 
Results relatively objective.    Results relatively subjective. 
     Source: from Hair et al. (2007). 
 
Quantitative researchers cannot deal with the social and cultural creation of its own 
variables and can only deal with deduction, confirmation, explanation, testing of 
hypotheses, prediction and statistical analysis. The qualitative researchers, in contrast, 
are concerned with induction, interpretation, discovery, exploration and understanding 
through social and cultural senses (Eriksson and Kovalainen, 2008). However, both the 
quantitative and the qualitative methods are valuable and can make a worthwhile 
contribution to what is known about the phenomenon under study (Denscombe, 2007).  
It has been argued that using mixed methods in one overall research study has more 
advantages than using a single method. According to Creswell and Clark (2011, p. 12) 
there are a number of advantages to utilising multi-methods in the same study:  
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 Mixed methods research provides strengths that balance the weaknesses of both 
quantitative and qualitative research.   
 Mixed methods research provides additional evidence for studying a research 
problem than either quantitative or qualitative research alone. 
 Mixed methods research assists in answering those research questions that 
cannot be answered by quantitative or qualitative approaches alone. 
 Mixed methods research provides a link through the sometimes adversarial 
divide between quantitative and qualitative researchers. 
Therefore, a mixed-methods research strategy is adopted in the current study i.e. 
quantitative and qualitative approaches, where each research strategy is considered 
suitable for application to the particular type of research questions. By combining both 
research techniques within the current study, it will help the study provide stronger 
evidence for a conclusion by convergence and validation of results. Denscombe (2007, 
p. 110) stated that: 
Combining the methods, however, allows the researcher to produce a fuller 
account of the situation that covers not only the scale of the issue (e.g. 
numbers involved, age, sex, ethnic group) but also gives some insight into 
the motivational factors that give rise to the behaviour (e.g. self-image, 
stress, peer groups) 
 
According to Muskat et al. (2012) mixed-methods research is helpful to use in order to 
produce a research outcome that is of higher value than single approaches in qualitative 
or quantitative methods. Moreover, mixed-methods research, according to Johnson and 
Onwuegbuzie, (2004, p. 17), “is an attempt to legitimise the use of multiple approaches 
in answering research questions, rather than restricting or constraining researchers’ 
choices”. In short, as summarised by Denscombe (2007, p. 110), the mixed methods 
approach can be a valuable research strategy for:  
• The validation of the study findings in terms of their accuracy; 
• Chec ing for bias in research methods; and 
• The development of research instruments. 
Given the second objective of this particular study, and the intention to gather data from 
a number of years, a longitudinal research strategy is also adopted, since, as noted by 
Collis and Hussey (2003), such a study enables the researcher to examine change 
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processes within a social, economic and political background. Saunders et al. (2003) 
assert that the  ey strength of longitudinal research is its’ capability to study change and 
development. 
Moreover, it can be employed to investigate whether there have been significant 
changes or developments over a period of time and how these changes or developments 
might be explained (Collis and Hussey, 2003). Additionally, a longitudinal research 
approach can shed light on the elements which cause the change over time. As Collis 
and Hussey (2003) asserted, a longitudinal study is often associated with a positivist 
research methodology. 
In the context of this research, therefore, the longitudinal study is used to examine 
changes in the extent of voluntary disclosure and determine whether Libyan commercial 
banks have paid particular attention to voluntary information disclosure over a period of 
six years (2006-2011). The main reason for using the longitudinal study approach is that 
it allows the researcher to measure the pattern of change and to obtain factual 
information, requiring collection on a regular or continuing basis, thus enhancing its 
accuracy (Kumar, 2005).  dditionally, “longitudinal studies are appropriate when 
research questions and hypotheses are affected by how things vary over time” (Hair et 
al., 2003, p. 62). In longitudinal studies the study population is visited a number of 
times at steady intervals, usually over a long period, and data must be collected from the 
same sample population (Figure 6.3) (Kumar, 2005).  
 
Figure 6.3: The longitudinal study design 
 
 
 
                 t                          t                              t                            t 
      = Data Collection                 t = Interval between data collection                      
Source: Kumar (2005) 
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194 
 
6.6 Data Collection Methods  
“Data” refers to “ nown facts of things used as a basis for inference or rec oning” 
(Collis and Hussy, 2003, p. 160). In both positivistic and phenomenological research, 
the researcher needs to gather data about the phenomena being researched (Collis and 
Hussy, 2003). Data can be collected for research in a variety of ways and from different 
sources (Sekaran, 2003). However, the type and quantity of data to be collected depends 
on the nature of the study composed with its research objectives (Hair et al., 2003).  
The data for the current study are extracted from commercial ban s’ annual reports and 
semi-structured face-to-face interviews with directors of accounting departments in 
Libyan commercial banks who are involved directly in the preparation of those annual 
reports. Collection of data through different methods or collecting different types of 
data on the topic of interest will improve the accuracy of judgements and research 
outcomes (Ghauri et al., 1995). The following subsections discuss the process for 
sample selecting and collecting the commercial ban s’ annual reports, and selecting the 
sample of interviewees. 
6.6.1 Selection of sample and collecting the annual reports  
This study is concerned with the information disclosed in the annual reports of Libyan 
listed and unlisted commercial banks from 2006 to 2011. Though the annual report is 
only one means of corporate reporting, it should serve as a good proxy for the level of 
voluntary disclosure provided by a commercial bank through all disclosure means 
(Botosan, 1997). The reason for choosing this time period is that it is expected to give 
more insight into whether there are any significant changes in the voluntary disclosure 
levels being linked to the first stock market established in Libya in 2006; the first of its 
 ind was officially founded by Decision No (134) of the General People’s Committee 
(GPCO), on June 3, 2006. 
The analysis of listed commercial banks annual reports from 2006 allows the 
exploration of the influence of listing requirements of the LSM, on the level of 
information voluntarily disclosed by listed banks in their annual reports. In addition, 
during that period Libya had remarkable and rapid economic development moving from 
a centrally planned economy to a more market-oriented economy. This made significant 
changes in the corporate external financial reporting environment in Libya.  
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Selecting commercial banks in the sample was based on the availability of their audited 
annual reports for six years (2006-2011). The sample represents the entire population of 
the commercial banks listed in the LSM until the end of 2011. The researcher planned to 
collect the annual reports of the entire population of represented unlisted commercial 
banks. The total number of unlisted commercial banks was eight in 2011.  
Three unlisted banks were excluded from the sample as they were established after 2006 
(i.e. Almutahed Bank for Trading and Investment, Arab Commercial Bank, and First 
Gulf Bank), and they had not started their activities at that time; three other unlisted 
commercial banks were also excluded because their audited annual reports were not 
available (Al-Ejmaa Al-Arabei Bank, Bank Alaman for Commerce and Investment, and 
North Africa Bank). 
It should be noted that the majority of Libyan commercial banks do not have their own 
website; others have a website but without access to the entire audited annual reports. 
Finally, the total number of listed and unlisted commercial banks covered under the 
study is nine. A copy of the audited annual reports for the years 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 
2010 and 2011 was collected from each bank
1
.  
Six banks have participated in interviews; the researcher was able to collect their annual 
reports from 2006 to 2009 on the interview day, and the annual reports of the financial 
year 2010 and 2011 were collected later. Annual reports for three listed banks were 
downloaded from the LSM’s website. 54 audited annual reports from the period 2006-
2011 of nine listed and unlisted commercial banks were obtained and analysed. The list 
of commercial banks covered by the current study is shown with their year established 
and listing status in Table 6.5. 
 
 
                                                 
1
 Two commercial banks (National Commercial Bank and Wahda Bank) were not able to publish their 
annual reports for 2011 due to the 17.02.2011 Libyan revolution; they published annual reports of 2012, 
which were collected and used in this study.   
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Table 6.5: List of the Libyan commercial banks covered by the current study 
Commercial Bank’s Name  Year 
Established 
Listing Status 
1. Sahara Bank 1964 Listed 
2. Gumhouria Bank 1969 Listed 
3. The National Commercial Bank 1970 Listed 
4. Wahda Bank 1970 Listed 
5. Commerce and Development Bank. 1996 Listed 
6. Mediterranean Bank 1997 Listed 
7. Alsaraya Trading and Investment Bank 1997 Listed 
8. Alwafa Bank 2004 Unlisted 
9. Alwaha Bank 2005 Unlisted 
 
 
6.6.2 Selecting sample interviewees 
The second phase of data collection in the current study involved conducting a semi-
structured, face-to-face interview, which was designed as a data collecting strategy to 
meet the fourth research objective. The researcher planned to interview all the Libyan 
listed and unlisted commercial ban s’ directors of the accounting departments or 
representatives who are involved directly in the preparation of annual reports. Directors 
of the accounting departments in Libyan commercial banks were chosen for two 
reasons.  
Firstly, based on the researcher’s  nowledge of Libyan commercial ban s’ regulations, 
directors of the accounting departments are more reliable sources and are more exposed 
to issues relating to the banking financial reporting and disclosure practices than other 
directors or employees in Libyan commercial bank. Secondly, directors of the 
accounting departments are directly responsible for the preparation of financial annual 
reports and accounts of Libyan commercial banks.  
Nevertheless, the researcher was not able to realise the plan due to bureaucratic rules 
that governed the Libyan banking system, and so it was difficult for the researcher to 
conduct interviews with all directors of accounting departments. It should also be noted 
that confidentiality and anonymity were crucial factors, as the subjects were commercial 
banks.  
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As a result, six commercial banks (two listed and four unlisted commercial banks) 
allowed the researcher to carry out interviews with the people responsible for preparing 
their annual reports. The final size of the sample interviewees was seven. Two 
representatives of one listed commercial bank were present in one of the interviews. 
The number of participants in the interviews formed a good representation and  
provided rich information concerning the current financial reporting and disclosure 
practices by Libyan listed and unlisted commercial banks. 
 
6.7 Research Instruments and Procedures 
This section introduces the main research instruments and procedures employed in the 
present study. Section (6.7.1) explains the research method to measure the extent of 
voluntary disclosure in the annual reports of each individual commercial bank for each 
year (dependent variable, TVDIS), which involves a two-step process: construction of 
the voluntary disclosure index and scoring the voluntary information disclosure items. 
The semi-structured interview process adopted by this research is outlined in section 
(6.7.2).  
 
6.7.1 Research method to measure the extent of voluntary disclosure 
The purpose of this section is to explain the method used to answer the first research 
question of this study, i.e. to what extent have Libyan listed and unlisted commercial 
banks disclosed voluntarily information in their annual reports during the period 
between 2006 and 2011. Measuring the level of voluntary information disclosure in the 
annual reports of each individual commercial bank for each year involves a two-step 
process: (i) construction of the voluntary disclosure index, and (ii) scoring the voluntary 
information disclosure items. A detailed description of each step is given below. 
6.7.1.1 Construction of the voluntary disclosure index 
The first step is to construct a disclosure index in order to assess the voluntary 
disclosure level in the commercial ban s’ annual reports. It is demonstrated in the 
disclosure literature that a self-constructed disclosure index is a widely used method of 
collecting data to assess the extent of information disclosure in corporate annual reports 
(e.g. Singhvi and Desai, 1971; Buzby, 19975; Barrett, 1976; Kahl and Belkaoui, 1981; 
Chow and Wong-Boren, 1987; Cooke, 1989a, 1991; Raffournier, 1995; Inchausti, 1997; 
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Tsamenyi et al., 2007; Hossain, 2008). Therefore, for the principal purpose of this 
research, the index approach is considered appropriate.  
A major step in the construction of the voluntary disclosure index is the selection of 
information items that could be disclosed voluntarily by listed and unlisted commercial 
banks in their annual reports and which are relevant to the Libyan environment. Wallace 
(1988, p. 354) claims that there is no general theory to guide what should be considered 
when deciding upon a list of information items for inclusion in a disclosure index. 
As discussed earlier in Chapter Five, the Banking Law No. (1) of 2005 provided a legal 
framework for regulation and supervision of Libyan commercial banking activities until 
2012. The only legal requirement for Libyan commercial banks, according to the 
provisions of Article 84 of this law, was that every commercial bank must display, 
throughout the year and in a visible place at its head office and at all of its branches, a 
copy of its most recent, audited balance sheet and profit and loss accounts. These 
financial statements must be also published in the Official Gazette and in a domestic 
newspaper. 
However, the Libyan Banking Law No. 1 (2005) or its later amendments did not specify 
any additional requirements concerning the form and content of the balance sheet and 
profit and loss account. It is obvious that no specific information items are required to 
be disclosed in the Libyan commercial ban s’ consolidated financial statements, which 
was confirmed by interviewees’ responses in Chapter Seven of this thesis.  
Therefore, it can be concluded that the Libyan Banking Law No (1) of 2005 failed to 
specify the actual level of information that commercial banks must disclose in their 
consolidated financial statements. In other words, this law does not provide details of 
the key legislation and guidelines relevant to the preparation of financial statements and 
other accounts by the Libyan commercial banking sector.  
As discussed in Chapter Five, listed companies on the LSM are required to submit a 
copy of their annual audited financial statements, the auditor’s report and the annual 
report of the board of directors within a period not exceeding three months from the end 
date of the financial year to the LSM. According to LSM rules, listed companies must 
prepare their financial statements in accordance with the IASs/IFRS, reviewed in 
accordance with the International Standards on Auditing (ISA).  
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In addition to these listing requirements, LSM has the right to request additional 
information not contrary to the legislation in force. However, the detailed requirements 
on the form and content of the company's financial statements and reports were not 
specified. In fact, since the LSM was established in 2006, none of the companies listed 
in the LSM, including banks, could confirm that their audited annual financial 
statements have been prepared in accordance with IFRS requirements. More 
importantly, listed commercial banks in fact must follow the CBL directives, 
regulations and legislation when they prepare their annual accounts and consolidated 
financial statements.  
As the current study focuses on information that is expected to be presented in the 
commercial ban s’ annual reports and this information is not compulsory to be 
disclosed in the annual reports of listed and unlisted Libyan commercial banks, it is 
assumed that the information represents free choices on the part of commercial bank 
management to provide financial and non-financial information considered relevant to 
the decision-making needs of users of their annual reports (Meek et al., 1995).  
Hence, the selection of voluntary information items for inclusion in the disclosure index 
that will be employed in this study to measure the extent of voluntary disclosure in 
annual reports is based on the following criteria:  
(i) Information items recommended for banking disclosure by the International 
Accounting Standards Board (IASB) and other bodies such as the US Financial 
Accounting Standards Board (FASB), the Basel Committee, and the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF); the items should not be mandatory for 
disclosure by any Libyan codes. 
(ii) Information items included in earlier relevant voluntary disclosure studies (i.e. 
Kahl and Belkaoui, 1981; Abdul Hamid, 2004; Hossain and Taylor, 2007; 
Hossain and Reaz, 2007; Hooi, 2007; Hossain, 2008; Barako and Brown, 2008, 
Maingot and Zeghal, 2008). 
A review of recently published annual reports and discussion with interviewees was 
used to refine the items included in the voluntary disclosure index. However, Marston 
and Shrives (1991, p. 198) have acknowledged the fact that: 
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The validity of disclosure indices as a measure of information disclosure 
cannot be accepted without question. However, no other method for 
measuring disclosure has been developed…The fact that no one particular 
index has gained favour with researchers illustrates another facet of the 
validity problem. Most researchers adapt and tailor existing indices to meet 
their own perceived needs. This is an attempt to create an index that is valid 
in the particular research environment being investigated 
 
A total of 63 items of information were finally identified as relevant to Libyan 
commercial banking disclosure and are applicable to all sampled banks. These 63 
voluntary information items were then classified into five key categories according to 
their nature: 
(A) Background about the commercial bank/ general information;  
(B) Social responsibility information; 
(C) Financial ratios and other statistics information;  
(D) Accounting policies, and 
(E) Corporate governance information.  
Table 6.6 shows the number of voluntary disclosure items under each category. The list 
of the 63 voluntary disclosure items is comprised in Appendix No. 1.   
              
Table 6.6: Voluntary information categories 
Category Number of  
Information 
Items 
% 
 
(A) Background about the Commercial Bank/ General 
Information 
11 17.46 
(B) Social Responsibility Information 4 6.35 
 (C) Financial Ratios and Other Statistics  Information 21 33.33 
 (D) Accounting policies 8 12.70 
(E) Corporate Governance Information 19 30.16 
        Total 63 100 
6.7.1.2 Scoring the voluntary information disclosure items 
The second step in measuring the extent of voluntary disclosure in annual reports for 
every commercial bank in the sample for each year involves scoring the voluntary 
disclosure index items. A scoring sheet was designed including the 63 voluntary 
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disclosure items index (see Appendix No. 2), to score each of the sample commercial 
banks on their voluntary disclosure levels. 
Two main approaches were found to be widely used by earlier disclosure studies to 
develop a scoring scheme to determine the level of a corporate annual disclosure, these 
being the weighted scoring approach, and the unweighted scoring approach 
(dichotomous scoring approach).  
The weighted approach is constructed based on surveys of the perceptions of financial 
report users. Users are asked to scale their perceived importance of disclosure index 
items from one to five, one if an item is not important to their decision-making and five 
if it is very important to their decisions. This approach has been adopted in several 
previous empirical studies (e.g. Singhvi and Desai, 1971; Buzby, 1974; Barrett, 1976; 
Kahl and Belkaoui, 1981; Malone et al., 1993). However, Cooke and Wallace (1989) 
consider that any scoring approach employed to assign weights to each item of 
information may be misleading, since the level of importance differs according to 
entities, transaction, the user, industry, country and the time of the study.  
The unweighted approach, in contrast with the weighted method, uses a dichotomous 
score, in which one point given if an item is disclosed in the annual report and zero if 
not disclosed. This approach is based on the assumption that each information item in 
the disclosure index is considered equally important to all users of corporate annual 
reports. Therefore, the unweighted approach is less subjective than the weighted 
approach. 
Researchers such as Cooke (1989a and 1989b), Cooke (1992), Wallace et al. (1994), 
Hossain et al. (1995), Akhtaruddin (2005), Ahmed (2006), and Hossain (2008) prefer to 
use the unweighted approach to avoid the subjectivity inherent in any individual scoring 
of disclosure index items. As confirmed by Adams and Hossain (1998, p. 264) “an 
unweighted disclosure index was employed because criticisms of the use of weighted 
disclosure indices are widespread in the academic accounting literature.”  
Additionally, previous empirical research which has employed both a weighted and an 
unweighted scoring technique has indicated that there are no substantial differences to 
the statistical findings which emerge between the two approaches (e.g. Choi, 1973; 
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Chow and Wong-Boren, 1987; Robbins and Austin, 1986; Wallace and Naser, 1995). 
For the purpose of this study it therefore, an unweighted approach (dichotomous scale) 
was adopted for use, in which if a commercial bank discloses an item of information 
included in the disclosure index it is assigned a score of 1, and 0 if it is not disclosed.  
The main reason for adopting this approach in the current study is to avoid the 
subjectivity inherent in using any weighted scoring approach. Another reason is that the 
unweighted scoring approach has been most commonly employed in prior disclosure 
studies (see e.g. Cooke, 1989b; Hossain et al., 1995; Hossain and Reaz, 2007). 
Moreover, one of the main research objectives of the current study is concerned with 
developments in the levels of voluntary disclosure over the period 2006 to 2011 rather 
than with the importance of information items to any specific user group. 
Therefore, the use of a weighted scoring technique is inappropriate in the precise 
circumstances of this study, since the items of information are to be assigned according 
to users’ perceptions in a particular year. Hence, it may be the case that some or all 
information items are considered to be very important in one year, but much less 
important in another.  
After the all voluntary disclosure items have been scored, the Total Voluntary 
Disclosure Index Score (TVDIS) for each of the 54 annual reports from the commercial 
banks in the sample (this score as dependent variable), is calculated as the ratio of the 
Actual Voluntary Disclosure Score (AVDS), which is awarded to a commercial bank, 
divided by the Maximum Voluntary Disclosure Score (MVDS), which that particular 
commercial bank is expected to earn.  
The Total Voluntary Disclosure Index Score for each commercial bank for each year 
(TVDIS) is calculated as follows: 
 The Actual Voluntary Disclosure Scores (AVDS) for per commercial bank in 
the sample of the study in each year is additive as: 
                            
 
 
 
 
            n 
AVDS = ∑ dj 
                j = 1 
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Where, AVDS = Actual Voluntary Disclosure Score for per commercial bank.  
             dj = 1 if the j information item is disclosed in the annual reports. 
                   dj = 0 if the j information item is not disclosed in the annual reports. 
                                         n = the total of information items which a commercial bank is expected to 
disclose. 
 
 The Maximum Voluntary Disclosure Score (MVDS) that an individual 
commercial bank is expected to earn is calculated as follows:   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Where, MVDS   = Maximum Voluntary Disclosure Score. 
n = the number of information items in the voluntary disclosure index 
expected to be disclosed, where   n ≤ 63 
                                                                                              
  Therefore, the Total Voluntary Disclosure Index Score (TVDIS) for the 
individual commercial bank for each year is calculated as follows: 
 
 
 
 
TVDIS for the individual commercial bank for per year (its value range from zero 
to one) = Actual Voluntary Disclosure Score (AVDS) ÷ Maximum Voluntary 
Disclosure Score (MVDS). The fraction is then multiplied by 100 to convert to per 
cent and rounded up to the nearest whole number. A commercial bank with higher 
value of disclosure score demonstrates the greater extent of voluntary information 
disclosure in its published annual reports. 
6.7.2 Semi‐structured interview process  
Interviews are one of the most commonly used research methods employed for 
collecting primary data; they can be conducted with individuals or groups, using face-
to-face, telephone, email or video (Collis and Hussey, 2009). The interviews allow the 
researcher to gain an insight into an individual’s beliefs and attitudes towards a specific 
              n 
MVDS = ∑dj 
                      j= 1 
 
 
TVDIS = AVDS ÷ MVDS (100%) 
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subject (Wilson, 2010).  Interviews can be structured, unstructured or semi-structured. 
A structured interview is based on an inflexible set of interview questions. One of the 
major drawbacks of the structured interview is that the researcher has little flexibility to 
react to the particular concerns of the interviewee; there is also no guarantee that the 
questions asked focus on the issues that are most relevant to the topic studied (Kriksson 
and Kovalainen, 2008). Unstructured interviews are also known as in-depth interviews; 
the interview begins with broad questions, the interviewers then debate these in a 
general, open manner, and the subsequent interview questions are very much dependent 
on the answers given by the interviewees (Wilson, 2010).  
A semi-structured interview is a mixture of the structured and unstructured approach; it 
is based on a set of structured questions, but at the same time provides room for the 
interviewees to elaborate on certain points and raise specific questions or subjects 
(Wilson, 2010). An additional advantage of conducting semi-structured interviews is 
that the views and opinions expressed during the interview stem from a single source 
(the interviewee) (Denscombe, 2007). A common feature of the three interview methods 
is that they have more flexibility than printed questionnaires and give the interviewees 
the chance to express their personal views and perceptions in their own words (Coll and 
Chapman, 2000).  
For the purpose of this study, a semi-structured, face-to-face interview was adopted as 
the most effective technique to be used in the current study to obtain accurate and more 
detailed information from those preparing commercial ban s’ annual reports. The main 
advantage of a semi-structured interview method is to conduct discussions to not only 
reveal and understand the ‘what’ and the ‘how’ questions but also to place more 
emphasis on exploring the ‘why’ questions. (Saunders et al., 2003).  Since the present 
study depends upon the data extracted mainly from annual reports published by Libyan 
commercial banks, by using interview techniques the researcher can gain valuable 
supplementary information and explanations that cannot be found in the annual reports. 
As Kriksson and Kovalainen (2008, p. 80) pointed out, “a common reason for the use of 
interviews in business research is that they are an efficient and practical way of 
collecting information that the researcher cannot find in a published form”.  
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In addition, this method also assists and supports the researcher in interpretation of 
quantitative results in the current study. Furthermore, “qualitative data can be used to 
strengthen quantitative research designs in general and intervention research designs 
(experimental or quasi-experimental) in particular” (Leech and Onwuegbuzie, 2007, 
p.560). Moreover, it is recommended that using more than one research method will 
enhance the research findings by providing a fuller and more complete picture of the 
matter that is being studied (Denscombe, 2007). 
To interview the people preparing the commercial ban s’ annual reports, a copy of the 
‘Participant Information Sheet’ (see copy in  ppendix No. 3) attached with the 
‘Management Letter’ (see copy in  ppendix No. 4), explaining the purpose of the 
interviews was hand-delivered to all directors of accounting departments in Libyan 
commercial banks to obtain their permission and to arrange an appropriate date and 
interview time. It ultimately depended on the personal relationships and contacts 
already formed which resulted in six commercial banks (4 listed and 2 unlisted) 
allowing the researcher to conduct the interviews.  
The interviewees were given the choice to select a convenient time for their interviews. 
Each interview lasted approximately forty-five to ninety minutes. All interviews were 
conducted face-to-face on a one-to-one basis excepting one interview which was held 
with two participants representing one commercial bank. Semi-structured questions 
were used by the researcher as guidelines during the interviews (see Appendix No. 5) 
and also to allow interviewees to answer questions in their own words, encouraging 
them to elaborate on their responses and give more accurate and complete information.  
The original interview questions were first written in the Arabic language, since all 
interviews were conducted in Arabic and later translated into the English language by 
the researcher. Before conducting the interviews, the interview questions were tested by 
two Libyan professional practice accountants to guarantee that the interview questions 
can be answered without misunderstanding. 
All interviews began with the researcher introducing himself to the interviewees, after 
having thanked them for participating; this was then followed by a brief introduction to 
the research aims and objectives as well as explaining the purpose of the interview. 
Each interviewee was assured that all information given during the interview would be 
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used for academic purposes only and would be treated confidentially, and that they have 
the right to change their mind at any time; they were also asked whether the interview 
could be recorded by the researcher.  
This was done to make interviewees feel more comfortable and to encourage them to 
provide realistic and free answers to all interview questions. All interviewees were also 
invited to give their comments on the issues that they thought might not be covered in 
the interview questions. Four interviews were tape-recorded and handwritten notes were 
taken during the all interviews. After asking the interviewee to confirm the recordings 
and written notes, they were then translated from Arabic to English and transformed 
into a written document at the end of each interview by the researcher.  
Content analysis was used for analysis of the interview transcripts. Content analysis has 
been defined as “an approach to the analysis of documents and texts that see s to 
quantify content in terms of predetermined categories and in a systematic and replicable 
manner” (Bryman, 2004, p. 181). According to Denscombe (2007) content analysis is a 
technique which helps the researcher to analyse the content of documents and can be 
used with any ‘text’, whether it be in the form of writing, sounds or images, as a manner 
of quantifying the contents of that text. 
Content analysis involves creating categories which classify the meaning expressed in 
the data, and then coding, tabulating and illustrating the data itself (Jankowicz, 1995, p. 
195). More precisely, Kumar, 2005 (p. 240-241) clarified that content analysis means 
analysis of the contents of an interview in order to identify the main themes that arise 
from the answers given by interviewees. According to Kumar (2005), the process of 
analysis of the contents of an interview involves the following steps: 
Step 1- Identify the main themes; 
Step 2- Assign codes to the main themes; 
Step 3- Classify responses under the main themes; and 
Step 4- Integrate themes and responses into the text of the report. 
The above four steps will be applied in this study to analyse the respondents’ 
interviews. Despite there being a number of software programs that can be used to 
analyse qualitative research data, such as ATLAS, NUD*IST6, and NVIVO, using them 
to analyse small data - six interviews - will be more time-consuming. As pointed out by 
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Kanakriyah (2012) qualitative data analysis software is considered more time-
consuming as the researcher must draw tree nodes with different themes and sub-nodes 
with related themes on paper before putting them on NVIVO. He also added:  
This consumed more time than using colour codes (using highlighter 
pens) to connect between different themes of the same issues in a 
transcription methods table. The second reason for not using 
qualitative data analysis software was the discrepancies between Word 
and NVIVO document pages. Some features were missing in NVIVO 
and the software sometimes suddenly shut down after more than six 
hours of work (Elsayed, 2008, p. 240), causing a loss of analysis. The 
third reason was the small number of interviewees, fourteen, which 
didn‘t need analysis by software (p. 199). 
 
6.8 Development and Formulation of the Research Hypotheses  
This section highlights the development and formulation of the research hypotheses in 
order to answer the third research question. Previous empirical studies that examined 
the relationship between the extent of disclosure and corporate-specific attributes have 
shown that there are many company characteristics that might influence the extent of 
disclosure (i.e. mandatory, voluntary or aggregate disclosure) in annual reports.  
Seven commercial bank characteristics (age of bank, size of bank, bank liquidity 
position, profitability, government ownership, foreign ownership, and listing status) as 
determinants of voluntary disclosure were selected in this study, based on the findings 
of previous empirical disclosure research and the Libyan socio-economic environment. 
As suggested by Smith (2004) that theory and the existing literature should drive the 
formation of research hypotheses. Hence, the tenets of agency theory and signalling 
theory and their association with the extent of voluntary disclosure are used in 
developing the research hypotheses in the following subsections:  
6.8.1 Age of the commercial bank (AGE) 
The age of business entity is a critical factor in determining the level of information 
disclosure in its annual reports (Akhtaruddin 2005 and Owusu-Ansah 2005). An older 
company is likely to be more expert in collecting, processing and releasing information 
(Owusu-Ansah 2005). Accordingly, it may seem that long-standing commercial banks 
having more experience in ways of providing more extensive disclosure about their 
financial results and current position to satisfy users’ needs than young commercial 
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banks. Moreover, older commercial banks are more likely to include more financial and 
non-financial information above legal requirements in their annual reports than younger 
banks. Abdul Hamid (2004) suggested that the age of a bank, like any other corporation 
or business entity, may influence the level of information disclosure.  
Prior disclosure studies examining the relationship between the extent of disclosure and 
firm age have documented inconsistent results. For example, Alsaeed (2006) examined 
empirically the impact of firm age on the level of voluntary information disclosure. The 
empirical results revealed that firm age does not associate significantly with the level of 
disclosure. In a more recent study by Galani et al. (2011), the age of the company was 
found to be insignificant in explaining the variation of mandatory disclosures in the 
annual reports of non-financial Greek companies. In the case of banking companies, 
Hossain (2008) claimed that no relationship exists between ban ing companies’ age and 
the extent of monetary disclosure.  
Moreover, Hossain and Reaz (2007) empirically investigated the relationship between 
bank age and the extent of overall voluntary information disclosed by listed banking 
companies in India. They revealed that the age variable is not significant. In contrast, a 
significant positive association between the company’s age and the extent of disclosure 
have been found by Owusu-Ansah (1998 and 2005). However, the commercial bank age 
effect has not been supported by any empirical evidence to suggest such a theorised 
positive relationship. Therefore, the commercial bank age is chosen as one of the 
independent variables for testing. This leads to formulation of the first research 
hypothesis: 
H1: There is a significant positive association between the extent of voluntary 
information disclosure in annual reports and the age of a commercial bank. 
 
In this study, the age of a commercial bank is considered to be the number of years it 
has been in operation since its inception up until 2011. 
 
6.8.2 Size of commercial bank (SIZE) 
  company’s size was found in previous disclosure studies as a significant explanatory 
variable in explaining variation in the extent of information disclosed by companies. For 
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instance, Cooke (1991) stated that the most important independent variable that helps 
explain variations in voluntary disclosure in Japanese corporate annual reports is size. 
Most of the prior disclosure studies in various countries have empirically agreed that 
corporate size has a positive relationship with the level of corporate voluntary 
disclosure (e.g. Singhvi and Desai, 1971; Buzby, 1975; Kahl and Belkaoui, 1981; Chow 
and Wong-Boren, 1987; Cooke, 1989; Cooke, 1991; Hossain et al., 1994; Meek et 
al.,1995; Raffournier, 1995; Hossain et al., 1995; Depoers, 2000; Haniffa and Cook, 
2002; Leventis and Weetman, 2004; Abdul Hamid, 2004; Alsaeed, 2006; Agca and 
Önder, 2007; Hossain and Taylor, 2007; Hossain and Reaz, 2007; Yuen et al., 2009). 
Although empirical evidence from previous studies provides prodigious support for the 
hypothesis that there may be a positive relationship between company size and the 
extent of disclosure, the theoretical basis for such a relationship is unclear (Wallace et 
al., 1994, p. 44). 
Agency theory suggests that agency costs are associated with the separation of 
management from ownership, which is likely to be higher in larger companies (Jensen 
and Meckling, 1976). Hence, large companies have more incentive to voluntarily 
disclose additional information in their annual reports than smaller firms, to reduce 
agency cost. Additionally, managers of larger companies tend to be more motivated to 
disclose more information in order to create or maintain strong demand for their 
securities (Hossain et al. 1994).  
Larger companies are expected to disclose more information than smaller companies in 
their published annual reports for a number of reasons (see Singhvi and Desai, 1971, p. 
131). Firstly, collection, preparing and disclosure a great amount of financial and non-
financial information is relatively less costly for large companies than smaller 
companies. Secondly, large companies disclose more financial and non-information in 
their published annual reports because they are more aware of the potential benefits of 
additional disclosure for increasing sta eholders’ confidence and attracting new 
investors. Thirdly, managers of smaller companies are likely to feel, more than 
executives of large companies, that full disclosure of information might endanger their 
competitive position (Singhi and Desai, 1971). 
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A few empirical studies on banking voluntary disclosure (i.e. Kahl and Belkaoui, 1981; 
Hossain and Taylor, 2007; Hossain and Reaz, 2007) have documented empirical 
evidence in the positive association between bank size and the extent of voluntary 
disclosure in the annual reports. It is therefore may difficult to conclude whether 
commercial bank size is an important explanatory variable to establish an association 
with the overall level of information voluntarily disclosed by commercial banks in their 
annual reports. Based on the above argument, the second research hypothesis is 
formulated as follows: 
  H2: There is a significant positive association between the size of a commercial bank 
and the extent of its voluntary information disclosure in the annual reports. 
Previous empirical disclosure studies have measured the size of an economic entity 
through different ways: total assets; number of employees; sales turnover, capital 
employed, net income and number of stockholders. Cook (1991, p.176) asserted that 
“size can be measured in a number of different ways and there is no overriding 
theoretical reason to select one rather than another. In this study, total assets was 
utilised as the proxy measure for a commercial ban ’s size (SIZE).  
6.8.3 Commercial bank liquidity position (LQDP) 
Commercial ban  liquidity is an important factor in enhancing a ban ’s business 
activity and determines the ban ’s ability to deal efficiently with decreases in deposits 
and other liabilities. Moreover, the liquidity ratio will assist investors, depositors and 
regulators in their predictions and assessment of ban ruptcy and a company’s going-
concern status (Owusu-Ansah, 2005).  
Several empirical disclosure studies have found a positive association between liquidity 
and the level of information disclosed in the company’s annual reports (e.g. Owusu-
Ansah, 2005; Alsaeed, 2006). On the other hand, other previous disclosure studies have 
found no positive relationship between liquidity and the extent of mandatory disclosure. 
For example, Wallace et al. (1994) found firm liquidity to be a significantly negative 
explanatory variable.  
As they argue, companies with lower liquidity ratios tend to view their results as bad 
news and probably consider the provision of more details as part of their accountability 
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to shareholders and other users of their annual reports. Wallace et al. (1994) added that 
it is more likely that the managers of high liquidity companies: (i) feel that shareholders 
are satisfied with the results and do not require additional information; and (ii) do not 
want to disclose additional detail that will have to be continued in succeeding years. 
A further empirical study by Wallace and Naser (1995) found no positive relation 
between firm liquidity and comprehensive disclosure. In other empirical evidence, 
Owusu-Ansah (1998) found that the liquidity of the firm is statistically insignificant. 
Furthermore, in a more recent empirical study by Galani et al. (2011) company liquidity 
was found to be insignificant in explaining the variation of mandatory disclosures in the 
annual reports of non-financial Greek firms. In fact, the entirety of these empirical 
research findings came from non-banking companies. So far, there is no conclusive 
empirical evidence to support the hypothesised relationship between liquidity position 
and the extent of voluntary disclosure in annual reports. 
Based on the previous empirical results, it is possible to predict that commercial banks 
with strong liquidity disclose more detailed information in their annual reports than 
commercial banks with weaker liquidity. To determine whether or not the liquidity of a 
commercial bank has an impact on the extent of voluntary disclosure, the third research 
hypothesis is formulated as follows: 
 
H3: Commercial banks with a higher liquidity position disclose more information 
voluntarily than do commercial banks with a lower liquidity position. 
 
In this study, commercial bank liquidity position (LQDP) is measured as the ratio of 
current assets divided by current liabilities at the end of the financial year.  
6.8.4 Profitability of the commercial bank (PRFT) 
The influence of profitability on the level of information disclosure in corporate annual 
reports is well documented in disclosure literature (e.g. Singhvi and Desai, 1971; 
McNally et al., 1982; Wallace and Naser 1995; Raffournier, 1995; Inchausti, 1997; 
Ansah, 1998; Akhtaruddin, 2005; Owusu-Ansah, 1998; Owusu-Ansah, 2005; Hossain 
and Taylor, 2007; Ghazali, 2007; Hossain, 2008). However, past empirical disclosure 
studies have produced mixed results on the relationship between profitability and the 
extent of companies’ disclosure. For example, Singhvi and Desai (1971) show a 
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significant positive relationship between these two variables. Further, Owusu-Ansah 
(1998) reports a significant positive relationship between profitability and mandatory 
disclosure.  
In contrast, McNally et al. (1982) examined the correlation between company 
profitability and the extent of voluntary disclosure, finding no significant association 
between the two. Similarly, Wallace and Naser (1995) did not find any positive 
relationship between disclosure level and profitability of the firm. A further empirical 
study by Akhtaruddin (2005) found no relationship between profitability and the level 
of corporate disclosure. The finding of his study was consistent with Raffournier (1995) 
and Inchausti (1997) whose results revealed that firm profitability was not significantly 
associated with the extent of information disclosure.  
A more recent study by Rouf (2010) found that the extent of voluntary information 
disclosure by listed non-financial companies of Bangladesh is not positively associated 
with their profitability. Moreover, Galani et al. (2011) report that a significant 
relationship between a firm’s profitability and its level of mandatory disclosure does not 
exist. In a similar vein, previous empirical research on commercial banking voluntary 
disclosure by Hossain and Taylor (2007) shows no statistically significant relationship 
between the extent of voluntary disclosure in the annual reports of Bangladeshi 
commercial banks and the profitability variable. 
In contrast, a study by Hossain (2008) found a significant positive relationship between 
the aggregate disclosure levels in the annual reports of listed banking companies in 
India and their profitability. Agency theory would suggest that the management of very 
profitable companies would disclose additional information in order to obtain personal 
advantages such as continuance of their positions and compensation arrangements 
(Inchausti, 1997).  
It is also argued, in the disclosure literature, that higher profitability motivates 
companies’ managers to disclose greater information since it increases investors’ 
confidence, which in turn, increases managers’ reparations (Rouf and Harun, 2011).   
company in good financial condition is expected to provide more extensive information 
disclosure than a company in poor financial condition (Cormier and Magnan, 1999). 
Based on the argument of signalling theory, managers of superior performance 
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companies use corporate disclosure to send signals to shareholders and the capital 
market. 
As Hossain and Taylor (2007) argue, a commercial bank with higher profits feels more 
comfortable in disclosing additional information than does a bank with lower profits. 
However, there is no critical evidence to support the idea that a profitable commercial 
bank is more willing to provide more information in its annual reports to the general 
public than a commercial bank with lower or negative profit. Thus, the fourth research 
hypothesis can be formulated as follows:  
H4: Commercial banks with higher profit are more likely to disclose greater voluntary 
information than are commercial banks with lower or negative profit.  
 
Previous researchers in this area have suggested a number of measurements such as 
Return on Sales (ROS), Return on Total Assets (ROA), Return on Equity (ROA), and 
Return on Capital Employed (ROCE), for use as proxies for profitability. In this study, 
the commercial ban ’s profitability (PRFT) is measured by (ROA), the amount of profit 
after tax for a financial period as a percentage of the assets of a commercial bank (the 
net profits divided by total assets).  
6.8.5 Government ownership (GOVR) 
A number of empirical disclosure studies have tended to assess the influence of 
government ownership on the extent of corporate voluntary disclosure. As an example, 
Makhija and Patton (2004) investigated the effect of government ownership on the 
extent of voluntary financial disclosure by Czech firms. They found that government 
ownership is a significant determinant of the overall extent of disclosure. In other 
empirical evidence, Ghazali (2007) examined the impact of government ownership on 
corporate social responsibility disclosure in Malaysian company annual reports. He 
found that there is a significant positive relationship between the level of disclosure and 
government ownership. 
A more recent study by Said et al (2009) examined the relationship between corporate 
governance characteristics, namely board size, board independence, duality, audit 
committee, ten largest shareholders, managerial ownership, foreign ownership and 
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government ownership, and the extent of voluntary disclosure. They found that the most 
significant variable that influences the level of voluntary disclosure is government 
ownership. 
As separation of ownership and control increases, managers of companies are more 
likely to convene to provide additional information relevant to an assessment of their 
outcomes (Creswell and Taylor, 1992). In this regard, agency theory suggests that 
where there is a separation between company owners and control, the potential for 
agency costs arises because of incentive conflicts between managers and shareholders 
(Hossain et al., 1994; Raffournier, 1995). Hence, managers of companies with large 
shareholders would voluntarily disclose more information as a means to mitigate agency 
conflict with companies’ shareholders.  
Ghomi and Leung (2013) affirmed that a company with a lower ownership 
concentration has a larger number of shareholders than a company with a high 
ownership concentration. Thus, state-owned corporations are characterised as a high 
ownership concentration, so managers may have no incentive to disclose more 
information. It is because the determined ownership structure provides managers of 
state-owned companies with lower incentives to voluntarily disclose information to 
meet the needs of no dispersed shareholders groups (Rouf, 2011). 
However, previous voluntary disclosure studies have shown a positive relationship 
between the extent of voluntary disclosure and government ownership, with the 
exception of Ghazali and Weetman (2006), who found a negative relationship between 
government ownership and the extent of voluntary disclosure. 
It was commonly believed that government-owned commercial banks tend to be less 
competitive compared to privately owned commercial banks because government 
ownership often reduces profitable orientation. Accordingly, private commercial banks 
are expected to disclose more detailed information in their annual reports than 
government-owned commercial banks. However, it was argued that a company in which 
the government is a considerable shareholder will disclose more voluntary information 
in their annual reports (Ghazali, 2007). In addition, Naser et al (2002) pointed out that 
government participation in the ownership of a company's shares can be viewed as a 
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supervising mechanism that may affect the quality of information disclosure in the 
annual reports. 
The government ownership variable has not yet really been tested in relation to the level 
of voluntary disclosure in the annual reports of listed and unlisted Libyan commercial 
banks. Thus, this study attempts to explore whether the overall level of voluntary 
disclosure of information is associated with the commercial bank government 
ownership structure. Hence, the fifth research hypothesis is formulated as follows:    
H5: There is a significant association between the extent of information voluntarily 
disclosed in the annual report and government ownership. 
In this study, a sample of commercial banks is divided into two main groups. The first 
group includes commercial banks in which the Libyan government and its agencies 
have ownership of more than 50% of the issued shares; these commercial banks are 
considered as being state-owned. Another group includes commercial banks in which 
the Libyan government and its agencies own 50% or less of the issued shares; these 
commercial banks are considered as being private. 
6.8.6 Foreign ownership (FOWN) 
Previous disclosure literature reports a strong relationship between the extent of 
disclosure in corporate annual reports and foreign ownership. Previous empirical 
voluntary disclosure studies (e.g. Haniffa and Cooke 2002; Haniffa and Cooke 2005; 
Barako et al., 2006; Wang et al., 2008; Huafang and Jianguo, 2007) found that 
companies with more foreign shareholding disclose more information voluntarily. For 
instance, Barako et al., (2006) examined the association between foreign ownership and 
the level of information voluntarily disclosed by listed Kenyan companies.  
The result indicates that foreign ownership is significantly associated with the extent of 
voluntary disclosure. In addition, Wang et al., (2008) examined empirically the 
determinants of voluntary disclosure in the annual reports of Chinese listed firms; they 
found that the level of voluntary disclosure is positively related to the proportion of 
foreign ownership. More recently, Bokpin and Isshaq (2009) examined the relation 
between corporate voluntary disclosure and foreign share ownership on the Ghana 
Stock Exchange.  
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The results indicate a statistically significant interaction between corporate disclosures 
and foreign share ownership among the sample firms. In contrast, empirical research by 
Naser et al., (2002) found there was no association between foreign ownership and the 
extent of disclosure in corporate annual reports. Furthermore, Said et al. (2009) reported 
no association between the extent of voluntary disclosures and foreign ownership.  
Agency theory argues that in a diffused ownership environment, companies have more 
incentives to provide additional financial and non-financial information in their annual 
reports to reduce agency costs and information asymmetry (Ho and Wong, 2001). It 
could be argued that companies with a greater number of shareholders might be 
expected to have more information in their annual reports, than those companies with a 
smaller number of shareholders. 
In the Libyan commercial bank context, the banking sector liberalisation and 
privatisation recently undertaken by the Libyan government gave opportunities for 
foreign investors to buy shares in state-owned commercial banks. Owusu-Ansah (1998) 
suggests that companies with foreign ownership are likely to have more sophisticated 
financial reporting systems that facilitate greater disclosure in their annual reports than 
companies with non-foreign ownership. However, he argued that the capability of a 
block of foreign owners to positively influence disclosure practices depends on the size 
of other block holder stakes (Makhija and Patton, 2004). As appears from the above 
discussion, previous empirical studies that investigated the relationship between foreign 
ownership and the extent of disclosure have provided mixed results.  
In Libya, totally foreign ownership is not allowed in the banking sector; as a part of the 
privatisation programme, in 2007 the CBL allowed foreigners to own up to 19% of the 
shares in two previously wholly government-owned commercial banks and one private 
commercial bank (Sahara Bank, Wahda Bank, and Commerce and Development Bank). 
Since then, there has been no empirical evidence reported relating to influence of the 
presence of foreign owners within Libyan commercial banking sector on the extent of 
voluntary disclosure. 
Accordingly, in the current study it is expected that partially foreign ownership will be 
positively associated with the extent of voluntary information disclosure in annual 
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reports of Libyan commercial banks. Hence, the sixth research hypothesis is formulated 
as follows: 
H6: there is a positive association between the extent of information voluntarily 
disclosed in the annual reports and foreign ownership. 
Foreign ownership (FOWN) in this study will be represented by a dummy variable; if 
the commercial ban ’s shares are totally or partly foreign-owned, it takes a value of 
one, otherwise it takes a value of zero. 
6.8.7 Listing status (LISTS) 
Prior studies have argued that listed companies are more likely to disclose more 
financial and non-financial information in their annual reports than unlisted companies. 
Several empirical studies have shown that there is a positive relationship between listing 
status and disclosure levels (e.g. Singhvi and Desai, 1971; Cooke, 1989a; Cooke, 1991; 
Malone et al., 1993; Wallace et al.,1994; Hossain et al., 1995; Inchausti, 1997; Abdul 
Hamid, 2004). For instance, Wallace et al. (1994) reported that comprehensive 
disclosure increases with listing status. Further, Abdul Hamid (2004) provides empirical 
evidence that companies listed in the stock market disclose more detailed information 
than unlisted companies. 
Additionally, Singhvi and Desai (1971) examined the relationship between listing status 
and the extent of corporate disclosure in the United States. Singhvi and Desai found that 
there is a significant association between the extent of information disclosure and listing 
status. Similarly, Cook (1989a) tested the association between listing status and extent 
of corporate annual disclosure in Sweden. He found that there is a significant 
association between the extent of disclosure and listing status. 
Moreover, Malone et al. (1993) also find a significant positive relationship between 
listing status and the level of information disclosure by oil and gas companies. 
However, an empirical study conducted by Buzby (1975) indicated no significant 
positive association between listing status and the extent of information disclosure in 
the corporate annual reports.  
Listed companies are likely to disclose more information than unlisted companies for 
two reasons (Raffournier, 1995); first, listed companies have to comply with minimum 
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disclosure requirements of market regulatory authorities; in addition to this mandatory 
disclosure, listed companies may also voluntarily provide extra information in order to 
give more confidence to investors and thus obtain better financing conditions.  
Agency theory suggests that the extent of information disclosure in annual reports may 
vary with listing status (Cook, 1991). As Firth (1979) indicated that minimum 
disclosure requirements of listed companies in the stock exchange are slightly higher 
than non-listed companies. Therefore, this study attempts to examine the relationship 
between listing status in the LSM and the level of voluntary information disclosure in 
the annual reports of a commercial bank. The fifth research hypothesis is established as 
follows:  
H7: There is a positive association between the commercial bank listing status in the 
Libyan stock market and the level of information voluntarily disclosed in the 
annual report. 
The listing status (LISTS) variable will take the following values: 
Listing = 1 if the commercial bank is listed in the LSM. 
Listing = 0 if the commercial bank is unlisted in the LSM. 
6.9  Statistical Analysis Techniques 
A number of statistical techniques can be utilised to analyse data and to test the research 
hypotheses. Univariate and multivariate analysis techniques have been widely used by 
researchers in previous studies to test the relationship between the extent of disclosure 
in annual reports (dependent variable) and the company specific-characteristics 
(independent variables) (see e.g. Hossain et al. 1994; Cooke, 1989a; Akhtaruddin, 2005; 
Owusu-Ansah, 1998; Owusu-Ansah, 2005; Hossain and Reaz, 2007; Hossain, 2008). In 
this study, both univariate and multivariate statistical analyses are performed to 
investigate the correlation between the extent of voluntary disclosure and commercial 
bank attributes. The following subsections outline these statistical techniques. 
6.9.1 Univariate analysis  
Univariate analysis is used to examine the correlation between a single independent 
variable and the extent of voluntary disclosure (dependent variable). This study applies 
two types of univariate analysis, descriptive analysis for dependent and independent 
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variables which include mean, standard deviation, minimum, maximum, skewness, and 
Kurtosis. The second univariate analysis is a correlation analysis (i.e. Spearman’s ran ). 
Non-parametric univariate test, Spearman’s ran  (Spearman’s rho) correlation 
coefficient is performed to investigate the significant relationship between the extent of 
voluntary disclosure in annual reports (dependent variable) and each of the commercial 
bank characteristics (seven independent variables). Correlation coefficient is the statistic 
tool that describes how strongly variables are related to one another (Brown et al. 1989 
p. 255). 
According to Marczyk et al. (2005, p. 219) Spearman rank-order (rs) can be used to 
examine the relationship between two variables measured on ordinal scales (such as, a 
correlation of class rank (ordinal) and socioeconomic status (ordinal)). It is also a 
suitable measure of the correlation between two variables when outliers, non-normality, 
nonconstant variance, and nonlinearity may exist between the two variables being 
investigated (Hintze and Kaysville, 2007). An alternative parametric test, namely the 
Pearson correlation coefficient, is excessively influenced by outliers, unequal variances, 
non-normality, and nonlinearities (Hintze and Kaysville, 2007). 
It is notable that prior disclosure studies which applied both non-parametric and 
parametric tests on the same data, yielded similar numerical results. For example, 
Hossin et al. (1994) employed both statistical tests in the univariate analysis, to examine 
the correlation between the extent of disclosure and a company’s characteristics. They 
revealed that the results are similar to each other. As a result of these the Spearman 
correlation coefficient is chosen in this study to investigate the association between 
variables. 
6.9.2 Multivariate analysis  
Multivariate analysis “refers to a group of statistical techniques for handling three or 
more variables at a time” (Kervin, 1992, p. 614). More specifically, multivariate 
analysis is concerned with testing the linear relationship between a single (dependent or 
response variable) and a combined set of (independent or predictor variables). 
Multivariate techniques have emerged as a powerful tool to analyse data represented in 
terms of numerous variables (Kothari, 2004). According to Rencher (2002, p. xv) the 
multivariate analysis is more powerful than the univariate analysis and enables the 
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researcher to (1) explore the combined performance of the variables and (2) determine 
the impact of each variable in the presence of the others. 
In this context, Hossain et al. (1995, p. 78) state that the multivariate analysis is 
considered to be more appropriate to assess the simultaneous effect of a company’s 
characteristics on the extent of overall voluntary disclosure. The multivariate Ordinary 
Least Squares (OLS) model has been frequently used in many previous disclosure 
studies to assess the effect of corporate specific-characteristics on the extent of different 
disclosure levels (e.g. Hossain et al., 1994; Wallace et al., 1994; Hossain et al., 1995; 
Raffournier, 1995; Wallace and Naser, 1995; Owusu-Ansah, 1998; Depoers, 2000; 
Akhtaruddin, 2005; Hossain1and Reaz, 2007; Kumar et al., 2008; Hossain, 2008). The 
OLS as defined by Hair et al. (2007, p. 374) “is a relatively simple mathematical 
technique that makes sure the straight line will best represent the relationship between 
the multiple independent variables and the single dependent variable”.  
It means that the multiple regression model can be used to predict a single dependent 
variable from a set of many independent variables. Hence, the multivariate OLS 
longitudinal panel model with robust standard errors is used in this study to test the 
simultaneous effect of seven commercial bank attributes (i.e. age of bank, size of bank, 
bank liquidity position, profitability, government ownership, foreign ownership, and 
listing status) on the extent of overall voluntary disclosure, and determine which of 
those seven independent variables are significant in explaining the variations in the 
voluntary disclosure levels among Libyan commercial banks. The multivariate OLS 
regression model will be represented by the following equation:  
TVDIS = β0 + β1 GE + β2SIZE + β3LQDP + β4PRFT + β5GOVR + β6 FOWN + 
β7LISTS +є 
Where: 
 TVDIS = the total voluntary disclosure index score (dependent variable) 
 AGE    = Age of commercial bank   
SIZE   = Size of commercial bank  
LQDP = Liquidity position of commercial bank  
PRFT = Profitability of commercial bank   
GOVR = Government ownership, dummy variable 
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FOWN = Foreign ownership, dummy variable   
LISTS = Listing status, dummy variables 
  β        = regression model coefficients (parameters).     
 β0,      = constant or intercept                             
 ε     = error term. 
As discussed previously in this chapter in section (6.7.1.2), the dependent variable 
(TVDIS) is expressed as a ratio and is thus bound to lie within the range zero to one. 
Since the dependent variable is a dichotomy, using a dichotomous dependent variable in 
the OLS regression model is considered inappropriate because the model assumes an 
unconstrained dependent variable (Ahmed and Nicholls, 1994). 
It means that when the dependent variable has values that fall between zero and one 
then the multivariate OLS model becomes an ineffective estimation technique. As noted 
by Garson (2012), a dichotomies dependent variable should not be used in procedures, 
such as OLS regression, which assume a normally distributed dependent variable. 
A logit transformation of the dependent variable can be used to counter this issue. 
Cooke (1998, pp. 211-212) pointed out that “the dependent variable is a metric ratio and 
therefore can be legitimately transformed, where necessary, and used in regression 
analysis”. 
In consistence with previous empirical disclosure studies (e.g. Cooke, 1998; Ahmed and 
Nicholls, 1994), before running the OLS linear regression analysis, the natural 
logarithmic transformations of the TVDIS is performed in order to satisfy the 
assumption of normality for the OLS linear regression model. As emphasised by 
Tabachnick and Fidell (2007, p. 92) transformation of variables is usually preferable 
and reduces the number of outliers; it is likely to produce normality, linearity, and 
homoscedasticity among the variables.  
In addition, transformation of data as a common tool can be used to improve normality 
of a distribution and balancing variance to meet assumptions as well as improve effect 
sizes (Osborne, 2010). Additionally, Cooke (1998, p. 210) argues for the supportive use 
of data transformation:  
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Transformation of data is useful in regression analysis when the relationship 
between the dependent and independent variables is inherently non-linear, when 
the distribution of the errors is not approximately normal, and where there are 
problems of heteroscedasticity or non-independence of the error terms.  
 
Table 6.7 represents the seven independent variables, their proxies and notations used in 
the OLS longitudinal panel regression model. 
 
Table 6.7: Summary of independent variables, their proxies and notations used in 
the OLS regression model 
Independent 
Variables 
Proxies of Independent Variable Notations Source of 
Information 
Age of 
Commercial Bank  
Number of years it has been in 
operation since its inception up 
until 2011 
(AGE) Commercial 
bank annual 
reports 
Size Commercial 
Bank 
Natural logarithm of commercial 
ban ’s total assets 
(SIZE) Commercial 
bank annual 
reports 
Commercial Bank 
Liquidity Position 
Current Ratio (current assets 
divided by current liabilities) 
(LQDP) Commercial 
bank annual 
reports 
Profitability Return on Assets (ROA) (net profit 
divided by total assets) 
(PRFT) Commercial 
bank annual 
reports 
Government 
Ownership 
Dummy variable with one value if 
Libyan government or its agencies 
owned 50% or more of the capital; 
and 0 if not 
(GOVR) Central  Bank of 
Libya 
Foreign 
Ownership 
Dummy variable with one value if 
the commercial ban ’s shares are 
totally or partly foreign-owned, or 
zero if not 
(FORN) Central  Bank of 
Libya 
Listing Status Dummy variable with one value if 
the commercial bank is listed or 
zero if unlisted 
(LISTS) Libyan Stock 
Market 
 
6.10 Summery and Conclusions 
This chapter has discussed in detail the research methodology and methods employed in 
this study to answer research questions and also to test the research hypotheses. It has 
begun to explain the difference between research methodology and methods. Further, it 
has also discussed the research philosophy, approach and strategy, including justifying 
the reasons for the choices for the current study. It has also explained the process of 
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selection of the study sample and the method of collecting the annual reports as well as 
selection interviewees.  
Moreover, it has described the research instrument and processes followed to measure 
the extent of voluntary disclosure in the annual reports for each sampled commercial 
bank. A self-disclosure scoring sheet comprising 63 voluntary disclosure index items is 
designed and then the dichotomous procedure is chosen to obtain a commercial ban ’s 
disclosure score for each year’s period studied. The semi-structured interview process 
has also been outlined in this chapter.  
Additionally, it has presented the development and formulation of the research 
hypotheses to be tested in the current study. Finally, it has briefly described and justified 
the statistical analysis techniques that have been adopted to test the research hypotheses.  
The following two chapters, Seven and Eight, will include the analysis of the results of 
empirical research. Chapter Seven reports the results of the semi-structured face-to-face 
interviews; Chapter Eight is devoted to providing results of empirical analysis of 
measuring the extent of voluntary disclosure in the annual reports of Libyan listed and 
unlisted commercial banks over the period of 2006-2011, as well as the statistical 
results of the research hypotheses testing. 
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Chapter Seven 
Views and Perceptions of Libyan Commercial Banks’ Annual Reports 
Preparers Related to Financial Reporting and Voluntary Disclosure 
Issues 
 
 
7.1 Introduction 
The principal purpose of this chapter is to address the fourth research question i.e. what 
are the views and perceptions of Libyan commercial ban s’ annual reports preparers 
related to the current mandatory financial reporting and voluntary disclosure issues. 
Specifically, this chapter is devoted to the report and discussion of the results of the 
semi-structured face-to-face interviews with six directors of accounting departments in 
Libyan commercial banks who are involved directly in the preparation of Libyan 
commercial ban s’ annual reports. 
This chapter has been organised as follows. Section (7.2) highlights the objectives of 
semi-structured face-to-face interviews. Section (7.3) presents and discusses the 
respondents’ views and perceptions on the current Libyan commercial ban ing annual 
financial reporting and mandatory disclosure practices. Section (7.4) analyses and 
reports on the preparers’ views of voluntary disclosure in commercial ban s’ annual 
reports. The final section of this chapter (7.5) provides the summary and conclusion of 
the chapter.  
7.2 Objectives of Semi-Structured Interviews  
The face-to-face semi-structured interviews were carried out to achieve the following 
key objectives:  
1. To gain a deeper and further insight into the current annual financial reporting and 
mandatory disclosure practices.  
2. To explore the respondents’ views on factors influencing commercial banking 
voluntary disclosure. 
3. To gather insight into significant issues that are not well understood related to the 
nature of commercial banking voluntary disclosure.  
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4. To apply the evidence assembled from the interviews to support the interpretation of 
the findings from the quantitative analysis. 
7.3 General Views on Annual Financial Reporting and Mandatory Disclosure 
Practices 
Interview questions were divided into two primary parts (see Appendix 3), the first part 
includes three main questions and purposes of exploring the views of the interviewees 
about the current state of financial reporting and mandatory disclosure practices by 
Libyan commercial banks. The following subsection will present and analyse the 
respondents of the interviewees to these questions.  
7.3.1 Views on preparation and presentation of financial annual reports 
This subsection reports the interviewees’ responses to questions about preparation and 
presentation of Libyan commercial ban s’ financial annual reports. The interviewees 
were asked to explain how their commercial banks prepare their annual financial 
statements and other external financial reports, they were also asked to raise any other 
issues relating to financial reporting and mandatory disclosure practices. The key aim of 
this question is to gather more insight into the legal disclosure requirements concerning 
the form and content of financial statements and other annual financial reports that are 
required to be disclosed to external stakeholders.  
The answers obtained from the participants in the interviews relating to preparation and 
presentation of commercial ban s’ financial statements and other external financial 
reports are represented in detail in the following paragraphs. Libyan commercial annual 
reports’ preparers were as ed whether their commercial ban s consider specific national 
accounting standards laid down in national regulations or legislations when preparing 
annual accounts and financial statements.  
All the six Libyan commercial ban  annual reports’ preparers who were interviewed 
indicated that they there are no specific national accounting standards laid down by 
national regulations or legislations required to be followed to prepare their annual 
financial reporting. However, they further stressed that there are a number of directives 
and resolutions issues promulgated from time to time by the Central Bank of Libya, 
which must to be taken into account when preparing the different commercial bank 
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accounts and reports. The following comment by CB1 indicates the interviewees’ views 
regarding this issue,  
“Until now there are no enforcement national accounting standards and no 
compulsory accounting rules to be followed by accountants to prepare the bank 
financial reporting…in some cases we have to follow the directives issued by 
Central Bank of Libya”.  
 
In addition, the interviewees were asked whether they consider standards or disclosure 
requirements of international organisations (i.e. I Ss/IFRSs, the Basel Committee’s 
guidelines), at first no accurate answers were given by almost of the interviewees, after 
the researcher rephrased the question and provided them with further explanations, 
some of participants gave their answers with slight clarifications. For example, one of 
the participants in the interviews (CB6) said that 
“International Financial Reporting Standards are not imposed on commercial 
banks by Libyan Banking Laws and therefore we have no obligation to apply 
them. From the other side the lack of accounting infrastructure and 
professionalism in Libya makes it difficult to be adopted at the present time”.  
 
Most interviewees pointed out that they use Generally Accepted Accounting Principles 
(GAAP) to prepare their annual consolidated financial statements. In fact, GAAP were 
not specified or defined by either the Banking Law 2005 or the Libyan Commercial 
Laws. Furthermore, commercial ban s annual reports’ preparers were as ed whether 
there are any compulsory disclosure items required for inclusion in the contents annual 
reports; all of the interviewees stressed that no particular information items were legally 
required to be published for external users of commercial ban s’ annual reports. One of 
the respondents, BC2 stated; 
“At the present time…our commercial banks are legally required to submit  a 
copy of its audited annual consolidated financial statements within four months 
of the end of the fiscal year with other statements and clarifications to Central 
Bank of Libya for its own purpose and use we are also required by Banking 
Law 2005 to display a copy of our consolidated financial statements to general 
public in the head office and at all of our branches,…I can say that commercial 
bank management is responsible for the preparation its consolidated financial 
statements in their own format, but from the financial year beginning on the 
first of January 2011, the management of the commercial bank were asked to 
prepare its consolidated financial statements according to the formats provided 
by Central Bank of Libya”.    
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It was clear from the interviews carried out with commercial ban s’ annual reports 
preparers that there is currently no applicable financial reporting framework identified 
in the Banking Law 2005 and other regulations can be adopted by Libyan commercial 
banks to prepare their annual accounts and financial statements. 
7.3.2 Views on the publication of annual reports 
The commercial ban  accounts’ preparers were also as ed to provide their views on the 
types of financial statements and other sections of the annual report that they currently 
publish to the general public. The following Table 7.1 below displays different sections 
of financial annual report published by Libyan commercial banks as indicated by 
interviewees.  
Table 7.1: Sections of annual report published by Libyan commercial banks 
Sections of Financial Annual Report CB1 CB2 CB3 CB4 CB5 BC6 (6) 
Balance Sheet       6 
Profit and Loss Account       6 
 uditor’s Report       6 
Notes to the Financial Statements       6 
Statement of Cash Flows        1 
Board of Directors’  nnual Reports       6 
Note: 
1. BC1= a large state-owned commercial bank (listed); BC2= a medium state-owned 
commercial bank (listed); BC3= a medium state-owned joint-stock commercial bank 
(listed); BC4= a private medium-sized commercial bank (listed); BC5= a medium 
state-owned commercial bank (unlisted); BC6= a private small-sized commercial bank 
(unlisted). 
 
Table 7.1 shows that all Libyan commercial banks (listed and unlisted) surveyed 
published annually to their shareholders, balance sheet, profit and loss account, 
auditor’s report, notes to the financial statements, and board of directors’ reports, only 
one of the interviewees, CB2 claimed that its commercial bank also prepares an annual 
statement of cash flow and publishes it to the ban ’s shareholders. However, all of the 
interviewees asserted that the audited annual consolidated financial statements (balance 
sheet and profit and loss account statement) are the only sections of financial annual 
report that are legally required by Banking Law, No 1 of 2005 to be published to the 
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general public within four months of the end of its fiscal year. Amongst others, for 
example, CB1 states:    
“We are required each year by Banking Law, No 1, 2005 to prepare and 
publish annual audited consolidated financial statements to the general public 
no more than four months after the end of the fiscal year, but we also annually 
published other sections of financial annual report to our shareholders on a 
voluntary basis such as board of directors’ reports, auditor’s report, quarter-
yearly balance sheet statement, and quarter-yearly profit and loss account 
statement”. 
 
In addition, some of the respondents mentioned that listed commercial banks are 
required to prepare and submit their audited annual consolidated financial statements 
and must be accompanied with the auditor’s report, board of directors’ reports, quarter-
yearly balance sheet statement, and quarter-yearly profit and loss account statement to 
LSM. They also asserted that there are no legal requirements as to the format and 
content of such statements by either the Banking Law 2005 or LSM rules. 
Overall, it seems clear from the respondents’ answers that Libyan commercial ban s 
were required by Banking Law 2005, publishing only their audited annual consolidated 
financial statements to the general public (i.e. balance sheet and profit and loss account 
statement) and no additional sections of annual financial report were subject to 
compulsory disclosure. Only listed commercial banks are required to prepare and 
submit their audited annual consolidated financial statements with the auditor’s report, 
board of directors’ reports, quarter-yearly balance sheet statement, and quarter-yearly 
profit and loss account statement to LSM. 
 s asserted by all the participants’ in the interviews there are no specific information 
items that are required to be revealed in the audited consolidated financial statements or 
other accounts either by Baking Law 2005 or LSM rules. Other sections of annual 
financial report were disclosed by the majority of Libyan commercial banks to their 
external sta eholders on a voluntary basis (i.e. auditor’s report, notes to the financial 
statements, and board of directors’ reports). 
7.3.3 Views on the need for the development of the current financial reporting and 
mandatory disclosure practices 
Commercial ban s annual reports’ preparers were as ed to provide their views on the 
need for the development of the Libyan’s commercial ban ing current financial 
229 
 
reporting and mandatory disclosure practices. The interview respondents mainly agreed 
that the current financial reporting and mandatory disclosure practices by Libyan 
companies in general and in the financial institutions in particular still did not reach the 
same level of development that was being achieved by the most of the Arabic countries 
which have similar socio-economic, environmental conditions. This was due to the 
absence of enforcement of national accounting standards and insufficient disclosure 
laws and regulations.  
The majority of the participants in the interviews emphasised that more effort was 
urgently needed to be undertaken by Libyan authorities to provide the necessary laws 
and regulations in order to improve the system of financial reporting and financial 
disclosure. For example, one of the interviewees, CB2, stated:   
 “I can say that the existing financial reporting and disclosure practices in Libya 
still not regulated compared to other Arabic countries… no serious efforts have 
been taken until now to regulate the financial reporting and public disclosure 
practices”. 
 
Another interviewee has shared the same view, CB4 stressed that 
“Indeed, the absence of national accounting standards and a lack financial 
reporting system and disclosure regulations in Libya had a negative impact on the 
quality of the financial reports and I hope this matter will demand more attention 
by local authorities in the near future”.  
 
This would suggest that there is no legal framework or guidelines for the preparation of 
Libyan’s commercial ban s’ annual consolidated financial statements or other financial 
reports as well as a lack of national accounting standards that can be adhered to by 
banks or auditors. One interviewee (CB1) believes that “…without sensational 
economic and legal environment reforms it would be difficult to improve the current 
banking financial reporting and public disclosure practices in Libya”. This interviewee 
implies that establishing a good financial reporting system and disclosure practice is 
influenced by other country aspects. 
In summary, this section has explored commercial ban s’ annual reports preparers’ 
views and perceptions on the current financial reporting and mandatory disclosure 
practices. The interviewees were generally of the opinion that the current financial 
reporting and mandatory disclosure practices by Libyan commercial banks compared to 
other international practices are still not robust enough, regulated enough and display a 
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lack accounting regulation on the disclosure requirements to satisfy the information 
needs of external stakeholders. The following is a brief outline the key findings of the 
interviews: 
 All of the interviewees indicated that only the audited consolidated financial 
statements (balance sheet statement and profit and loss account) annually must 
be published to the general public according to Banking law No 1, 2005. Listed 
commercial banks only were required by LSM rules and regulations to publish 
their annual audited consolidated financial statements with the auditor’s report, 
quarter-yearly balance sheet statement, and quarter-yearly profit and loss 
account statement. 
 The participants have pointed out that there is no required supplementary 
information to be disclosed with the audited consolidated financial statements to 
the general public. 
 All of the respondents asserted that there is no specific information items 
required to be disclosed in the face of consolidated financial statements or other 
accounts either by banking law or LSM regulations.  
 Most of interviewees mentioned that the Generally Accepted Accounting 
Principles (GAAP) are the only standards currently applied in preparing their 
consolidated financial statements.  
 All of the participants in the interviews asserted that they voluntarily published 
auditor’s report, notes to the financial statements, and board of directors’ annual 
reports as well as quarter-yearly balance sheet statement and quarter-yearly 
profit and loss account statement. 
 The participants revealed that Libyan’s authorities needs to adopt more 
regulations to improve the financial disclosure within the commercial banking 
sector.                         
7.4 Preparers’ Views on Voluntary Disclosures in Annual Reports  
The preceding section has reported the interviewees’ responses on a number of issues 
related to the current annual financial reporting and mandatory disclosure practices by 
Libyan commercial banks. Part two of the semi-structured interview questions guide 
contains six questions that were used to explore the interviewees’ views and perceptions 
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about issues relating to voluntary disclosure in annual reports. It therefore the aim of 
this section to analyse and discuss the interview responses to these questions.  
It should be noted that the questions included in the interview questions guide were not 
set to be answered by each question, in some cases there were more than two questions, 
aiming to gain more insights about the same theme. For example, questions two and 
three aim to explore the interviewees’ perceptions related to the benefits and costs of 
voluntary disclosures in annual reports (see Appendix 3).  
Part two of the interview questions were put forward to cover four themes as illustrated 
in Figure 7.1. The participants’ answers to part two questions are presented in the 
following subsections. Subsection (7.4.1) reports the interviewees’ responses about the 
factors influencing commercial banking voluntary disclosure. Subsection (7.4.2) 
analyses and discusses the participants’ answers related the benefits and costs of 
voluntary disclosure for a commercial bank. Subsection (7.4.3) explores and presents 
preparers’ views about the usefulness of voluntary disclosure in making economic 
decisions. Subsection (7.4.4) discovers and reports preparers’ perspectives on the 
usefulness of voluntary disclosure to a wide range of users. 
     Figure 7.1: Voluntary disclosure in the commercial banks’ annual reports 
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7.4.1 Factors influencing voluntary annual report disclosure 
The participants in the interviews have suggested a number of institutional and 
environmental factors that have an influence on the level of voluntary information 
disclosed in the annual reports of Libyan commercial ban s. The interviewees’ 
responses related to factors influencing banking voluntary disclosure and are 
summarised in Table 7.2 and discussed in detail in the following subsections. 
 
                           Table 7.2: Factors influencing voluntary annual report disclosure: preparers’ views 
 CB1 CB2 CB3 CB4 CB5 CB6 (6) 
Competition in the banking industry       6 
Commercial bank size       5 
Profitability       5 
Commercial bank age       3 
Government ownership       4 
Liquidity position       3 
Foreign ownership       2 
Listing status        2 
7.4.1.1 Competition in the commercial banking industry 
 ccording to almost all of the interviewees’ perspectives, increased competition among 
commercial banks had a major influence on the extent of voluntary information 
disclosure in annual reports. The majority of the respondents believed that Libyan 
commercial banks nowadays have large-scale worldwide operations and significant 
participation in the international markets. They are currently facing a greater and 
stronger competitive environment than ever before, which has had a great impact on the 
quality and quantity of information needed to be disclosed. 
In addition to this, some of the interviewees indicated that as a result of recent 
worldwide economic and banking system changes, post the global financial crisis, the 
Libyan commercial banking sector has also been affected in terms of increasing 
information disclosure and to change their traditional disclosure policy. The following 
comments reveal these views:  
 “…as a result of worldwide economic and banking system changes after the 
financial crisis, it has become imperative for local our commercial banking 
sector to take into account these changes in order to develop its performance 
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and its business and maintain its ability to compete in global markets. This 
forced us to change our traditional disclosure policy and encouraged us to 
disseminate additional information to maximise returns and attract the largest 
possible number of clients” (CB3). 
 
 
“I think that the globalisation of banking activity, banking liberalisation of 
services, and increasing the competition in the commercial banking industry 
have influenced the type and the extent of information disclosure. Indeed …we 
paid more attention in the recent years to the quantity and quality of information 
published in our commercial bank’s annual financial reports” (CB6). 
 
From another point of view, one of the interviewees (BC4) expressed that 
“… There is no doubt that voluntary disclosure can help our commercial bank 
to increase its reputation among banks and enhance its competitive 
advantage… Nonetheless publishing more detailed information also may create 
very great risks to our bank competitive position”. 
 
 
Although this factor tends to play a significant role in voluntary annual reports 
disclosure decisions, as perceived by all the participants in the interviews, it was not 
included in the statistical models because of the difficulty in finding a suitable proxy.  
7.4.1.2 Commercial bank size 
The size of the commercial bank was identified by almost all of commercial banks 
annual reports’ preparers interviewed (5 out of 6) as an additional  ey factor influencing 
the level of voluntary disclosure. The majority of the interviewees believed that large 
commercial banks are more motivated to provide more detailed information than 
smaller commercial banks because they have more institutional ownership and more 
public relations, as expressed in the following comments:  
“…We have a larger number of branches, employees, clients, and shareholders 
and are providing a wide range of banking services which require us to  provide 
a wide range of information and further detailed information in our published 
annual financial reports to satisfy the needs of all these groups” (BC2). 
 
“I think that big commercial banks have more capacity than small banks to 
involve in the business of securities underwriting, granting real estate loans, and, 
granting of credit and advances…big banks also have a high number of 
depositors and shareholders, which puts more pressure on the management of 
these banks to provide more reliable information in the published annual reports 
in order to meet the information needs of these groups” (BC1). 
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That implies that the larger commercial banks are more willing to disclose additional 
voluntary information in their annual financial reports than smaller banks in order to 
meet the requirement of external stakeholders. 
It is worth noting that all of the commercial ban s’ annual reports preparers interviewed 
have had different view about the terms of commercial bank size, some of them believe 
the size of commercial ban  can be measured by the number of the ban ’s branches, 
others consider the number of employees working in the bank, but almost all of the 
interviewees agreed that the total assets possessed by a commercial bank is the most 
accurate representation of the commercial bank size. This quotation, for example is 
illustrative of this point of view, CB5: 
“From my point of view, it is difficult to determine whether this commercial bank 
is small or big commercial bank because there is no definition in Libyan Banking 
Law that can be used to distinguish between them, but I believe the size of a bank 
can be measured by the total assets that bank owned in the certain year”. 
From the interviews it is evident that a commercial bank size can be measured by a 
number of proxies to find out its impact on the voluntary disclosure level, but the total 
assets is a good proxy to represent the size of commercial bank as received by the 
majority of interviewees. In this study, the size of commercial bank was measured by 
total assets and the statistical results show a significant association between a 
commercial bank size and voluntary disclosure level. 
7.4.1.3 Commercial bank’s profitability 
  commercial ban ’s profitability is perceived by all interviewees, as an important 
factor influencing the extent of voluntary disclosure in the commercial banking annual 
reports. One justification, was pointed out by BC3: 
 “According to my own banking experience I think that managers of profitable 
commercial bank are more involved in disclosing additional information in their 
annual reports to reveal their good financial performance…” 
 Similarly, another interviewee, CB1, stated that: 
“From my personal view I believe that managers of a larger profitable 
commercial bank are more likely to disclose voluntary information than less 
profitable bank, because they have the enough financial resources and expertise 
necessary for the preparation and publication of such kind of information and 
also to demonstrate that they are capable of managing their banks”.  
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The above responses infer that management in highly profitable commercial banks are 
motivated to disclose more detailed information in the annual reports to external 
stakeholders than smaller commercial banks. It could be noted that managers of 
commercial banks signal detailed financial and non-financial information when they are 
achieving good performance. The statistical results of this study show, however, an 
insignificant association between profitability and the extent of voluntary disclosure in 
Libyan commercial ban s’ annual reports. 
  7.4.1.4 Commercial bank age 
The respondents in the interview hold mixed views with regard to the influence of 
commercial bank age on the amount of information voluntarily disclosed in annual 
reports. For example, an opinion was expressed by one of the commercial banks annual 
reports’ preparers interviewed, CB5: 
“It would seem to me that a long established a bank does not mean that it 
reveals much detail information than a new founded bank such as our bank 
which was established in the recent years when it compared with other 
currently Libyan commercial banks,… we have adopted the latest technology, 
our employees have a high skills,…we are exposed to competitive behaviour,… 
we have more motivation to publish more information about the services we  
provided and our performance to attract new customer and to enhance our 
reputation in the market” . 
 
However, one interviewee, CB2, expressed that older commercial banks are more likely 
to provide additional information in their annual reports to the general public. The 
following excerpt is illustrative of this view: 
 “It seems to me that older commercial banks mean that they have got more 
experience and more skills which give them the ability to prepare and 
provide more detailed information through their published annual reports”. 
 
In general, the interviewees’ responses provided different views regarding the effect of 
a commercial bank age on the extent of voluntary disclosure in annual reports. Some of 
the interviewees believe that the age of a commercial bank may not be a significant 
factor in determining the voluntary disclosure level. Others view that the age of 
commercial bank could be an important factor determining the extent of voluntary 
disclosure in the annual reports. According to the statistical results reported by a current 
study, the age of the commercial bank was found not to be positively associated with 
the extent of voluntary disclosure.   
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7.4.1.5 Liquidity position  
With regard to the impact of the liquidity position on the amount of information 
voluntarily disclosed in commercial ban s’ annual reports, almost of the responses 
believed that there is no direct association between liquidity positions and information 
voluntarily provided in annual reports. The interviewees indicated that high liquidity 
may negatively affect commercial bank profitability and also can reflect poor 
management performance. 
They mostly suggested that, a management of commercial bank with high level of 
liquidity has no motivation to disclose additional information in their annual reports. 
The statistical result of this study did not show a robust relationship between liquidity 
and the extent of voluntary disclosure in annual reports. 
7.4.1.6 Government ownership  
A number of explanations for the significance of government ownership factor in 
influencing the extent of voluntary disclosure in annual reports were expressed by 
interviewees. For example, one of the participants in the interviews, CB2, stated that: 
 “… government-owned commercial banks are subjected to extensive control 
by a larger number of government bodies than private-owned commercial 
banks and consequently will be exposed to greater demand for additional 
information”. 
 
A similar view was expressed by another respondent CB1,  
“…I can say that government-owned commercial bank have to provide extra 
reports and other financial information to a number of Libyan government 
agencies and other stakeholders whereas privately-owned commercial banks 
did not have to”. 
 
The above preparers’ perspectives would suggest that government-owned commercial 
banks are more likely to reveal more detailed information than privately-owned 
commercial banks because they are under the pressure of a large number of government 
agencies. However, the interviewees’ views are inconsistent with the statistical results 
which are reported in Chapter Eight of this research. 
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7.4.1.7 Foreign ownership 
The impact of the foreign ownership on the general level of voluntary disclosure was 
not considered by some annual reports’ preparers interviewed an important influential 
factor. As shown in the following example: 
“I doubt that the foreign investors who hold a small portion of shares in Libyan 
commercial banks will have an impact on the level of information provided in 
annual financial reports positively”(CB2).    
 
Another annual report prepare, CB4, shared the same view:  
“I do not believe that a commercial bank with a small percentage foreign 
ownership disclosed more voluntarily information, since the foreign investors do 
not have a significant degree of influence on the commercial bank’s 
management” 
 
On the other hand, two interviewees mentioned that the influence of foreign ownership 
on the amount of voluntary information disclosed in the published annual reports to be 
significant, as stated by CB5;  
“…allowed to foreign institutional investors to buy shares of some local 
commercial banks, encouraged the management of these banks to change their 
traditional disclosure policy”.   
 
Another participant, CB3, said that:  
“In general I thank that a commercial bank with a higher a proportion of 
foreign ownership is motivated to disclose more information because the foreign 
institutional investors are supposed to play a positive role in controlling 
commercial bank management and encouraging more information disclosure”. 
 
The above responses imply that the commercial banks with a higher share of foreign 
ownership are motivated to disclose more information in their published annual reports. 
On the other hand, as perceived by some interviewees, commercial banks with a smaller 
a proportion of foreign ownership have no motivation to disclose additional information 
in the annual reports. Notwithstanding that, the interviewees’ opinions relating to the 
influence of the foreign ownership factor on the extent of voluntary disclosure are 
mixed; the statistical results reported in Chapter Eight of the present study showed that 
the foreign ownership factor is not significantly associated with the level of voluntary 
disclosure. 
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7.4.1.8 Listing status 
The listing status was also perceived by two interviewees as is a significant factor that 
determines the extent of voluntary information disclosure. They indicated that 
commercial banks listed in the stock market would disclose more detailed information 
in their annual reports while unlisted banks tend to reveal less information to external 
stakeholders, because they are subjected to further reporting requirements and 
continuously under capital market pressure. The following quotation illustrates one of 
the interviewee’s views:  
 “I think that commercial banks listed in the stock market are more driven to 
disclose more information in their annual reports than unlisted commercial 
banks, because they are subjected to further reporting requirements and 
continuously under capital market pressure…I would also say that listed banks 
have a large number of shareholders but also they seek to attract more new 
investors into the banks business through revealing more reliable information in 
their annual reports” (BC2).  
 
The interviewees’ perceptions related to the influence of listing status factors to the 
extent that voluntary disclosures in annual reports were consistent with the statistical 
results reported in chapter eight of the present study. 
In summary, the interview respondents have suggested a number of influential factors 
influencing the extent of voluntary disclosure in the annual reports of commercial 
banks. The most frequently occurring factors as perceived by almost of the interviewees 
were competition in the commercial banking industry, commercial bank size, 
profitability, and government ownership. While other influential factors namely 
liquidity position, foreign ownership, commercial bank age, and listing status were 
perceived by some interviewees as being influential factors influencing voluntary 
annual report disclosure. 
With the exception of competition in the commercial banking industry, these factors 
(the independent variables) have been tested in the statistical models in chapter eight of 
this study. Despite that, competition in the commercial banking industry tend to play a 
significant role in voluntary annual reports disclosure. It was not included in the 
statistical models because of the difficulty in finding a suitable proxy. The interviewees’ 
perceptions were consistent with some of the statistical results of the current study (see 
chapter nine).  
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7.4.2 Benefits and costs of voluntary information disclosure  
This section analyses and reports on the interviewees’ responses to interview questions 
relating to benefits and costs of voluntary information disclosure in commercial ban s’ 
annual reports. The following subsections will discuss and presents the benefits and 
costs of voluntary disclosure for a commercial ban  from an interviewees’ perspective.  
7.4.2.1 Perceived benefits of voluntary disclosure in annual reports 
The general belief amongst commercial ban s’ annual reports preparers who 
participated in the interviews that the analysis of the benefits and costs associated with 
voluntary disclosure decisions have to be made with more consideration. Reasonably, a 
commercial ban ’s management would choose to provide additional detailed 
information to the general public when they feel that the advantages/benefits from 
disclosure outweigh the costs. The following quote is representative of the responses 
from commercial ban s’ annual reports preparers. When discussing the benefits and 
costs associated with voluntary disclosures decision, CB3 offered:  
“In the banking industry in particular, a decision to voluntarily disclose 
additional information to external users is not simple and is more complicated 
than other industries… we aware that there are some benefits we can gain from 
disclosing additional information in our commercial bank annual reports, but 
as always there is a risk and therefore we take enough time before the decision 
is made in order to weigh the advantages and costs associated with such a 
decision”.   
 
The following table 7.3, below, summarises the main advantages/benefits of voluntary 
disclosure in annual reports as perceived by preparers of Libyan commercial ban s’ 
annual reports.  
 
Table 7.3: Perceptions on benefits of voluntary disclosure in annual reports 
Benefits of voluntary disclosure CB1 CB2 CB3 CB4 CB5 CB6 (6) 
Enhanced the commercial ban ’s 
reputation 
      6 
Give positive impressions of a 
commercial ban ’s prospects 
      6 
Gaining the trust of stakeholders       5 
Improved investor relations/ increase 
investor confidence 
      4 
Lower average cost of capital       1 
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Table 7.3 shows that all of the interview participants perceived that enhancing the 
ban ’s reputation is one of the  ey benefits to a commercial ban  of disclosing 
information voluntarily in the annual reports. It gives a positive impression of a 
commercial ban ’s prospects it is also perceived by all interviewees as another foremost 
benefit to a commercial bank of having voluntarily information disclosed in the annual 
reports. As expressed by one of the interviewees, BC1: 
 “Providing general public and shareholders with more useful information in 
annual reports can help the commercial bank management improve the 
bank’s reputation and also will give optimistic impression about the future of 
the bank”. 
The interviewees mostly suggested that gaining the trust of stakeholders was another 
benefit that can be expected from disclosing additional information voluntarily in the 
annual reports of commercial banks. One of them, CB5, stated: 
“I think that lack level of financial and non-financial information provided in 
the commercial banks annual reports is more likely to be interpreted by many 
external stakeholders as a less transparent,… thus I believe that more detailed 
information disclosed in annual reports strengthens the trust of stakeholders in  
commercial bank management”.  
  
Some of the interviewees indicated that disclosing more information in annual reports 
can help the management of the commercial ban  to improve investors’ relations as well 
as increase investors’ confidence.  s stated by BC2 “…providing relevant and accurate 
information in annual reports can help the managers of a commercial bank to keep and 
to build strong relationships with its investors and shareholders”.   
One of the participants, BC4, said that: “a commercial bank can reduce its cost of 
capital by increasing the annually financial disclosure level”. However, some of the 
interviewees would argue that most commercial banks do not rely on external capital 
and they are considered as the main money sources for funding different companies’ 
schemes. That would imply that disclosing additional information voluntarily in the 
annual reports is not motivated by a commercial ban ’s need to reduce its cost of equity 
capital.  
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7.4.2.2 Perceived costs of voluntary disclosure in annual reports 
From the face-to-face semi-structured interviews, it is apparent that there is also strong 
evidence that making voluntary disclosure decisions may involve costs for a 
commercial bank. Table 7.4 displays the costs of voluntary disclosure in annual reports 
as perceived by the participants in the interviews. 
Table 7.4: Perceptions on costs of voluntary disclosure 
Costs of voluntary disclosure CB1 CB2 CB3 CB4 CB5 CB6 (6) 
Preparatory costs: the cost of 
gathering, processing, disseminating 
the information 
      6 
Competitive disadvantages       5 
Potential legal responsibility       4 
As apparent in Table 7.4, the most frequent costs mentioned by all of the participants in 
the interviews is preparatory costs which includes cost of gathering, processing, and 
disseminating the information in the  annual reports of commercial banks. 
A second potential cost for making voluntary disclosure decisions as perceived by 
almost of the interviewees is competitive disadvantage.  Almost of the interviewees 
indicated that disclosure of too much detailed information in annual reports can be used 
by competitors of a commercial bank, as a result, it negatively influences a commercial 
bank position.  
As expressed by BC1 “…the disadvantage of disclosure of too much information about 
all a commercial bank activities can be used by competitors of a commercial bank”. 
Most of the participants in the interviews believed that disclosing detailed information 
about commercial bank projects or strategies, research and development plans as well as 
information about the mergers and acquisitions, and the sale of assets can be harmful to 
the commercial bank position. 
Some of the interviewees perceived that providing detailed financial and non-financial 
information to the general public can expose the management of a commercial bank to 
potential legal responsibility. For example, one of the interviewees, BC4, stated: 
 “I believe that the costs or disadvantages of offering too much detailed 
information by the commercial bank may encourage the customers or 
stakeholders of the commercial bank to take a legal action against the bank when 
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they feel that information is not true or misleading, and such information may be 
utilised by them as evidence against the bank”.  
 
Another participant in the interviews, BC2, shared the same view, 
“In fact, our commercial bank has its own strict disclosure rules and therefore we 
have to follow it when disclosing banking financial and non-financial information 
to external users in order to avoid any potential legal action against us due to 
publishing such details information”. 
 
In summary, the participants in the interviews believed that the analysis of benefits and 
costs associated with voluntary disclosure decisions have to be made with more 
consideration. Enhancing the commercial ban ’s reputation is one of the  ey benefits to 
a commercial bank of disclosing information voluntarily as suggested by interviewees. 
Furthermore, it gives a positive impression of a commercial ban ’s prospects. It was 
suggested as another foremost benefit to a commercial bank of having voluntarily 
information disclosed in the annual reports.  
Additional benefits of participating in the voluntary disclosure were considered to be 
gaining the trust of stakeholders in the commercial banking managers, improved 
investor relations, and lower average cost of capital. While the most important costs of 
voluntarily disclosing information were preparatory costs, competitive disadvantages, 
and potential legal responsibility. 
7.4.3 Views on the usefulness of voluntary disclosure in making economic decisions 
This section presents and discusses interviewees’ perceptions’ concerning to what 
extent that information voluntarily disclosed in the Libyan commercial ban s’ annual 
reports is useful or essential for economic decision-making. Table 7.5 below displays 
the preparers’ perceptions on the usefulness of voluntary disclosure in making economic 
decisions. 
 
Table 7.5: Perceptions on the usefulness of voluntary disclosure in making 
economic decisions 
 CB1 CB2 CB3 CB4 CB5 CB6 (6) 
Very useful       4 
Partial useful       2 
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The participants in the interviews held mixed views regarding the usefulness of 
voluntary disclosure in the commercial ban s’ annual reports in making economic 
decisions.  As seen in Table 7.5, the majority of the interviewees (4 out 6) believed that 
voluntary disclosure in the commercial ban s’ annual reports is very useful and can be 
used for decision-making purposes.  For example, as commented by CB2, “we annually 
publish additional information in annual reports and I believe most of information is 
relevant and useful for making economic decisions”.  
While, two of the interviewees suggested that the information disclosed voluntarily in 
the commercial ban ’s annual reports may not be very useful, due to the fact that the 
vast majority of external stakeholders are not reliant or not relying on the information 
voluntarily revealed by commercial banks in making their vital economic decisions. In 
addition, such voluntary disclosures may not satisfy all the external users’ needs in 
practically making economic decisions.  
As stated by CB6, more voluntary information provided in commercial bank annual 
reports may help some sophisticated users in their investment decisions, but for other 
external users it is not very helpful”.  The second of the interviewees CB4 stated:  
 “I believe that voluntary disclosures provided in the commercial banks’ annual 
reports… from viewpoint of many external stakeholders are not very useful for 
their decision-making purpose, because the most of these users are not relying 
on these disclosures when they take their vital investment decisions, since 
voluntarily information is not approved or audited by the external auditors of 
commercial banks”.   
Overall, the majority of the interviewees believed that voluntarily information disclosed 
in the commercial ban s’ annual reports is useful and helpful in ma ing economic 
decisions. However, some would argue that voluntary disclosures are not very useful, 
since the vast majority of external stakeholders do not rely on these disclosures and are 
not using them in making their economic decisions, because, the majority of user groups 
would rely on audited financial information and consider it more trustworthy for their 
decision making purpose. This would suggest that the balance sheet and profit and loss 
account statement disclosed annually by Libyan commercial banks are more important 
for making economic decisions rather than other sections of the annual report. 
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7.4.4 Views on the usefulness of voluntary disclosure to a wide range of users 
This section reports and discusses the interviewees’ responses to what extent that they 
perceived that voluntary information disclosure in the commercial banks annual reports 
is useful to a wide range of users (i.e. ban ’s shareholders, government agencies, 
individual investors, institutional investors, stock market brokers, researchers and other 
scholars, ban ’s employees, and general public ).  
 
Table 7.6: Perceptions on the usefulness voluntary disclosure to wide range of 
users  
Useful to: CB1 CB2 CB3 CB4 CB5 CB6 (6) 
Ban ’s shareholders       6 
Government agencies       0 
Individual investors       4 
Institutional investors       4 
Stock market brokers       4 
 Ban ’s employees       5 
Researchers and other scholars       5 
General Public       2 
 
The interviewees hold mixed feelings about the usefulness of voluntary information 
disclosure in the annual reports of commercial banks to a wide range of users, in the 
sense of requiring to make decisions about commercial banks. As seen in Table 7.4, all 
of the interviewees believed that additional information provided in the annual reports is 
useful to commercial ban s’ shareholders. This would suggest that a commercial bank 
annual report to be the only means of communicating with shareholders. 
In contrast, all interviewees argue that the financial and non-financial information 
disclosed voluntarily in their commercial ban s’ annual reports may not be useful to 
government agencies since they already have the legal power to access to vital 
information before it is published in the annual reports, such as tax authorities, Central 
Ban s’ officers, and other supervising governmental bodies. They usually do not rely on 
voluntarily disclosed information for government purpose uses. For example, CB1 
states:  
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“In fact, the majority of government agencies do not legally recognise or rely 
on voluntary information published by the commercial bank, they frequency 
ask the management of the bank to provide them with accurate and up-to-date 
information directly, and use for official purposes”. 
Five of the interviewees believed that voluntary information disclosed in annual reports 
is useful to the commercial ban s’ employees, because the commercial ban ’s annual 
reports contains comprehensive information on the ban ’s various business which 
including employees welfare, new services offered, change in the salaries, pensions, 
changes in information technology, application of a new technology changes in existing 
legislation, and administration changes. This viewpoint was apparent in the following 
response by CB3:  
“…our employees mainly relied on information published annually in our 
bank’s annual reports for their own use, they are particular interested in 
profitability information, and other information such as employee welfare, 
training, wages, pensions, health care, and the future plans”.  
 
Furthermore, the majority of the respondents (4 out 6) asserted that voluntary 
disclosures provided in the commercial banks’ annual reports can be useful to stock 
market brokers if they use and interpret these disclosures in a proper way depending on 
whether or not they have a fair degree of financial sophistication. 
Four of the interviewees believed that information provided on the voluntary basis is 
useful to individual and institutional investors for their investment decisions. 
Nonetheless, others (2 out 6) indicated that the majority of individual and institutional 
investors seek private disclosure from commercial ban s’ managers via telephone 
communications or face-to-face meetings, because they have no confidence in the 
information voluntarily disclosed in a commercial ban ’s annual reports.  
Additionally, they mentioned that individual and institutional investors rely heavily on 
the financial information disclosed in the audited consolidated financial statements 
(balance sheet statement and profit and loss account statement), rather than other 
information published in other forms of financial reporting, since the audited 
consolidated financial statements including accurate and reliable information about the 
financial performance and financial position of commercial banks.  
246 
 
Almost all of the participants in the interviews (5 out 6) suggested that information 
provided in their commercial ban s’ annual reports is valuable and useful to researchers 
and other scholars, since the information published annually in annual reports including 
financial statistical data and other financial information is expected to be very useful in 
conducting different kinds of academic research or other types of research.  
Only two interviewees asserted that additional information disclosed in the commercial 
ban s’ annual reports is useful and can be used by general public such as students, 
teachers, farmer, traders, and local media. For example, CB4 said, 
“From my view, I strongly believe that voluntary financial and non-financial 
information published in the commercial bank’s annual reports is useful to the 
wider community which includes for example students, teachers, farmers, 
traders, and local media,… who are usually trying to get more detailed 
information on all the banking facilities such as credit facilities, social loans, 
bank’s home loans, and car loans”.    
 
In summary, almost all of participants in the interviews believed that the provision of 
voluntary information in the annual report of commercial banks is useful for a wide 
range of users, in the sense of requiring to make decisions about commercial banks.  
However, the interviewees would argued that voluntary disclosures provided in their 
commercial ban s’ annual reports may not be useful to government agencies since they 
have legal power to access vital information about the financial performance and 
financial position of commercial banks before it is published in the annual reports. 
 
7.5 Summary and Conclusions 
This chapter has reported and reviewed the results of the face-to-face semi-structured 
interviews conducted with six Libyan commercial ban s annual reports’ preparers 
related to two main issues: first their views and perceptions about the current financial 
reporting and mandatory disclosure practices; second their perceptions about a series of 
issues relating to voluntary disclosure practices in the annual reports of Libyan 
commercial banks.   
Overall, the key objectives of carrying out the interviews was to gain a deeper insight 
into the current annual financial reporting and mandatory disclosure practices. Also, to 
gather an insight into significant issues that are not well understood related to the nature 
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of commercial banking voluntary disclosure which includes factors influencing the 
extent of voluntary disclosure, benefits and costs of voluntary disclosure, the usefulness 
of voluntary disclosure in economic decision making and the usefulness of voluntary 
disclosure to a wide range of users. 
In general, the interview respondents mainly agreed that the current financial reporting 
and mandatory disclosure practices in Libya in general and in the financial institutions 
in particular still do not reach the same level of development that is currently achieved 
by the most of Arabic countries which have a similar socio-economic environmental 
conditions. Also some respondents expressed concerns about the absence of enforced 
national accounting standards and insufficient financial disclosure laws and regulations.   
The interview results also indicated that in respect of the legal disclosure requirements, 
that the consolidated balance sheet and profit and loss account statement were the only 
two sections of financial report required to be annually disclosed to the general public. 
While, listed commercial banks were required to submit their audited annual 
consolidated financial statements and must be accompanied with the auditor’s report, 
quarter-yearly balance sheet statement, and quarter-yearly profit and loss account 
statement to LSM.  
Furthermore, the results of the interviews revealed that there is no legal requirement for 
supplementary information to be disclosed with the audited consolidated financial 
statements to the general public. In addition to this specific information is not required 
to be disclosed in the face of consolidated financial statements or other financial reports 
either by banking law or the LSM regulations.   
Participants in the interviews have perceived that many factors influence the decision to 
disclose voluntary information in the annual reports. The most frequently influential 
factors were perceived to be, the competition in the commercial banking industry, 
commercial bank size, profitability, and government ownership. Other factors namely 
liquidity position, foreign ownership, commercial bank age, and listing status were also 
suggested by some interviewees as being some of the influential factors influencing 
voluntary annual report disclosure. Almost of these influential factors were tested in the 
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quantitative study of this research, some, including the statistical results reported in the 
chapter eight, were consistent with the interviewees’ perceptions. 
Commercial ban s annual reports’ preparers emphasised that the analysis of benefits 
and costs associated with voluntary disclosure decisions have to be made with more 
consideration. Enhancing the commercial ban ’s reputation is one of the  ey benefits to 
a commercial bank of disclosing information voluntarily as suggested by interviewees. 
Furthermore, giving a positive impressions of a commercial ban ’s prospects was also 
suggested as another foremost benefit to a commercial bank of having voluntarily 
information disclosed in the annual reports.  
Additional benefits of participating in voluntary disclosure are; gaining the trust of 
stakeholders, improved investor relations, and lower average cost of capital. While the 
most significant costs restricting the amount of information voluntarily disclosing in 
commercial ban s’ annual reports were preparatory costs, competitive disadvantages, 
and potential legal responsibility. Once again, the respondents in the interviews believed 
that voluntarily information disclosed in the commercial ban s’ annual reports is useful 
and helpful in making economic decisions. They also indicated that the provision of 
voluntary information in the annual report of commercial banks is useful for a wide 
range of users, in the sense of helping them to make decisions about commercial banks.  
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Chapter Eight 
The Extent of Voluntary Disclosure and its Relationship with 
Commercial Bank-Specific Attributes: Analysis and Findings 
 
8.1 Introduction 
This chapter specifically aims to address the first three research questions of the current 
study, which were clearly posed in Chapter One (section 1.3). The first three research 
questions are restated here again:  
1. To what extent have Libyan listed and unlisted commercial banks voluntarily 
disclosed information in their annual reports during the period between 2006 
and 2011? 
2. Has there been any significant improvement in the extent of overall voluntary 
information disclosures in the published annual reports of Libyan listed and 
unlisted commercial banks over the period of the study?  
3.  Is there any association between the extent of voluntary information disclosure 
by Libyan listed and unlisted commercial banks and each of the bank attributes 
(age of bank, size of bank, bank liquidity position, profitability, government 
ownership, foreign ownership, and listing status)? 
The chapter will therefore provide and discuss the results of the measurement and 
analysis undertaken to pursue answers to the research questions above. The reminder of 
the chapter has been divided into four main sections. The first section (8.2) deals with 
the descriptive information and statistics for the extent of total voluntary disclosure and 
its developments over a period of six years (2006-2011). The second section (8.3) 
presents the descriptive statistics for the extent and trend of voluntary disclosure by 
information categories. The third section (8.4) discusses the descriptive statistics for the 
extent to which each individual item of information is disclosed in the annual reports of 
Libyan commercial banks. The following section (8.5) is devoted to discussion and 
analysis of the key empirical findings of the univariate and the multivariate analyses of 
the testable hypotheses for research question three, which have been developed in 
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Chapter Six. The final section of the chapter (8.6) provides a summary and conclusion 
of the chapter. 
8.2 The Extent of Total Voluntary Disclosure and its Development over Time 
The first part of this section is devoted to addressing the first research question posed by 
the present study i.e. ‘to what extent have Libyan listed and unlisted commercial ban s 
voluntarily disclosed information in their annual reports during the period between 2006 
and 2011’. In addition, the second part of this section aims to address the study’s second 
research question i.e. ‘has there been any significant improvement in the extent of 
overall voluntary information disclosures in the published annual reports of Libyan 
listed and unlisted commercial banks over the period of the study’. 
8.2.1 The extent of total voluntary information disclosure  
In order to be able to measure the extent of voluntary information disclosure (i.e. 
TVDIS) in annual reports for each of the nine listed and unlisted commercial banks for 
the six years of the study, a self-disclosure scoring sheet comprising 63 voluntary 
disclosure index items divided into five information categories was designed and then 
the dichotomous procedure was applied to get a commercial ban ’s disclosure score, i.e. 
TVDIS for each year studied (more details are provided in section 6.7.1.2).  
The dichotomous scoring grants one if a commercial bank discloses a certain item or 
grants zero if it do not disclose it. Subsequently, a relative voluntary disclosure index 
(representing dependent variable in this study) was then calculated for the individual 
commercial bank for every year by the ratio of the actual number of items disclosed by 
a commercial bank to the maximum number of items (63) expected to be disclosed by 
each commercial bank in its annual reports. The voluntary disclosure scores per 
commercial bank for each year are displayed in Table 8.1 as percentages of the total 
voluntary disclosure index scores (TVDIS) measured in each commercial ban ’s annual 
report for the six years (2006-2011). Descriptive statistics of TVDIS for each year are 
presented in Table 8.2. 
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Table 8.1: The TVDIS for each commercial bank over the six-year period 
No. Commercial Bank Name MVDS TVDIS%**  Pooled 
TVDIS % 
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2006-2011 
1. Sahara Bank  63 32 33.3 54 56 56 57.1 48 
2. Gumhouria Bank 63 41.2 44.4 60.3 67 70 70 59 
3. National Commercial Bank 63 22.2 25.4 41.2 65.1 65.1 67 48 
4. Wahda Bank 63 40 41.2 59 62 62 63.4 55 
5. Commerce and Development Bank 63 22.2 26 49.2 54 56 56 44.1 
6. Alsaraya Trading and Investment Bank 63 8 11.1 19.1 24 24 25.4 19 
7. Mediterranean Bank 63 19.1 19.1 24 25.4 30.1 37 26 
8. Alwaha Bank* 63 16 16 22.2 24 29 32 23 
9. Alwafa Bank* 63 10 10 25.3 27 27 32 22 
Total  23.3 25.4 39.3 45 46.4 49 38 
                       * Unlisted commercial banks 
                 **TVDIS% = (Actual voluntary disclosure score (AVDS)/ Maximum voluntary disclosure score (MVDS) %), 
 which means the   relative disclosed scores received by each commercial bank. 
 
 
252 
 
Table 8.1 shows that the highest mean disclosure index score over the six years was 59%, 
achieved by Gumhouria Bank (listed), and the second mean highest index score was 55%, 
again reported by listed commercial bank (i.e. Wahda Bank). As also shown in the table, the 
lowest mean voluntary disclosure index score during the six years surveyed was reported by 
Alsaraya Trading and Investment Bank (listed), which obtained 19%. Remarkably, in 2006, 
National Commercial Bank and Commerce and Development Bank both obtained the same 
disclosure scores (22.2%). Again, in 2009, Alsaraya Trading and Investment Bank (listed) and 
Alwaha Bank (unlisted) reported the same disclosure level (24%). 
In addition, in 2010 Sahara Bank and Commerce and Development Bank gained the same 
disclosure score (56%).  Interestingly, in 2011, Alwaha Bank and Alwafa Bank (unlisted) 
reported the similar disclosure level (32%) out of 63 voluntary disclosure index scores. In 
short, the analysis of voluntary disclosure scores suggests that the extent of voluntary 
disclosure by Libyan commercial banks has increased noticeably during the six years studied 
(see Figure 8.1).  
 
Figure 8.1: The extent of TVDIS during the six-year period (2006-2011)  
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                        Table 8.2: Descriptive statistics of TVDIS over the six years   
Total Voluntary Disclosure Index Scores over the Six Years (TVDIS %) 
Years 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 Pooled % 
Mean  23.3 25.4 39.3 45 46.4 49 38 
Standard 
Deviation 
12.1 12.6 16.9 19.2 18.6 17.2 18.6 
Median 22.2 25.4 41.3 54 56 56 42.3 
Minimum  8 10 19.1 24 24 25.4 8 
Maximum  41.3 44.4 60.3 67 70 70 70 
 
Table 8.2 shows that the mean total voluntary disclosure index score (TVDIS) for the total 
sample of Libyan commercial banks across the six years is approximately 38%, with a 
minimum of 8% and a maximum of 70%. In 2006, the mean and median values for the 
TVDIS score were 23.3 % and 22.2% respectively, with standard deviation of 12.1. However, 
the TVDIS shows increases in the mean and median values of 49%, and 56% in 2011, with 
minimum and maximum at 25% and 70% respectively. It is also interesting to note that most 
of the listed commercial banks have improved the extent of their voluntary disclosure levels 
after their listing in the LSM (2007).  
Overall, there is a fair variation in the voluntary disclosure scores obtained by Libyan 
commercial banks over the six-year period. Analysis also suggests that there is wide variation 
in the voluntary disclosure scores for listed commercial banks compared to the disclosure 
scores for unlisted commercial banks over the period under investigation. However, such a 
conclusion should be taken with more caution since the unlisted commercial banks number 
only two, which represented 20% of the total sample.  
In order to gather additional insights on the voluntary disclosure practice by Libyan 
commercial banks, Table 8.3 displays the frequency distribution of the voluntary disclosure 
scores among commercial banks over the period covered by the current study.  
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    Table 8.3: Frequency distribution of voluntary disclosure scores among commercial 
banks 
TVDIS % Number of Commercial Banks 
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Greater than 50% 0 0 3 5 5 5 
41%-50% 1 2 2 0 0 0 
31%-40% 2 1 0 0 1 3 
21%-30% 2 2 3 4 3 1 
11%-20% 2 3 1 0 0 0 
≤10% 2 1 0 0 0 0 
Total 9 9 9 9 9 9 
 
 
It can be seen from Table 8.3 that in 2006, only one commercial bank (11%) out nine 
sampled commercial banks received a voluntary disclosure score value of more than 41%. 
Three commercial banks out of nine banks, representing 33 % of the study sample, obtained 
scores greater than 50% in 2008. In addition, from Table 8.3, it is possible to observe that 
since 2009 there has been no change in the number of commercial banks which achieved a 
voluntary disclosure score value higher than 50%; it remained consistent at just five 
commercial banks, representing 56% of those sampled. Overall, from 2006 to 2007, all 
sampled commercial banks scores ranged between less than 10% to 50%, but in the following 
years (2008 to 2011), the total voluntary disclosure scores of all sampled commercial banks 
fell within 11% and more than 50%.  
 
8.2.2 The development of the extent of total voluntary disclosure over time  
 s indicated earlier in this section, the second part of this section aims to address the study’s 
second research question. To address research question two, comparisons of the mean of ratio 
TVDIS over the six years studied will be undertaken in this subsection, to explore whether 
there were any significant developments in the quantity of information provided voluntarily 
by Libyan commercial banks in their annual reports during the time from 2006 to 2011. Table 
8.4 illustrates developments and changes in the commercial ban s’ extent of voluntary 
disclosure over the period of the six years. 
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      Table 8.4: Developments in the extent of TVDIS over the period 2006-2011  
 
Year TVDIS  
(Mean scores %)  
Differences 
among years 
Changes in TVDIS % 
(Yt-Yt-1)* 
2006 23.3 2006-2007 2.1 
2007 25.4 2007-2008 13.9 
2008 39.3 2008-2009 5.7 
2009 45 2009-2010 1.4 
2010 46.4 2010-2011 2.6 
2011 49 2006-2011 25.7 
   *Yt: Mean total voluntary disclosure score (TVDIS) in the following year, whereas  
    Yt-1: Mean total voluntary disclosure score (TVDIS) in the previous year.   
 
As can be observed from Table 8.4, the mean score of the TVDIS for each of the years 
covered by this study has increased from 23.3% in 2006 to reach 49% in 2011, meaning that 
the TVDIS improved over the six years by approximately 25.7%, which seems to be less 
satisfied. However, it was observed that the mean change in the TVDIS was only 2.1% 
(2006-2007), 13.9% (2007-2008), 5.7% (2008-2009), 1.4% (2009-2010), and 2.6% (2010-
2011) of the observed 25.7% total mean changes in the TVDIS over the period under study 
2006-2011. Moreover, as Table 8.4 shows, the mean score of the TVDIS was less 40% in 
2006, 2007, and 2008, then just over 40% in the final three years (2009-2011).  
The above analysis revealed that the quantity of voluntary information provided by Libyan 
commercial banks in their annual reports to the public has increased progressively over the 
six years studied. In other words, according to figures displayed in Table 8.4, the positive 
increase in TVDIS occurs during the whole years of the study. Throughout the six-year 
period (2006-2011), changes in mean scores of the TVDIS are within a range of 2.1% to 
25.7%. A noticeable change occurred between 2007 and 2008; the mean change in the 
TVDIS was 13.9%. Possible explanations for the evolving upward trend in the TVDIS 
include the economic liberalisation and reforms undertaken by Libyan government at that 
time, which had an influence on the voluntary disclosure practices by commercial banks.  
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8.3 The Extent of Voluntary Disclosure by Information Categories 
As was explained in the research methodology and methods, section (6.7.1.1) of Chapter Six, 
the 63 voluntary disclosure index items were classified into five information categories 
according to their nature. This was done in order to review the extent of voluntary disclosure 
in the annual reports of Libyan commercial banks in more detail. These information 
categories are (A) background about the commercial bank/ general information (11 items); 
(B) social responsibility information (4 items); (C) financial ratios and other statistics 
information (21 items); (D) accounting policies (8 items), and (E) corporate governance 
information (19 items). 
The highest possible disclosure score for each of the categories measured is eleven for 
background about the commercial bank/ general information category, four for social 
responsibility information category, twenty-one for financial ratios and other statistics 
information category, eight for accounting policies category, and nineteen for corporate 
governance information category. The following subsections will provide descriptive 
statistics for the five categories of voluntary information disclosed in annual reports of 
Libyan commercial banks during the period 2006-2011.   
8.3.1 Category A: Background about the commercial bank/ General information 
This first information category (A) displayed in the voluntary disclosure index contains 11 
voluntary disclosure items expected to be disclosed in the commercial ban ’s annual reports. 
As can be seen in the Table 8.5, the total average disclosure score for this information 
category over the six years was 62.4%. The average disclosure score ranged from 28.8% 
(Alsaraya Trading and Investment Bank) to 84.8% (Gumhouria Bank). The table also shows 
that two listed commercial banks have achieved the same score value over the survey period, 
namely Sahara Bank and Commerce and Development Bank (75.7%).  
Moreover, Table 8.5 indicates that the average of items disclosed by all Libyan commercial 
banks in the sample was about seven disclosure items in 11 information category items, 
which is considered reasonably acceptable. More specifically, Gumhouria Bank (listed bank) 
disclosed the highest number of information items at around nine items, followed by Sahara 
Bank and Commerce and Development Bank (listed banks) which on average disclosed eight 
items of this category. In contrast, the lowest disclosed information items was 3 items made 
by Alsaraya Trading and Investment Bank (listed bank), followed by Alwaha Bank (unlisted), 
4 items. Again, as seen in Table 8.5, during 2006-2011, there were slight improvements in the 
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overall average disclosure scores over the six years from 46.4% in 2006 to 71.7% in 2011. It 
is worth mentioning here that there was no change in the total average disclosure score value 
achieved by disclosing commercial banks (71.72%) between 2010-2011. 
In addition, over the period of six years, the average voluntary disclosure scores for each of 
the commercial bank sampled had increased, excepting one bank i.e. Alwaha Bank (unlisted), 
whose voluntary disclosure score remained the same value (36.3%) throughout the period 
studied. In general, the majority of Libyan commercial banks provided information on 
background about the commercial bank (general information) to external users in their 
published annual reports. However, there were many very large variances among the 
commercial ban s’ disclosure levels relating to the background information.  
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Table 8.5: Descriptive statistics: Background about the commercial bank/ General information (A) 
No. Commercial 
Bank Name 
Number of  Disclosed Items by each 
Commercial Bank out of  11 Items 
Disclosure Score % Pooled 
  2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 Average 
Number 
of  Items 
Disclosed  
Average 
Disclosure 
Score% 
1. Sahara Bank 7 7 9 9 9 9 63.6 63.6 81.8 81.8 81.8 81.8 8.3 75.7 
2. Gumhouria Bank 8 8 10 10 10 10 72.7 72.7 90.9 90.9 90.9 90.9 9.3 84.8 
3. National 
Commercial Bank 
5 5 8 9 9 9 45.4 45.4 72.7 81.8 81.8 81.8 7.5 68.1 
4. Wahda Bank 6 8 10 11 11 11 54.5 72.7 90.9 100.0 100.0 100.0 9.5 86.3 
5. 
 
Commerce and  
Development 
Bank 
7 7 9 9 9 9 63.6 63.6 81.8 81.8 81.8 81.8 8.3 75.7 
6. 
 
Alsaraya Trading  
and Investment 
Bank 
2 2 3 4 4 4 18.2 18.2 27.2 36.3 36.3 36.3 3.1 28.8 
7. Mediterranean 
Bank 
4 4 7 7 9 9 36.3 36.3 63.6 63.6 81.8 81.8 6.6 60.6 
8. Alwaha Bank* 4 4 4 4 4 4 36.3 36.3 36.3 36.3 36.3 36.3 4 36.3 
9. Alwafa Bank* 3 3 6 6 6 6 27.2 27.2 54.5 54.5 54.5 54.5 5 45.4 
Total  5.1 5.3 7.3 7.6 7.8 7.8 46.4 48.4 66.6 69.7 71.7 71.7 6.8 62.4 
*Unlisted commercial banks 
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8.3.2 Category B: Social responsibility information 
Social Responsibility is the second information category (B) appearing in the self-
constructed voluntary disclosure index; it comprises four voluntary disclosure items 
expected to be reported by management of Libyan commercial banks in their annual 
reports. Social responsibility disclosure, according to Branco and Rodrigues (2006, p. 
245) “refers to the disclosure of information about companies’ interactions with society, 
and it is an important instrument in the dialog between business and society”. 
Overall, the study found that Libyan listed and unlisted commercial banks did not 
release any social disclosure information to the general public over the six year period 
studied in their published annual reports, with one exception: one commercial bank out 
of nine banks (Commerce and Development Bank) had disclosed one information item 
out of four items in this category during the six years. More precisely, the total average 
social disclosure score value of all sampled commercial banks over the six years studied 
was relatively very poor (0.5%), with the voluntary average disclosure score value 
ranging from the lowest at 0.00 % to the highest at 4.2%. One of the possible reasons 
for this very poor level of social responsibility disclosure is that the top management of 
Libyan commercial banks do not seem to accept the policy of revealing social 
information to external stakeholders.  
Generally, this suggests that those preparing Libyan commercial ban s’ annual reports 
are not paying any attention to this type of information when preparing their external 
annual reports, in spite of the fact that prior research has demonstrated that banks and 
other financial companies provide social responsibility information in their annual 
reports. For instance, Douglas et al. (2004) found that Irish and international banks 
disclose different volumes of social responsibility information on their published annual 
reports and their websites as well. Abdul Hamid (2004) has also found that banks and 
finance companies in Malaysia reported adequate social responsibility information in 
their annual reports.  
A further empirical study by Branco and Rodrigues (2006) revealed that the Portuguese 
banks disclose a considerable amount of social responsibility information in their annual 
reports and their websites. A more recent study by Hossain and Reaz (2007), who 
empirically investigated the extent of voluntary disclosure by listed banking companies 
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in India, found voluntary information such as corporate social disclosure disclosed in 
the annual reports in the Indian banks to an acceptable level. 
8.3.3 Category C: Financial ratios and other statistics information 
This third information category (C) within the voluntary disclosure index includes 21 
items of information. All of these information items are applicable to disclosing 
commercial banks and are expected to be revealed in their annual reports to the public. 
Table 8.6 displays descriptive findings about the extent of disclosure of the financial 
ratios and other statistics information (category, C). 
From the table 8.6, it can be seen that the total average disclosure score over the period 
of the study (2006-2011) for the entire sample was 41.3% (an average of 8.7 items of 
the 21 category items). In particular, in 2006 (24.8%), 2007 (25.9%), 2008 (41.8%), 
2009 (49.7%), in 2010, (51.8 %), and 2011 (54.5%) it was the highest total score. 
Gumhouria Bank has the highest disclosure score (65.8%), followed by Wahda Bank 
(57.9%), Sahara Bank (55.5%), and National Commercial Bank (53.1%).  
The remaining sampled commercial banks have average disclosure scores ranged 
between 16.6% and 41.2%. The lowest average disclosure score (16.6%), was reported 
by Alwafa Bank (unlisted) over the six years studied. Table 8.7 also shows that Libyan 
commercial banks, over the period of the study, disclose on average about nine items of 
the 21 category information items. Specifically, the average of disclosed items for all 
sampled banks in 2006 and 2007 was about five items, but in 2008 was around nine 
items, and in 2009, 2010, and 2011 was approximately 11 information items. 
In general, the average value score for this category varied between 16.67% and 65.8% 
for the lowest and highest Libyan commercial ban s’ disclosures respectively. In 
addition, the scoring results point out that the highest disclosure scores were attained 
over the study period by listed commercial banks. Thus, Libyan listed commercial 
banks appear to voluntarily disclose in their annual reports more on financial ratios and 
other statistics information than unlisted.  
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Table 8.6 Descriptive statistics: Financial ratios and other statistics information (C) 
 
No. Commercial Bank 
Name 
Number of Disclosed Items by each 
Commercial Bank out of 21 Items 
Disclosure Score% Pooled 
  2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 Average of 
Number 
Items 
Disclosed  
Average 
Disclosure 
Score% 
1. Sahara Bank 7 7 13 14 14 15 33.3 33.3 61.9 66.6 66.6  71.4 11.6 55.5 
2. Gumhouria Bank 8 11 14 16 17 17 38.1 52.4 66.6  76.2 80.9 80.9 13.8 65.8 
 
3. 
National Commercial 
Bank 
5 5 9 16 16 16 23.8 23.8 42.8 76.2 76.2 76.2 11.1 53.1 
4. Wahda Bank 11 9 13 13 13 14 52.4 42.8 61.9 61.9 61.9 66.6 12.1 57.9 
5. 
 
Commerce and  
Development Bank 
4 4 9 11 12 12 19.1 19.1 42.8 52.4 57.1 57.1 8.6 41.2 
6. 
 
Alsaraya Trading  
and Investment Bank 
3 4 8 9 9 9 14.2 19.1 38.1 42.8 42.8 42.8  7 33.3 
7. Mediterranean Bank 5 5 5 6 7 8 23.8 23.8 23.8  28.5 33.3 38.1 6 28.5 
8. Alwaha Bank* 2 2 4 5 6 7 9.5 9.5 19.1 23.8 28.5 33.3 4.3 20.6 
9. Alwafa Bank* 2 2 4 4 4 5 9.5 9.5 19.1 19.1 19.1 23.8 3.5  16.6 
Total 5.2 5.4 8.7 10.4 10.8 11.4 24.8 25.9 41.8 49.7 51.8 54.5 8.7 41.4 
*Unlisted commercial banks 
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8.3.4 Category D: Accounting policies 
Accounting policies is the fourth information category (D) in the self-constructed voluntary 
disclosure index, and includes eight voluntary disclosure items which are expected to be 
disclosed by those preparing Libyan commercial ban s’ annual reports. The commercial 
ban s’ accounting policies are essential to understanding and interpreting the financial results 
reported in the annual report (Scotiabank Annual Report, 2012). 
As seen in Table 8.7, the Libyan commercial banks disclose over the six-year period on 
average 28.7%, with the total average number of disclosed items being 2.3 of the eight 
category items. The highest average score achieved was 64.5% (Gumhouria Bank (listed)), 
while the lowest score gained was 0.0% (Mediterranean Bank (listed)). The table also shows 
that over the six-year period (2006-2011), only four commercial banks in the sample (i.e. 
Sahara Bank, Gumhouria Bank, National Commercial Bank, and Wahda Bank) disclose at 
least one item related to their accounting policies. However, none of them disclosed the 
category’s total  information items (8 items) in their annual reports. It also indicated that no 
disclosure was made during the six years by Mediterranean Bank (listed) about its accounting 
policies.  
Furthermore, Table 8.8 shows that another commercial bank (i.e. Alsaraya Trading and 
Investment Bank) did not disclose any information relating to its accounting policies within 
its published annual reports for the years 2006-2010, with the exception of the year 2011, 
when only one item out of eight information items was disclosed by the bank. From the above 
analysis, it is evident that most information items under this category were rarely disclosed by 
the sampled commercial banks in their annual reports.  
There are certain reasons for low-level disclosure of these items in this category. The most 
important reason for those preparing Libyan commercial ban s’ annual reports not disclosing 
this type of information in the external annual reports might be a lack of regulatory 
enforcement in the country. In addition to this, the high cost of preparing and disclosing 
information to the public is also a possible reason that may prevent the management of 
commercial banks from providing such kind of information, as it was indicated by almost all 
responsible for preparing Libyan commercial ban s’ annual reports in Chapter Seven of this 
thesis. 
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Table 8.7: Descriptive statistics: Accounting policies (D) 
*Unlisted commercial banks 
 
 
No. Commercial Bank Name Number of  Disclosed Items by each 
Commercial Bank out of 8 Items 
Disclosure Score% Pooled 
  2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 Average 
Number of  
Disclosed 
Items 
Average 
Disclosure 
Score% 
1. Sahara Bank 1 1 3 3 3 3 12.5 12.5 37.5 37.5 37.5 37.5 2.3 29.1 
2. Gumhouria Bank 4 4 5 6 6 6 50.0 50.0 62.5 75.0 75.0 75.0 5.1 64.5 
3. National Commercial Bank 1 1 2 6 6 6 12.5 12.5 25.0 75.0 75.0 75.0 3.6 45.8 
4. Wahda Bank 3 2 4 4 4 4 37.5 25.0 50.0 50.0 50.0 50.0 3.5 43.7 
5. 
 
Commerce and  
Development Bank 
0 0 2 2 2 2 0.0 0.0 25.0 25.0 25.0 25.0 1.3 16.6 
6. 
 
Alsaraya Trading and 
Investment Bank 
0 0 0 0 0 1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 12.5 0.1 2.1 
7. Mediterranean Bank 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0 0.0 
8. Alwaha Bank* 0 0 1 1 3 3 0.0 0.0 12.5 12.5 37.5 37.5 1.3 16.6 
9. Alwafa Bank* 0 0 4 5 5 5 0.0 0.0 50.0 62.5 62.5 62.5 3.1 39.5 
Total % 1 0.8 2.3 3 3.2 3.3 12.5 11.1 29.1 37.5 40.2 41.6 2.3 28.7 
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8.3.5 Category E: Corporate governance information   
This is the final information category (E) appearing in the self-constructed voluntary 
disclosure index; it contains nineteen items of information which are expected to be 
disclosed voluntarily in the annual reports of Libyan commercial banks. Disclosing 
information on corporate governance can be used as a signal of the transparency of 
commercial bank management to external stakeholders. 
Table 8.8 indicates that listed and unlisted Libyan commercial banks on average 
voluntarily disclosed about six items of the total of this category’s information items (19 
items). The average highest number of disclosed items was about 9 items out of 19 
information items, which was reported by Commerce and Development Bank (listed), 
while a lower average number of disclosed items was about one item (Alsaraya Trading 
and Investment Bank (listed)).  
Table 8.8 also shows that over the period of the study (2006-2011), the average total 
scores regarding the disclosure of corporate governance information was relatively low 
(31.6%). The highest disclosure score value (49.1%) was achieved by Commerce and 
Development Bank (listed), while the lowest value score (7%) was attained by Alsaraya 
Trading and Investment Bank (listed).  
It is clear from Table 8.8 that, during the six years studied (2006 -2011), there were 
moderate increases in both the average disclosure scores and the average number of 
disclosed items within this category. More precisely, the total average disclosure score 
and the total average number of disclosed items were 17.5% (3 items) in 2006, 22.8% (4 
items) in 2007, 32.7% (6 items) in 2008, 36.8% (7 items) in 2009, 38% (7 items) in 2010 
and 42.1% (8 items) in 2011. It can be concluded that the majority of the sampled 
commercial banks (listed and unlisted) do not disclose adequate corporate governance 
information in their published annual reports.  
This outcome is not surprising as it results from a lack of financial reporting and 
disclosure regulation as well as the absence of legal enforcement in the country. In 
comparison with similar prior studies in other countries, the quantity of corporate 
governance information provided in the annual reports of Libyan commercial banks from 
265 
 
2006 until to 2011 was not encouraging. For example, in a developing country, Hossain 
and Reaz (2007) reported that listed banking companies in India disclosed an adequate 
level of voluntary information related to corporate governance in their annual reports. A 
more recent relevant study in a developed country by Maingot and Zeghal (2008) 
indicated that Canadian banks disclose a large volume of information related to corporate 
governance, covering a total of 54 items. 
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Table 8.8: Descriptive statistics: Corporate governance information (E) 
No. Commercial Bank Name Number of Disclosed Items by each 
Commercial Bank out 19 Items 
Disclosure Score % 
 
Pooled 
  2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 Average of 
Number  
Items 
Disclosed  
Average 
Disclosure 
Score%  
1. Sahara Bank 5 6 9 9 9 9 26.3 31.5 47.3 47.3 47.3 47.3 7.8 41.2  
2. Gumhouria Bank 6 5 9 10 11 11 31.5 26.3  47.3 52.6 57.9 57.9 8.5 45.6 
3. National Commercial Bank 3 5 7 10 10 11 15.7 26.3 36.8 52.6 52.6 57.9 7.6 40.3 
4. Wahda Bank 5 7 10 11 11 11 26.3 36.8 52.6 57.9 57.9 57.9 9.1 48.2 
5. 
 
Commerce and  
Development Bank 
3 7 11 11 12 12 15.7 36.8 57.9 57.9 63.1 63.1 9.3 49.1 
6. 
 
Alsaraya Trading  
and Investment Bank 
0 1 1 2 2 2 0.0 5.2 5.2 10.5 10.5 10.5  1.3 7.0 
7. Mediterranean Bank 3 3 3 3 3 6 15.7 15.7 15.7 15.7 15.7 31.5 3.5 18.4 
8. Alwaha Bank* 4 4 5 5 5 6 21.1 21.1 26.3 26.3 26.3 31.5 4.8 25.4 
9. Alwafa Bank* 1 1 2 2 2 4 5.2 5.2  10.5 10.5 10.5 21.1 2 10.5 
Total % 3.3 4.3 6.3 7 7.2 8 17.5 22.8 33.3 36.8 38.0 42.1 6.0 31.7 
*Unlisted commercial banks 
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Table 8.9 summarises the descriptive statistics of voluntary disclosure scores of the five 
information categories over the six-year period of the study, while Figure 8.2 illustrates the 
extent of voluntary disclosure of the five information categories over the study years, 2006-
2011. From Table 8.9 and Figure 8.2 it can be noted that there is a varied dissimilarity in the 
range of the voluntary mean disclosure scores in each of the five information categories over 
the six years.  
Among the five categories of voluntary disclosure, background about the commercial bank/ 
general information (category A) has the highest overall mean disclosure score, which was 
approximately 62.4%; it was followed by financial ratios and other statistics information 
(category C, 41.4%), corporate governance information (category E, 31.7%), and accounting 
policies (category D, 28.7%), but social responsibility information category (B) has the lowest 
average voluntary disclosure score of 0.5%.  
More specifically, the background about the commercial bank/ general information (category 
A) has a minimum disclosure score of 28.8% and a maximum disclosure score of 86.3%, 
while social responsibility information (category B) has a minimum disclosure score of 0.0% 
and a maximum disclosure score of 4.1%. Financial ratios and other statistics information 
(category C) has a minimum disclosure score of 16.6 %, and a maximum disclosure score of 
65.88 %.  
Accounting Policies (category D) has a minimum disclosure score of 0.0 % and a maximum 
disclosure score of 64.5 %. The minimum voluntary disclosure score for the final category (E) 
i.e. corporate governance information was 7 % and a maximum disclosure score was 49.13 %. 
In general, the disclosure of the five information categories has improved over the six-year 
period of the study; however, the variances between them were relatively much greater.  
As can be seen from Table 8.9 and Figure 8.2, there is a slight improvement in the extent of 
general information disclosure (Category A) over the six years;  the mean disclosure score 
value is 46.4 %, 48.4%, 66.6%, 69.7%, 71.7% and 71.7% for the six-year period from 2006 to 
2011, respectively. On the other hand, the extent of the social responsibility information 
disclosure has shown no improvement during the six years, and remained the lowest disclosed 
category in the current study. 
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In addition, the extent of voluntary disclosure related to financial ratios and other statistics 
information, as illustrated in Figure 8.2, has improved over the six years; the mean disclosure 
score was 24.8% in 2006, but in 2011, the disclosure score value reached 54.5%. 
It can also  be seen from Figure 8.2 that the extent of annual voluntary disclosures about the 
accounting policies over the period of the study has increased, with the exception of the fiscal 
year (2007); the voluntary mean disclosure was 12.5% in 2006, but in 2007 its score has 
dropped to 11.1%, then it improved continually to reach the score value 41.6% in 2011. 
Moreover, as could be seen from Figure 8.2, there was a reasonable increase in the extent of 
corporate governance information disclosure over the six years, with its score ranging from 
17.5 % in 2006 to 42.1% in 2011. 
In summary, the previous five subsections have analysed the extent of voluntary disclosure by 
information categories. Overall, there were gradual increases in the quantity of the voluntary 
information provided by those preparing Libyan commercial ban s’ annual reports over the 
six years studied. However, the credibility of such information is still in doubt and is difficult 
to determine without further examination.  
It is appears from the analysis that the Libyan commercial ban s’ managers are more 
motivated to disclose additional information related to the background about the commercial 
bank/ general information than others types of information. In contrast, they have no incentive 
to provide social information in their published annual reports. The analysis also shows that 
those preparing Libyan commercial ban s’ annual reports disclosed certain information 
voluntarily about financial ratios and other statistical information, their accounting policies, 
and corporate governance, but the amount of information they provided in their published 
annual reports to the public is still insufficient.  
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Table 8.9: Summary of the descriptive statistics of voluntary disclosure scores by information categories  
 
Information Categories 
 
Mean percentage score Pooled Minimum  
Score% 
Minimum  
Score% 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
A. Background about the Commercial Bank/ General 
Information 
46.4 48.4 66.6 69.7 7 1 . 7 7 1 . 7 62.4 28.8 86.3 
B. Social Responsibility Information 0 . 0 0 . 0 0 . 0 2 . 7 0 . 0 0 . 0 0.46 0.0 4.1  
C. Financial Ratios and Other Statistics Information 24.8 2 5 . 9 41.8 49.7 5 1 . 8 5 4 . 5 41.4 16.6 65.8 
D. Accounting Policies 12.5 11.1 29.1 37.5 4 0 . 2 4 1 . 6 28.7 0.0 64.5 
E. Corporate Governance Information  17.5 22.8 33.3 36.8 3 8 . 1 4 2 . 1 31.7 7.1 49.1  
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Figure 8.2: Extent of voluntary disclosure information categories 
 
 
8.4 Comparison of the Results of this Study with Previous Studies  
This section compares the analysis findings reported in the current study with the results 
reported in similar studies conducted in different countries, either developing or developed. As 
has been indicated in the literature review chapter, very few previous empirical disclosure 
studies have focused on the extent of banking voluntary disclosure, since most of the prior 
earlier disclosure studies have excluded banks and other financial institutions from their 
samples. 
 
“Financial services companies such as banks and insurance companies were excluded because 
their specific financial characteristics, affect their information disclosure” (Hassan et al., 2009, 
p. 88). However, comparison with other studies will not be realistic for some reasons. First, 
these prior empirical studies have had different numbers of information items in the self-
constructed disclosure index and different information categories items, as pointed out by 
Citro (2013, p. 200) 
Prior studies have showed a great variation in the construction of a disclosure 
index, principally referred to the type of information disclosed and the number of 
items of information included in the index. 
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In addition, most previous research evaluated the aggregate disclosure level (mandatory and 
voluntary) in the annual reports of listed banking companies only, and no clear results about 
the extent of voluntary disclosure were reported (e.g. Hossain, 2008). More importantly, the 
majority of prior relevant research measured the extent of banking voluntary disclosure for 
one year only (e.g. Hossain and Taylor, 2007; Hossain and Reaz, 2008). 
 In addition, as pointed out in the literature review chapter of this thesis, there are very limited 
academic studies assessing the extent of voluntary disclosure in annual reports of banks and 
investigating its relationship with bank-specific characteristics; however no results have been 
reported by some of these published studies relating to general levels of voluntary disclosure 
scores. For example, Hossain and Taylor (2007) investigate the relationship between firm-
specific characteristics and the extent of voluntary disclosure of a sample of banking 
companies in Bangladesh, but no results were reported relating to the voluntary disclosure 
score.  
Furthermore, a study by (Kribat, 2009) examined empirically the extent of aggregate financial 
disclosure (mandatory and voluntary) in Libyan ban s’ annual reports. This study found that 
only 54% of information items were disclosed on average by sample banks (with a range of 
39% to 67%). However, as a study result it can hardly be interpreted since there was no clear 
distinction made between the results of the extent of mandatory and voluntary disclosure 
levels. Only two studies found in the empirical disclosure literature reported direct evidence 
about the extent of banking voluntary disclosure (i.e. Hossain and Reaz, 2008; Agyei-Mensah, 
2012). Hossain and Reaz (2008) found that, on average, the extent of voluntary disclosure in 
annual reports of Indian’s ban s was 34.7%, while  gyei-Mensah (2012) found that the mean 
value of the disclosure index score was 71%. 
However, the empirical results of these studies cannot be directly compared with the 
results of the current study because of the time period and the different types and number 
of information items measured. As the above discussion attests, the results of the current 
study can be seen as primary evidence taking into account the development of voluntary 
disclosure practices by listed and unlisted banks over a period of time. 
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8.5 Examining the Relationship between a Commercial Bank’s Attributes and the 
Extent of Voluntary Disclosure 
As was mentioned previously at the beginning of this chapter, this section is devoted to 
discussion and analysis of the key empirical findings of the testable hypotheses for 
research question three, which was developed in Chapter Six.  Specifically, it aims to 
investigate whether there is an association between the extent of total voluntary disclosure 
as the dependent variable (i.e. TVDIS) and a number of commercial ban s’ attributes 
(independent variables).  
The independent variables expected to have an effect on the extent of total voluntary 
disclosure investigated in the current study are: commercial bank size (SIZE), commercial 
bank age (AGE), profitability (PRFT), bank liquidity position (LQDP), government 
ownership (GOVR), foreign ownership (FOWN), and listing status (LISTS). 
This section was divided into two subsections; subsection (8.5.1) provides the result of 
univariate analysis. Subsection (8.5.2) discusses and reports on the results of multivariate 
analysis, and also compares the current study findings with results from previous relevant 
studies.  
8.5.1 Univariate analysis 
As has been pointed out in Chapter Six in section (6.9.3), two types of univariate analysis 
are performed in the current study: descriptive analysis for dependent and independent 
variables was first undertaken, which includes mean, standard deviation, minimum, 
maximum, skewness, and Kurtosis. The second univariate analysis is a correlation 
analysis, which was conducted to investigate the relationship between the dependent 
variable and each of the independent variables.  
8.5.1.1 Descriptive statistics 
Table 8.11 displays the descriptive statistics for dependent and independent variables used 
in this study. The descriptive statistics show that the mean value of the extent of voluntary 
disclosure is relatively low (38%), with S.D 18%, and a range from 8% to 70%. This 
implies that none of the Libyan listed and unlisted commercial banks disclosed all index 
voluntary information items. An analysis of this table also showed that the four continuous 
commercial bank attributes (i.e. age of the bank (AGE), commercial bank size (SIZE), 
profitability (PRFT), and bank liquidity position (LQDP)), had varied ranges.  
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From the descriptive statistic in Table 8.11, it can be observed that the average age of the 
commercial banks is about 23 years, with minimum 2 years and maximum 43 years from 
date of commencement to 2006. The mean value of commercial bank size is 20.908 (as 
represented by log of total assets), with ranges from 17.501 to 24.081, with S.D (2.061). 
 s shown also in the table, commercial ban s’ profitability (PRFT) ranges from -0.0179 to 
0.048, with average of 0.0075, and commercial bank liquidity position (LQDP) has a mean 
value 1.15 and a range from 0.96 to 1.58. 
Remarkably, the standard deviations (S.D.) do not show a large range in most of the 
continuous independent variables, with the exception of one independent variable (i.e. 
AGE); the standard deviation of this variable is 15.78. The mean value of government 
ownership (GOVR) is approximately 55 %, with a S.D of 0.501, while foreign ownership 
(FOWN) value has a mean of 33%, with a S.D of 0.475. Listing status (LISTS) has a mean 
value of 77 %, with a S.D of 0.503. This shows a huge variability between the commercial 
banks in the sample concerning their listing status. 
     Table 8.10: Descriptive statistics for dependent and independent variables 
Variable Mean S.D. Min. Max. Skewness Kurtosis 
TVDIS 0.38 0.185 0.08 0.70 0.2476 1.7253 
GOVR* 0.55 0.501 0.00 1.00 -0.2236 1.05 
FOWN* 0.33 0.475 0.00 1.00 0.7071 1.5 
AGE 23.27 15.780 2 43 0.1512 1.2609 
LISTS*  0.77 0.503 0.00 1.00 -0.1485 1.0221 
SIZE * 20.908 2.061 17.501 24.081 -0.1329 1.5255 
PRFT 0.0075 0.0095 -0.0179 0.048 1.4043 8.3795 
LQDP 1.1596 0.1427 0.96 1.581 1.3328 4.1388 
Note:* LISTS (% of total banks listed on LSM), GOVR (% of total banks owned 
by government), FOWN (% of total banks owned by government), and SIZE (Log 
of total assets). 
 
 
8.5.1.2 Correlation analysis 
The results for the Spearman’s ran  correlation matrix for the dependent variable (TVIDS) 
and independent variable are exhibited in Table 8.11.  
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Table 8.11: Spearman’s rank correlation matrix 
Spearman’s rank correlations between variables 
         
 
TVDIS AGE GOVR FOWN LIST SIZE PRFT LQDP 
TVDIS 1.0000        
 
        
AGE 0.5455** 1.0000       
 
(<0.0001)        
GOVR 0.5121** 0.0000 1.0000      
 
(0.0001) (1.0000)       
FOWN 0.4061** 0.0000 0.1581 1.0000     
 
(0.0023) (1.0000) (0.2535)      
LIST 0.6034** 0.5545** 0.0664 0.2626 1.0000    
 
(<0.0001) (<0.0001) (0.6331) (0.0551)     
SIZE 0.8726** 0.2571 0.7747** 0.3756** 0.4015** 1.0000   
 
(<0.0001) (0.0606) (<0.0001) (0.0051) (0.0026)    
PRFT -0.1805 -0.2901* -0.4711** 0.0769 0.0036 -0.3241* 1.0000  
 
(0.1914) (0.0333) (0.0003) (0.5806) (0.9795) (0.0168)   
LQDP -0.3611** 0.0017 -0.1232 -0.1979 -0.0775 -0.3264* -0.0811 1.0000 
 
(0.0073) (0.9900) (0.3750) (0.1515) (0.5777) (0.0160) (0.5599)  
         
*   Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level. 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level. 
P-values are given in parentheses: ( ). 
 
 
Table 8.12 indicates a number of significant correlations between the commercial bank 
characteristics (independent variables) and the extent of voluntary disclosure in annual 
reports (TVDIS). The univariate analysis shows that the TVDIS variable is positively 
correlated with AGE (r = 0.545), GOVR (r =0.512), LISTS (r = 0.603), and FORN (r 
=0.406) and these correlations are statistically significant at (P<0.01) level. The extent of 
voluntary disclosure also shows a significant positive association with commercial bank 
size (SIZE) (r = 0.873) at (P<0.01) level. 
In contrast, the extent of voluntary disclosure is negatively associated with the profitability 
variable (PRFT) (r = -0.180, p = 0.191) and bank liquidity position (LQDP) (r = -0.361, p 
= 0.073). Overall, almost of these findings are in agreement with research hypotheses 
concerning the association between the extent of voluntary disclosure in annual reports and 
commercial ban s’ attributes. 
8.5.2 Multivariate analysis 
In the previous section (8.5.1), the univariate statistical analysis was conducted to 
investigate the correlations between dependent variables and each independent variable. As 
has been discussed in section (6.9.2), Chapter Six, the multivariate analysis is considered 
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to be more appropriate to assess the collective effect of the commercial bank attributes on 
the general level of voluntary disclosure. Thus, this section reports and interprets the 
results for the multivariate test of the research hypotheses developed in Chapter 6, using 
the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) longitudinal panel regression model with robust 
standard error squares. Before running the multiple linear regression analysis, the 
assumptions underlying the OLS regression were tested for not being seriously violated. 
Results of these tests are summarised and briefly discussed in the following subsections.  
8.5.2.1 Assessing the assumption of normality 
From the descriptive analysis for the dependent and independent variables reported in 
Table 8.11, it can be observed that the value of standards kurtosis of TVDIS was not 
significant at the 0.05 level. While commercial bank profitability, and liquidity variables 
were, the kurtosis statistics confirmed that the variables are not distributed normally, 
berceuse the standard kurtosis for these variables exceed the normality range of ±3 
(Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006). In addition, a Shapiro-Wilk test also applied and rejected the 
assumption of normality (p = 0.00774). Further test concerns regarding normality of the 
residuals are performed in this study using Kernel density estimation; a histogram with 
narrow bins and a moving average (see Appendix No.7). 
The results of this test showed a lack of normality in the residual errors. As a consequence, 
before running the OLS linear regression analysis, in line with prior research (e.g. Ahmed 
and Nicholls, 1994; Wallace et al., 1994; Wallace and Naser, 1995; Hossain, Perera and 
Rahman, 1995; Raffournier, 1995; Inchaust, 1997; Depoers, 2000) the natural logarithmic 
transformations of the TVDIS and two explanatory variables was performed in order to 
satisfy the assumption of normality for the multivariate OLS linear regression model. The 
safest approach is to use transformations of variables to improve their normality 
(Tabachnick and Fidell, 2007, p. 78). 
8.5.2.2 Multicollinearity diagnostics   
Another important issue that should be considered before the OLS regression model is 
performed is multicollinearity. Multicollinearity is a problem which occurs if one of the 
independent variables is exactly, or nearly, a linear combination of the other independent 
variable. As pointed out by Cooke (1989a), one of the problems in undertaking any 
multiple regression analysis is that there may be multicollinearity between independent 
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(predictor) variables. In other words, a multicollinearity problem arises when there is a 
high degree of correlation among independent variables. 
As the amount of multicollinearity increases, estimation of the model coefficients becomes 
unstable and the standard errors can be excessively large. As stated by Garson (2012), a 
high multicollinearity leads to large standard errors, large confidence intervals, and 
diminished power. Although the regression software program (STATA) ignores 
explanatory variables resulting in serious multicollinearity, however, it was essential to 
inspect whether collinearity is a problem before running the regression model, using 
Variation Inflation Factor (VIF).  
The VIF indicates how much the variance of the coefficient estimate has been inflated by 
multicollinearity, although there is no formal VIF value for determining the presence of 
multicollinearity. However, O’Brien (2007) suggested that if the VIF is >10 there is robust 
evidence that collinearity is affecting the OLS estimates. Table 8.13 shows that all the 
independent variables had VIF values of less than 10, while the mean of VIF is 3.22. Thus, 
it can be concluded that the issue of multicollinearity does not exist among the present 
study’s independent variables. Consequently, the results of the regression analysis can be 
interpreted with a high degree of confidence. 
 
Table 8.12: Multicollinearity test results (VIF) 
 
Variable VIF Results 
SIZE 6.78 No Multicollinearity presents 
AGE 5.78 No Multicollinearity presents 
LQDP 1.2 No Multicollinearity presents 
 PRFT 1.56 No Multicollinearity presents 
LISTS 1.64 No Multicollinearity presents 
GOVR 4.15 No Multicollinearity presents 
FOWN 1.41 No Multicollinearity presents 
Mean VIF 3.22 
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8.5.2.3 Checking the homoscedasticity of residuals 
Another key assumption for multivariate OLS model is homogeneity of the variance of the 
residuals. The failure of homoscedasticity can be caused either by no normality of one of 
the variables or by the fact that single variable is linked to some transformation of the other 
(Tabachnick and Fidell, 2007). A commonly used graphical method is to plot the residuals 
versus fitted (predicted) values. If the multivariate OLS model fits well, the residual errors 
should be equally distributed about zero when plotted against the fitted values of disclosure 
and against each independent variable. From Figure 8.3, it is evident that a greater number 
of points lie above the reference line than below, but a number of the points below the line 
represent a greater magnitude of residual error. Therefore, the data does not have equal 
dispersion about the fitted values. 
 
 
            Figure 8.3: A plot of the residuals against the fitted values 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
To validate the visual evidence of heteroscedasticity, White’s test and the Breusch-Pagan 
test were applied. Both of these test the null hypothesis that the variance of the residuals is 
homogenous. Therefore, if the p-value is very small, then the hypothesis has to be rejected 
and the alternative hypothesis that the variance is not homogenous must be accepted. 
These tests are very sensitive to model assumptions. Therefore, it is advisable to combine 
the tests with the diagnostic plots in Figure 8.3 to make a judgment on the severity of the 
heteroscedasticity and to decide if any correction is needed. 
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 lthough neither test results in a rejection of the null hypothesis (White’s test: p = 0.3006, 
Breusch-Pagan test: p = 0.2131), both are based on the assumption that the errors are 
normally distributed, which has already seen is not the case when the graphical method is 
used. Accordingly, the regression assumption has not been violated and the multivariate 
OLS model can be used with more confidence. However, in the case with 
heteroscedasticity, transformation of the variables leads to reduction or elimination of 
heteroscedasticity (Tabachnick and Fidell, 2007). 
8.5.2.4 Results of OLS regression analysis 
After the basic assumptions for the OLS regression model are tested and the validity of 
analyses was confirmed by using statistical software, STATA 12, the results of the OLS 
longitudinal panel regression with clustered robust standard error is presented in Table 
8.13. 
 
Table 8.13: Results of the OLS longitudinal panel regression with clustered robust 
standard error 
Independent 
Variables 
Coefficient Robust 
SE 
 t-statistic p-value  [95% Confidence 
Interval] 
AGE -0.002 0.001807 -1.1 0.302    -0.00616 0.002173 
GOVR -0.03972 0.055928 -0.71 0.498  -0.16869 0.089253 
FOWN -0.01184 0.037775 -0.31 0.762  -0.09895 0.07527 
LISTS 0.125019* 0.042574 2.94 0.019  0.026844 0.223195 
SIZE 0.087948** 0.019015 4.63 0.002  0.044099 0.131797 
PRFT 1.098793 1.140526 0.96 0.364  -1.53126 3.72885 
LQDP -0.04419 0.102415 -0.43 0.677  -0.28036 0.191976 
Adjusted R
2
 = 0.8404                                                                                            p<0.0001 
R-squared   =  0.8615                                                      
Prob > F      =  0.0000       
Number of obs =  54         
SE= Standard Error   
- means negative effect, + means positive effect. * means significant at 0.05 (p ≤ 0.05) 
 ** means significant at 0.01(p ≤ 0.01) 
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The OLS regression longitudinal panel results presented in Table 8.14 show that the 
regression model with robust standard error is highly significant (p<0.0001). The adjusted 
R square correlation is 0.84, which means that the OLS regression model is capable of 
explaining 84% of variation in the TVDIS of the selected commercial banks throughout 
this study period. This value of adjusted R² compares with that obtained in the prior 
relevant disclosure studies. It is higher than Hossain and Taylor (2007) at 24%, Hossain 
and Reaz (2007) at 25%, Agyei-Mensah (2012) at 8%, but the explanatory power of this 
model is lower than Hassan et al. (2009) in respect of non-financial companies (87.3%). A 
detailed discussion of the further regression result on the basis of research hypotheses is 
presented in the following paragraphs. 
Hypothesis (H1): Age of the commercial bank (AGE) 
Although the Spearman correlation matrix results show that commercial bank age has a 
positive correlation with the extent of voluntary disclosure (TVDIS),  the results of OLS 
regression model as presented in Table 8.14 show no significant relationship between the 
age of a commercial bank and TVDIS. The regression coefficient for the predictor variable 
(AGE) is -0.002.  
As a result, H1: “There is a significant positive association between the extent of voluntary 
information disclosure in annual reports and the age of a commercial bank” is rejected. In 
brief, according to the OLS regression results, it can be inferred that there is no significant 
positive relationship between a commercial ban ’s age and the level of voluntary 
disclosure in annual reports.  
The result of this study is consistent with Hossain and Reaz (2007), who found that bank 
age is not statistically significant in explaining the level of voluntary disclosure in India. 
Hossain (2008) also found no relationship exists between Indian ban ing companies’ age 
and the extent of disclosure. A more recent study by Galani et al. (2011), found the age of 
the company to be insignificant in explaining the variation of disclosures in the annual 
reports of non-financial Greek companies. In contrast, a significant positive relationship 
between the company’s age and the extent of disclosure has been found by Owusu-Ansah 
(1998; 2005).  
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Hypothesis (2): Size of commercial bank (SIZE) 
The regression results as shown in the Table 8.14 revealed that the most important 
commercial bank attributes that helps explain variations in the extent of voluntary 
disclosure in the annual reports of Libya’s commercial ban s is size. The regression 
coefficient for the variable is 0.087948, which is positive and very significant at the 0.002 
level (p ≤ 0.01).  s a result, H2: “There is a significant positive association between the 
size of a commercial bank and the extent of its voluntary information disclosure in the 
annual reports” is strongly accepted. 
Overall, it can be concluded, based on the statistical results displayed in Table 8.14, that 
there is a significant positive relationship between a commercial ban ’s size as represented 
by total assets (log of assets) and voluntary disclosure level in annual reports. This result is 
line with the outcomes from prior relevant disclosure studies. For instance, in Bangladesh, 
Hossain and Taylor (2007) found a significant positive relation between the bank size (as 
measured by log of assets) and the extent of voluntary disclosure. In India, Hossain and 
Reaz (2007) also found a positive association between the size of the bank and annual 
reports voluntary disclosures. By contrast, Agyei-Mensah (2012), found no significant 
relationship between the voluntary disclosure level and bank size as represented by value 
of net assets. 
Hypothesis H3: Commercial bank liquidity position (LQDP) 
The regression result indicated that the effect of bank liquidity position on TVDIS, as 
represented by current ratio is generally negative, with the coefficient of -0.04419. 
Therefore, H3:“Commercial banks with higher liquidity position disclose more 
information voluntarily than do commercial banks with lower liquidity position” is not 
accepted. In short, the OLS statistical analyses show that a commercial ban ’s liquidity 
position has no statistically positive relationship with voluntary disclosure levels. 
This result coincide with Agyei-Mensah (2012), who found no relationship between 
liquidity and the extent of voluntary disclosure in annual reports of rural banks in the 
Ashanti region of Ghana. Galani et al. (2011) also found the firm liquidity to be 
insignificant in explaining the variation of the disclosure levels. Nevertheless, the finding 
of the current study disagrees with the findings of Owusu-Ansah (2005) and Alsaeed 
(2006).  
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Hypothesis H4: Profitability of the commercial bank (PRFT) 
According to the OLS regression results, the influence of profitability on the extent of 
voluntary disclosure is not statistically significant (p = 0.364). This is inconsistent with the 
a priori expectation of signalling theory and agency theory. As a result, H4: “Commercial 
banks with higher profit are more likely to disclose higher voluntary information than are 
commercial banks with lower or negative profit” cannot be accepted.  
The current result is consistent with the findings in Hossain and Taylor (2007). They found 
the profitability variable, as measured by return on assets (ROA), is not significant in 
determining the extent of voluntary disclosure in annual reports of Bangladeshi 
commercial banks. Another researcher, Rouf (2010), found that the extent of voluntary 
disclosure by listed non-financial companies of Bangladesh is not positively associated 
with the profitability variable.  
By contrast, the finding of this study contradicts the finding of Agyei-Mensah (2012). He 
found that the association between profitability variable as presented by return on capital 
employed (ROCE) and voluntary disclosure level in Ghana is statistical positive. Hossain 
(2008) also found a significant positive relationship between profitability and the 
disclosure levels in the annual reports of listed banking companies in India.   
Hypothesis H5: Government ownership (GOVR) 
The results of the OLS model as shown in Table 8.14 indicate that the variable of 
government ownership is negatively associated with voluntary disclosure level. The 
regression coefficient for the government ownership variable is -0.03972 and negative. 
Thus, H5: “There is a significant association between the extent of information voluntarily 
disclosed in the annual report and government ownership” is not statistically supported.  
In sum, the regression results confirmed a negative association between government 
ownership and the extent of voluntary disclosure in annual reports of Libya’s commercial 
banks. This result is similar to Ghazali and Weetman (2006), who found a negative 
relationship between government ownership and the extent of voluntary disclosure. In 
contrast with the current study result, a number of studies have found a positive 
relationship between government ownership and the level of disclosure in annual reports. 
Scholars such as, Makhija and Patton (2004) found that government ownership is a 
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significant determinant of the overall extent of disclosure. Ghazali (2007) also found a 
significant positive relationship between the level of disclosure and government 
ownership. These findings were found typically by using a number of alternative 
definitions for government ownership. 
Hypothesis H6: Foreign ownership (FOWN) 
The statistical results show that foreign ownership is negatively associated with the extent 
of voluntary disclosure in the commercial ban s’ annual reports, with the coefficient of -
0.01184. This empirical result does not coincide with agency theory explanations. 
Accordingly, H6: “there is a positive association between the extent of information 
voluntarily disclosed in the annual reports and foreign ownership” is not supported in this 
study. In summary, the statistical tests performed reveal that there is an insignificant 
association between foreign ownership and the extent of voluntary disclosure provided in 
the annual reports.  
The current result of this study is consistent with empirical research by Naser et al. (2002), 
who found that there was no association between foreign ownership and the extent of 
disclosure in corporate annual reports. Furthermore, Said et al. (2009) report no association 
between foreign ownership and the voluntary disclosure level. In contrast, researchers such 
as Haniffa and Cooke (2002), (2005); Barako et al. (2006); Wang et al. (2008) find a 
positive relationship between foreign ownership and companies’ voluntary disclosures.  
Hypothesis H7: Listing status (LISTS) 
The OLS statistical results show that listing status has a positive association with 
commercial ban s’ voluntary disclosure levels. The correlation coefficient for the variable 
is 0.125019, which is positive and at the level of significance 0.019 (p ≤ 0.05). Thus, H7: 
“There is a positive association between the commercial bank listing status in the Libyan 
stock market and the level of information voluntarily disclosed in the annual report” is 
strongly accepted. In short, the results of the tests support the hypothesis that there is a 
positive significant association between a commercial ban ’s listing status and voluntary 
disclosure level.  
This result is similar to prior empirical studies which have shown that there is a positive 
relationship between listing status and disclosure levels (e.g. Singhvi and Desai, 1971; 
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Cooke, 1989a; Cooke, 1991; Malone et al., 1993; Wallace et al., 1994; Hossain et al., 
1995; Inchausti, 1997;  Abdul Hamid, 2004). The current study result contrasts with the 
finding by Buzby (1975), who reported no significant positive association between listing 
status and the extent of information disclosure in the corporate annual reports. 
8.6 Summary and Conclusions 
The purpose of this chapter has been to empirically investigate the extent of overall 
voluntary information disclosed in the annual reports of Libyan listed and unlisted 
commercial banks during the period 2006-2011 (the first objective); their trend across time 
(the second objective); and whether an association exists between seven commercial 
ban s’ attributes (ban  size, ban  age, ban  liquidity position, profitability, government 
ownership, foreign ownership, and listing status); and the level of voluntary disclosure (the 
third objective). 
The results of the descriptive analysis showed that the extent of overall of voluntary 
disclosure in annual reports of Libyan’s listed and unlisted commercial ban s is a 
relatively low (38%) with a range from 8% to 70 %. However, there were slight 
improvements (the average was 25.7%) in the extent of overall voluntary disclosure in the 
annual reports of Libyan commercial banks between 2006 and 2011.  
The empirical results also indicated that there have been variations in the general level of 
voluntary disclosure among Libyan commercial banks over the six-year period covered by 
the current study, ranging from a low of 19% (Alsaraya Trading and Investment Bank 
(listed)) to a high of 59 % (Gumhouria Bank (listed)). Furthermore, this chapter has 
analysed the extent of voluntary disclosure by information categories.  
The 63 information items comprising a self-constructed voluntary disclosure index were 
grouped into five information categories: (A) background about the commercial bank/ 
general information (11 items); (B) social responsibility information (4 items); (C) 
financial ratios and other statistics information (21 items); (D) accounting policies (8 
items), and (E) corporate governance information (19 items).  
The analysis showed that there is a varied difference in the mean voluntary disclosure 
scores amongst the five information categories over the six years. Among the five 
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information categories forming the index, the background information category had the 
highest disclosure level (62.4%), followed by financial ratios and other statistics 
information (41.4%), corporate governance information (31.7%), accounting policies 
(28.7%); lastly, the social responsibility information category (B) had a low level of 
voluntary disclosure score (0.46%). 
The chapter also reported the results of testing the hypotheses which were developed in 
Chapter Six; two statistical tests were performed, univariate and multivariate tests. In 
general, univariate and multivariate tests provided inconsistent results. Univariate analysis 
was conducted to ascertain whether there are significant correlations between the extent of 
voluntary disclosure and each single commercial ban ’s attributes (independent variables). 
The univariate test results showed that the voluntary disclosure level was positively 
significant when correlated with commercial bank age, bank size, government ownership, 
foreign ownership, and listing status. In contrast, the extent of voluntary disclosure was 
negatively associated with the profitability variable and bank liquidity position.  
A second multivariate statistical analysis was carried out, using a multivariate OLS 
longitudinal panel regression model with robust standard error, which was applied after 
underlying assumptions were tested to examine the simultaneous effect of commercial 
bank-specific characteristics on the general level of voluntary disclosure. The results of 
multivariate analysis show a significant positive association between the extent of overall 
voluntary disclosure and commercial bank size and listing status. However, no significant 
association was found between the voluntary annual disclosures and other explanatory 
variables.  
The following chapter will summarise the current study and indicates the implications, 
contributions, limitations, and the suggestions that flow from it. 
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Chapter Nine 
Summary, Conclusions, Implications, Contributions, Limitations and 
Suggestions for Further Research 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
The last chapter of this thesis is devoted to giving a brief a summary of the research, 
including the research methodology and methods, main conclusions of the current 
research, and indicates its implications, contributions, and limitations. Further, the 
suggestions for further research are also provided in this chapter. This chapter has been 
organised into five sections. Section (9.2) outlines the research methodology and methods. 
Section (9.3) summarises the main findings and conclusion of the current study. Section 
(9.4) discusses the implications of research findings. Section (9.5) presents the main 
contributions of this study. Section (9.6) highlights the limitations of the study, and the 
final section (9.7) provides suggestions for further research.  
9.2. Research Methodology and Methods 
In this study, a mixed methods research approach-a mixture of both quantitative research 
and qualitative research has been adopted in order to gain a better understanding of 
voluntary disclosure issue in the context of the banking sector, rather than applying either 
approach alone. The decision behind integrating both approaches within the current study 
was justified in the methodology and methods chapter. In line with the objectives of the 
study, four main research methods have been used in the current study. These were: 
 Self-constructed un-weighted disclosure index method, to measure the total level 
of voluntary disclosure in annual reports. 
 Longitudinal research approach, to investigate whether there have been any 
significant changes or developments in the extent of voluntary disclosure over the 
six-year period.  
 Univariate and multivariate analyses, to test the hypotheses developed in this 
study. 
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  Face-to-face semi-structured interviews, to obtain accurate and more detailed 
information about current commercial banking financial reporting and disclosure 
practices.  
 
9.3 Conclusions of the Study 
This section summarises, in the following subsections, the main empirical findings 
reported in Chapters Seven and Eight of this thesis. 
9.3.1 The interviews results 
To gain a deeper insight into current financial reporting and disclosure practices by Libyan 
listed and unlisted commercial banks, face-to-face semi-structured interviews with those 
responsible for preparing Libyan’s commercial ban s annual reports were conducted to 
capture their opinions and views, mainly about two issues. Firstly, their views about 
current financial reporting and mandatory disclosure practices; Secondly, their perceptions 
about a series of issues relating to voluntary disclosure practices, which include factors 
influencing the extent of voluntary disclosure, benefits and costs of voluntary disclosure, 
the usefulness of voluntary disclosure in economic decision-making, and the usefulness of 
voluntary disclosure to a wide range of users.  
According to the interviewees, the current financial reporting and mandatory disclosure 
practices in Libya in general, and in the banking sector in particular, still do not reach the 
same level of development currently achieved by most Arabic countries with similar socio-
economic environmental conditions. In particular, interviewees raised concerns about the 
absence of enforced national accounting standards and insufficient financial disclosure 
laws and regulations.   
In respect of the legal disclosure requirements, the interviewees indicated that the 
consolidated balance sheet and profit and loss account statement were the only two 
sections of a financial report required to be annually disclosed to the general public. 
However, listed commercial banks were required to submit their audited annual 
consolidated financial statements, which must be accompanied with the auditor’s report, 
quarter-yearly balance sheet statement, and quarter-yearly profit and loss account 
statement to the LSM.  
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Furthermore, the results of the interviews indicated that there is no legal requirement for 
supplementary information to be disclosed with the audited consolidated financial 
statements to the general public. In addition to this, no specific information items are 
required to be disclosed in the face of consolidated financial statements or other financial 
reports, either by banking law or the LSM regulations.   
Libyan commercial ban  annual reports’ preparers have suggested a number of factors that 
influence the decision to disclose voluntary information in the annual reports of 
commercial banks. The most frequently influential factors were perceived to be the 
competition in the commercial banking industry, commercial bank size, profitability, and 
government ownership. Some interviewees suggested other factors, namely bank liquidity 
position, foreign ownership, commercial bank age, and listing status, as influential factors 
influencing the extent of voluntary disclosure.  
The possible effects of these influential factors were tested in the quantitative study of this 
research, with the exception of the competition in the commercial banking industry; the 
statistical results reported in Chapter Eight showed that only size of commercial bank and 
listing status are significant factors associated with extent of voluntary disclosure in 
Libyan commercial ban s’ annual reports. 
Enhancing a commercial ban ’s reputation and giving a positive impression of its 
prospects were the key benefits to a commercial bank of disclosing information voluntarily 
as suggested by interviewees. Additional benefits from participating in the voluntary 
disclosure in annual reports suggested during the interviews were gaining the trust of 
stakeholders, improved investor relations, and lower average cost of capital, while the most 
significant costs restricting the amount of information voluntarily disclosed in commercial 
ban s’ annual reports were preparatory costs, competitive disadvantages, and potential 
legal responsibility. 
Finally, the respondents in the interviews believed that information voluntarily disclosed in 
the commercial ban s’ annual reports is useful and helpful in making economic decisions. 
Interviewees also perceived that the provision of voluntary information in the annual 
reports of commercial banks is useful for a wide range of users, in the sense of helping 
them to make decisions about those commercial banks.  
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9.3.2 Measuring the extent of voluntary disclosure in the annual reports 
The extent of voluntary disclosure in the annual reports of Libyan listed and unlisted 
commercial banks was measured over the six years period (2006-2011) by developing a 
self-constructed un-weighted disclosure index comprising 63 voluntary information items, 
in which was consistent with prior research. The index items were classified into five 
information categories, namely (A) background about the commercial bank/ general 
information; (B) social responsibility information; (C) financial ratios and other statistics 
information; (D) accounting policies, and (E) corporate governance information. Selecting 
the information items included in the voluntary disclosure index was based on their 
relevance to the commercial banking sector. 
To measure the extent of overall voluntary disclosure for every commercial bank in the 
sample for each year, a scoring sheet instrument (see Appendix Two) was designed, 
including the all voluntary disclosure index items (63) and using a dichotomous approach 
score, in which an item was given 1 if disclosed and 0 if not disclosed. The main reason for 
adopting this approach in the current study was to avoid the subjectivity inherent in using a 
weighted scoring approach. The total voluntary disclosure score (TVDIS), for each of the 
54 annual reports from two unlisted and seven listed commercial banks in the sample, was 
calculated as the ratio of the actual voluntary disclosure score divided by the maximum 
voluntary disclosure score which that particular commercial bank is expected to earn. 
The findings of the analysis showed that the average score of the overall voluntary 
disclosure in the annual reports of Libyan commercial banks over the six year period was 
low (38 %), with a range between 8% and 70%. In 2006, the extent of the voluntary score 
was 23.3%, but in 2011 the average score of voluntary disclosure increased by 49%. The 
results of this study also revealed that there was a greater variation in the voluntary 
disclosure scores obtained by Libyan commercial banks over the six year time period; the 
highest disclosure score over the six years was 59 %, achieved by Gumhouria Bank 
(listed), while the lowest disclosure score was 19%, reported by Alsaraya Trading and 
Investment Bank (listed).  
Analysis also reveals that there was wide variation in the voluntary disclosure scores for 
listed commercial banks compared to the disclosure scores for unlisted commercial banks 
over the period under investigation. It is also interesting to note that most of the listed 
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commercial banks have improved the extent of their voluntary disclosure levels after their 
listing in the LSM. In addition, the analysis of voluntary disclosure scores suggests that the 
extent of voluntary disclosure by Libyan commercial banks has increased noticeably 
during the six years studied. 
Furthermore, to satisfy the second research objective and answer the relevant research 
question, the study has also examined whether there were any significant developments in 
the extent of voluntary disclosure in the annual reports of Libyan listed and unlisted 
commercial banks during the time from 2006 to 2011. The results indicated that the 
changes in the extent of voluntary disclosure scores during the six-year period (2006-2011) 
were within a range of 2.1% to 25.7%. This means the quantity of voluntary information 
provided by Libyan commercial banks in their annual reports to the general public has 
increased progressively over the six years studied. 
9.3.3 Evaluating the extent of voluntary disclosure by information categories 
For further interesting results, the study has analysed the extent of voluntary disclosure by 
information categories. As discussed in the methodology chapter, the 63 information items 
included in a self-constructed voluntary disclosure index were grouped into five 
information categories according to their nature. The study found that there is a difference 
in the extent of the voluntary disclosure scores in each of the five information categories 
over the six years. 
Among the five information categories forming the index, the background information 
category had the highest disclosure score value, which was approximately 62.5%, followed 
by financial ratios and other statistics information (41.5%), corporate governance 
information (31.8%), and accounting policies (28.7%), but the social responsibility 
information category (B) had the lowest average voluntary disclosure score, at 0.5%.  
9.3.4 Examining the relationship between a commercial bank’s attributes and the 
extent of voluntary disclosure 
Seven hypotheses were formulated in section 6.8 of Chapter Six to examine the association 
between the extent of voluntary disclosure in annual reports and the commercial ban ’s 
attributes (i.e. bank size, bank age, profitability, bank liquidity position, government 
ownership, foreign ownership, and listing status).  
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Both univariate and multivariate analyses were applied to test these hypotheses. The results 
of the univariate analysis indicate that the extent of voluntary disclosure is positively 
correlated with commercial bank size, bank age, government ownership, foreign 
ownership, and listing status. However, the voluntary disclosure level was found to be 
negatively associated with the profitability variable and commercial bank liquidity 
position.  
On the other hand, the result of multivariate OLS model shows that only two explanatory 
variables, namely commercial bank size and listing status, were found to be significant in 
explaining the variations in the extent of voluntary disclosure in the annual reports of 
Libyan listed and unlisted commercial banks over the study period, while the other 
variables were found to be insignificant. Overall, the results of the current study are 
consistent with the evidence documented by most prior research. 
 
9.4 Implications of Research Findings 
One of the objectives of the current study was to measure the extent of voluntary 
disclosure provided in the annual reports of Libyan listed and unlisted commercial banks 
over the six-year period. Findings from this investigation showed that the amount of 
financial and non-financial information disclosed in the annual reports of listed and 
unlisted commercial banks was very low, specifically in some categories of information.  
This may offer suggestions for improving the extent of financial and non-financial 
information provided in the commercial ban s’ annual reports for their external users (i.e. 
shareholders, depositors, investors, stock brokers,  government bodies, academics, and 
other users) in order to be able to make wise economic decisions. It also enables them to 
evaluate the commercial ban s’ activities and ris  management practices, since the annual 
report published by a commercial bank is considered an important means of 
communicating financial and non-financial information between the ban ’s management 
and outsiders.   
Overall, the research findings of this study have implications to various stakeholders of the 
commercial banks. More importantly, this knowledge provides a significant benefit to the 
LCB (as the government agency responsible for all banks) to adopt more regulations to 
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increase the extent of information disclosure in the commercial ban s’ annual reports and 
to improve disclosure transparency in the banking sector. Poor transparency banks are not 
likely to voluntarily disclose additional information about their management performances. 
It is widely recognised that increased transparency leads to a reduction in the frequency 
and magnitude of commercial bank difficulties.  
Additionally, the present study also gives a better understanding and more insights into 
financial disclosure practices in the commercial banking sector in a developing country. It 
also provides beneficial insights to international institutions, especially those that are more 
interested in enhancing the regulatory framework for financial reporting and corporate 
governance in the emerging economies, such the BCBS, the IASB, the WB, and the IMF.  
Generally, this study has found that more efforts from regulatory authorities must be 
undertaken to improve qualitative and quantitative disclosures in the commercial ban s’ 
annual reports in a way that better enables various stakeholders to assess management 
performance and risks. Undoubtedly, disclosing sufficient information in the annual reports 
may assist to advantage the management of commercial bank, in building customer 
confidence and profitable customer relationships. 
Furthermore, findings from the qualitative study of this thesis revealed that the current 
financial reporting and mandatory disclosure practices by Libyan commercial banks 
compared to other international practices are still not robust enough, regulated enough and 
display a lack accounting regulation on the disclosure requirements to satisfy the 
information needs of external stakeholders. Therefore, commercial banks regulators should 
consider issuing a set of accounting and financial reporting standards or guidelines for the 
preparation of annual reports, which seem to be demanded from commercial banks annual 
reports preparers’ viewpoints. 
The findings of this study further indicate that the preparatory cost which includes cost of 
gathering, processing, and disseminating the information in the annual reports of 
commercial banks, and also costs of competitive disadvantage and potential legal 
responsibility are the major barriers that discourage managers of commercial banks from 
providing additional information in their annual reports. 
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Besides, the qualitative study found that the enhancing the commercial ban ’s reputation is 
one of the key benefits to a commercial bank of disclosing information voluntarily. Also, 
having voluntarily information disclosed in the annual reports, gives a positive impression 
of a commercial ban ’s prospects.  
Additional benefits from participating in the voluntary disclosure were considered to be 
gaining the trust of stakeholders in the commercial banking managers, improved investor 
relations and lower average cost of capital. This would suggest that managers of 
commercial banks need to consider the costs and benefits of additional information 
disclosure in the annual reports before making them available to public.  
Among other findings, the present study provides empirical evidence supporting the 
applicability of agency and signalling theories which were selected as the underlying 
theoretical framework in this research to explain voluntary disclosure in annual reports of 
commercial banks. Application of these theories in explaining factors influencing 
voluntary disclosure in the commercial ban s’ annual reports, however, was limited. 
Another primary objective of this study was to determine whether there is any significant 
association between the extent of voluntary disclosure and commercial banks specific-
attributes. This study has provided important empirical evidence related to the impact of 
commercial banks specific-attributes on the extent of voluntary disclosure provided in 
annual reports. For example, commercial bank size measured by total assets was found in 
this study to be the most significant variable in explaining variations in the voluntary 
disclosure levels. Hence, the nature of this empirical evidence suggests that larger 
commercial banks are motivated to disclose more information voluntarily in their annual 
reports than smaller banks. 
This confirms the results obtained in Kahl and Belkaoui (1981), Hossain and Taylor (2007) 
and Hossain and Reaz (2007) and adds to the evidence that commercial bank size is an 
important explanatory variable for establishing an association with the overall level of 
information voluntarily disclosed by commercial banks in their annual reports. For 
practical implications of this finding, the regulatory bodies may pay specific attention to 
small commercial banks to enhance the extent of disclosure in their annual reports. 
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The empirical results in this study also showed the listing status to be a significantly and 
positively associated variable with the extent of voluntary disclosure in the annual reports. 
This provides evidence that the extent of voluntary disclosure by listed commercial banks 
is generally greater than other banks. 
9.5 Contribution to the Knowledge 
This study contributes to the limited academic literature in the area of banking industry 
disclosure and to the growing accounting literature on the association between corporate 
specific-attributes and the extent of voluntary disclosure in the following aspects: 
 This study contributes to the academic disclosure literature by providing new 
empirical evidence of the relationship between certain corporate characteristics 
and the extent of voluntary disclosure in annual reports. To date, there is very 
little existing empirical evidence about the impact of commercial bank specific-
attributes such as bank size, age of the bank, profitability, bank liquidity position, 
government ownership, foreign ownership, and listing status on the extent of 
annual voluntary disclosure. The empirical findings of this study indicate that the 
commercial bank size and listing status are significantly and positively related to 
the extent of voluntary disclosure.  
 
 The study contributes to the existing literature by providing a longitudinal 
investigation of the extent of voluntary disclosure in the annual reports of Libyan 
listed and unlisted commercial banks over a six-year period, to determine whether 
the voluntary disclosure level has improved over time. Most prior empirical 
research has examined the commercial banking voluntary disclosure practices of 
only one year (cross-sectional), and hence, this study can be considered as an 
additional contribution to the body of knowledge.   
  
 This the first empirical study that has investigated the level of information 
voluntarily disclosed by listed and unlisted Libyan commercial banks, and its 
relationship with corporate attributes. Examining voluntary disclosure practices in 
a country with different governance, economic conditions, social cultural 
characteristics, and dominant religion (Islam) has shed further light on the 
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external factors influencing corporate voluntary disclosure practices. A study of 
financial reporting and voluntary disclosure practices by the Libyan commercial 
banking sector will, therefore, contribute to the limited academic disclosure 
literature relating to banking sector disclosure and represent an addition to that 
body of knowledge. 
 
 This study contributes to the academic accounting literature by attempting to 
confirm or disprove the findings reported in prior empirical disclosure studies 
concerning the relationship between the extent of voluntary disclosure in annual 
reports and bank specific-characteristics; it also provides a basis for the 
undertaking of future research. The findings of the current study provide support 
to prior empirical relevant research that has found a significant positive 
association between the extent of voluntary disclosure and bank size and listing 
status. The results of this study also provide evidence that age of the bank, 
profitability, bank liquidity position, government ownership, and foreign 
ownership do not have any significant relationship with the general level of 
voluntary disclosure. This result is inconsistent with some prior disclosure 
studies.  
 
 Quantitative and qualitative methods (mixed methods research) were adopted in 
this study to investigate the voluntary disclosure behaviour in the Libyan banking 
sector, in order to gain a better understanding of voluntary disclosure issues in the 
context of the banking sector than by applying either approach alone. Prior studies 
that examined the extent of voluntary disclosure in the annual reports and its 
relationship with ban s’ attributes, have used only quantitative analysis and relied 
on information from ban s’ annual reports as a data source. Combined qualitative 
analysis in the study gives further insights into different disclosure issues and 
identifies other aspects that may not simply be obtained from the quantitative 
analysis. The use of mixed methods research in the current study is therefore 
considered as a further contribution to the body of knowledge. 
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 The findings of this updated study provide significant information for commercial 
banking management, banking regulators, the Central Banks, the accounting 
profession, potential local and foreign investors, researchers, international 
institutions, and other government agencies to help them to assess the 
transparency level and the amount of information available from Libyan 
commercial banks for the decision-making processes, especially since there is no 
enforcement of accounting and auditing standards in the country. 
 
9.6 Limitations of the Study 
There are some limitations of the current study, which can be summarised as follows: 
Firstly, a self-constructed disclosure index, which was developed to measure the extent of 
voluntary disclosure in annual reports. In spite of the self-constructed index being widely 
used in prior empirical disclosure studies as an appropriate research instrument for 
measuring the level of information disclosed in the corporate annual reports, this 
instrument has its limitation. One possible limitation of studies using self-constructed 
disclosure indices to measure the extent of disclosure is that the results are only valid to the 
extent that the disclosure index used is appropriate (Hassan et al., 2009). 
Secondly, the current study has focused on the voluntary information published in annual 
reports of Libyan commercial banks; other types of information sources were omitted from 
the investigation, such as commercial bank circulars, financial press releases and the bank 
websites that might be used by the managers of Libyan commercial banks to communicate 
their information to the general public. 
Thirdly, this study has measured the extent of voluntary disclosure in the annual reports of 
both listed and listed Libyan commercial banks. The sample size was 9 commercial banks, 
2 unlisted and 7 listed. Listed commercial banks in the LSM were all represented in the 
current study sample, while only two unlisted commercial banks out of eight were 
represented in this study population sample, because there was difficulty obtaining six 
years’ worth of annual reports for the six unlisted commercial ban s at the time of the 
study. Hence, the conclusions and implications extracted from the empirical evidence in 
the present study may not be generalised to the rest of Libya’s unlisted commercial banks.  
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Finally, the small sample size of the participants in the interviews (six interviewees), was 
due to the difficulty in obtaining official permission in time and the limited time given to 
the researcher to conduct the interviews; this reduced the opportunity to explore further 
interesting issues about financial reporting and voluntary disclosure practices in Libyan 
commercial banks.  
9.7 Suggestions for Further Research 
This research has acknowledged its limitations, but it is believed that the current research 
results provide a useful insight into the voluntary disclosure practices by commercial banks 
and give a starting point for future academic research. Thus, a number of suggestions for 
possible further research are highlighted by the results of this study, namely: 
Firstly, this study has only focused on the voluntary information disclosed in the 
commercial ban s’ annual reports, though commercial ban s may use other means to 
disclose their financial and non-financial information, such as quarterly and interim 
reports, the Internet, bank circulars, and financial press releases. Thus, further research can 
be undertaken to investigate the extent of voluntary disclosure published in quarterly 
financial reports or on the level voluntary information provided through commercial 
ban s’ websites.  
Secondly, this research was limited only to one particular country. Thus, further research 
could be undertaken to compare the extent of voluntary disclosure practices in Libyan 
commercial banks with the voluntary disclosure practices of commercial banks in other 
countries in general, and in developing countries in particular. 
Thirdly, the current research has investigated the impact of seven commercial ban s’ 
attributes on the extent of voluntary disclosure in their annual reports. Further research 
could extend this investigation to include other explanatory variables such as board 
composition, complexity of business, assets in-place, and cultural factors examined for 
their potential influence on the extent of voluntary disclosure in the Libyan commercial 
ban s’ annual reports, since no prior studies have attempted to test the association between 
the extent of voluntary disclosure and these factors in Libya. 
Fourthly, concerning the reliability of the proxies for commercial bank attributes 
(independent variables) included in the multivariate OLS regression model. In this study, 
the rate of return on assets has been used as a measure of profitability, and the ratio of 
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current assets to current liabilities used as proxy for liquidity variable, while the total assets 
are used to measure commercial bank size. Prior literature suggests that variables can be 
represented by many different proxies. Further research can use other proxies, such as the 
rate of return on capital employed as a profitability variable and market value of the 
commercial bank as the measure of bank size to confirm correlation results of the present 
study. 
Lastly, consideration of the usefulness of voluntary disclosure in the annual reports of 
commercial banks for a wide range of users, such as customers, investors, government 
agencies , shareholders, employees, academics, and other interested parties. Future 
research based on the results of this study could be conducted to survey the views and 
perceptions of listed and unlisted commercial ban s’ annual report users in Libyan or 
another country’s context. 
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Appendix No. 1: Disclosure Index of Voluntary Information Items 
 
A. Background about the Commercial Bank/ General Information (11) 
A1.1 Brief narrative history of the bank 
A1.2 Description of bank Structure 
A1.3 Description of major services produced 
A1.4 The legal form of the bank 
A1.5 Address of Bank/telephone/fax 
A1.6 Bank Website address 
A1.7 Email address 
A1.8 Date and details of establishment 
A1.9 General outlook of business activities 
A1.10 List of branches location 
A1.11 Information on branches/telephone/fax/ adders for correspondence 
B. Social Responsibility Information (4) 
B1.1 Sponsoring public health, sporting of recreational projects 
B1.2 Information on donations to charitable organisations 
B1.3 Supporting national pride/government.-sponsored campaigns 
B1.4 Information on social banking activities/banking for the society 
C. Financial Ratios and Other Statistics Information (21) 
C1.1 Brief discussion of the ban ’s operating results     
C1.2  nalysis of ban ’s liquidity position     
C1.3 Return on assets 
C1.4 Return on equity 
C1.5 Liquidity ratios                                                         
C1.6 Earning per share    
C1.7 Capital adequacy ratios  
C1.8 Loan to deposit ratio 
C1.9 Total dividends 
C1.10 Dividends per share for the period 
C1.11 Breakdown of employees by geographic area 
C1.12 Categorise of employees by gender                                             
C1.13 Number of branches extension during the current fiscal year                                                 
C1.14 List of top five shareholders of the bank                   
C1.15 Financial statistics for more than two years      
C1.16 Comparative Income statement for 2 years     
C1.17 Comparative balance sheet for 2 years                    
C1.18 Comparative current year and previous year figures 
C1.19 Disclosure half-yearly Balance Sheet statement         
C1.20 Disclosure half-yearly profit and loss account statement 
C1.21 Cash flow statement 
D. Accounting Policies (8) 
D1.1 Accounting Valuation of fixed assets (e.g., fair value or historical cost) 
D1.2 The depreciation methods used 
D1.3 Foreign currency transactions, translation and differences treatment 
D1.4 Events after the balance sheet date 
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D1.5 Disclosure of accounting standards uses for its accounts 
D1.6 Statements of compliance with approved IFRS/IASs 
D1.7 Treatment of Tax 
D1.8 Treatment of contingent liabilities. 
E.  Corporate Governance Information (19) 
E1.1 Chairman of the board identified                                                            
E1.2 List of board members 
E1.3 Disclosure information on board members’ qualifications and experience 
E1.4 Duties of board of members 
E1.5 List of senior managers (not on the board of members)/ senior management 
structure 
E1.6 Disclosure information on senior managers’ qualifications and experience                                                 
E1.7 Managers’ engagement/directorship of other companies 
E1.8 Picture of all senior managers/ board of members 
E1.9 Picture of chairperson 
E1.10 Information about changes in board members 
E1.11 Classification of managers as executive or outsider 
E1.12 Details of senior managers and board of members remuneration 
E1.13 Statement of percentage of total shareholder of 20 largest shareholders 
E1.14 A review of shareholders by type 
E1.15 Number of shares held by managers 
E1.16 Bank policy on employee training 
E1.17 Number of board of members meetings held and date 
E1.18 List of audit committee 
E1.19 Chairman’s statement 
63 Total 
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Appendix No. 2: Scoring Sheet of Libyan Commercial Banks 
Voluntary Annual Disclosure 
 
 
      A.  Commercial Bank Demographic Data: 
Name of the Commercial Bank:  
Established in Year:  
 
     B.  Commercial Bank Characteristics: 
      Variable No 1: Bank Age (AGE): 
             Number of Years since Date of commences       
   
 
 
             Variable No 2:  Bank Size (SIZE): 
 
 
Total Assets (LD) 
 
2006  
2007  
2008  
2009  
2010  
2011  
                                                                           
              Variable No 3: Liquidity (LQDP): 
 
Current Ratio 
 
(Current Assets/Current 
Liabilities) 
2006  
2007  
2008  
2009  
2010  
2011  
 
 
Scoring Sheet No. 
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            Variable No 4:  Profitability (PRFT): 
 
Return on Assets (Net 
Profit/Total Assets): 
 
2006  
2007  
2008  
2009  
2010  
2011  
             
                                                           
        Variable No 5:  Government Ownership (GOVR):                               
Government Ownership  2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Yes       
No       
 
 
         Variable No 6:  Foreign Ownership (FORN):                               
Foreign Ownership 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Yes       
No       
 
               Variable No 7: Listing Status (LISTS): 
Listing Status 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Listed in LSM       
Unlisted in LSM       
 
 
C. Disclosure Scores: 
                                                   
 
1. Total Actual Score: 
2006  
2007  
2008  
2009  
2010  
2011  
302 
 
 
 
 
                                                   
 
 
2. Total Maximum 
Score: 
 
2006  
2007  
2008  
2009  
2010  
2011  
 
 
 
 
3. Relative Score (Total   
Actual Score ÷ Total 
Maximum Score): 
 
2006  
2007  
2008  
2009  
2010  
2011  
 
 
D. Voluntary Information Disclosure Items in Annual Reports: 
A. Background about the Commercial Bank/ 
General Information (11) 
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
A1.1 Brief narrative history of the bank              
A1.2 Description of bank Structure       
A1.3 Description of major services produced        
A1.4  The legal form of the bank         
A1.5 Address of Bank/telephone/fax                    
A1.6 Bank Website address                                            
A1.7 Email address       
A1.8 Date and details of establishment       
A1.9 General outlook of business activities       
A1.10 List of branches location       
A1.11 Information on branches/telephone/fax/ 
adders for correspondence 
      
B. Social Responsibility Information (4)  2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
B1.1 Sponsoring public health, sporting of 
recreational projects 
      
B1.2 Information on donations to charitable 
organisations 
      
B1.3 Supporting national pride/government.-       
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sponsored campaigns 
B1.4 Information on social banking 
activities/banking for the society 
      
C. Financial Ratios and Other Statistics 
Information (21) 
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
C1.1 Brief discussion of the ban ’s operating 
results     
      
C1.2  nalysis of ban ’s liquidity position           
C1.3 Return on assets       
C1.4 Return on equity       
C1.5 Liquidity ratios                                                               
C1.6 Earning per share          
C1.7 Capital adequacy ratios        
C1.8 Loan to deposit ratio       
C1.9 Total dividends       
C1.10 Dividends per share for the period       
C1.11 Breakdown of employees by geographic 
area 
      
C1.12 Categorise of employees by gender                                                
C1.13 Number of branches extension during 
the current fiscal year                                                 
      
C1.14 List of top five shareholders of the bank                       
C1.15 Financial statistics for more than two 
years      
      
C1.16 Comparative Income statement for 2 
years     
      
C1.17 Comparative balance sheet for 2 years                         
C1.18 Comparative current year and previous 
year figures 
      
C1.19 Disclosure half-yearly Balance Sheet 
statement         
      
C1.20 Disclosure half-yearly profit and loss 
account statement 
      
C1.21 Cash flow statement       
D. Accounting Policies (8) 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
D1.1 Accounting Valuation of fixed assets 
(e.g., fair value or historical cost) 
      
D1.2 The depreciation methods used       
D1.3 Foreign currency transactions, 
translation and differences treatment 
      
D1.4 Events after the balance sheet date       
D1.5 Disclosure of accounting standards uses 
for its accounts 
      
D1.6 Statements of compliance with approved 
IFRS/IASs 
      
D1.7 Treatment of Tax       
D1.8 Treatment of contingent liabilities.       
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E.  Corporate Governance Information (19) 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
E1.1 Chairman of the board identified                                                              
E1.2 List of board members       
E1.3 Disclosure information on board 
members’ qualifications and experience 
      
E1.4 Duties of board of members       
E1.5 List of senior managers (not on the 
board of members)/ senior management 
structure 
      
E1.6 Disclosure information on senior 
managers’ qualifications and experience                                                 
      
E1.7 Managers’ engagement/directorship of 
other companies 
      
E1.8 Picture of all senior managers/ board of 
members 
      
E1.9 Picture of chairperson       
E1.10 Information about changes in board 
members 
      
E1.11 Classification of managers as executive 
or outsider 
      
E1.12 Details of senior managers and board of 
members remuneration 
      
E1.13 Statement of percentage of total 
shareholder of 20 largest shareholders 
      
E1.14 A review of shareholders by type       
E1.15 Number of shares held by managers       
E1.16 Bank policy on employee training       
E1.17 Number of board of members meetings 
held and date 
      
E1.18 List of audit committee       
E1.19 Chairman’s statement       
Total  63 63 63 63 63 63 
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Appendix No. 3: Participant Information Sheet 
 
 Research Title: An Evaluation of Voluntary Disclosure in the Annual Reports of  
                             Commercial Banks: Empirical Evidence from Libya 
 
 
The principal aim of this research is to evaluate to what extent the Libyan listed and 
unlisted commercial banks provided voluntary information disclosure in their annual 
reports, between 2006 and 2011. The research is also intended to determine whether the 
extent of voluntary information disclosure is associated with commercial bank-specific 
characteristics (i.e. age, size, liquidity, government ownership, profitability, listing status, 
and auditor-type). 
 
Your participation in the study would be to take part in an interview where we discuss 
some issues related to current commercial banking financial reporting systems and 
disclosure practice, which are attached to this sheet. The interview will last approximately 
forty-five to ninety minutes depending on how much time you have available. I will record 
the interviews with your permission; and I will also collect your ban ’s audited annual 
reports for 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010 and 2011 on the interview day. All interview 
recordings will be destroyed after the data has been be analysed. The findings of this study 
will be utilised in my PhD thesis and also will be presented at academic conferences and in 
academic journals, although names and specific details will be removed to protect 
confidentiality 2 
 
If you have any questions or concerns about the interview, please contact me (Email: 
A.Hawashe@edu.salford.ac.uk).  
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Appendix No. 4:  Management Letter (The Interview Permission) 
 
The University of Salford                                                                         
School of the Built Environment  
 
To Directors of Accounting Department of-------------------- 
 
Dear Sir/Madam 
I am a lecturer at the University of Sebha, Faculty of Economics, currently carrying out 
Ph.D. research, at the University of Salford, Manchester, UK. The objective of the research 
is to evaluate the extent of voluntary information disclosure in annual reports of Libyan 
commercial banks. This project requires interviewing Libyan commercial banks annual 
reports preparers and collecting the annual reports for 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010 and 
2011.  
As you are responsible for preparing your commercial bank financial statements and 
annual reports, you have been chosen as one of the research sample to participate in an 
interview, because of your duty related with banking financial reporting and disclosures.  
 
I would be very grateful if you give me authorisation to conduct the interview at a time that 
is suitable for you, which should take no more than 90 minutes approximately. In addition, 
I would like to get a copy of your audited annual reports, from the year 2006 to the last 
issue, and if possible, supply me with these copies on the interview day. 
 
May I thank you in advance for your cooperation in this matter, and please be aware that 
all information provided will be treated with complete confidentially and will be used only 
for research purposes.  
 
Yours faithfully 
Abdallah AL-Mahdy Hawashe  
PhD Candidate  
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Appendix No. 5: The Semi-structure Interview Questions Guide 
 
Background Information :( Please provide the following information) 
 Commercial Bank name:  
  Year Establishment:  
  Ownership Structure:   
  Listing Status: 
  Name of participant: 
 
 
Part One:  About the Annual Financial Reporting and Mandatory Disclosure 
Practices in Libyan Commercial Banks: 
 
1- Could you please explain how your commercial bank prepares their annual financial 
statements and other annual external financial reports? 
 Did your commercial bank consider specific national accounting 
standards laid down in national regulations or legislations (e.g. the 
commercial code, banking law, the stock market law and government 
agencies, etc.) when preparing annual accounts and financial statements? 
 Did your commercial bank consider standards or disclosure requirements 
of international organisations (i.e. I Ss/IFRSs, the Basel Committee’s 
guidelines)? 
 Is there any legal disclosure requirement which should be considered by 
your commercial bank? If so, are these requirements set by your 
commercial bank management, internal accountants, or by the regulatory 
authorities? What is a minimum level of disclosure which must be 
disclosed by your bank?  
 What is the procedure that you followed in identifying the format and 
contents of the financial statements and other annual reports including 
content of notes of financial statements? 
 
2. What type of financial statements and other reports does your commercial bank publish 
annually to the public? (Profit and Loss Account, Balance Sheet, Cash Flow Statement, 
and other financial reports).  
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3. What is your view about the current state of financial reporting and disclosure practices 
in Libyan commercial banks?  Do you see the need for the development of the current 
financial reporting and disclosure practices? Why or why not? 
 
Part Two: Questions About Voluntary Information Disclosure: 
1. In your opinion, do you think there is any association between the extent of voluntary 
information disclosure in the annual reports of a commercial bank and its attributes 
such as size, liquidity, profitability, age, government ownership, foreign ownership, 
listing status… etc.? 
2. Are there any constraints or barriers that limit the amount of information you are 
prepared to voluntarily disclose in the annual reports to the general public? If so, 
please, explain.  
3. What advantages/ benefits do you believe that your commercial bank will achieve 
from disclosing additional information voluntarily in the annual reports to external 
stakeholders?  
4. To what extent do you think that information voluntarily disclosed by your 
commercial bank in its annual reports is useful or essential for economic decision-
making?   
5. In your view, do you think that the disclosure in the annual reports of a commercial 
bank needs to be sufficiently comprehensive to meet the needs of wide range of users? 
If so, please explain. 
6. Do you think that financial information and non-financial information voluntarily 
disclosed by your commercial ban  is useful to wide range of users such as ban ’s 
shareholders, government agencies, individual investors, institutional investors, stock 
mar et bro ers, researchers and other scholars, ban ’s employees, and general public? 
If so, please explain?  
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Appendix No. 6: Representative Offices of Foreign Banks in Libya 
Opening Date Approval Date Representative Office  No. 
16/8/9111 16/8/9111 Arab Banking Corporation –Bahrain 1  
25/4/9111 25/4 /9111 Arab Bank for Investment & Trade 2  
15/8/9111 18/6/9111 Housing Bank Of Jordan 3  
1/9/9111 18/4/9111 British Arab Commercial Bank 4  
9/09/9111 30/6/9111 Arab Investment Bank Of Jordan 5  
13/6/.222 26/8/9111 Italian Arab Bank/ UBAE 6  
24/1/.22. 27/8/.222 Bank Of Valletta  7  
30/10/.22. 8./12/9111 Suez Canal Bank  8  
21/7/.225 20/./.225 BAWAQ Bank – Austria  9 
15/2/.222 9./9./.225 Calyon Bank  10 
204/.222 22/10/.225 International Tunisian Bank  11 
1/6/.222 22/10/.225 Piraeus Bank / Egypt  12 
19/4/.221 31/10/.221 National Qatar Bank  13 
10/6/.221 14/9/.222 Bank HSBC  14 
12/9/.221 14/9/.222  (BIAT )International Arab Tunis Bank  15 
20/9/.221 14/3/.221 Societe Generale Bank* 16 
9/19/.221 14/9/.222 BNP PARIBAS Bank **  17 
9/9/.221 30/4/.221 Fransa Bank / Lebanon  18 
30/5/.221 17/6/.221 Wafa Bank / Morocco  19 
2././.221 11/5/.221 National Abu Dhabi Bank  20 
3/6/.221 13/8/.221 Commerz Bank / German  21 
10/6/.292 22/4/.221 Uni Bank 'Representative Office' Credit 22 
9/10/.292 29/12/.221 standard chartered Bank 'Representative Office' 23 
31/9/.299 15/7/.292 Al-Baraka Group / Bahrain  24 
* The representative office of Societe Generale Bank is frozen from 2009/07/01.  
** The representative office of (BNP PARIBAS) is frozen from 2010/01/01. 
Source: The third annual report of the Department of Bank Supervision and 
Monetary for the years 2010-2011. 
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Appendix No. 7: Graphical Examination of the Residuals 
 
 
Figure 1 compares the distribution of the model residuals (using Kernel density estimation; 
a histogram with narrow bins and a moving average) against a normal distribution. It is 
clear from Figure 1 that we may have some issues with a lack of normality in the residual 
errors. 
 
 
Figure 1: Comparing Kernel Density Estimates of the Model Residuals Against a 
Normal Distribution 
 
 
 
 
The concerns regarding normality of the residuals are confirmed using a standardised 
normal probability (P-P) plot which is sensitive to a lack of normality in the middle of the 
data (Figure 2), and by plotting the quantiles of the residual errors against the quantiles of a 
normal distribution (known as a Q-plot) which is sensitive to a lack of normality near the 
tails/extremes (Figure 3). 
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Figure 2: A Standardised Normal Probability (P-P) Plot of the  
Model Residuals 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: A Plot of the Residual Error Quantiles Against  
             the Quantiles of a Normal Distribution 
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